


A COMPANION TO HENRY OF GHENT



Edited by

GORDON A. WILSON

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A Companion to Henry of Ghent

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VOLUME 23

A Companion to Henry of Ghent

Edited by
Gordon A. Wilson



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PREFACE

There is no doubt that Henry of Ghent, who taught in the Theology Faculty at the university in Paris from approximately 1275 until his death in 1293 and thus bridged the gap between two towering figures of medieval thought, Thomas Aquinas who died in 1274 and John Duns Scotus who was just finishing his studies in the early to mid 1290s, is now appreciated as the most original and most influential philosopher of the last quarter of the thirteenth century. There are many historical reasons which have led to this high evaluation of Henry's thought, including more contemporary interest in the historical analysis of medieval texts, the appearance of modern critical editions of his works, the "modern" aspects of many of his theories, and, of course, his influence on his contemporaries and subsequent thinkers from the 14th century through the Renaissance and beyond. This *Companion to Henry of Ghent* is intended to introduce Henry and his thought to contemporary readers. The volume consists of six general sections, each of which is devoted to a specific topic or aspect of Henry's thought.

The volume begins with some historical considerations. The first article examines what is now known about Henry's authentic works and those works which are attributed to him with varying degrees of probability. Robert Wielockx, who has edited Henry's *Quodlibet II*¹ and who has carefully analyzed Godfrey of Fontaines's manuscripts which contain sections of Henry's authentic works,² then provides a detailed study of the events of 1277, including Henry's role in Stephan Tempier's Condemnation of March 7, 1277, and Henry's account of his own prior summons before Tempier and the papal legate, Simon de Brion. Jules Janssens, known for his work on medieval Muslim philosophers,³ contributed two

¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, ed. Robert Wielockx (Leuven, 1983).

² Andrea Auello—Robert Wielockx, "La versione del *Quodlibet IV*, qq. 7–8, di Enrico di Gand nel ms. Paris BnF lat. 16297," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, XIX (2008), pp. 371–499 and Andrea Auello—Robert Wielockx, *Godfredo di Fontaines Aspirante Baccelliere Sentenziario. Le Autografe 'Notule De Scientia Theologie' e la Cronologia del Ms. Paris BnF 16297*, CC Autographa Medii Aevi, VI (Turnhout, 2008).

³ See in particular his previous works concerning Henry of Ghent and both Averroes and Avicenna, namely Jules Janssens, "Henri de Gand: lecteur critique d'Averroès", held at the fourteenth annual symposium of the SIEPM at Geneva (Averroès, l'averroïsme, l'anti-averroïsme), October 2006 (forthcoming in the acts of the colloquium) and Jules

articles: one which examines the significant positive impact that Avicenna had on Henry of Ghent, and a second which carefully sorts out aspects of Averroes's positive influence on Henry from particular theories of Averroes which Henry found objectionable.

The second general section of this volume treats Henry's theology. Henry was, after all, a secular priest who was regent master in the Theology Faculty at the university in Paris. Ludwig Hödl, who has edited Henry's *Tractatus super facto praelatorum et fratrum*⁴ as well as an important part of Henry's *Quaestiones ordinariae* (= *Summa*),⁵ presents in detail Henry's thought concerning God, Christology, and ecclesiology. Hödl correctly points out that Henry's theology contains crucial insights concerning creation, including the human being's place in it. Juan-Carlos Flores, the author of a book on Henry's understanding of the Trinity,⁶ provides an analysis of Henry's understanding of the Trinity. Henry's trinitarian theology is complex, because it not only entails highly nuanced metaphysical terms, but also is intertwined with Henry's understanding of the metaphysical category of relation and impacts Henry's theory of concept formation.

Martin Pickavé, whose book on Henry's metaphysics⁷ has added much to Henry of Ghent studies, has written two articles for the third section of the present work, namely the section devoted to Henry's metaphysics. In the first article he examines Henry's overall metaphysics, and specifically explains the reasons that metaphysics is primary in Henry's philosophy and that God is considered the *primum cognitum*. He also reviews the

Janssens, "Some Elements of Avicennian Influence on Henry of Ghent's Psychology", in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death*, ed. Willy Vanhamel, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy) Series I, vol. 15 (Leuven, 1996), pp. 155–169; art. repr. in Jules Janssens, *Ibn Sīnā and his Influence on the Arabic and Latin World*, (Variorum Collected Studies Series), CS 843 (Hampshire, 2006), XVI, pp. 155–169.

⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 31 (*Tractatus super facto praelatorum et fratrum*), ed. Ludwig Hödl—Mark Haverals, cum Introd. Hist. L. Hödl, (Leuven, 1989).

⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (= *Summa*), art. XLI–XLVI, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998).

⁶ Juan Carlos Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity*, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1) XXVI (Leuven, 2006). See also J.C. Flores, "Intellect and Will as Natural Principles: Connecting Theology, Metaphysics and Psychology in Henry of Ghent," in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. Guy Guldentops—Carlos Steel, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1) XXXI (Leuven, 2003), pp. 277–305.

⁷ Martin Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft: Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Leiden, 2007).

analogy of being; the principles, parts, and properties of being; and the nature and relationship of metaphysics and philosophical theology. In his second article, Pickavé analyzes three technical terms in Henry's thought, namely individuation, essence, and being.

The fourth section is dedicated to Henry's epistemology. Steven Marrone, who has treated Henry's epistemology in detail in two of his books,⁸ first examines Henry's overall epistemology, and clearly indicates both the Aristotelian and the Augustinian influences on Henry's theory of knowledge, particularly on Henry's understandings of illumination and the intelligible species. Bernd Goehring, who has studied the topic of concept formation in Henry's thought,⁹ contributes a detailed analysis of the *verbum mentis* in the thought of Henry of Ghent. In this piece Goehring examines a gradual refinement of Henry's account of concept formation and presents six features of a mental word in Henry's theory.

The fifth section concentrates on Henry's moral philosophy. Fr. Roland Teske, who has translated sections of Henry's *Summa* into English,¹⁰ contributes a piece on the relation of the human will and the human intellect. He presents a close reading of texts in which Henry maintains that the will is superior to the intellect—a theory which counters some of the claims of Thomas Aquinas. Mairalucrezia Leone, who has concentrated her studies on Henry's ethical theory,¹¹ provides a careful analysis of Henry's moral theory. She demonstrates that Henry created his own unique moral philosophy and that this ethical theory contains new and original traits in comparison to other writers of his day.

The last section contains two articles devoted to Henry's influence on subsequent thinkers. In the first, Tobias Hoffmann, who has written on the Franciscan, John Duns Scotus,¹² examines the influence that Henry

⁸ Steven Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985) and id., *The Light of thy Countenance. Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden, 2001).

⁹ Bernd Goehring, *Henry of Ghent on Cognition and Mental Representations*, Cornell University (diss.), 2006.

¹⁰ See in particular Roland Teske, *Henry of Ghent: Quodlibetal Questions on Free Will*. Translated from the Latin with Introduction and Notes. *Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation* 32 (Milwaukee, 1993).

¹¹ Mairalucrezia Leone, "Zum Status der Theologie bei Heinrich von Gent—Ist sie eine praktische oder eine theoretische Wissenschaft?", in *What is "Theology" in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th–15th Centuries), as reflected in their Self-Understanding* (Archa Verbi, Subsidia I), ed. Mikołaj Olszewski (Münster, 2007), pp. 195–224 and id., "The Theologian and the Contracts: Henry of Ghent and the *emptio-venditio redditum*", *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 75/1 (2008), pp. 137–160.

¹² Tobias Hoffman, *Creatura intellecta: Die Ideen und Possibilia bei Duns Scotus*

of Ghent had upon the metaphysics of Scotus. Specifically he reviews the analogy vs the univocity of being and the knowability of God, the subject of metaphysics, the metaphysical proof of God's existence, and being as a quidditative notion. Amos Edelheit, who has specialized in Renaissance philosophy,¹³ has written the final article for this volume in which he examines the influence of Henry on Pico della Mirandola. Edelheit identifies passages in Henry's *Summa* and *Quodlibeta*, both of which were in Pico's library, which were the sources for thirteen theses dedicated to Henry in Pico's 900 theses.

In attempting to provide this "introduction" to Henry and his thought there were certain historical (the events that and thinkers who influenced his thinking), theological (his Trinitarian thought, for example), and philosophical (metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical) issues which needed to be addressed. There was a wide range of topics which Henry addressed during his long career at the university in Paris. Because he treated such diverse issues and was influenced by various thinkers and influenced many subsequent authors, there are different types of articles in this volume: some are more historical and philological, others are more expository; and some are more philosophical, others are more theological. Each article, though, can be helpful to introduce the reader to Henry of Ghent in his historical circumstances and influences, as well as to his philosophical and theological thought.

The articles contained in this volume are intended to be an introduction to Henry's thought, and as an introduction the volume cannot be and is not exhaustive. One could easily point to important topics for which an article was not explicitly dedicated, e.g. Henry's arguments for God's existence, Henry's analysis of relation, Henry's dymorphic theory of the number of human substantial forms, Henry's notion of human rights, Henry's treatment of skepticism, Henry's Augustinianism, Henry and Thomas Aquinas, Henry's influence on subsequent Carthusian thinkers, Henry's

mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius (Münster, 2002); id., "The *Quaestiones De anima* and the Genesis of Duns Scotus's Doctrine of Univocity of Being", in *Soul and Mind: Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. Jean-Michel Counet and Russell Friedman (Leuven, forthcoming); id., "Duns Scotus on the Origin of the Possibles in the Divine Intellect", in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch (Leiden, 2009), pp. 359–379.

¹³ See, for example, Amos Edelheit, "The 'Scholastic' Theology of Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola: Between Biblical Faith and Academic Skepticism" *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* LXXIV/2 (2007), pp. 523–570.

thought as taught by the Servites in the 1600s, Henry of Ghent as Canon Lawyer, etc. The volume was necessarily selective and is a beginning, and in these articles there will be themes implicitly and explicitly mentioned for further study. For those already familiar with Henry and his ideas, Henry and his thought are already known for their originality and their influence. P. Coffee's assessment of Henry nearly a century ago, remarkable as it was then, is still accurate: "Henry's writings reflect much deep and searching thought on the perennial problems of philosophy and religion. There perusal will persuade the impartial inquirer that much of our *modern* knowledge about these matters is *medieval*."¹⁴

Our gratitude is extended to W. Duba and O. Riborty for their English translation of the original German version of L. Hödl's article in this volume.

Gordon A. Wilson

¹⁴ P. Coffee, "Henry of Ghent" *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. VII, (New York, 1913), p. 235.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

HENRY OF GHENT'S WRITTEN LEGACY

GORDON A. WILSON

Henry of Ghent, a secular master in Paris, was a member of the Theology Faculty in Paris by 1275 or 1276.¹ Until his death in 1293 he wrote prolifically. Although he taught in the Faculty of Arts before he joined the Theology Faculty, few, if any, of his works from this earlier period of his career have survived. What has survived and what is known with a higher degree of certitude are works that are connected with his activities in the Theology Faculty. Henry's works can be categorized differently. For example, one could divide his works into those which have been printed (both in Renaissance editions and in more contemporary efforts, including the *Opera omnia* series which is currently being published under the auspices of the K.U. Leuven) and those which have remained unedited.² Perhaps a more useful division for the sake of this study is to divide his works into those known with certainty to be his (among which are his fifteen *Quodlibeta*, his *Quaestiones ordinariae* (= *Summa*), the *Tractatus super facto praelatorum et fratrum*, and some sermons) and those works which are attributed to him in some manner, but whose authenticities have varying degrees of probability.

¹ For an excellent analysis of the known biographical details of Henry's life, see Pasquale Porro, "An Historical Image of Henry of Ghent" *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death* (1293) ed. Willy Vanhamel (Leuven, 1996), pp. 373–403, and especially p. 375, n. 7 for earlier secondary studies devoted to his biography; see also P. Porro's earlier work, *Enrico di Gand. La via delle proposizioni universali* (Bari, 1990), pp. 143–173 and Raymond Macken, *Henri de Gand (†1293) maître en théologie à l'Université de Paris, archidiacre de l'évêché de Tournai, Dates et Documents* (Leuven, 2002). For information on Henry's career as archdeacon of Tournai, see Jacques Pycke, *Le Chapitre Cathédral Notre-Dame de Tournai de la fin du XI^e à la fin du XIII^e siècle. Son organisation, sa vie, ses membres*, Recueil de Travaux d'Histoire et de Philologie, 6^e série, fasc. 30 (Brussels, 1986), pp. 260; 317–318; Id. *Répertoire biographique des chanoines de Notre-Dame de Tournai, 1080–1300*, Recueil de Travaux d'Histoire et de Philologie, 6^e série, fasc. 35 (Brussels, 1988), pp. 48–52; 390–391.

² For the unedited works of Henry, see R. Macken, "The *Inedita* of Henry of Ghent Rediscovered" *Essays on Henry of Ghent* (Leuven, 1994), pp. 7–22.

Henry's two monumental works, his *Quodlibeta* and his *Quaestiones ordinariae* (= *Summa*) are two very different genres of literature. The 15 *Quodlibeta* arose from public disputations held in Paris during the Lent and Advent seasons. These public disputations originated in an oral session during which questions were posed by those attending. Because these questions could be on anything whatsoever, the topics could range from theology and philosophy to physics, psychology, mathematics, and canon law. Because the questions were posed by a public audience, the master did not control what questions would be asked. However, it is entirely possible that a student of a master might ask a sympathetic question which would allow his teacher to elaborate his most recent reflections on a topic which the master might like to address. Although a master had little control over which questions were raised, he did have a responsibility to organize the material, if and when he prepared his oral responses into a written text for distribution. In Henry's case he typically organized the material into matters pertaining to God and then into matters pertaining to creatures, and each of these two general divisions had further subdivisions.³

There are identifiable stages to a *Quodlibet*, and Henry's *Quodlibeta* are fine examples of these stages. First, there is a twofold oral stage: a first public meeting during which questions would be posed, and the second meeting, usually a few days later when the master would orally "determine" the questions. Second, there could be a written stage. Once the public oral dispute took place, some masters would take the material which they prepared for the oral stage and expand the treatment into a more elaborate and developed written response.⁴ The third and final stage was what might be called today as the publication stage, that is,

³ P. Porro, "Doing Theology and Philosophy in the First Person: Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibeta*," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden, 2006), pp. 215–231.

⁴ Palémon Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320* Bibliothèque Thomiste, 5 (Le Saulchoir-Kain, 1925), pp. 17–20; Amédée Teetaert, "La littérature quodlibétique" *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 14 (1937), pp. 79–83; Antoine Dondaine, *Secrétaires de Saint Thomas*, (Rome, 1956), pp. 132–133 and p. 212; Leonard Boyle, "The Quodlibets of St. Thomas and Pastoral Care," *The Thomist* 38 (1974), pp. 233–235; John Wippel, "Quodlibetal Questions Chiefly in Theology Faculties," in *Les Questions disputées et les Questions quodlibétiques dans les Facultés de Théologie, de Droit et de Médecine*, ed. Bernardo Bazán, John Wippel, Gérard Fransen, et al., Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental 44–45 (Turnhout, 1985), pp. 159–162; and P. Porro, "Doing Theology and Philosophy," p. 177.

the stage during which the written text was made available to masters and students.⁵ In Henry's case at the university of Paris, the university prepared an exemplar, divided into *pecia*, for the *stationarius* to distribute to students and scholars for them to make their own copies.⁶ So if one asks about the date of any *Quodlibet*, one must be careful to specify whether one is inquiring about when the question was first determined, when it was written, and when it was distributed and made available to a wide audience.

Participation in a quodlibetal disputation by a master was voluntary. Henry of Ghent did apparently participate nearly yearly in each of the approximate 15 years he flourished in the Theology Faculty.⁷ As a result, in Henry's case there are 15 *Quodlibeta* which were given roughly once each year. The dates of each of the *Quodlibeta* were first studied by

⁵ J. Wippel, "Quodlibetal Questions," pp. 185–186 and Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I–V, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. xxi.

⁶ For the distribution of Henry's *Quodlibeta* via a university exemplar divided into *pecia*, see the critical studies which precede the Latin texts in the Leuven series. For lists of the *pecia* transitions in Henry's *Quodlibeta* see R. Macken, "Les *Quodlibets* d'Henri de Gand et leur *exemplar* parisien," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 37 (1970), pp. 75–96; R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo*, II. *Catalogue Q–Z. Répertoire*, (Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, II), (Leuven–Leiden, 1979), pp. 976–1013; P. Porro, "Nuove indicazioni di *peciae* nel ms. Vat. *Borgh.* 300 rilevabili con l'ausilio della luce ultravioletta," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 31 (1989), pp. 147–149; G. Wilson, "Previous Unnoticed Indications of '*pecia*' Transitions in Manuscripts of Henry of Ghent, '*Quodlibeta*,'" *Manuscripta*, 33 (1989), pp. 227–231; and the critical studies at the front of volumes published in the Leuven series. For the existence of a second Parisian exemplar which probably replaced the first exemplar, see R. Macken, "Un deuxième exemplar des *Quodlibets* d'Henri de Gand," in *Miscellanea Codicologica F. Masai dicata*, ed. Pierre Cockshaw et Monique-Cécile Garand, Les Publications de Scriptorium, VIII (Ghent, 1979), II, pp. 301–307, as well as the critical studies which precede the volumes of Henry's *Quodlibeta* edited in the Leuven series. For the gradual improvement of the text of the second exemplar, see G. Wilson "Preliminary Indications of a Historical Development of a Historical Development in the Second Parisian Exemplar of Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet* VI," *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, (Villanova, Pennsylvania, 1981), pp. 135–143, and G. Wilson and Jennifer M. Gray, "The Historical Development of the Second Parisian University Exemplar of Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet* IV," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 50 (Notre Dame, Indiana, 2008), pp. 154–174.

⁷ It is possible that Henry's *Quodlibet* II and *Quodlibet* III were delivered during the same year. The *pecia* indications suggest that they were distributed together. For a discussion of this possibility, see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXV–XL, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1994), pp. xxiv–xxv; R. Macken, "Les *Quodlibets* d'Henri de Gand et leur *exemplar* parisien," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 37 (1970), p. 82; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* II, ed. Robert Wielockx, (Leuven, 1983) pp. xviii–xx, and J. Wippel, "Quodlibetal Questions," p. 186, n. 81.

Glorieux,⁸ and subsequently refined by Paulus,⁹ Hocedez,¹⁰ Lottin,¹¹ San Cristóbal-Sebastián,¹² and Gómez-Caffarena.¹³ The consensus of contemporary scholars, for example R. Macken¹⁴ and P. Porro,¹⁵ for the approximate dates of the *Quodlibeta* is:

<i>Quodlibet I</i>	Advent of 1276
<i>Quodlibet II</i>	Advent of 1277
<i>Quodlibet III</i>	Lent of 1278
<i>Quodlibet IV</i>	Advent of 1279 or Lent of 1280
<i>Quodlibet V</i>	Advent of 1280 or Lent of 1281
<i>Quodlibet VI</i>	Advent of 1281 or Lent of 1282
<i>Quodlibet VII</i>	Advent of 1282
<i>Quodlibet VIII</i>	Advent of 1284
<i>Quodlibet IX</i>	Lent of 1286
<i>Quodlibet X</i>	Advent of 1286
<i>Quodlibet XI</i>	Advent of 1287
<i>Quodlibet XII</i>	Advent of 1288
<i>Quodlibet XIII</i>	Lent of 1289
<i>Quodlibet XIV</i>	Advent of 1290
<i>Quodlibet XV</i>	Advent of 1291

The first printed edition of Henry's *Quodlibeta* was a 1518 printing by Badius,¹⁶ and this text was the basis for a subsequent printing by Zucolius in 1608¹⁷ and a reprinting of this text a few years later in 1613.¹⁸

⁸ P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, pp. 87–95.

⁹ Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* Etudes de philosophie médiévale, 25 (Paris, 1938), p. xv, n. 1.

¹⁰ Edgar Hocedez, "Henri de Gand, Gilles de Lessines et Gilles de Rome, [= Henri et Les Deux Gilles]," appendix 7, in E. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton. Sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine* Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense: Etudes et document, VII, (Louvain, 1925), p. 473.

¹¹ Odon Lottin, "Le libre arbitre chez Godefried de Fontaines," *Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie* 40 (1937) (pp. 214–241), p. 217, n. 15; see also Id., *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* 2nd ed. (Gembloux, 1957), I, pp. 307–308, n. 4.

¹² Antonio San Cristóbal-Sebastián, *Controversias acerca de la voluntad desde 1270 a 1300* (Madrid 1958), p. 110.

¹³ José Gómez-Caffarena, "Cronologia de la *Suma* de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus *Quodlibetos*," *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), pp. 116–133.

¹⁴ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, p. xvii.

¹⁵ P. Porro, "Doing Theology and Philosophy," pp. 174–179.

¹⁶ *Quodlibeta* Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo, Doctoris Solemnis, Socii Sorbonici et Archidiaconi Tornacensis, cum duplici tabella. Vaenumdantur ab Iodoco Badio Ascensio, Parsiis 1518 [2 volumes; reprint: Bibliothèque S.J., Leuven 1961].

¹⁷ Magistri Henrici a Gandavo, Doctoris acutissimi et celeberrimi, Archidiaconi Tornacensis, *Aurea Quodlibeta*, hac postrema editione commentarii doctissimis illustrata M. Vitalis Zuccolii Patavini. Apud Marcum Claserium, Venetiis 1608 [2 volumes].

¹⁸ Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo, Doctoris Solemnis, Socii Sorbonici, Ordinis

Although one can find a list of the questions in Henry's *Quodlibeta* in some of the manuscripts and in these early Renaissance editions, the most handy list for contemporary readers can be found in R. Macken's *Bibliotheca manuscripta*¹⁹ The printing by Badius has served as the standard text for nearly 500 years, but recently the DeWulf-Mansion Center of Higher Institute of Philosophy at the K.U. Leuven has undertaken the ambitious task of producing critical editions of Henry's complete works and a number of Henry's *Quodlibeta* have already appeared in this series.²⁰

The manuscript evidence confirms that these 15 *Quodlibeta* are by Henry of Ghent.²¹ In addition to the codicological evidence, in *Quodlibet VII* the author refers to himself by name as "Henry."²² There are references in later *Quodlibeta* to earlier *Quodlibeta*,²³ and there are references in Henry's *Quaestiones ordinariae* (= *Summa*) to his *Quodlibeta*, and vice versa.²⁴

Because of the nature of Quodlibetic literature, the questions one finds determined in them bear a resemblance to professional journals of today. *Quodlibeta* dealt with the pressing issues of the day, and in them one can obtain an insight into the most current debates of the day. For example, in Henry's *Quodlibeta* he repeatedly treated the philosophical problem of the number of human substantial forms. *Quodlibet I* q. 4 concerns whether the dead body of Christ in the tomb, once the soul of Christ had departed, had any other substantial form by which the

Servorum B.M.V. et Archidiaconi Tornacensis, *Aurea Quodlibeta*, hac postrema editione commentariis doctissimis illustrata M. Vitalis Zuccolii Patavini. Apud Iacobum de Franciscis, Venetiis 1613 [2 volumes].

¹⁹ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, pp. 952–974. A list of the questions in Henry's *Quodlibeta* can also be found in P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, pp. 177–199.

²⁰ At the time of this article, *Quodlibets* I, II, VI, VII, IX, X, XII, XIII, and XV have been published in the Leuven series. Until additional volumes appear as critical texts in the Leuven series, one must use the Badius edition.

²¹ P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, pp. 87–95.

²² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VII*, q. 23, ed. G. Wilson, (Leuven, 1991), pp. 160, 26–161, 30: "Propter primum autem membrum proposita est principaliter ista quaestio, puta si episcopus meus dicat mihi; 'Henrice, propter devotionem quam populus meae dioecesis habet erga te et fructum quem potest acquirere tibi confitendo, concedimus tibi plenam auctoritate nostra potestatem confessionem ipsius audiendi, absolvendi confitentes, atque iniungendi eis poenitentias salutare'; see also p. xxviii.

²³ See examples given by P. Glorieux (P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, pp. 87–95).

²⁴ J. Gómez-Caffarena, "Cronologia de la *Suma*," pp. 117–128.

body was informed,²⁵ a question similar to other quodlibetal questions by Thomas Aquinas²⁶ and Gerard of Abbeville.²⁷ In Henry's *Quodlibet II*, composed about a year after his first venture into Quodlibetic literature, a similar question is raised, but Henry is able to respond to this question in light of Stephan Tempier's Condemnation of 1277.²⁸ Subsequently, in his *Quodlibet III*, Henry again treats this issue, but the context is Giles of Rome's *Contra Gradus*.²⁹ About one year later, in *Quodlibet IV*, the issue is raised again, and here Henry deals with Giles of Lessines, who in his *Tractatus de unitate formae* had criticized Henry's own position on this issue.³⁰ And, in *Quodlibet X*, Henry again returns to the same question, but the context is John Peckham's Condemnation of 1286.³¹ The *Quodlibeta* provided Henry an opportunity to respond immediately to his critics, and as a result one finds in them Henry addressing the most recent theories and critiques advocated by his contemporaries.

Furthermore, one can find in Henry's *Quodlibeta* subtle refinements and developments in his own thought. In the above example of the number of human substantial forms, Henry writes in *Quodlibet I* of two possible "solutions" to the identity of the dead body of Christ in the tomb. One solution is essentially a position maintained by Giles of Rome, a defender of Thomas Aquinas's unicity theory. Giles in his *Theoremata de corpore Christi* maintained that there was but one substantial form

²⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 4, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1979), pp. 13–22: "Utrum corpus Christi in sepulcro, separata anima ab eo, habuit aliquam formam substantialem superinductam."

²⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 9: "Utrum anima perficiat corpus immediate vel mediante corporeitate."

²⁷ Gerard of Abbeville, *Quodlibet. XIV*, q. 7: "Utrum anima secundum totam substantiam suam sit forma corporis" (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16406, fols. 99–104v).

²⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 5, 8, et 9, ed. R. Wielockx, pp. 28, 18–29, 20; 45, 39–46; 58, 11–12; 61, 75–79; 63, 25; 66, 6–67, 20; and 68, 45–55; see also P. Porro, "Doing Theology and Philosophy," pp. 206–208.

²⁹ Giles of Rome, *Egidii Romani in libros de physico auditu Aristotelis commentaria. Eiusdem quaestio de gradibus formarum* (Venetiis: 1502)—hereafter noted as "*Contra Gradus*"; see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 6 ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 55^{H-I} and q. 8 ed. Badius, fol. 57^{A-B}; see also E. Hocedez, "Henri de Gand," pp. 473 and G. Wilson, "Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet III*: A Response to Giles of Rome's *Contra Gradus*" *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, 3 (1978), pp. 77–84.

³⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 13 ed. Badius, fol. 106^{VX}; see also E. Hocedez, "Henri de Gand," p. 456, note 2.

³¹ G. Wilson, "Henry of Ghent and John Peckham's Condemnation of 1286," in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. G. Guldentops—C. Steel (Leuven, 2003), pp. 261–276.

of human beings, the rational soul, and that the dead body of Christ in the tomb was without a substantial form, but somehow it was determined only by quantitative dimensions.³² The second solution that Henry treats in *Quodlibet I* is that there is some substantial form other than the rational soul, a form of corporeity, which remains informing the body once the soul of Christ departs.³³ Shortly after this was written, Henry was called before Simon de Brion, then papal legate, and Stephan Tempier.³⁴ In his *Quodlibet II*, Henry defended the second position, namely a substantial dymorphism, and is critical of the very version of the unicity theory which he examined in detail in *Quodlibet I*. He wrote that in treating both positions, it was his intention not to endorse either, but simply to examine both.³⁵ In *Quodlibet III* Henry returns to the same

³² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 4, ed. R. Macken, p. 19, 49–52: “Aut si ponere velimus quod anima immediate perficit materiam, nec sit ponere gradus formarum in ea, dicemus quod in corpore Christi, anima separata, remansit materia nuda ab omni forma substantiali, solis dimensionibus quantitatis determinata.” The position that there is but one substantial form of a human being one can find in Thomas Aquinas, but the notion that a body uninformed by any substantial form is extended in three dimensions and derivatively in the category of substance is unique to Giles of Rome. See Gordon Wilson, “Human Generation According to Henry of Ghent,” *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, 9 (1984), p. 65, n. 8; see Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi*, in *Aegidii Romani Quodlibeta* (Bologna 1481).

³³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 4, ed. R. Macken, p. 18, 41–44: “Aut igitur ponemus quod anima non immediate perficit materiam, sed sit aliqua forma substantialitatis aut corporeitatis et etiam forte alicuius commixtionis, media inter animam et materiam, in materia, quae manet in ea, anima separata . . .”

³⁴ See Roger Marston, *Quodlibet I*, q. 11, ed. Girard F. Etzkorn et al. (Quaracchi, 1968) (Assisi, Bibl. Commun. 118, fol. 134^b: “Hanc igitur opinionem [de unitate formae] tenere non audeo, cum sit contraria philosophicis et theologicis documentis, propter quod retracta fuit Parisius solemniter a magistro Henrico de Gandavo et a magistro Adenulpho, sicut aliqui hic praesentes propriis auribus audierunt”). See also Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 127, app. crit., lin. 60–80; Roberto Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes* (Louvain, 1951), pp. 491–492; Angelus Walz, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain, 1963), pp. 156–158; Ludwig Hödl, “Neue Nachrichten über die Pariser Verurteilungen der thomasischen Formlehre,” *Scholastik* (1964), pp. 178–196; and G. Wilson, “Human Generation,” p. 60. See also the articles by R. Wielockx and L. Hödl in this volume.

³⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 11, 52–75: “Quaestio ista proposita erat, ut credo, propter determinationem habitam in anno praecedenti circa illam quaestionem ‘Utrum in corpus Christi in sepulcro, anima separata ab eo, aliqua forma nova, qua informabatur, fuit introducta.’ . . . Ostensum etiam fuit ibidem quomodo magis congruebat fidei et dignitati Christi uterque horum duorum modorum ponendi: aut quod, separata anima a corpore Christi, remansit pura materia eius sine omni forma substantiali, secundum negantes gradus formarum in homine aut quod remansit in materia aliqua forma media inter animam rationalem et materiam, secundum ponentes gradus formarum in homine. Quis tamen horum modorum sustinendus esset

topic and provides a clear response to specific arguments in Giles of Rome's *Contra Gradus*.³⁶ There Giles argued, for example, that proponents of a dymorphic theory maintain that "when the sensitive arrives in the embryo of man, the vegetative ceases, and when the intellectual arrives the sensitive leaves, such that there is no generation without corruption nor vice versa."³⁷ Henry, aware of Giles's criticism, is quick to note that for proponents of the dymorphic theory, there are two possible positions that could be taken concerning the succession of forms: one which is as Giles described, but the second possibility is that the vegetative and sensitive forms are infused with the rational soul.³⁸ Up to and including *Quodlibet III*, the issues with which Henry had dealt concerning the number of human substantial forms had been primarily theological issues associated with the identity of the dead body of Christ in the tomb and transubstantiation at the Eucharist. In *Quodlibet IV*, q. 13, Henry revisits this issue again, and this time he provides extensive critiques of both the unicity theory, especially as formulated by Giles of Lessines in his tract *De unitate formae*, and the pluralist

secundum veritatem fidei, non determinavi. Utrumque enim horum modorum exposui, sed neutrum sustinui, quia hoc non pertinebat ad illam quaestionem. Exposui tamen magis modum ponendi, anima separata, materiam manere nudam, quia obscurior erat. Non tamen omnino fuit intentionis meae ipsum asserere, licet hoc aliquibus videbatur, quia prolixius in eo proseguendo immoratus fui. Sed aspicienti scriptum patet clare quod neutrum illorum modorum sustinui, sed solummodo utrumque ipsorum exposui suo modo."

³⁶ G. Wilson, "Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet III*," pp. 77–84; E. Hocedez, "Henri de Gand," pp. 459–460.

³⁷ Giles of Rome, *Contra Gradus* (Venetiis: 1502), fol. 215: "In embryone hominis adveniente sensitivo, cedit vegetativum, et adveniente intellectivo cedit sensitivum. Ita quod non est generatio absque corruptione nec e converso".

³⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 6, ed. Badius, fol. 54^a: "Nos qui necesse habemus ponere quod anima intellectiva est forma et actus corporis, ut in quadam quaestione dicetur inferius et quod propter animam intellectivam sit alia forma in homine educta de potentia materiae, ut forma mixti, quae stat in forma carnis et ossis, sicut determinatum est in quibusdam aliis quaestionibus de Quolibet; sumus inter duo Auctoritas scripturae hoc exprimit, ut videtur, cum dicit Genesis II 'Formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae' hoc quoad corpus et sequitur quoad anima 'Et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae' per quod, ut videtur, insinuat quod in illa inspiratione recepit omnem actum vitae." See E. Hocedez, "Henri de Gand," pp. 467–472; Paul Bayerschmidt, "Die Seins- und Formmetaphysik des Heinrich von Gent in ihrer Anwendung auf die Christologie. Eine Philosophie- und Dogmengeschichtliche Studie," in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, 36, Hft. 3–4 (Münster i. W., 1941), pp. 259–260; G. Wilson, "Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet III*," pp. 77–84; and Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, ed. R. Wielockx, pp. xiv–xv, n. 8.

theory. The question allowed Henry to elaborate in the most comprehensive way his own dymorphic theory, and to the theological issues which he had discussed in his previous *Quodlibeta* he now adds what he himself described as an *a priori* argument, namely one based upon human generation: since there are two agents involved in the production of a human being, a supernatural agent, God, and the natural agents, the human parents, there must be proper ends for each action.³⁹ God produces the rational soul, and the natural agents, namely the human parents, produce a proper terminus, namely the substantial form of corporeity.⁴⁰ Henry's point, expressed as a criticism of the unicity theory, is that if there is but one substantial form of a human being, the rational soul, which is infused *ab extra* by God, and prime matter is ingenerable (according to Aristotle),⁴¹ human parents seem to be producing nothing substantial to their offspring.

Because the questions in the *Quodlibeta* of Henry were raised by a public audience over a nearly fifteen year period, it is not surprising to find that historical events prompted some of the questions and that the *Quodlibeta* contain valuable references to historical events and dates.⁴² For example, in *Quodlibet II* Henry makes reference to specific articles in Stephan Tempier's March 7, 1277 condemnation (but no such specific references are in *Quodlibet I*).⁴³ In this *Quodlibet* Henry even remarks that he was on the commission of theologians assembled by Tempier to investigate these matters.⁴⁴ In *Quodlibet IV*, Henry refers to Tempier as "quondam" bishop of Paris, an indication that Tempier was no longer alive.⁴⁵ In *Quodlibet VII*, Henry is aware of and writes about Pope Martin IV's Bull "Ad fructus urberes," Ranulphe d'Homblières's consultation

³⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 13, ed. Badius, fol. 109^{rG}: "Sunt ergo diversa agentia et diversis mutationibus, ergo impossibile est terminum actionum eorum esse unum et eundem numero ..."

⁴⁰ Ibid: "Et sic sequitur necessario quod ad minus duae sint formae substantiales in homine: una educta in potentia materiae per agens naturale, altera vero producta ab extra per agens supernaturale."

⁴¹ Arist., *Physics I*, 9 (192a 27).

⁴² P. Porro, "Doing Theology and Philosophy," pp. 209–210.

⁴³ P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, pp. 89–90.

⁴⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 67, 21–24: "In hoc enim concordabant omnes magistri theologiae congregati super hoc, quorum ego eram unus, unanimiter concedentes quod substantia angeli non est ratio angelum esse in loco secundum substantiam."

⁴⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 15, ed. Badius, fol. 128^{rL}: "Et propter illam eandem rationem qua in formis specialissimis substantiae non est secundum eos magis vel

of masters in theology in November 1282 concerning the privileges of the friars granted in this papal bull, and another Parisian meeting concerning these same privileges.⁴⁶ In *Quodlibet IX*, q. 12, he wrote concerning events surrounding the death of King Phillip II, who died on Oct. 5, 1285;⁴⁷ in *Quodlibet XIV*, q. 15 he is aware of the miracle of Billettes;⁴⁸ and in *Quodlibet XV* he provides one of the earliest written references to the fall of Acre.⁴⁹

The *Quodlibeta* and the dating of them have become the Rosetta stone for unlocking the dating of articles in Henry's *Quaestiones ordinariae* (= *Summa*), because both works were written over approximately the same time span. Because there are references in the *Quaestiones ordinariae* (= *Summa*) to the *Quodlibeta*, and vice versa, scholars like Gómez-Cafferena, have been able to reconstruct the approximate dates of certain articles in the *Summa*.⁵⁰ For example, there are times in Henry's *Quodlibeta* when he writes that he already treated a certain issue in his ordinary questions, and when these questions can be identified with certitude, one can reasonably conclude that these questions in the *Summa* had already

minus nisi in forma humana vel anima rationali, iuxta hoc quod determinavit quondam episcopus Parisiensis cuius sententiae non contradico". See P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, p. 91 for a similar comment concerning *Quodlibet V*.

⁴⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VII*, q. 24, ed. G. Wilson, p. 152,2-4: "... ideo nuper plures ex magistris nostris ad hoc satis probabiliter attendentes, iudicaverunt illud erroneum" et p. 177, 70-73: "... quemadmodum nuper super eadem quaestione a coetu plurimorum episcoporum, utpote 13, quorum duo errant archiepiscopi, petum fuit a collegiis magistrorum regentium Parisius in facultatibus theologiae et decretorum, quid ipsi sentirent"; see Heinrich Denifle-Emile Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, I, (Paris, 1889), p. 595; P. Glorieux, "Prélats français contre religieux mendiants. Autour de la bulle 'Ad fructus uberes' (1281-1290)," *Revue d'histoire de l'Eglise de France*, XI, (1925), pp. 316-320; P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, pp. 90-91; Gaines Post, "A Petition relating to the Bull 'Ad fructus uberes,'" *Speculum*, 11 (1936), p. 232; Decima L. Douie, *The Conflict Between the Seculars and the Mendicants at the University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century* (London, 1954), pp. 26-27.

⁴⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 12, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1983), pp. 225,6-240,48; see also P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, p. 91.

⁴⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XIV*, q. 15, ed. Badius, fols. 556^{vA}-560^{vD}; P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, p. 93.

⁴⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XV*, q. 16, ed. G. Etzkorn et G. Wilson (Leuven, 2007), pp. 154,5-155,10: "Ubi fugiens bene facit vitam suam salvans, male facit in hostes ruens ut occidatur; sed nuper Sarracenis hostibus Christianorum devastatis civitatem Acconensem, bene fecerunt qui fugerunt vitam suam salvantes; ergo miles ille, qui aliis fugientibus in exercitum Sarracenorum irruiat praevolens et occisus est, male fecit."

⁵⁰ J. Gómez-Cafferena, "Cronología de la *Suma* de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus *Quodlibetos*," *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), p. 133.

been composed by the time of the particular *Quodlibet*.⁵¹ Similarly there are times when Henry writes in his *Quodlibeta* that he needs to treat a certain issue in his ordinary lectures, and when these articles and/or questions are identified, one can assume that their composition had not been finalized by the time Henry in a particular quodlibetic question anticipated a future discussion in his *Summa*.

Because *Quodlibeta* are a specific genre of literature and because Henry's *Quodlibeta* spanned nearly fifteen years, it is difficult at times to understand Henry's thought. Even the subtle Doctor, John Duns Scotus, lamented how difficult it was to determine some of Henry's definitive philosophical positions.⁵² Anyone attempting to grasp Henry's philosophical ideas will be challenged by his fifteen *Quodlibeta*, in part because the scholar will need to examine multiple questions in various *Quodlibeta*, and sometimes unearth relevant comments from questions whose titles may not always indicate that Henry is addressing directly or indirectly the philosophical issue the scholar is pursuing. With patience, though, the wealth of information in Henry's *Quodlibeta* is worth the effort, and one can appreciate the evaluation by M. Grabmann that Henry's *Quodlibeta* are the most valuable scholastic *Quodlibeta*.⁵³

The second major, certainly authentic work by Henry is his *Quaestiones ordinariae* (= *Summa*).⁵⁴ Henry's *Summa*, always referred to by Henry in his other works as his "ordinary questions,"⁵⁵ is a different literary type than his *Quodlibeta*. In Henry's case the *Summa* was based upon the ordinary lectures that Henry delivered to his classes in the theology faculty in Paris. For it, unlike for his *Quodlibeta*, Henry was in control of the questions. It was Henry himself who formulated the questions, arranged the questions into articles, and organized the articles into a well constructed whole.

⁵¹ See for example, Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXV–XL, ed. G. Wilson, pp. xx–xxi.

⁵² John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 1, q. 5 ed. Vatic., VII, p. 61, 1–3, n. 183: "Sic igitur diversimode loquitur [i.e. Henricus] de hac materia in diversis locis; et qui magis laboraverit ad intelligendum eum, in fine erit magis incertus".

⁵³ Martin Grabmann, "Bernhard von Auvergne, O.P. († nach 1304), ein Interpret und Verteidiger des hl. Thomas von Aquin aus alter Zeit," *Divus Thomas* (Fr.), 10 (1932), p. 34: "Die Quodlibeta des Doctor solemnus, wohl das wertvollste Quodlibetalienwerk des Scholastik ...".

⁵⁴ See the excellent study of Henry's *Summa* by L. Hödl in the Introduction to Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXI–XXXIV, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1991), pp. xi–xxxiv.

⁵⁵ See R. Macken's comment in Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, ed. R. Macken, p. xxi.

The *Summa* of Henry was first printed by Badius in 1520.⁵⁶ This was followed by a 1646 edition by Scarparius.⁵⁷ Although both Renaissance editions contain a list of articles and questions, the most accessible list of articles and questions for the contemporary reader can be found in R. Macken's *Bibliotheca manuscripta* . . .⁵⁸ Some of the articles of Henry's *Summa* have been critically edited and have been published in the Leuven series of his *Opera omnia*.⁵⁹

There are at least three identifiable stages in the transmission of Henry's *Summa*. The first was an oral stage, when Henry delivered his lectures, presumably from some kind of written notes or abbreviated text. The second was when Henry prepared a written text for the university.⁶⁰ And the third was when the university prepared an exemplar divided into *pecia* for distribution to scholars and students.⁶¹ Furthermore, it is highly

⁵⁶ Henricus de Gandavo, *Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum theologi recepto praeconio Solennis Henrici A Gandavo, cum duplici repertorio, Tomos Prior, Posterior*. Venumda[n]tur in ædibus Iodoci Badii Ascensii, cum Priuilegio Regio ad calcem explicando. Paris, in f^o, 2 vols., 1520. A reproduction by the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure, through the efforts of E. Buytaert, O.F.M., is perhaps the volume most readily available in libraries today: Henry of Ghent, *Summa[e] Quaestionum Ordinariarum* (Reprint of the 1520 Edition), 2 vol., The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953.

⁵⁷ Henricus de Gandavo, *Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo, ordinis Servorum B.M.V., Doctoris Solemnis, socii Sorbonici, Archidiaconi Tornacensis, Summa in tres partes digesta*, . . . , opera et studio A.R.P.M. Hieronymi Scarparii . . . , Ferrariæ, apud Franciscum Succium, 1646.

⁵⁸ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, pp. 1021–1042.

⁵⁹ At the time of this publication, the following articles have appeared in the *Opera omnia* series: articles 1–5, articles 30–34; articles 35–40; articles 41–44, and articles 45–52.

⁶⁰ L. Hödl, "Der Projektband der kritischen Edition der *Summa* des Heinrich von Gent," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 64 (1988), pp. 226–227; Id., "Introduction à l'édition critique de la *Summa* d'Henri de Gand," in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXI–XXXIV, ed. R. Macken, pp. xxv–xxvii; Id., *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXV–XL, ed. G. Wilson, pp. xxi–xxvi; and Id., *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I–V, ed. G. Wilson, pp. xxi–xxii.

⁶¹ See the discussions concerning the transmission of Henry's *Summa* via a university exemplar divided into *pecia* in the critical studies which precede the Latin texts in the volumes edited in the Leuven series Henrici de Gandavo *Opera omnia*. For a list of the *pecia* transitions in Henry's *Summa*, see R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, pp. 1044–1065. It is possible that a Vatican manuscript (Vaticana, *Borgh.* 17), which contains articles 53–75, is the actual first Parisian university exemplar for these later articles: see Giulio Battelli, "L'«exemplar» della *Summa* di Enrico di Gand," *Clio et son regard. Mélanges d'histoire de l'art et d'archéologie offerts à Jacques Stiennon*, ed. Rita Lejeune et Joseph Deckers, Liège, 1982, pp. 23–33 and R. Macken's review of this article in *Scriptorium*, 38 (1984) pp. 5*–6*. For the *pecia* transitions of the second Parisian university exemplar, see G. Wilson, "A Second Exemplar of Henry of Ghent's *Summa*" *Manuscripta*, 38 (1994), pp. 42–50.

probable that Henry lectured on the same material more than once and some of the corrections in some of the manuscripts probably reflect this.⁶² And, after Henry had delivered a good copy of his *Summa* to the university, he did continue to lecture from some written source.⁶³ As a result, caution must be introduced whenever one writes of the date of Henry's *Summa*: is one referring to the date of his initial lecture, or of his composition of a written text, or of the establishment of the university text for distribution to scholars?

Furthermore, it is unknown with certainty when Henry's *Summa* was made available in the university bookstore. L. Hödl has tentatively raised the possibility that this may have happened posthumously.⁶⁴ R. Macken has proposed that articles 1–61 of the *Summa* were delivered to the *stationarius* at Paris all at once, perhaps in 1289, with the intention that the subsequent articles would follow.⁶⁵ R. Wielockx has demonstrated that Godfrey of Fontaines's manuscript of the early articles of Henry's *Summa* was copied as early as 1276 or 1277.⁶⁶ What was the manuscript model of Godfrey's copy?⁶⁷ As a student of Henry, he perhaps had access to the *liber magistri* which was in the school of Henry and which was made available to some.⁶⁸ Was Henry's *Summa* made available in the bookstore as a whole, or were parts of it made available as they were completed, as Macken has suggested?⁶⁹ Most interesting are two comments in

⁶² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I–V, ed. G. Wilson, pp. xxxviii–xlvi; R. Macken, “Les corrections d’Henri de Gand à sa *Somme*,” *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 44 (1977), p. 57.

⁶³ L. Hödl, “Literar- und Problemgeschichtliches zur neuen kritischen Edition der ‘Opera Omnia’ des Heinrich van Gent,” *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 32 (1985), p. 312, n. 44; Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XLI–XLIV, ed. L. Hödl, (Leuven, 1998), pp. lviii–lix et lxii–lxv; Id., *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXV–XL, ed. G. Wilson, p. xxii, n. 12; and Id., *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I–V, ed. G. Wilson, pp. xxxviii–xxxix.

⁶⁴ L. Hödl, “Zur kritischen Neuausgabe der *Summa* des Heinrich von Gent (Eine Voranzeige),” *Franziskanische Studien*, 69 (1987), p. 158 and Id., “Introduction à l’édition critique de la *Summa* d’Henri de Gand” in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXI–XXXIV, ed. R. Macken, p. xxviii.

⁶⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXI–XXXIV, ed. R. Macken, p. liv.

⁶⁶ Giles of Rome, *Apologia*, (*Opera omnia* III.1), ed. R. Wielockx, pp. 17–24 and R. Wielockx, “Henry of Ghent,” in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. J.J.E. Gracia and T.B. Noone, (Oxford, 2003), p. 296.

⁶⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I–V, ed. G. Wilson, p. li, n. 32.

⁶⁸ For the term “*liber magistri*” see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXV–XL, ed. G. Wilson, p. xxii, n. 12.

⁶⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXI–XXXIV, ed. R. Macken, pp. liv–lv; Id., *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXV–XL, ed. G. Wilson, pp. xxii–xxvi.

Quodlibet V in which Henry refers to earlier treatments in his *Summa*, and he mentions the article's title and the title of the question!⁷⁰ It would seem that anyone who read this in 1280 would have been very puzzled if at least this part of the *Summa* would not have been available and accessible in some form in 1280.

R. Bayerschmidt has described Henry's *Summa* as an "unfinished cathedral."⁷¹ Indeed, from what Henry himself wrote, he intended the *Summa* to be composed of two large sections: the first was to be a section on God and the second was to be a section on creatures.⁷² Probably because of Henry's death, he did not complete the second section. The section on God, though, is full of references like "as will follow below in speaking about creatures."⁷³ There is a symmetry and structure to the *Summa*, for example what Henry writes about God's will parallels his treatment of God's intellect.⁷⁴ One can only speculate whether the intended but not completed section on creatures would have paralleled the section on God.

Because the *Summa* is incomplete, it presents its own unique problems for the contemporary scholar. For example, if one were interested in Henry's cosmology, one would need to shift through primarily theological questions to reconstruct his cosmology. Similarly, if one were interested in his metaphysical notion of relation, one can find Henry discussing this, but again one must search for this in the theological section

⁷⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 4 ed. Badius, fol. 158^{vN}: "Unde et scientia Dei, si sit ars, illa pure speculativa est, et non practica, ut determinavimus alibi in quaestionibus, art. 37, q. 7 de habitibus speculativis in Deo" et Id., *Quodlibet V*, q. 7 ed. Badius, fol. 171^{vB}: "Hic oportet reducere ad memoriam aliqua quae determinavimus alias, art. 31, q. 1 circa Dei aeternitatem . . ."; see also Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXV–XL, ed. G. Wilson, pp. xx–xxi et xxv–xxvi.

⁷¹ P. Bayerschmidt, "Die Seins- und Formmetaphysik," p. 6.

⁷² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. 21, ed. Badius, I, fol. 123^r; see also Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXV–XL, ed. G. Wilson, p. cxxviii.

⁷³ For some of the stock phrases similar to "ut inferius patebit loquendo de creaturis," see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. 28 ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 164^{vl}, and art. 29, q. 5 ed. Badius, I, fols. 173^{vH}, 174^{rl}, 174^{rl}; see also Mario Santiago de Carvalho, "On the Unwritten Section of Henry of Ghent's *Summa: loquendo de productione creaturae*," in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. G. Guldentops and C. Steel (Leuven, 2003), pp. 327–370; Id., "Sobre o Projecto de 'Tractatus de productione creaturae' de Henrique de Gand," *Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos*, 11–12 (1997), pp. 211–230.

⁷⁴ See the structure of articles 36–40 which pertain to the intellect, and compare with articles 45–47 which deal with the will.

on God.⁷⁵ Furthermore, one may not expect to find Henry's epistemology in his section on God, but Henry does extensively treat human epistemological issues in the opening articles⁷⁶ and one can find comments concerning human knowledge in Henry's treatment of God's knowledge.⁷⁷

A third work that is attributed to Henry of Ghent and must be categorized in his authentic works is the *Tractatus super facto praelatorum et fratrum*.⁷⁸ Henry was intimately involved in the disputes in Paris on the privileges granted to the friars by Martin IV in his bull "Ad fructus urberes." As early as his *Quodlibet VII* Henry addressed this bull. However, this "Tractatus" seems to have been not a part of Henry's *Quodlibet* disputations, but a separate tract which was appended to *Quodlibet XII* as question 31.⁷⁹ In the manuscript tradition, the material contained in the *Tractatus* existed in two forms: one, an extensive treatment, the text of which appears in the Leuven series as volume xvii; and two, an abbreviated version which appears in some manuscripts and in the printing of Badius.⁸⁰ There were many issues related to the granting of the privilege to the friars to hear confessions without obtaining the permission of the local bishop and priest, and Prof. Hödl provides an excellent analysis of these in his critical study which precedes the critical text in the Leuven series.⁸¹ Among some of the issues were: could a pope, in this case

⁷⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXI–XXXIV, ed. R. Macken, particularly art. 32, qq. 2 and 5.

⁷⁶ See for example, Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I–V, ed. G. Wilson, pp. 3–372, where one finds Henry dealing with the possibility and limits of human knowledge throughout the first five articles of the *Summa*. For secondary literature relating to human knowledge, see the article below by Steven Marrone and the article below by Bernd Goehring.

⁷⁷ See for example Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. 34, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, pp. 201,4–238,29.

⁷⁸ Sections of this tract were published in 1974 in John Marrone, "The Absolute and the Ordained Powers of the Pope. An Unedited Text of Henry of Ghent," *Mediaeval Studies*, 34 (1974), pp. 23–27. The critical text is now available in Henry of Ghent, *Tractatus super facto Praelatorum et Fratrum (Quodlibet XII, quaestio 31)*, ed. L. Hödl—Mark Haverals (Leuven, 1989).

⁷⁹ Four manuscripts (Paris, *Arsenal* 454, fol. 179^{va}, Bologna, *Bibl. Univ., lat.* 2236, fol. 252^{vb}, Firenze, *Bibl. Naz., Conv. Soppr.* A2506, fol. 148^{ra}, and Krakow, *Bibl. Jagiell.* 697, fol. 141^{va}) state that this question was disputed before *Quodlibet XII*: "Aliam quaestionem addidit isti Quodlibet, quam prius disputaverat"

⁸⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII, quaestiones 1–30*, ed. Jos Decorte (Leuven, 1987), p. xxi.

⁸¹ L. Hödl, "Theologiegeschliche Einführung" in Henry of Ghent, *Tractatus super facto Praelatorum et Fratrum (Quodlibet XII, quaestio 31)*, ed. L. Hödl—M. Haverals, pp. vii–cxvii.

Martin IV, “undo” a decree of a church council, in this case, the decree “Omnis utrobique sexus” of the fourth Lateran Council which mandated yearly confession to one’s “proper priest”; was there a limit on papal power; was there a distinction between ordained and absolute powers of the pope;⁸² could a pope fail to act for the greater good of the church and thus not act out of loving kindness?

There are some sermons, letters, and another question which have survived and seem to be authentically by Henry. For example, there is a *sermo in die festi Sanctae Catharinae*,⁸³ a *sermo in synodo, feria 2^a post “Misericordia Domini”* 1287,⁸⁴ a *sermo in dominica VII^a post Pentecosten “Attendite a falsis prophetis,”*⁸⁵ and a *sermo de Purificatione Virginis Deiparae “Suscepimus, Deus, misericordiam.”*⁸⁶ The first three have been printed,⁸⁷ but the last existed in one manuscript which is now lost.⁸⁸ There are also six letters⁸⁹ and a question on whether God is composed of act and potency.⁹⁰ These have yet to appear in print.

In addition to these works that are certainly by Henry, there are some works, although attributed to Henry, must be attributed to him with varying degrees of probability. Naturally there are greater and lesser degrees of uncertainty, and each work must be examined on its own merits.

One work attributed to Henry with the greatest degree of probability is his *Lectura ordinaria super Sacram Scripturam*. This work, attributed to Henry in the one manuscript containing the text, was not edited during

⁸² J. Marrone, “The Absolute and the Ordained Powers,” pp. 7–27; P. Porro, “Henry of Ghent on Ordained and Absolute Power,” *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. G. Guldentops—C. Steel (Leuven, 2003), pp. 387–408.

⁸³ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca. manuscripta*, II, p. 1067; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, ed. R. Macken, p. xxiv; P. Porro, “Bibliography,” p. 408.

⁸⁴ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, pp. 1067–1068; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, ed. R. Macken, p. xxiv; P. Porro, “Bibliography,” p. 408.

⁸⁵ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca. manuscripta*, II, p. 1068; P. Porro, “Bibliography,” p. 408.

⁸⁶ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, pp. 1068–1069.

⁸⁷ Respectively in E. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton. Sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine* (Louvain, 1925), pp. 509–517; Kurt Schleyer, *Die Anfängedes Gallikanismus in 13ten Jahrhundert. Der Widerstand des französischen Klerus gegen die Privilegierung der Bettelorden (Historische Studien)*, 14 (Berlin, 1937), pp. 140–150; Heinrich Roos, “Eine Universitätspredigt von Heinrich von Gent” *Henrici Roos in memoriam in Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age grec et latin*, 24 (1978), pp. 5–15.

⁸⁸ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, p. 1068.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1069.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

the Renaissance. Although B. Smalley published some sections of it in the 1950s,⁹¹ it was first printed in its entirety in 1972 as volume 26 in *Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia*⁹² and was subsequently taken into the Leuven series, *Henrici de Gandavo Opera omnia*, as volume 36.⁹³ The text, if it is indeed by Henry, would probably date to early in Henry's career in the Theology Faculty in Paris, probably 1275 or 1276.⁹⁴

B. Smalley noted that there are many themes in the *Lectura ordinaria super Sacram Scripturam* which are themes that can be found in the authentic works of Henry, for example, the author's appeal to the *Timaeus* and his critique of the thesis of an eternal world,⁹⁵ and concluded "We shall call our commentator 'Henry of Ghent' as a working hypothesis."⁹⁶ R. Macken recognized the resemblances of content and style in the *Lectura ordinaria super Sacram Scripturam* with the certainly authentic works of Henry, but hesitated to claim that it was certainly authentic.⁹⁷ Subsequent to its appearance in the Leuven series, however, a reference was found in Henry's *Summa* which could be only to the *Lectura ordinaria super Sacram Scripturam*,⁹⁸ and it seems safe to believe that this work was by Henry.

For those interested in what is probably Henry's thought from early in his career, the *Lectura ordinaria super Sacram Scripturam*, even though it contains lectures on only the early chapters of Genesis, treats many typical philosophical theories of Henry. Here it is argued that matter is substantial rather than solely a potentiality, that there is a primacy of the will over the intellect, and that creation is the result of the overflowing goodness of God's will. There is also the rejection of the determinism of creation that one finds in passages in Avicenna.⁹⁹

⁹¹ Beryl Smalley, "A Commentary on the Hexaameron by Henry of Ghent" *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 20 (1953), pp. 60–101.

⁹² "La 'Lectura ordinaria super Sacram Scripturam' attribuée à Henri De Gand", ed. R. Macken *Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia* (26), (Louvain, 1972).

⁹³ Henry of Ghent, *Lectura ordinaria super Sacram Scripturam* (*Henrico de Gandavo adscripta*), ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1980).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

⁹⁵ B. Smalley, "A Commentary on the Hexaameron," p. 75.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁹⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Lectura ordinaria*, ed. R. Macken, p. xxi.

⁹⁸ G. Wilson, "A Note Concerning the Authorship of the *Lectura Ordinaria* Attributed to Henry of Ghent," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 56 (1989), pp. 227–231.

⁹⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Lectura ordinaria*, ed. R. Macken, pp. 46, 68–47, 5.

A second of the “doubtful” works of Henry is a Syncategorematic text which exists in one manuscript, now housed in the public library of Brugge, and which will shortly appear in the Leuven *Opera omnia* series.¹⁰⁰ In this manuscript the text is twice attributed to Henry of Ghent, and in the text one finds a distinction between *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae*, which is an important distinction in Henry’s philosophy, but one that is not exclusive to Henry. The text does use notions of “res” and “ens” in a manner consistent with the use of these terms in Henry’s *Quodlibeta* and *Summa*. Consequently, even though some caution is in order, the text may indeed be by Henry.¹⁰¹ The text, which treats syncategorematic terms in logical propositions, for example “tantum,” “nisi,” and “quin,” does make reference to the *Syncategoremata* attributed to Peter of Spain, and it probably dates to the mid-1260s.

A third doubtful work which is attributed to Henry in one manuscript is a series of questions which was published as “*Quaestiones variae*” in the Leuven *Opera omnia* series. Although these questions contain some themes that are typical of Henry, there are reasons to doubt the attribution. First, in these questions the author refers to William of Moerbeke’s translation of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, but in the authentic works of Henry, he consistently used other translations.¹⁰² Second, the writing style is not Henry’s. Henry is well known to construct complex and seemingly interminable sentences, but in these various questions the sentences are relatively short and straightforward. Third, some of these questions have the appearance of being quodlibetal questions, according to G. Etzkorn.¹⁰³ However, the totality of Henry’s Quodlibetal disputations is known—Henry’s *Quodlibet XV* is described as the last of his life¹⁰⁴—and these questions do not appear among the authentic *Quodlibeta*. Subsequent to the publication of these *Quaestiones variae* it

¹⁰⁰ *Syncategoremata Henrico de Gandavo adscripta*, ed. Henk Braakhuis, G. Etzkorn, et G. Wilson (Leuven, forthcoming).

¹⁰¹ See the excellent introduction by Braakhuis in the forthcoming edition of the Syncategoremata which treats in detail the authorship of this tract.

¹⁰² Jos Decorte, “Aristotelian Sources in Henry of Ghent” in *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)* ed. W. Vanhamel (Leuven, 1996), p. 107 and R. Macken, “Les sources d’Henri de Gand,” in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 76 (1978), p. 15.

¹⁰³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones variae Henrico de Gandavo adscriptae*, ed. G. Etzkorn (Leuven, 2008), p. xi.

¹⁰⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XV*, ed. G. Etzkorn—G. Wilson (Leuven, 2007), p. xix.

was discovered that some of these questions were questions in Richard of Mediavilla's *Quaestiones disputatae*. The attribution to Henry in the manuscript seems incorrect.

There is a series of questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in a manuscript of the Escorial which attributes these questions to Henry, but this attribution is in a modern hand. Some of the questions have recently been transcribed and published by P. Porro.¹⁰⁵ J. Gómez-Caffarena,¹⁰⁶ L.J. Bataillon,¹⁰⁷ and M. Laarmann¹⁰⁸ have independently expressed doubt over this attribution. More recently P. Porro has reviewed the case for, as well as the case against, attributing this text to Henry.¹⁰⁹ And yet, doubts remain, and M. Pickavé has argued that these questions are not by Henry.¹¹⁰ Even if the attribution to Henry is incorrect, this does not mean that Henry did not write a tract on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, as Macken has argued.¹¹¹ Of course, the authenticity of these questions will be better understood once these questions are edited.¹¹² In the meantime, a list of the questions in the Escorial manuscript is provided by R. Macken.¹¹³

¹⁰⁵ P. Porro, "Le *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* attribuite a Enrico di Gand: elementi per un sondaggio dottrinale," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale; rivista della Società internazionale per lo studio del Medioevo latino*, 13 (2002), pp. 575–602.

¹⁰⁶ J. Gómez-Caffarena, "Ser participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante," *Analecta Gregoriana*, XCIII (Roma, 1958), p. 271.

¹⁰⁷ Louis-Jacques Bataillon, "Bulletin d'histoire des doctrines médiévales" *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 44 (1960), p. 164.

¹⁰⁸ Matthias Laarmann, *Deus, primum cognitum. Die Lehre von Gott als dem Ersterkannten des menschlichen Intellekte die Heinrich von Ghent (†1293)*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, Neue Folge, 52 (Münster i. W., 1999), p. 44.

¹⁰⁹ P. Porro, "Le *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* attribuite a Enrico di Gand: elementi per un sondaggio dottrinale," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale; rivista della Società internazionale per lo studio del Medioevo latino*, 13 (2002), pp. 516–527.

¹¹⁰ Martin Pickavé, "Zur Authentizität des Metaphysikkomentars in Ms. Escorial H. II.1" in M. Pickavé *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zur einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*, (Leiden, 2007), pp. 369–374. See also below, M. Pickavé's article on Henry's metaphysics, esp. note 39.

¹¹¹ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, p. 1096.

¹¹² P. Porro, "Bibliography," p. 409.

¹¹³ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, pp. 1074–1096.

Another work which has been attributed to Henry is a set of questions on the *Physics* of Aristotle. L. Bellemare¹¹⁴ and R. Perron¹¹⁵ maintained that these are by Henry, but one wonders whether all of J. Paulus's original doubts have been removed.¹¹⁶ If this work is authentically by Henry, then the remark at the beginning of Book II, "Circa initium IIⁱ *Physicorum* primum dubitabile esset de natura et de modis naturae, secundum esset de causa et modis eius. Sed quia de his habitum est supra V^{um} *Metaphysicae*, supersedendum est ad praesens et tunc sequitur de tertio dubitabili principali cuius sunt causae per accidens, ut casus et fortuna ..."¹¹⁷ indicates that by the time this was composed, a set of questions on the *Metaphysics*¹¹⁸ had already been finished. However, if these questions on the *Physics*, as well as those on the *Metaphysics* mentioned above, were by Henry, there seems to be no known reference to either work in his authentic *Quodlibeta* and *Summa*. Perhaps as the Leuven edition of Henry's *Opera omnia* progresses more will be discovered and known about these questions—those on the *Physics* as well as those on the *Metaphysics*. A list of the questions contained in the work on the *Physics* can be found in R. Macken's *Bibliotheca manuscripta*¹¹⁹

Another work attributed to Henry is a *Quaestiones in Librum de causis*, however it is highly doubtful whether this work was by Henry. Certainly, J. Gómez-Caffarena,¹²⁰ L.J. Bataillon,¹²¹ and J. Zwaene-

¹¹⁴ Lucien Bellemare, *Les "Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum" attribuées à Henri de Gand* (Ms. Erfurt, Amplon. F. 349, ff. 120^{ra}–184^{rb}), (*Etude sur l'authenticité de l'oeuvre. Etude et texte des Questions sur les livres I et II*) (Université Catholique de Louvain. Institut Supérieur de philosophie. Dissertation présentée pour l'obtention du grade de docteur en philosophie) (pro manuscript), 2 vol., (Louvain, 1964), pp. 43–115; Id., "Authenticité des commentaires de Paris et de Bologne sur la Physique attribuées à Henri de Gand," *La Filosofia della natura nel medioevo* (Atti del terzo Congresso Internazionale de Filosofia medioevale, Passo della Mendola (Trento), 31 agosto–5 settembre 1964), (Milano, 1966), pp. 470–477.

¹¹⁵ René Perron, *Les livres trois et quatre des "Quaestiones super VIII libros physicorum," attribuées à Henri de Gand* (Université Catholique de Louvain—Institut Supérieur de Philosophie) (Dissertation présentée pour l'obtention du grade de docteur en philosophie) (pro manuscript), 3 vol., (Louvain, 1961), pp. 107–110.

¹¹⁶ J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand*, p. xviii.

¹¹⁷ L. Bellemare, *Les "Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum,"* II, p. 167, 2–8.

¹¹⁸ Could these be the questions contained in the Escorial manuscript, mentioned above?

¹¹⁹ R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, pp. 1101–1112.

¹²⁰ J. Gómez-Caffarena, "Ser participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante," *Analecta Gregoriana*, XCIII, (Roma, 1958), p. 271.

¹²¹ L.J. Bataillon, "Bulletin d'histoire des doctrines médiévales" *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 44 (1960), p. 164.

poel¹²² have expressed serious doubts and the judgment by A. Pattin was that this work was not by Henry.¹²³ The work, though, does exist in a modern edition by Zwaenepoel,¹²⁴ where a list of the questions can be found.¹²⁵

There are also a number of sermons that are attributed to Henry, but whose authenticity is doubtful.¹²⁶ In addition, there are a number of smaller works attributed to him, but again the attribution is questionable. These include a logical work, a work *De unitate et uno*, a tract *De virginitate*, and a *Summa de poenitentia*.¹²⁷

Henry was indeed prolific and his certainly authentic works contain much that is of historical, theological, metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical interest, as the following articles in this volume will reveal. His thought immediately impacted discussions at Paris and elsewhere, and his influence on subsequent thinkers, not only of his generation, but also into the Renaissance and beyond, indicates that he was a pivotal philosopher of the late Middle Ages.

¹²² John P. Zwaenepoel, *Les Quaestiones in librum de causis attribuées à Henri de Gand, Edition critique* (Philosophes Médiévaux, XV), (Louvain-Paris, 1974), pp. 43–91.

¹²³ Anon., *Liber de Causis* ed. A. Pattin (Leuven, 1966), p. 38.

¹²⁴ J. Zwaenepoel, *Les Quaestiones in librum de causis*.

¹²⁵ J. Zwaenepoel, *Les Quaestiones in librum de causis*, pp. 153–154.

¹²⁶ See R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, pp. 1120–1123.

¹²⁷ These are treated as “doubtful works” in R. Macken’s *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, pp. 1112–1120.

II

HENRY OF GHENT AND THE EVENTS OF 1277

ROBERT WIELOCKX

This contribution consists of two parts. The first, which shows Henry of Ghent's role in the events of March 1277, relies on historical sources and especially on Henry's autobiographical notes. The second part is based on a reading of some of the significant passages in Henry's works which, from *Quodlibet II* (Advent 1277) onwards, allow a closer look at Henry's later interpretation of the series of condemnations and censures of March 1277.

I. Henry as Eyewitness and Actor of the Events

Henry is an authorised witness and important actor of the four main events of the university life of Paris in March 1277: the drafting of the famous decree which was promulgated 7 March and which prohibited the teaching of 219 appended propositions, the process of Giles of Rome which ended with a refusal of the "licentia docendi", Henry's own summons to the papal legate, and the first step of an eventually miscarried process against the memory of Thomas Aquinas.

A. The Decree of 7 March 1277

Henry himself writes that he was present at the meeting in which the masters of the Faculty of Theology were drafting the list of propositions of the decree of 7 March 1277.¹ His information regarding this event is, therefore, that of an eyewitness. His presence, besides, was not exactly a passive one, since, as R.-A. Gauthier observed long since, the formulation of at least one of the articles of the decree (208; Mandonnet: 157) bears

¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. Robert Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), pp. 66–67, ll. 6–24, especially ll. 21–24: "In hoc enim concordabant omnes magistri theologiae congregati super hoc, quorum ego eram unus, unanimiter concedentes quod substantia angeli non est ratio angelum esse in loco secundum substantiam".

the stamp of Henry's personal phraseology.² Henry's possible part in the insertion of article 217 (Mandonnet: 187) has been suggested by R. Macken and after him by R. Hissette.³

B. *The Process of Giles of Rome*

As E. Hocedez pointed out long ago, the masters of theology had to meet twice to examine Giles's positions: once under Stephen Tempier († 3 September 1279), when Giles was to be refused the "licentia docendi", and another time under Tempier's successor Ranulphe de la Houblonnière, when Giles, on the order of Honorius IV, was to be promoted a master of theology (1285).⁴

Thanks to Henry's accurately formulated information (public discussion of *Quodlibet* X, q. 5, Advent 1286) we are able to establish a "terminus ad quem" of Giles of Rome's process under Tempier. Henry states that at the moment of his summons to the papal legate, certain persons ("quidam") had been censured in Paris because they seemed to hold Thomas Aquinas's thesis of the unicity of the substantial form in the human being.⁵ Henry specifies, furthermore, that those "quidam" were more precisely those who had advanced their thesis at the moment

² René-Antoine Gauthier, "Trois commentaires 'averroïstes' sur l'Éthique à Nicomaque", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 16 (1947/1948), pp. 187–336, especially p. 220, where the remarkable correspondence in wording between art. 208 (Mandonnet 157) and Henry's *Quodlibet* I was noticed.

³ Raymond Macken, "La temporalité radicale de la créature selon Henri de Gand", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 38 (1971), pp. 211–272, especially p. 236; Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Philosophes médiévaux, 22; Louvain, 1977), p. 277. J. Paulus, J. Gómez Caffarena and P. Porro are less affirmative: Jean Paulus, "Les disputes d'Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome sur la distinction de l'essence et de l'existence", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 15–17 (1940–1942), pp. 323–358, especially p. 347; José Gómez Caffarena, *Ser participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante* (Analecta Gregoriana, 93; Roma, 1958), p. 129, n. 2; Pasquale Porro, "Possibilità ed 'esse essentiae' in Enrico di Gand", in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293)*, ed. Willy Vanhamel (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre. Ser. 1, 15; Leuven, 1996), pp. 211–253, especially p. 223, n. 32.

⁴ Edgar Hocedez, "La condamnation de Gilles de Rome", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 4 (1932), pp. 34–58, especially p. 44 et p. 57.

⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* X, q. 5, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1981), p. 128, apparatus: "Iam etiam 10 annis, cum quidam notati fuerunt Parisius, quasi posuissent quod in homine non esset forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis . . . , vocatus a domino Simone, tunc legato, et requisitus . . . quid ego sentirem, an quod in homine essent plures formae substantiales, an quod unica tantum . . .".

at which he himself, in his *Quodlibet I*, left open the possibility of a unique substantial form in the human being.⁶ Only Giles of Rome meets all the requirements for being the person Henry is referring to. Giles was censured (art. 48) for holding without reserve (commentary on the Sentences) a form of the unicity thesis close to, but not identical with, Aquinas's: unlike Thomas, Giles did not pronounce himself, in that work, on the special case of the number of substantial forms in the human being. Giles was also the author of the *Theoremata de Corpore Christi*, a work that was chronologically close to Henry's First *Quodlibet* and to which Henry, in the oral dispute of this *Quodlibet*, amply referred. He, indeed, spent so much time and conviction in presenting the thesis of the *Theoremata de Corpore Christi* that his contemporaries rightly believed Henry made then Giles's position his own. Finally, in his *Quodlibet IX* (Lent 1286), only a few months before the report (Advent 1286) in which he closely associated his summons with the censure of the Thomas-like unicity thesis, Henry of Ghent again established the points of similarity (and dissimilarity) between the *Theoremata de Corpore Christi* and his own *Quodlibet I*.⁷ Since Giles's censure, which was of course the final step of Giles's process (1277), preceded Henry's summons, also the previous steps in Giles's process, namely the magisterial examination of Giles's theses and the "Apologia" during which Giles refused orally and publicly to recant those theses, must of necessity also have taken place before. Because in the Advent of 1286 Henry says—in using the paschal style as was common in Paris—his summons took place "ten years ago", he dates it before Easter 1277, that is, before 28 March of that year. Hence, the steps of Giles's process coming to an end with the refusal of his "licentia docendi" must have preceded the day of 28 March 1277.

⁶ Ibid.: "Iam etiam 10 annis, cum quidam notati fuerunt Parisius, quasi posuissent quod in homine non esset forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis, et ego eodem tempore in dubio reliquissem in prima disputatione mea de Quolibet quaestione(m) an plures formae ponendae essent in homine vel unica tantum, vocatus a domino Simone, tunc legato, et requisitus ...".—The agreement of tenses, concretely of the two pluperfects, requires that the simultaneity of which Henry is speaking ("eodem tempore") denotes, not the simultaneity of his *Quodlibet I*, of which he is speaking in the pluperfect, and the censure, of which he is speaking ("notati fuerunt") in the perfect, but the simultaneity of *Quodlibet I* ("in dubio reliquissem") and the position which apparently sympathised with Thomas's ("quasi posuissent") and which became, only thereafter, the target of the censors.

⁷ Robert Wielockx, *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia*. III, 1: *Apologia. Édition et commentaire* (Unione Accademia Nazionale. Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Testi e Studi, 4; Firenze, 1985), pp. 82–86 (henceforth: *Apologia*).

As to the “terminus a quo” of Giles’s process under Tempier, Godfrey of Fontaines and the anonymous annotator of the MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 853, who confirms Godfrey’s witness on this point, are very explicit: they inform us that the decree of 7 March 1277 preceded the meeting in which the masters of theology granted the truth of the proposition “Non est malitia in uoluntate nisi sit error uel aliqua nescientia in ratione”.⁸ The proposition granted by the masters, of which Godfrey and the Anonymous are speaking, is one of those 51 incriminated propositions figuring in the list of Giles’s process.⁹ The witness of Godfrey and the anonymous annotator is corroborated by the unanimous assumption of their contemporaries regarding the chronological succession of the two events: when Henry of Ghent mentions the two—which he regularly does—, he usually mentions first the decree of 7 March.¹⁰ The common memory of the contemporaries took the order of the two events for granted. They did not feel the need to establish it explicitly.

That the decree of 7 March 1277 not only preceded the magisterial meeting of 1285, but also the one of Lent 1277, is beyond any doubt. Two independent proofs show it. First, Godfrey of Fontaines’s disciple, John of Pouilly is absolutely clear on this point: when the masters were granting Giles’s thesis (“Non est malitia in uoluntate nisi sit error uel aliqua nescientia in ratione”), they acted in their capacity as assessors of bishop Stephen.¹¹ Secondly, Godfrey of Fontaines’s famous hermeneutical prin-

⁸ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet VIII*, q. 16, ed. Jean Hoffmans (Louvain, 1924), pp. 165–166: “Propter quod etiam quidam articuli ab episcopo reprobati, ante approbationem tamen huius propositionis, qui videntur contrariari huic propositioni, sunt sic exponendi quod huic propositioni, prout fieri potest, concordent”. The witness given by the annotator of MS Vat. lat. 853 was quoted by Hocedez, “La condamnation” (see n. 4), especially pp. 42–43.

⁹ Wielockx, *Apologia* (see n. 7), pp. 9–10, p. 54, p. 59.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹¹ John of Pouilly, *Quodlibet II*, q. 11, MSS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14565, fol. 111^{ra}; lat. 15372, fol. 54^{rb} (see MSS Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II 1 117, fol. 170^{ra}; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1017, fol. 71¹): “Idem magistri fuerunt assessores episcopi Stephani in condendo articulos et in concedendo predictam propositionem”.—Ludwig Hödl, “Die Diskussion des Johannes de Polliaco über die Lehrentscheidung der Pariser Theologen von 1285/86 ‘Non est malitia in voluntate ...’”, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 66 (1999), pp. 245–297, especially pp. 248–249, excises the name of Stephen Tempier from the German “translation” (p. 248) of John of Pouilly’s text and then claims this text does *not* imply that, when the masters granted Giles’s proposition, they did so at the time when Tempier was the bishop. But the two locutions “in condendo articulos” and “in concedendo predictam propositionem” are grammatically ruled by the same “fuerunt assessores”. And

ciple was that inconsistencies between the decree of 7 March 1277 and the censure of Giles of Rome must be resolved on the basis of the indisputable principle that the later of the two interventions had to furnish the norm of interpretation of the earlier one. Now then, Godfrey obviously takes the agreement of the masters with Giles's proposition as the norm for the interpretation of the decree of 7 March. In so doing he supposes that it was the process of Giles which came after the decree of 7 March. If the decree of 7 March had not preceded also the "propositio magistralis" by which the masters agreed under (and against) Tempier on Giles's proposition, Henry would have had an easy task to make the opposite conclusion prevail by virtue of the same hermeneutical principle. If, indeed, the decree of 7 March was promulgated after the magisterial proposition of 1277, the bishop's decree ought to have been the norm of interpretation of the magisterial proposition or ought even to have abrogated it. Henry of Ghent, however, who was himself an eyewitness of the events, never shows any doubt about Godfrey's reasoning regarding the hermeneutical principle itself or regarding the chronological relationship between the decree of 7 March and the magisterial proposition. His way of arguing, indeed, rather supposes, with Godfrey and other contemporary eyewitnesses, that the masters granted Giles's proposition (against Tempier) after the promulgation of the decree of 7 March.¹²

Among the board of examiners of Giles's positions, Henry of Ghent played neither a minor part nor was he the only moving force behind Giles's process. On the one hand, it must be recognized that Giles's teachings which were made the object of his censure take usually a course opposite to Henry's. The phraseology of at least twelve of Giles's involved positions can be traced back in the very formulas used by Henry for stating the opposite theses. One article in particular of Giles's censure can very well be the result of a personal, rather than theological or philosophical, conflict between Henry and Giles. On the other hand, regarding the location of a spiritual substance (art. 49) and the simultaneity of reason and will (art. 24 and 51), Henry of Ghent, as all the other masters, agreed with Giles and disagreed with Stephen Tempier. In addition, some

since, unlike L. Hödl, John of Pouilly specifies himself that those assessors were the assessors of *bishop Stephen* ("episcopi Stephani"), the source by no means lacks clarity. Against the background of an unambiguous historical source like this, L. Hödl would have done better not to attempt, by a manipulation of the source and by a heroic piece of interpretation, to make the source say the opposite of what it really and explicitly says.

¹² Wielockx, *Apologia* (see n. 7), p. 81, pp. 105–113.

criticisms of Henry of Ghent's personal positions uttered by Giles of Rome as early as 1276 do not figure among the positions censured during Giles's process. Furthermore, two of Giles's curbed teachings find their exact opposite not in Henry but in John Pecham and other Franciscans. Moreover, regarding two further positions of Giles, close to if not identical with those of Thomas Aquinas, Henry takes at that moment of his career a more moderate course than the majority of the masters. Henry is of the opinion that Giles's teaching, according to which matter cannot exist without form, does not necessarily lead to a denial of revealed truths or their supposed implications (the existence of "accidents" without proper "substance", as in the Sacrament of the Eucharist). When Giles's thesis, according to which there is only one substantial form in whatever composite, was censured by the masters and probably marked as being in one way or another opposite to the Christian faith, Henry most probably abstained from voting. At that moment, Henry did not envisage the necessary link between the unicity thesis and unorthodoxy. Only later, during his summons to the legate, did he hear *to his surprise* of such a link. In the earlier stage of his career, even though he was already tending toward anthropological dimorphism, he did not even reject the unicity thesis considered in itself, that is, abstracting from theological aspects. He did not reject unconditionally the thesis in the specific form in which it was upheld by Thomas Aquinas. Without qualification, he certainly did not disown it in the generic form in which it figured in Giles's commentary on Peter the Lombard and in which it was censured by the bishop and the majority of the masters.¹³

C. Henry's Summons to the Legate

Since Henry had most probably abstained from condemning without qualification two of Giles's theses which were close to Thomas Aquinas's—the impossibility for matter to exist without form and the unicity of substantial form in all composites—, the bishop and his staff were left uncertain about Henry's exact position regarding points of doctrine which, at that time, were felt as theologically weighty. It is therefore understandable that Henry was shortly thereafter summoned to the papal legate, Simon de Brie, in the presence of Tempier and his diocesan staff.¹⁴

¹³ Ibid., pp. 102–113, pp. 177–178.

¹⁴ Götz-Rüdiger Tewes, "Die päpstliche Kurie und die Lehre an der Pariser Universität im 13. Jahrhundert", in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der*

The conversation between Simon and Henry, as reported by the latter, ruled on the unicity thesis in the characteristic formulation it has in Thomas Aquinas's distinctive position.¹⁵

When Henry, in conformity with his *Quodlibet I*, explained that he tended towards anthropological dimorphism, without excluding as hypotheses either Thomas's or Giles's thesis, the legate, after hearing the bishop and his staff, ordered Henry to declare publicly and in his university teaching that there is more than one substantial form in the human being. The legate also added a threat: when the Christian faith was at stake, he said, he would not spare anybody. As Henry himself comments, he learned from this threat that the unicity thesis, as formulated by Thomas, was in opposition to the Christian faith. And Henry adds that, taking into account the previous consultation of the legate with Tempier and his staff, Thomas's unicity thesis had, as it seemed to him, been condemned by the legate on advice of Tempier and his staff (Ranulphe de la Houblonnière and John of Les Alleux), albeit non publicly.¹⁶

This insider information allows two conclusions. First, before his summons to the legate Henry was not aware of any peril that Thomas's thesis could entail for the Christian faith. Second, the legate and the bishop

Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, ed. Jan A. Aertsen—Kent Emery, Jr.—Andreas Speer (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 28; Berlin, 2001), pp. 857–872, rightly stresses the role of Simon de Brie in the events.

¹⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), p. 128 apparatus: "... vocatus a domino Simone, tunc legato, et requisitus ... quid ego sentirem, an quod in homine essent plures formae substantiales, an quod unica tantum".

¹⁶ Ibid.: "Iam etiam 10 annis, cum quidam notati fuerunt Parisius, quasi posuissent quod in homine non esset forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis, et ego eodem tempore in dubio reliquissem in prima disputatione mea de Quolibet quaestione(m) an plures formae ponendae essent in homine vel unica tantum, vocatus a domino Simone, tunc legato, et requisitus in praesentia domini Stephani, tunc episcopi parisiensis, et domini Ranoldi, nunc episcopi parisiensis, et magistri Ioannis Aurelianensis, tunc cancellarii parisiensis et nunc fratris ordinis praedicatorum, quid ego sentirem, an quod in homine essent plures formae substantiales an quod unica tantum, et cum respondissem quod potius sentirem quod plures, ipse dominus Simon post modicam consultationem cum praedictis personis, me tracto in partem, mihi dixit: 'Volumus et praecipimus tibi, quod publice determines in scholis tuis, quod in homine sint formae substantiales plures, non sola anima rationalis, ne scholares de cetero super hoc maneant in dubio'. Et quia, secundum quod mihi visum fuit, suspicabatur ne satis efficaciter mandatum suum in hoc exsequeretur, comminando addidit: 'Sis sollicitus ut clare et aperte determines plures formas substantiales esse in homine, quia in causa fidei nemini parcerem'. Ex quo visum est mihi ipsum sensisse quod in determinando an plures formae substantiales vel tantum unica sint in homine, agitur causa fidei. Visum est et (ed.: etiam) mihi quod dicere tantum unicam formam esse in homine de consilio dictorum virorum damnaverit, licet non publice".

did not simply aim at winning Henry over to any form of the plurality thesis. What was at stake was to break the silence and to bring out a public censure of the very specific form Thomas Aquinas had given to the unicity thesis. Therefore, the summons of a leading theologian and his expected change of mind were rather a means of preparing a solid magisterial majority for the moment when, as planned, the bishop and the legate would request the masters to answer the question whether this and other theses of Thomas's were open to a canonical censure to be promulgated by the bishop on his own authority.

D. *The Process of Thomas Aquinas*

A few days after his summons, Henry took part in the meeting in which the masters of theology, on an order of Stephen Tempier and Simon de Brie, were to examine the Christian orthodoxy of some of Thomas Aquinas's positions.

The existence of the process against Thomas is beyond doubt, as it is beyond doubt that this process was a separate one.¹⁷

The existence of a process against Thomas is well attested by the independent, agreeing and complementary testimonies of Henry of Ghent, William de la Mare and John Pecham.¹⁸

¹⁷ Wielockx, *Apologia* (see n. 7), 1985, pp. 81–88, pp. 91–96, pp. 215–224; Id., “Autour du procès de Thomas d'Aquin”, in *Thomas von Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen*, ed. Albert Zimmermann (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 19; Berlin, 1988), pp. 413–438; Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, “1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome”, *Vivarium*, 35/1 (1997), pp. 72–101; John F. Wippel, “Bishop Stephen Tempier and Thomas Aquinas. A Separate Process against Aquinas?”, *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 44 (1997), pp. 117–136; Robert Wielockx, “A Separate Process against Aquinas. A Response to John F. Wippel”, in *Roma, Magistra Mundi. Itineraria culturae mediaevalis*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Textes et Études du moyen âge, 10; Louvain-la-Neuve, 1998), pp. 1009–1030; Id., “Procédures contre Gilles de Rome et Thomas d'Aquin. Réponse à J.M.M.H. Thijssen”, *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 83 (1999), pp. 293–313.

¹⁸ Wielockx, “Autour du procès” (see n. 17), pp. 413–416 (with references to, and comments on, John Pecham's and William de la Mare's witnesses). Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), p. 127, apparatus: “Loquendo autem de damnatione per sententiam magistrorum, scio, quia interfui, quod iam 10 annis elapsis, magistri omnes theologiae tam non regentes actu quam regentes, qui haberi (ed.: habui) potuerunt Parisius, simul congregati ad examinandos quosdam articulos de mandato domini Stephani episcopi parisiensis et domini Simonis legati, qui postmodum fuit papa Martinus, inter quos articulos erat ille, quod in homine non erat forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis, omnes unanimiter uno ore, duobus exceptis, dixerunt quod dicere in homine non esse formam nisi animam rationalem falsum erat”.

From the relative chronology of the events related by Henry of Ghent we know that the process against Thomas was a separate procedure. His summons to the pontifical legate comes when the process of Giles of Rome had already come to a close. And, again, the summons comes before the first step of the process against Thomas.¹⁹

The separate character of the process against Thomas is confirmed by absolute chronology. Thomas's process is still pending when, on 7 December 1284, John Pecham addresses the Chancellor and the masters of the university of Oxford.²⁰ And, even later, legal prosecutions were definitively suspended when in June 1285 Honorius IV handed the dossier of Thomas's controversial articles over to the counsel of the masters of the Faculty of Theology in Paris. By the very ceding of the dossier the pope made it known that he did not consider the relevant teachings of Thomas as heretical. Moreover, by ordering the bishop of Paris to act in all things in conformity with the majority of the masters of theology, the pope made it known that he considered Thomas's teachings neither as suspect nor as allowing the bishop to overstep the exemption of religious who, in his diocese, would remain faithful to Thomas's positions. Thus, the pope reduced the case against Thomas, got up by a bishop, to its correct status as a case coming under the competence of the Faculty of Theology.²¹ In short, the process against Thomas, still pending at the end of 1284 and definitively deferred in 1285, cannot be the same as the one of Giles of Rome, which came to an end already before 28 March 1277.

It is no wonder, then, that the articles examined on Thomas's process are different in wording from those which were part of Giles of Rome's process, even though in substance they are at times very similar.²²

As to Henry's role in the magisterial censure of Thomas Aquinas's teachings, two points are in order.

With the exception of the two Dominicans, who abstained, Henry joined the majority thesis and, for the first time in his career, rejected without qualification the unicity of substantial form in the human being.²³ It is worth noticing, however, that the theological note the masters put on Thomas's unicity thesis, was neither "hereticum" (opposite to the faith and authentically declared as such), nor "erroneum" (simply

¹⁹ Wielockx, "Autour du procès" (see n. 17), pp. 422–437.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 418–422.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 419–420.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 418.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

opposite to faith), but merely “falsum”.²⁴ Henry, from whom this precious information can be drawn, specifies furthermore the reason why the masters applied this theological note. They did so, he says, because they considered the thesis opposite to the Christian faith, not in itself, but in its consequences.²⁵ They must have been of the opinion that Thomas, or anybody else who made Thomas’s thesis his own, must not of necessity be considered suspect, as long as his faith would lead him not to draw the conclusions that, all the rest remaining equal, would follow from Thomas’s thesis.

A second article, taken from Aquinas, is known to have been censured by the masters: “Quod Deus non potest facere materiam sine forma”.²⁶ On this point too, Henry is less straightforward than other masters. Unlike them, Henry holds, indeed, that admitting this thesis must not of necessity lead to a denial that God could create or preserve accidents without their proper substance, to a denial, in other words, that God can do what, according to the then common understanding, is done in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. The faith of a theologian being given, there is enough reason for him to reject the consequences that, otherwise, would or at least could necessarily follow from such premises.²⁷

II. Henry as Interpreter of the Events

This seems not the place to present an exhaustive analysis of all of Henry’s works which are related in one way or another to the events of March 1277 and their philosophical and theological implications. Nor would the

²⁴ Wielockx, *Apologia* (see n. 7), pp. 222–223, text and n. 192. When speaking of the magisterial censure of 1277, Henry simply says the theological note was “falsum” (see n. 18 above). When, immediately thereafter, he is reporting on the magisterial censure of 1285, he is even more explicit. The following text is quoted according to the MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15350, fol. 171^{va-vb}, the divergent readings of R. Macken’s edition (pp. 127–128, apparatus) being indicated between parentheses: “Sed quia illud non dixerunt esse falsum nisi quia uisum fuit eis quod redundaret in doctrinam fidei quoad quosdam articulos fidei circa corpus Christi naturale et circa sacramen(tum) eucharistie et (ed.: ne-) quia (ed.: -que) contrarium (ed.: contra eam) uidebatur dictis (ed.: doctrina) sanctorum (ed.: formarum), quod ego testifcor qui interfui, procul dubio in eo quod illud iudicabant (ed.: probabant) esse falsum ex tali causa, in hoc, ut michi (ed.: intellexi) uidetur (ed.: enim), iudicabant ipsum erroneum et esse dampnandum, licet implicate”. (The readings “intellexi” and “enim” are indicated as dubious in the edition.)

²⁵ Wielockx, *Apologia* (see n. 7), pp. 222–223, n. 192.

²⁶ Wielockx, “Autour du procès” (see n. 17), pp. 415–416.

²⁷ Wielockx, *Apologia* (see n. 7), pp. 168–169.

present pages seem worth writing if they were to paint again the portrait of a Henry of Ghent champion of the Parisian orthodoxy as expressed in the bishop's decree of 7 March 1277. A useful task can still be achieved, however. On the basis of five well selected cases it can be shown that Henry of Ghent's later teaching related to the condemnations and censures of March 1277 is characteristically nuanced. Without pretending to cover, by these five analyses, all Henry has to say in every respect about the events of March 1277, these five test cases are not without consequences for the understanding of Henry's overall thought regarding these events.

A. Spiritual Substance and Individuation

It is well known that Henry was not satisfied with a position Thomas Aquinas held almost unbroken and unqualified throughout his career: in spiritual substances individualization is ensured not by matter, which is lacking in immaterial substances, but by their very essence.²⁸ There is however one passage in Thomas's works where something of a new perspective becomes visible. In his *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 4, Thomas admits the existence of a principle of individuation which is still immaterial and yet distinct from the essence as such. True, in spiritual substances their essence ensures their separation from all other substances. But there are also some "accidents" in them, that is, other individualizing factors ("alia quaedam"): they are beyond the mere essence of spiritual substances and belong to their supposite instead.²⁹ His thorough integration of Avicenna seems to have helped Henry to develop considerably this timid way of reckoning with individualizing "accidents" in the realm of the immaterial. In his *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, indeed, he explains that the intention of the essence of a creature implies neither the intention of its existence nor the intention of its subsistence in one supposite. Each essence of a creature, therefore, considered as such, is open to subsisting either in one or in more supposites. Hence, unlike what philosophers and some theologians may think, not only material creatures can be many in one species.³⁰

²⁸ Gordon Wilson, "Supposite in the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent", in *Henry of Ghent*, ed. Willy Vanhamel (see n. 3), pp. 343–372, especially pp. 347–349.

²⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 4, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Roma, 1996), p. 217, ll. 97–102, text and apparatus of the sources; *ibid.*, ad 1, p. 218, ll. 136–149.

³⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, ed. R. Wielockx, (Leuven, 1983), pp. 35–57, especially, pp. 38–39, ll. 78–85; p. 39, ll. 93–97. (See also Henry's *Quodlibet XI*, q. 1, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fols. 438^{rN}–439^{vZ}.)

So far, Henry clearly parts company with the Aristotelian camp both in and outside of the Faculty of Theology. But when he appeals in this context to the decree of 7 March, he does not simply mark his disagreement with one wing of the faculty. He, indeed, quotes three of the decree's articles in this context, but immediately stigmatizes a much more important error.³¹ If it is wrong to hold that there are not many individuals within the same species unless this is a material one, this error is at least right insofar as it keeps matter apart from immaterial creatures. By contrast, those who, in order to save many individuals in one species of angels, go to the point of admitting the existence of matter in the immaterial substances are doing something worse.³² Not only do they hold matter indispensable for individualization—which would be enough for depriving them of the right to invoke the decree in support of their thesis—but they also look for matter where it cannot be found. Obviously, Henry of Ghent did not have any special sympathy for William de la Mare's approach.³³

B. *Spiritual Substance and Location*

It is a common opinion among the historians of the decree of 7 March 1277 that in establishing art. 204 (Mandonnet: 55) Stephen Tempier ignored the advice of the masters whom he had appointed as his advisers.³⁴ The contemporaries of the events are not less unanimous in their witnesses. As he himself plainly states, Henry of Ghent did not see how to reconcile art. 204 (Mandonnet: 55) with art. 219 (Mandonnet: 54). This admission becomes significant in the light of another one: Henry clearly says that art. 219 (Mandonnet: 54) was put on the list of the 219 articles by the unanimous agreement of the masters of theology.³⁵ The articles 204 (Mandonnet: 55) and 219 (Mandonnet: 54), which Henry of Ghent felt unable to reconcile, are declared by Giles of Rome and Godfrey of

³¹ Ibid., p. 45, ll. 39–51.

³² Ibid., ll. 46–47: "Quod si hoc error est, patet re vera quod illi *multum* errant qui ponunt in angelis esse materiam ...". Italics mine.

³³ Palémon Glorieux, *Les premières polémiques thomistes: I.—Le Correctorium Corruptionis "Quare"* (Bibliothèque thomiste, 9; Le Saulchoir, 1927), pp. 60–62.

³⁴ Hissette, *Enquête* (see n. 3), p. 105.

³⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, (Leuven, 1983), p. 72, ll. 35–40: "Nihilominus tamen, cum est in loco non operando, bene potest esse in loco secundum substantiam per aliud, quod est illius ratio ... Quomodo tamen ..., ut verum fatear, dico quod ignoro penitus"; ibid., p. 67, ll. 16–24: "... dico igitur, secundum iam propositam determinationem pontificalem, angelum sine operatione esse in loco ... In hoc ...

Fontaines instances of inconsistency within the decree.³⁶ The presence of divergent theses in the decree can be best explained by the fact that the document proceeded from two distinct groups, one formed by the Faculty of Theology, the other by the diocesan staff around Tempier. At the Theological Faculty people knew: "Incorporalia in loco non sunt".³⁷ As to Tempier, he did or did not know. In any event, already by 10 December 1270 he had condemned Siger of Brabant's thesis who, by virtue of his leaning towards averroism, conceived the union of the soul with the body as a union by operation and, accordingly, had arrived at denying that the soul could suffer from the fire of hell.³⁸ In the first *Quodlibet* Henry holds after the condemnation of 7 March 1277, when treating of the specific cause of the location of immaterial substances, he touches upon this issue. Could it be, Henry asks, that those substances are in a place because of the impressions they undergo in a way similar to the demons who are in hell because of the material fire which affects them? Henry prudently evades entering into a full discussion. To claim that a spiritual substance is not in a place without undergoing some impression, he says, will perhaps be judged as erroneous as to admit that such a substance is located because of its operation. In an interesting turn of his reasoning Henry insists: it is quite possible that, according to the intention of the bishop, a spiritual substance is located without acting on any body or without undergoing any impression from it.³⁹ Henry seems disposed to go as far as to satisfy Tempier even on points the bishop might have only had the intention to state.⁴⁰

In sum, Henry would infringe the decree as little as Giles and Godfrey. However, whereas his two colleagues dare openly to denounce the inconsistencies in the bishop's act, Henry simply confesses his inability to reconcile one article of the decree with another one. He also does not say plainly that the difficulty of reconciling the two articles derived from the determination with which the bishop maintained his isolated point

concordabant omnes magistri theologiae congregati super hoc, quorum ego eram unus, unanimiter concedentes quod substantia angeli non est ratio angelum esse in loco secundum substantiam".

³⁶ Wielockx, *Apologia* (see n. 7), p. 103, n. 25.

³⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 5, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 28, ll. 15–18.

³⁸ Siger of Brabant, *In tertium de anima*, q. 11, ed. Bernardo Bazán (Louvain, 1972), pp. 31–35.

³⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, (Leuven, 1983), pp. 67–68, ll. 31–55.

⁴⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XIII*, q. 4, ed. Jos Decorte (Leuven, 1985), pp. 20–25, especially p. 21, ll. 26–41, shows Henry is as determined in 1289–1290 as he was in 1277.

of view. Henry rather prefers to state that the masters were unanimous in agreeing with the second of the two articles. Not content with simply not infringing any of the decree's prohibitions, he went to the point of surmising Tempier's unspoken wishes and of complying with them.

C. *Simultaneity of Intellect and Will*

Since Godfrey of Fontaines puts reference marks in front of the propositions 24 and 51 of Giles of Rome's censure, Giles took up the defence of those two propositions, which supposes that he was requested to recant them.⁴¹ It cannot be but on Tempier's order that Giles was obliged to recant. Indeed, as is known from John of Pouilly's *Quodlibet II*, the masters of theology, who were the assessors of Tempier in Giles's censure, had granted the truth of those two propositions.⁴²

Godfrey, as is well known, openly writes that the proposition of Giles granted by the masters cannot be true if art. 129 (Mandonnet: 169) of the decree of 7 March 1277 is to be upheld. To get out of trouble, Godfrey proposes to *interpret* the article and to consider the magisterial proposition, which came later in time, as the norm of that interpretation.⁴³ Godfrey's disciple John of Pouilly too is of the opinion that the magisterial proposition abolishes the art. 129 (Mandonnet: 169) of the decree, if this article is understood in a certain way. He proposes an interpretation of the decree's article which, he claims, will allow saying that the masters who drafted the decree and agreed upon Giles's proposition did not contradict—or even excommunicate—themselves.⁴⁴ The annotator of the MS Vat. lat. 853 writes that the magisterial proposition, which came chronologically

⁴¹ Wielockx, *Apologia* (see n. 7), pp. 9–10, pp. 10–15, p. 105.

⁴² See above, n. 11.

⁴³ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet VIII*, q. 16, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1924), pp. 165–166: “Et hoc patet etiam ex hoc quod ab omnibus doctoribus in theologia concessum est quod haec propositio est vera et tenenda secundum quod verba eius sonant et praetendunt, scilicet quod non est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error vel nescientia in ratione. Haec enim propositio non posset habere veritatem si contra iudicium rationis posset esse electio voluntatis. Propter quod etiam quidam articuli ab episcopo reprobati, ante approbationem tamen huius propositionis, qui videntur contrariari huic propositioni, sunt sic exponendi quod huic propositioni, prout fieri potest, concordent”.

⁴⁴ John of Pouilly, *Quodlibet II*, q. 11, MSS BnF lat. 14565, fol. 111^{ra}; lat. 15372, fol. 54^{rb}: “Idem magistri fuerunt assessores episcopi Stephani in condendo articulos et in concedendo predictam propositionem. Et ideo cum predicta magistralis propositio interimat articulum predicto modo intellectum, si predicto modo deberet articulus intelligi, illi magistri sibi ipsis contradixissent, omnes etiam XVI magistri qui illam propositionem concesserunt excommunicationis sententiam incurrerent, que omnia non sunt dicenda”.

later than the decree of 7 March, must serve as a norm of interpretation of the latter's controversial articles. He concludes that, since the proposition admits the simultaneity of reason and will, art. 130 (Mandonnet: 166) of the decree cannot be understood as a condemnation of this simultaneity: it must, therefore, be seen as a condemnation of the causality of reason on the will.⁴⁵ Elsewhere the same annotator reveals the existence of another way to reconcile the magisterial proposition with the articles 129 (Mandonnet: 169) and 130 (Mandonnet: 166): since they agreed on the simultaneity of reason and will, the masters excluded neither the causality of reason on the will nor, conversely, of will on reason. Rather, they considered the supporting both opinions as legitimate and compatible with the decree of 7 March. Therefore, the articles 129 (Mandonnet: 169) and 130 (Mandonnet: 166), if well interpreted, condemn neither the causality of reason on the will, nor the converse.⁴⁶ For his part, Henry of Ghent does not simply side with the voluntarist wing, to which he certainly belongs.⁴⁷ He indicates the existence of a reconciliation between the magisterial proposition with the articles 129 (Mandonnet: 169) and 130 (Mandonnet: 166) of the decree of 7 March. This reconciliation is very close to the previous one.⁴⁸ Henry, moreover, plunges into a personal attempt, not always as clear as it is prolix, to reconcile the magisterial proposition with the articles 129 (Mandonnet: 169) and 130 (Mandonnet: 166) of the decree. According to him, those articles condemn the necessitating causality of reason upon the will, and the magisterial proposition does not abolish that condemnation. Nevertheless he admits his incapacity to show that the proposition and art. 130 (Mandonnet: 166) agree in every respect. This is his reasoning: the will cannot oppose right reason without becoming the cause of an obscuring of reason. Hence, since the magisterial proposition requires simultaneity of reason and will, the will, from the first moment at which it has become the cause of a first obscuring of reason, has already ceased to be simultaneous with an entirely right reason. In other words, a will which is simultaneous with an entirely right reason is a totally right will. However, unless one were to know better, to

⁴⁵ Hocedez, "La condamnation" (see n. 4), pp. 42–43.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 43, p. 50, text and n. 59.

⁴⁷ Martin W.F. Stone, "Moral Psychology After 1277. Did the Parisian Condemnation Make a Difference to Philosophical Discussions of Human Agency?", in *Nach der Verurteilung*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen et al. (see n. 14), pp. 795–826, especially pp. 804–815, shows the influence of William of Auvergne on Henry's philosophy of will.

⁴⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 245, l. 56–p. 248, l. 32.

say this is to grant the truth of what Tempier condemned in his art. 130 (Mandonnet: 166).⁴⁹ Henry also notes his failure to reconcile art. 129 (Mandonnet: 169) with the magisterial proposition and admits that he cannot find a better solution.⁵⁰

The difficulty in maintaining the decree of 7 March in its literal meaning as well as the proposition granted by the masters, taken in the sense in which they agreed upon it, was acknowledged by all schools of theology and was certainly not without foundation.⁵¹

The masters did not wait until the 1280s to become aware of these difficulties. When, a few days after 7 March 1277, they met to examine Giles's propositions, the masters granted the magisterial proposition only after debate. What was at stake was precisely the question of knowing whether reason is the cause of the will or vice versa. Giles's proposition had caused debate because it had initially been misunderstood under the impact of the decree of 7 March. Art. 129 (Mandonnet: 169) of the decree, indeed, had been censured in order to curb the causality, and more specifically the necessitating causality, of reason upon the will. Once it became clear that Giles entirely abstracted from the question of causality between reason and will, the masters soon came to an agreement with each other to grant the truth of the proposition. The magisterial proposition did not contradict the bishop's sentence unless the latter was understood in a specific way. The point in the decree which the masters considered essential, namely the condemnation of the necessitating causality of reason, was spared. True, to understand the decree in this way the masters had to interpret slightly the letter of the decree, but they had done something similar when they appended art. 219 (Mandonnet: 54), which implied an interpretation of the art. 204 (Mandonnet: 55) urged by the bishop. As far as articles 129 (Mandonnet: 169) and 130 (Mandonnet: 166) were concerned, the masters had a very good reason to interpret them. If, indeed, the masters had condemned Giles's thesis, they would have curbed at the same time their own teaching, according to which evil will entails an *immediate* obscuring of reason. If, on the other hand, they granted Giles's thesis, they got two advantages. Not only did they not oppose the point which, in their opinion, was essential in the decree, but, in addition, they avoided censuring their own teaching.⁵²

⁴⁹ Ibid., q. 10, p. 268, l. 90–p. 271, l. 55; see also p. 259, l. 93–p. 268, l. 89.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 271, ll. 49–55; *ibid.*, q. 13, p. 286, l. 22–p. 289, l. 85, especially ll. 75–83.

⁵¹ Wielockx, *Apologia* (see n. 7), pp. 106–107.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 107–108.

Henry of Ghent, albeit with less open satisfaction than Godfrey of Fontaines, nevertheless recognizes that the magisterial proposition requires an interpretation of the decree of Tempier and he clearly shows willingness to accept this consequence. He does so in his *Quodlibet X*, qq. 9–10 and q. 13.⁵³ Interestingly enough, Henry's *Quodlibet I*, q. 17, held in Advent 1276, shows that his position in *Quodlibet X* is far from being the result of an unanticipated choice. In this First *Quodlibet*—hence a few months *before* March 1277—, the simultaneity of mistaken reason and evil will is expressly and systematically developed in a step by step analysis of the process which in incontinent people—as opposed to what happens in temperate and, on other grounds, in intemperate people—leads from right reason and right will via incipient weakening of goodwill (due to interference of an evil impulse) and incipient obscuring of reason, toward an evil choice and a (temporarily) blinded reason.⁵⁴ It is, therefore, quite in line with his personal thought that not only in 1285, but as early as 1277 Henry readily rejoined the unanimous agreement of the masters with Giles of Rome and held, against Stephen Tempier's singular position, that, from the chronological point of view, mistaken reason and evil will are concomitant notwithstanding the priority of will in the order of causality.⁵⁵

*D. Unicity of Form in the Human Being:
From "Heresy" to "Theological Opinion"*

Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet X*, q. 5 shows a remarkable process in its author's mind regarding the evaluation of Thomas Aquinas's personal thesis according to which there is only one substantial form, namely the rational soul, in the human being. Three stages of this process can be substantiated. In Stage I, Henry attempts to brand Thomas's thesis as heretical and supports this claim by referring to Pecham's public condemnation of 30 April 1286 in London and to two condemnations by the Faculty of Theology in Paris, a private one in March 1277 and

⁵³ See n. 48–50.

⁵⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 17, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1979), p. 138, l. 31–p. 149, l. 55, especially p. 140, l. 76–p. 143, l. 30.

⁵⁵ Along with the texts quoted in n. 54, one passage in particular of *Quodlibet I*, q. 17 deserves full noticing here (ibid., p. 147, ll. 17–20): "Quod autem ex parte voluntatis qua debet homo esse practicus, prius deordinetur incontinens (prius dico, *non duratione, sed causalitate*: simul enim fuit error rationis et deordinatio voluntatis) quam ex parte rationis qua debet homo esse sciens, aperte patet ...". Italics mine.

an implicit one between Easter 1285 and Easter 1286. In Stage II, after at least one academic year, Henry cancelled, added and changed a great deal in his text including those passages of Stage I regarding Thomas's thesis. This intensive rewriting resulted in the admission that Thomas's position was a tolerable theological opinion. The references to the London and Paris condemnations stood, however, albeit without Henry's personal and severe theological notes on Thomas's thesis. In Stage III, Henry may have felt that any further reference to the public condemnation from abroad, which strictly speaking did not have a juridical force in Paris, and his appeal to the Paris condemnations, which were admittedly only private or implicit, would hardly be useful in an argument to be fought out on Parisian soil with, among others, such a perceptive and acute a colleague as Godfrey of Fontaines. He understandably did away with all references to those condemnations, unless they were interesting on other grounds, for instance, insofar as they touched on an apparent implication of Henry himself in the London condemnation (art. 6).⁵⁶

The process revealed in Stages I-II-III can be detected with the help of Godfrey of Fontaines's historical information and of his copy of Henry's *Quodlibet X*, q. 5. This significant process can be confirmed by a remarkably similar process in the very same *Quodlibet X*, q. 5 regarding, this time, the author's three successive reactions towards Godfrey's criticism (*Quodlibet III*, q. 5) of Henry's anthropological dimorphism (Christological implications as articulated in the public dispute of *Quodlibet X*, q. 5).

i. Thomas's Thesis according to Stages I, II and III

In his *Quodlibet III*, q. 5 (Advent 1286) Godfrey of Fontaines reports that in the wake of the London condemnation of 30 April 1286 many Parisian masters declared to be unaware that Aquinas's unicity thesis and its corollaries were held in Paris to be heretical or opposite to the Christian faith.⁵⁷ It is therefore surprising, Godfrey says, that in Paris

⁵⁶ Gordon Wilson, "Henry of Ghent and John Peckham's Condemnation of 1286", in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. Guy Guldentops—Carlos Steel (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre. I, 31; Leuven, 2003), pp. 261–275.

⁵⁷ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet III*, q. 5, ed. Maurice De Wulf—Auguste Pelzer (Louvain, 1904), pp. 207–208 (longer version), p. 314 (shorter version). See Ludwig Hödl, "Neue Nachrichten über die Pariser Verurteilungen der thomasischen Formlehre", *Scholastik*, 39 (1964), pp. 178–196, especially p. 180.

one man pretends those articles or similar ones are publicly condemned not only in England, but also everywhere, and denounces all those as excommunicated who teach one or all of them.⁵⁸

A good case can be made for detecting in two passages of Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet X*, q. 5 as kept in MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15350 the target Godfrey had in view. The two passages are written by S, Godfrey of Fontaines's socius, who accounts for the text of full page there. Both passages were *cancelled* in particular at another, obviously later time.

In a first passage, Henry says he believes truly that, as the Archbishop of Canterbury had stated, those articles in which Thomas's unicity thesis was of primary importance were heresies.⁵⁹

In a second passage Henry is concerned with the theological note given by the Parisian Faculty of Theology when meeting on an order of Pope Honorius IV (between Easter 1285 and Easter 1286). As they had done when meeting on the order of the papal legate and the bishop in 1277, the masters declared Thomas's unicity thesis neither erroneous nor heretical, but wrong. In 1285–1286 they declared it wrong, because it indirectly compromised the articles of faith about Christ's natural body and about the Eucharist. Because of this, Henry infers that, since the masters had sentenced Thomas's thesis on behalf of its erroneous consequences, they had judged it to be erroneous and open to condemnation, so that anybody who would attempt to support it with obstinacy was publicly branded a heretic.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet III*, q. 5, ed. M. De Wulf—A. Pelzer (Louvain, 1904), p. 208 (longer version), p. 314 (shorter version).

⁵⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 126, ll. 32–33, l. 35 and apparatus: "Quae (opinio de unitate formae in homine) revera ... mihi ... videtur et diu visum est quod quoquo modo est merito damnabilis tamquam erronea et redundans in doctrinam fidei ... Sed quod plus est, primas Angliae dictos octo articulos, in quibus principaliter est ille de unitate formae in homine, in sua sententia pronuntiavit esse haereses damnatas in se vel in suis similibus. Quod revera bene credo, licet pertractatio nondum fuerit declarata Parisius ut pro erroribus publice Parisius teneri debeant". (See MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 171^{va}2, 4–11.) Is "licet ... debeant" from Stage II?

⁶⁰ MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 171^{va}53–^{vb}5 (the marginal and interlinear additions of C are marked hereafter between square brackets; divergent readings of R. Macken's edition, pp. 127–128, apparatus, are indicated between parentheses): "Sed quia [dico (ed.: duo (?)) quod ide(m) (ed.: quidem (?)) illud non dixerunt esse falsum nisi quia uisum fuit eis quod redundaret in doctrinam fidei quoad quosdam articulos fidei circa corpus Christi naturale et circa sacramen(tum) eucharistie [et (ed.: ne-) quia (ed.: -que) contrarium (ed.: contra eam) uidebatur dictis (ed.: doctrina) sanctorum (ed.: formarum)], quod ego testificor qui interfui, procul dubio in eo quod illud iudicabant (ed.: probabant) esse falsum ex tali causa, in hoc [, ut michi (ed.: intellexi (?)) uidetur (ed.: enim (?)),]

The two passages, which correspond with the object of Godfrey's criticism of an early version of Henry's *Quodlibet X*, q. 5, may have been part of Henry's public dispute of his *Quodlibet X* or, somewhat later, of an early written stage of the text. Since, either way, they belong to the earliest stage we are able to reach, they can be considered as parts of Stage I. It is prudent, of course, not to take it for granted that even the earliest text of Godfrey's codex (written in full page by S) must be an uncontaminated mirror of Stage I. Indeed, in the portions of *Quodlibet X*, q. 5 written in full page of MS BnF lat. 15350 by S, there is a surprising coexistence of phrases or sentences which affirm the heretical character of Thomas's thesis (see above n. 59–60) and others which doubt it (see for instance “si haeresis est”, ed. cit. (n. 5), p. 106, l. 18; MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 170^{va}12). Unless Henry would have been inconsistent on so sensitive an issue *in one and the same stage of his writing*, this coexistence seems to reflect a text which, still indebted to Stage I, integrated also some elements of Stage II.

Stage II is attested by its contents, by codicology and by chronology. As to contents, two of its characteristics must be noted here. No phrases which affirm without qualification the heretical character of Thomas's unicity thesis are to be found in it. New phrases in which Henry doubts or qualifies this heretical character are present in it.⁶¹

iudicabant ipsum erroneum et esse dampnandum, [licet implicate,] ut quicumque ipsum pertinaciter conaretur defendere, publice censeretur esse hereticus”.—The “ut”-clause (“ut quicumque ... publice censeretur esse hereticus”) has been understood here as denoting not a purpose (grammatically equally possible), but a consequence, for three reasons. 1° Only this latter understanding explains the strong reaction of Godfrey of Fontaines's *Quodlibet III*, q. 5 targeting this very precise point and accounts for Henry's subsequent and increasingly important withdrawals regarding the very same point (first in Stage II, then more completely in Stage III). 2° In Henry's view (unaltered in all three stages I–II–III), a censure by the Faculty of Theology is enough for making the curbed teaching, if obstinately held, a heresy. Henry's definition of heresy, indeed, does not require that a thesis is condemned as a heresy by the canonical authority (MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 171^{rb}23–30; ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 125, ll. 95–3). 3° Last, not least, Henry changed his mind (Stages II–III) on the essential point. After the repeated Parisian censures emitted by the Faculty of Theology and the London condemnation, he first had come to believe that Thomas's thesis had ceased to be a legitimate theological opinion. It is only later that he held Thomas's thesis was, *also after those condemnations*, as legitimate an opinion as before (see below, text and n. 65). Such a clear change of mind in such an important issue would not have been possible without Henry holding at an earlier stage that Thomas's thesis, if obstinately asserted, was indeed openly heretical.

⁶¹ For instance, in the MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 170^{va}15 (see ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 106, apparatus, under “I. Correctiones” etc., unnumbered l. 4), where the text in full page (hand S) reads “Prima siquidem que talis est”, C adds in the margin “heresis, ut dicit, si tamen heresis sit” and inserts it after “Prima siquidem”. See also here above,

This distinctive character of Stage II is confirmed on codicological grounds. In MS BnF lat. 15350, this stage is regularly to be found in the margins and in the interlinear spaces and is normally written down by C, one of Godfrey's ordinary collaborators, easily recognizable thanks to his distinctive writing and ink. His ink shows that he is responsible for cancelling the two passages recognized as typical of Stage I. His handwriting confirms that he is responsible for additions which are specifically those of Stage II. As is obvious from the case quoted on purpose in n. 60 above, C happens to add, first, passages typical of Stage II to S's text and to cancel, next, S's text and his own additions. Must C, then, be supposed to have cancelled his additions in a second, separate campaign? But the data can easily be explained on the hypothesis of one campaign. It is, for instance, normal that a passage which was to be cancelled was accompanied, in the model, by "va- -cat" marks. And it is equally usual that copyists failed at first to realize the presence of those marks and became aware of them only at the moment when, before finishing their work, they gave their model a new and closer look in order to check their copy. On this hypothesis, C, like S, seems to have copied a model which was no uncontaminated representative of one redactional stage.

Finally, Stage II, recognizable by contents and codicologically, is also substantiated by its chronology. Unlike Stage I, which may correspond with the public discussion of *Quodlibet X* (Advent 1286), Stage II originated not earlier than 1287–1288. According to Stage I, indeed, the meeting of the masters held between Easter 1285 and Easter 1286 had taken place "last year" ("anno precedente"). In Stage II Henry must have felt unsatisfied with this dating, because after "anno precedente" he now added "annum disputationis huius".⁶² The specification would hardly have been felt as necessary if the revision had still taken place in the same year (paschal style) as the public dispute of *Quodlibet X*.

Stage III is codicologically attested in MS BnF lat. 15350 by the intervention of N, writing in a late 13th Century—early 14th Century hand, who does not belong to Godfrey of Fontaines's ordinary staff of collaborators and, in this codex, intervenes only in a few places of the copy of

n. 60, especially the interlinear addition "ut michi uidetur" and the marginal addition "licet implicate", which introduce a qualification into the hard statement which became the object of Godfrey's sharp criticism. See below, text and n. 65.

⁶² MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 171^{va}47 (see ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 127, apparatus): marginal addition in C's handwriting.

Quodlibet X (fols. 170, 171, 180, 181). Two of N's interventions are especially important here. They consist in cancelling two portions of text. The first portion regarded the London condemnation of 1286, of which, after N's intervention, almost nothing remains except, for instance, the slightly adapted part regarding art. 6 of that condemnation, which, interpreted in a particular way, would involve Henry's anthropological dimorphism among the victims of Pecham's condemnation.⁶³ By cancelling this text attested also in a somewhat different version in the MS Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium Duchownego 33, N conforms the text of Godfrey's codex to the one attested in witnesses (CHOS) of a university exemplar. These latter witnesses contain, *from one and the same hand per codex*, at least the *Quodlibet X–XV* (1286–1292) and are therefore datable 1293 at the very earliest. The second portion of text cancelled by N regarded the Parisian censures of 1277 and 1285 in a way not unrelated to the London condemnation.⁶⁴ Since N cancels passages written not only by S but also by C, and since N, in turn, is nowhere corrected by either S or C, N's interventions mark the latest discernable redactional stage.

In light of this increasing renunciation of any argument showing the heretical character of Thomas's thesis, it is quite understandable that one of the significant additions of Stage II was never given up in Stage III. At the place where Henry, speaking of the London condemnation, had first claimed, in Stage I, he had held and continued to hold that Thomas's thesis *had been* (obviously in a past that was come to an end with the London condemnation) a legitimate theological opinion, he made a significant addition in Stage II. "I have always held and continue to hold, he now said, that this thesis had been *and continues to be* a legitimate theological opinion".⁶⁵

The history of the textual tradition of *Quodlibet X*, q. 5 shows, therefore, that Henry of Ghent resumed, in Stages II and III, a position very much like the one he held before his summons to the papal legate Simon de Brie and bishop Stephen Tempier in March 1277. Just as he was surprised then to learn that Thomas's thesis would compromise the Christian faith, he now openly makes it clear that he regards this thesis as a genuine theological opinion.

⁶³ Ibid., fol. 170^{va}15–vb30 (see ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), pp. 106–108, apparatus).

⁶⁴ Ibid., fol. 171^{va}33–vb35 (see ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), pp. 127–128, apparatus).

⁶⁵ Ibid., fol. 171^{va}3 (see ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 126, ll. 31–35, especially l. 34, apparatus): the interlinear addition "et potest adhuc" is from C's hand.

ii. Successive Reactions to Godfrey's Criticism of Henry's Personal Position

A very similar shift in opinion occurs elsewhere in *Quodlibet X*, q. 5. When, indeed, Henry replies extensively to Godfrey of Fontaines's criticisms of the first version of this q. 5, he similarly begins by seeing in Thomas's unicity thesis a threat to the Christian faith and he ends up with a final recognition that only a theological opinion is at stake.

Godfrey of Fontaines's sharp criticism (*Quodlibet III*, q. 5, Advent 1286) of Henry's *Quodlibet X*, q. 5 (version of the public discussion in the same Advent 1286), became, no doubt, Henry's target in an extra reply added later to the text of *Quodlibet X*, q. 5.

Henry's reply, which is to be found in the Louvain edition from p. 93, l. 00 through p. 105, l. 93, addresses distinctly the position Godfrey presented in his *Quodlibet III*, q. 5. First, only in this presentation can all three arguments by which Henry epitomizes his target (p. 93, l. 00–94, l. 29) be traced, the third of the three arguments (p. 94, ll. 22–29) figuring exclusively in *Quodlibet III*, q. 5, not in *Quodlibet II*, q. 7. Secondly, the rewriting of those sections of *Quodlibet X*, q. 5 regarding the London and Paris condemnations took place under the influence of Godfrey's characteristic criticism uttered in *Quodlibet III*, q. 5.

It is evident that the reply originated later than the first version of *Quodlibet X*, q. 5. First, Henry could of course not possibly have replied in his first version to a criticism of which this first version was precisely the target. Secondly, the end of the reply is expressly marked as the end of an excursus by Henry himself.⁶⁶

Whereas, in *Quodlibet XII*, q. 10, Henry firmly rejects the unicity of form in man and does not show any willingness to hold the multiplicity thesis, in his reply (*Quodlibet X*, q. 5) to Godfrey's criticism, he goes as far as saying that he considers the thesis of anthropological dimorphism as "more probable", which is not exactly the same as presenting it as certain.⁶⁷ And he would be disposed, he adds, to hold the

⁶⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 105, l. 93.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 105, ll. 77–78 (MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 169^r10): "quae mihi videtur ad praesens probabilior". In his *Quodlibet XII*, q. 10, ed. Jos Decorte (Leuven, 1987), p. 51, ll. 23–27, Henry states: "firmiter teneo, sicut et alias saepius declaravi, quod sicut anima humana non posset esse forma corporis asini, ubi clarum est corpus esse corpus ab aliqua formaeducta de potentia materiae, sic impossibile esset solam animam esse formam materiae in homine". The question whether Henry's last rewriting of *Quodlibet X*, q. 5, comes before or after *Quodlibet XII* cannot be examined here.

multiplicity thesis, if it could better integrate the facts of Christ's death into theological theory.⁶⁸

Godfrey of Fontaines paid special attention to Henry's reply. In MS BnF lat. 15350, fols. 168^{ra}–169^r, Henry's reply figures on a bifolio, which was inserted in the middle of the original quire (binion: fols. 166, 167, 170, 171) and which was written by a distinctive copyist (L). This hand, or a very similar one, continues fols. 277^{va}–290^{rb} the correction, left unachieved by Godfrey of Fontaines, of the copy of Henry's *Quodlibeta XIII–XV* and Servais of Mt. St. Elias's *Quodlibeta*. The second folio of this original full bifolio was cut into two sheets of parchment of unequal dimensions. The first sheet remains as fol. 169 and consists of the upper part of the total original surface plus the stub still visible and descending deeply. Without the diameter of the stub, this first sheet is 16,7 cm wide. The second sheet, which is 16,7 cm long, was used for inserting what appears now to be fol. 180.⁶⁹ This fol. 180 contains the text of *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, p. 239, l. 1–p. 243, l. 8, possibly Henry's cumulative reply to Godfrey's *Quodlibet III*, q. 16 ("determination" lost). The first text of fol. 180 is in C's handwriting. Its correction is the work of N, who correctly solves some of C's compact abbreviations and adds corrections making good sense (fol. 181^{va} mg. inf.). N intervenes nowhere else in this codex (and in Godfrey's library) than on fols. 170, 171 (also the two interventions of Stage III), 180 and 181.

The fact itself that Henry's reply targeted precisely Godfrey of Fontaines's criticism of Henry's original version suffices to explain why Godfrey was especially interested in this reply. Indeed, the margins of this

⁶⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 105, ll. 79–82.

⁶⁹ Because fols. 168–169 and fol. 180 show *common* signs of previous displacements within the codex, their original belonging to one bifolio receives a further confirmation. C's instructions (fol. 168^r mg. sup.) to insert fols. 168–169 "above" ("supra") do not fit the actual situation. The text of fols. 168–169 ought to be inserted fol. 170^{rb} and, if fols. 168–169 had been originally destined to occupy their actual place, C should have given the instruction to insert fols. 168–169 "infra". The sheet which is fol. 180 was destined originally by Godfrey (notice in his handwriting on fol. 181^{rb} related to l. 4) to be placed "in fine totius huius uoluminis". (It should be noticed that "the end of the whole volume", in Godfrey's view, can best refer to fol. 338, a folio where James of Viterbo's *Quodlibet I* (1292–1293) ends, where the original binding (works of Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome [fols. 348^{rb}–384^{vb}] and Thomas Aquinas *not* included) ended and after which no sign of Godfrey's hand is discernable.) C, for his part (his pen, his ink), cancelled this instruction of Godfrey and added, fol. 180 and fol. 181^{rb}, mutual signs of reference and signs of insertion of the text of fol. 180. If the original destination of fols. 168–169, as for fol. 180, was "the end of this whole volume", C's instruction to insert the text of fols. 168–169 "supra" was originally fitting.

very bifolio fols. 168–169 are heavily annotated in the handwriting of Godfrey himself, whose notes, not surprisingly, do not exactly comply with Henry's views.

Henry of Ghent's supplementary reply to Godfrey's criticism (*Quodlibet III*, q. 5) deserves a closer look. Indeed, Henry's reply shows three successive reactions to Godfrey's criticism. Over against Godfrey's preference for treating the question of the unicity or, respectively, multiplicity of substantial forms in the human being on the basis of the nature of things and, hence, with the primary help of philosophical arguments, Henry's first reaction is an outcry of irony: How Catholic it is to prefer the philosophers to the data of the Christian faith!⁷⁰ The text of this first reaction, as it is kept in Godfrey's codex, is in the handwriting of L and is cancelled afterwards by C, who substitutes a rather mitigated phrase for it in the margins: It is to be said that it is not befitting to prefer what we learn from experience, by natural arguments according to the teachings of the philosophers, to those things we firmly hold to happen in the Sacraments and in the other facts belonging to the Christian Faith. This second version, characterized by the reading "conueniens", is attested by the common witness of Godfrey's codex and the MS Pelplin, Bibl. Sem. Duchownego 33.⁷¹ Henry finished however by substantially mitigating his reaction to Godfrey in a third version. Whereas until now he had understood the preference for "nature" as opposed to the preference for the *data of faith*, he finished by opposing it simply to his own *theological opinion* regarding the death of Christ and the Eucharist. And, instead of saying it is not fitting to prefer the nature of things, he accordingly finished by stating that it is *not unfitting* to prefer the nature of things to a theological interpretation. He simply added that if someone would understand that nature is to be preferred to the Christian faith as such, it would be simply right to take the opposite course, that is, to reject any, even minimal disagreement of the philosophers with the authentic faith. He specified however that he thought nobody would understand Godfrey's definition of "facts" as denoting what belongs to the Christian faith as such. This third reaction is present in the entire manuscript tradition, although in Godfrey's and in the Pelplin codex the crucial

⁷⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 5, MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 168^{vb}34; ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 103, ll. 33–34, apparatus.

⁷¹ Ibid., MSS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 168^{vb}33 mg. and Pelplin, Bibl. Sem. Duchownego, fol. 205^{va}36. In the edition (ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), pp. L–LI, p. 103, ll. 33–34), the existence of the distinctive variant reading "conueniens" is mentioned neither in the introduction nor in the apparatus.

prefix “in” is lacking, the two MSS continuing to read “conueniens” where the later witnesses of the university tradition read correctly “inconueniens”.⁷²

Godfrey’s reaction to this outcome, as visible in the abundant notes he left in the margins of Henry’s reply to his (Godfrey’s) own criticism of Henry, is eloquent in two respects.

First, the critical notes which he left in the margins of Henry’s reply cleverly exploit Henry’s way of arguing from “the facts”, that is, what happened in Christ’s death and what happened (and happens) in the Eucharist in *Henry’s interpretation*, as opposed to the “nature of things”. Godfrey uses this distinction to argue that Henry’s position, unlike Thomas’s, is more open to objections insofar as, instead of relying on the nature of things acknowledgeable by everybody, it is based on facts interpreted in a way unaccounted for in the history of theology.

Second, unlike Henry, who is disposed, he says, to go over to the multiplicity thesis of Pecham and others if it could better resolve the problems, Godfrey turns Henry’s confession of holding an only “probable” position into an argument for favouring Thomas’s unicity thesis, which in comparison, Godfrey says, has the strength of relying on the universally acknowledgeable “nature of things”. Since Godfrey’s observations deserve to be known correctly and completely, they will be published in the appendix of this article.

E. *Creation: A Kind of Change?*

Henry’s variations in opinion regarding the relationship between creation and preservation of creatures did not escape the attention of scholarship.⁷³

In his First *Quodlibet* Henry opposes Thomas Aquinas’s, Giles of Rome’s and especially also Boethius of Denmark’s position, according to which creation is neither a change nor an action really different from preservation. In a line of thought similar to Bonaventure’s, Henry is very determined to demonstrate that creation is of necessity a *change* of some

⁷² Ibid., MSS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 168^{vb}34–46 and Pelplin, Bibl. Sem. Duchownego, fol. 205^{va}36–vb5; ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 103, ll. 33–47.

⁷³ Giorgio Pini, “La dottrina della creazione e la ricezione delle opere di Tommaso d’Aquino nelle ‘Quaestiones de esse et essentia’ (qq. 1–7) di Egidio Romano”, *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, III-1 (1992), pp. 271–304, especially pp. 298–304; Porro, “Possibilità” (see n. 3), p. 224, n. 33.

sort: namely the change from mere essence into existence. He urges, therefore, that creation is one act and the preservation in existence is another.⁷⁴

In his *Quodlibet IX*, q. 1, on the other hand, he states that just as, on God's side, to create and to preserve is one action, so also, on the side of God's creature, to be created and to be preserved in existence is only one receiving God's undivided action. Henry does not hide his variation of opinion and explicitly refers to his initial and somewhat different position in *Quodlibet I*.⁷⁵ He does not fail to add, however, that at the instant of creation the creature *changes* into real existence and that the very same change is designated by the term "preservation" for the rest of the time during which this creature exists.

Under the pressure of the discussions with Giles of Rome, Henry, in his *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, would qualify the non-identity of creation and preservation.⁷⁶ On the one hand he readily admits that an essence cannot possibly be the subject of creation in this sense that the essence would be imagined to be a subject actually existing before receiving, by the change which is creation, the term to be produced, namely existence.⁷⁷ On the other hand he forcefully rebukes the other extreme which would consist in admitting that the essence to be created would be the term of creation without also being in any real sense at all the subject of creation. Therefore, he admits that the same essence is actualized by its existence and by creation, that is, by its coming into existence, but in a different way respectively. Creation is the act of the essence insofar as this essence is merely in potency and a subject intermediary between existing and non-existing. Existence, in turn, is the act of this essence, not merely inasmuch as this essence is a subject in potency to existence, but rather inasmuch as this essence is the term itself of the change which is creation.⁷⁸ In this way Henry returns anyhow to a distinction between creation and

⁷⁴ Macken, "La temporalité" (see n. 3), p. 236, pp. 242–256; Hissette, *Enquête* (see n. 3), pp. 277–280.

⁷⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 2, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 13, l. 59–p. 14, l. 65. Unlike what the editor claims (apparatus), it is not true that Henry's remark on *Quodlibet I* is, in MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 127^{va} mg. sup., from "the corrector's" hand. It is in the handwriting of the text of the full page there and more precisely of the hand of S, Godfrey's most continuous copyist, who accounts for more than the half of all copies kept of Godfrey's library.

⁷⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 192, ll. 16–17: "... non sunt omnino idem ... *forte* ... creatio et conservatio". Italics mine.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 192, l. 20–p. 193, l. 32.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 191, l. 92–p. 192, l. 19.

preservation as in his *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, even if he allows, on the other hand, for the identity between the thing created and the thing preserved. Creation itself, in its specificity, is the act of an essence inasmuch as this one is in potency. Existence, in its specificity, is the act of an essence inasmuch as, instead of being merely subject of creation, it is also its term. Preservation, in its specificity, is the act of an essence which, after having come into existence by creation, continues to exist in actuality.

Henry, as is very well known, considers the difference between essence and existence neither as real nor as rational, but as intentional. Inasmuch as this difference escapes being a merely rational one, the status of the essence which is subject and term of creation cannot be reduced to a merely cognitive reality. So, the status of creation as a change of some sort can be maintained on good grounds. Creation could be no change at all, indeed, if it were only the motion from being *known* to being in existence.

In Henry's view, the status of the essential being cannot be reduced to the status of a merely cognitive being. His *Quodlibet III*, q. 9, as J. Wippel pointed out and P. Porro recognizes, is clear on one crucial point: with the three types of "being" ("esse naturae extra in rebus", "esse rationis", "esse essentiae") correspond three types of "thing" ("res naturalis", "res rationis", "res essentiae"). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that "esse essentiae", as well as "esse existentiae", belongs to the sphere of being without belonging as such and necessarily to the sphere of a merely cognitive being.⁷⁹ In the phrase of *Quodlibet III*, q. 9, fol. 62^{VR}13–14 "solum esse essentiae vel rationis in intellectu", the locution before the conjunction and the one after it must not be synonyms, but they can be authentic alternatives. As long as this is true, Henry ought not to be suspected of such heavy an inconsistency as to withdraw, in this short phrase, what he plainly states in this very same q. 9 of his *Quodlibet III*. It is clear enough that essential being and cognitive being can coincide in definite cases, were it only because, in God, this is what happens by definition. This however does not alter the fact that none of both aspects ought to be denied a real presence even in the absolutely simple, divine reality.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 9, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 61^{r-v}0; John F. Wippel, "Essence and Existence", in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann—Anthony Kenny—Jan Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 385–410, especially p. 403; Porro, "Possibilità" (see n. 3), p. 240.

⁸⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VII*, qq. 1–2, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, 1991), p. 18, ll. 43–49 cannot show that Henry simply subsumes "esse essentiae" under cognitive reality.

It may very well be the case, then, that Henry felt satisfied with an intentional distinction between essential being and existence. This distinction is, in his view, a sufficient basis for continuing to admit that creation is a change of some sort (from essential reality into existence) and, consequently, that creation and preservation are specifically different (even though they both may be present in a preserved creature).

At this point, however, where Henry may have thought he had saved the possibility of maintaining a difference between creation and preservation, he might have provoked the confrontation with a question far more serious still.

As J. Gómez Caffarena pointed out and P. Porro reinstated, Henry fully develops in *Quodlibet X*, q. 7 and especially in *Quodlibet XI*, q. 3 an insight which is not simply absent from his earlier writings such as *Summa*, art. XXVI, q. 1.⁸¹ It is not specifically existence which is now regarded as the first and primary term of creation, but rather essence itself. All the rest, like its quiddity and its passing with this “quiddity” into existence, are now regarded rather as some further unfolding or, in the terminology of the *Liber de causis*, “information” of the primary and pregnant being of the essence itself.

This late fruit of Henry’s characteristic thought makes him run a serious risk. If, indeed, the primary term of creation is essence itself, just as in conformity with Henry’s basic thought essence, not existence, is the basic “reality”, how to maintain at the same time that this essential being (“esse essentiae”) can in any real sense be the object and term of a genuine *change*? Unlike existence which according to Henry comes after the already “real” essence, this essential being cannot possibly come *after* something in any real sense. Indeed, ever since it is a necessary object in God’s eternal knowledge, it must be an eternal copy of the eternal archetype.

According to Henry, God can freely decide which essence (“res a ratitudine”) he puts into actual existence and which he leaves in its mere

The context (l. 46) makes it clear that the essence can very well have a being “in ipsis singularibus extra”. And shortly thereafter (ll. 49–61) Henry states that, although it is never separate from extant supposites or from the intellect (ll. 53–61), the “esse” (*sic*) of the quiddity and essence (l. 53) is as distinct from all the rest, that is, from the essence’s being in supposites and from its being in the intellect, as humanity in itself is distinct from all its “accidents”, like its being in human supposites and its being in the intellect (ll. 49–53). Avicenna is at the very core of Henry’s essential thought.

⁸¹ Gómez Caffarena, *Ser* (see n. 3), pp. 101–126; Porro, “Possibilità” (see n. 3), pp. 233–234.

possibility. The actually existent universe, therefore, cannot but depend on God's sovereign choice.⁸² However, for freely deciding which essence is to be created in actual existence the difference between "real things" ("res a ratitudine") and fictive things ("res a reor reris") must be supposed. Unlike what happens with essences, which "ceteris paribus" can all pass into existence, there is no way of thinking that any "res a reor reris" could pass into the realm of "res a ratitudine" or vice versa. There being absolutely no way of changing this situation, it does not make any sense to think God would have the choice to make even one "res a reor reris" join the realm of "res a ratitudine". That the divine essence is imitable by this finite "aliquitas", by that other one and by the universe of all real things ("res a ratitudine") can as little depend on God's free choice as God's essence itself.

Two crucial works, *Quodlibet IX* and *Quodlibet V*, deserve to be quoted here.

In *Quodlibet IX*, qq. 1–2, Henry time and again stresses his view, shared with Thomas Aquinas, whose formulae (*De veritate*, q. 2, a. 2–4) can easily be recognized in Henry's, that the possible creatures are in God's intellect as known objects are in knowledge. On the other hand, he states openly in the same context that the essential being is irreducible to being known.⁸³

Henry also does not fail to realize that, whereas things operated by our intellect are diminutive beings, the essences, although present in God's knowledge in their capacity as known realities, have nevertheless something in themselves which is naturally suited for existing in actuality by God's efficient causality.⁸⁴

It is true that things different from God and known by him are in his knowledge in their capacity as some things *known*, but precisely because this way of divine knowledge is the utmost of perfection it has a crucial status. Realities known in this knowledge possess more than simply any cognitive being. They equally possess the *being* which they are according to their essence and they possess the *being-some-thing* which distinguishes them from all other "somethingness".⁸⁵

⁸² See, for instance, Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 4, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fols. 158^{rh}–159^{rt}.

⁸³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 2, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 32, ll. 63–72.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31, ll. 44–52.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34, ll. 24–27 (punctuation corrected): "Sciendo enim se, in sua cognitione ut quaedam cognita ipsa scita alia a se habent esse id quod sunt per suam essentiam et aliquid ad se, et haec est perfectissima scientia et modus perfectissimus sciendi alia a se".

How serious this immanence of the essential being of possible creatures within God's knowledge and essence is to be taken can be seen from the fact that Henry does not shrink from stating that God's essence not simply *has*, but also *is* the *specificity* (*ratio*) of relation to them. If both substance and accident apply to God's relation to possible creatures, no one could feel content with interpreting Henry's thought as if this relation would be merely accidental.⁸⁶

Keeping to Henry's considerations in *Quodlibet* V, q. 4, it appears that, according to him, "although God cannot have it in himself except in relation to creatures, He can not possibly not possess the specificity of the perfection which is proper to the "idea" and which regards the reality that is something by essence and nature. Regarding everything which is something in terms of quidditative and essential being, God indeed possesses by virtue of his necessary perfection the specific perfection of being idea and being imitable archetype ... It ought to be agreed that God wills of necessity whatever He wills, since He wills all these things in willing himself, namely inasmuch as on behalf of what they have in goodness of nature and essence they all have a necessary relationship to the goodness which He is Himself ... In this way the goodness of his essence is the reason why He wills everything, just as the truth of this very essence is to Him the reason to know everything. That is why, just as He knows of necessity everything He knows—regarding their quidditative being—, in the same way He wills everything He wills regarding that very same quidditative being. Therefore, simply and absolutely, He knows and wills everything with the very necessity of His knowledge and will in knowing and willing of necessity Himself".⁸⁷

The syntactically somewhat awkward sentence is the result of a "correction" written by C on partial erasure of S's text in MS BnF lat. 15350, fol. 128^{rb}36–39. Erasure and rewriting, which continue also fol. 128^{rb}39–43, are not indicated in the quoted edition.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 28, ll. 57–64 (punctuation corrected): "Sic autem sua essentia, qua cognoscit se, cognoscit et alia a se, ... dico ... ut *ipsa essentia est ratio, et habet rationem, respectus quo respicit alia a se*, non ut quae sunt per existentiam aliquid extra in seipsis, sed ut quae sunt per essentiam *aliquid in* divina cognitione, videlicet in eo quod divina essentia est ratio et forma exemplaris illorum, et ut forma et causa et principium formale exemplarum". Italics mine.

⁸⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V, q. 4, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 158^{vo}: "Quod enim est aliquid per essentiam et naturam, licet non sit in existentia aliqua extra intellectum, non potest non esse tale, nec potest non habere rationem perfectionis idealis in Deo. Nec e converso Deus potest non habere rationem perfectionis suae idealis ad illud: habet enim de necessitate perfectionis suae rationem perfectionis idealis et imitabilitatis ad omne illud quod est aliquid in esse quidditativo et essentiae, et quod potest esse aliquid in esse

Conclusion

In the light of the five test cases analyzed here Henry's interpretation of the events of March 1277 appears to be characteristically nuanced. Henry rejects the position of those like Thomas Aquinas who hold matter indispensable for making many individuals within one species, but he also disowns William de la Mare's attempt to make the Syllabus of 7 March 1277 support universal hylomorphism. Henry scrupulously keeps to the opinion of Stephen Tempier and his diocesan staff on the location of spiritual substances, even though this leads him to pay the price of openly confessing his ignorance as to how such an opinion could be reconciled with what are openly recognized truths. Nevertheless, he maintains with the unanimous masters of theology that a spiritual substance cannot be located by virtue of its substance. He admits, in agreement with Giles of Rome and the masters of theology, the strict simultaneity of intellect and will, and he consequently qualifies Tempier's rejection of the thesis according to which right reason goes hand in hand with right will. His evaluation of Thomas Aquinas's personal thesis according to which there is only one substantial form in the human being, namely the rational soul, is especially interesting. In the public discussion of his *Quodlibet* X (Advent 1286), Henry endeavours to label this thesis as heretical. But, at long last, he makes room for a return to his earlier indulgent position, held in Advent 1276 and Lent 1277, when he was surprised in hearing from Simon de Brie, later Pope Martin IV, that Thomas's thesis would compromise the Christian faith. Instead of branding Thomas's position as heretical he would simply consider it again as a legitimate theological opinion. Whereas one of Tempier's main concerns was the curbing of the pagan view of a necessary emanation of participated and participating realities from the non-participated first reality, Henry endeavours to steer a middle course. On the one hand, he eagerly emphasizes the contingency of creation in the order of existence

existentiae, quamvis ratio talis non sit in Deo nisi ex respectu et comparatione ad creaturam"; *ibid.*, fol. 158^{vp}: "... bene concedendum est quod Deus vult de necessitate quaecunque vult, eo quod omnia huiusmodi vult volendo seipsum, et hoc propter necessariam habitudinem illorum secundum id quod habent bonitatis naturae et essentiae ad bonitatem quae ipse est ..."; *ibid.*, fols. 158^{vp}–159^{rp}: "Ut secundum hunc modum bonitas suae essentiae sit ei ratio volendi omnia, sicut veritas eiusdem est ei ratio sciendi omnia, ut sicut de necessitate scit quaecunque scit, quo scilicet ad esse eorum quidditativum, sic de necessitate vult quicquid vult quoad idem, et simpliciter et absolute omnia scit et vult de necessitate suae scientiae et voluntatis in sciendo et volendo seipsum de necessitate".

corresponding with God's free will. On the other hand, he does not hide his willingness to allow for the necessary being of created quiddities in the order of essence corresponding with God's ideas and ordained power.⁸⁸ When, in *Quodlibet X*, q. 7 (1286) and *Quodlibet XI*, q. 3 (1287–1288), he goes even to acknowledge that the essential being is the primary object and term of creation, he faces a crucial dilemma. In making the essential being the primary object of creation, he makes it to be a change, something it could not possibly be according to his own opinion. If, on the other hand, he would give up the idea of creation as a change, he would not only oppose the decree of 7 March 1277 and his own teaching, he would also have to face the question as to how the essential and unchangeable being can still possibly be an instance of God's sovereign free choice.

⁸⁸ Porro, "Possibilità" (see n. 3), pp. 247–253; Id., "Henry of Ghent on Ordained and Absolute Power", in *Henry of Ghent*, ed. Guy Guldentops et al. (see n. 56), pp. 387–408.

Appendix

The text edited hereafter under the title “Godefridi de Fontibus Reprobatio” etc. is to be found in ms. Paris BNF lat. 15350, in the lower margins of fol. 168^{ra-rb} and the upper margin of fol. 168^{rb}. It was printed partially by R. Macken in the apparatus of Henry of Ghent’s *Quodlibet X*, Leuven, 1981, p. 99, without recognizing Godfrey’s handwriting and authorship.

Godfrey wrote or drafted three endings. The first was located at the extreme lower margin of fol. 168^{rb}, where Godfrey could well have wished to have more room available. A second was begun and left incomplete soon in a small margin in front of the beginning of the “Reprobatio”. The third ending, finally, was located in the broader upper margin of fol. 168^{rb}. Godfrey put a reference mark at the beginning of this third ending. He repeated the same sign before the line of the “Reprobatio” where the first ending also began. In this line itself of the “Reprobatio” he put a vertical stroke to mark the exact place where the first and respectively the third ending were to be connected with the preceding part of the “Reprobatio”. Since Godfrey did not cancel the first ending it will not be suppressed in the edition hereafter. And because the second ending reveals the attempts of Godfrey to locate his planned ending in a fitting part of the page the edition offers the three endings in their natural succession.

Abbreviations used:

G	Godefridus de Fontibus
Mc	ed. Macken, Leuven, 1981, p. 98, l. 19ss, apparatus
+	<i>addidit</i>
<i>del.</i>	<i>delevit</i>
<i>exp.</i>	<i>expunxit</i> etc.
<i>mg.</i>	<i>in margine</i>
<i>praem.</i>	<i>praemisit</i> etc.
<i>s. v.</i>	<i>supra versum</i>

- ⟨Godefridi de Fontibus Reprobatio⟩
 ⟨Henrici de Gandauo responsionis⟩
 ⟨(in Quolibet X, q. 5, statu III)⟩
 ⟨ad Godefridi obiecta (Quodlibet III, q. 5)⟩
 5 ⟨contra Henrici dimorphismum (in Quolibet X, q. 5, statu I)⟩

Illa positio ex qua sequitur illud quod multum probabiliter subponitur omnino repugnare nature rei, sic quod rerum natura illud nullo modo sustinere potest nec actor nature efficere, magis est irrationalis quam illa ex qua sequitur illud quod non subponitur repugnare nature rei, sed
 10 natura rei hoc sustinet et actor nature illud efficere potest, sed subponitur repugnare quibusdam dictis et factis, non omnino tamen certis et manifestis, sed dubiis.

Ex positione autem plurium formarum substantialium in eodem subponunt sequi contrariam positionem tenentes quod erit aliqua forma
 15 substantialis que non dabit esse simpliciter et quod aliqua forma existens in materia iam per formam substantialem perfecta sit forma substantialis dans esse simpliciter etc., que sunt nature rei substantialis et accidentalis omnino repugnantia, et ideo etiam positio quam hec secuntur est omnino ab istis iudicanda impossibilis et nature rei repugnans.

20 Ex positione autem unius forme substantialis tantum in uno subponunt sequi positionem contrariam tenentes quod conuersio fit uel in solam substantiam materie uel in compositum ex materia et anima, licet sub ratione qua dat esse corporeum, et quod in triduo mortis Christi fuit noua forma in materia Christi, et quod illud corpus non fuit idem
 25 numero cum uiuente simpliciter ratione idemptitatis nature, sed ratione idemptitatis subpositi, que, licet sint possibilia secundum rem, tamen subponuntur repugnare quibusdam uerbis quibus dicitur fieri conuersionem in uerum corpus Christi et fuisse idem corpus Christi mortuum et uiuum, Christum secundum naturam humanam fuisse compositum ex
 30 corpore et anima et cetera huiusmodi, que tamen non ita expresse dicunt illud quod isti ponunt, quin bene possint saluari secundum positionem aliorum.

6 multum] intellectu (?) Mc. | multum ... subponitur] s. v. G. 7 nature] s. v. G.
 8 sustinere] sub *praem. exp.* G. 11 tamen ... et] *mg.* G. 17–18 que ... repugnantia]
mg. G. 18 et ideo] Ideo Mc. | hec] haec (?) Mc. | secuntur] sequitur Mc. 21 fit]
 sit Mc. | uel] et Mc. 22 uel] et Mc. 25 simpliciter] + nisi *del.* G + nisi Mc.
 26 subpositi] supposita Mc. 29 secundum] + ho(min)e(m) *del.* G + hoc *exp.* Mc.
 30 et cetera] etc. Mc. | huiusmodi] + per *del.* G. | que] Quae Mc. | tamen] + possunt
del. G.

Et sic, quia non est omnino certum per talia signari sic fieri conuersio-
nem et talem fuisse corporis idemptitatem, cum natura rei patiatur quod
alio modo fiat, et sic ista positio falsa iudicatur propter rei omnimodam
impossibilitatem a tenentibus contrariam, alia autem falsa iudicatur, non
propter rei impossibilitatem, sed propter aliqualem apparentiam ex qui- 5
busdam uerbis possibilibus secundum utramque positionem saluari, que
quidem uerba secundum superficiem uidentur aliquo modo magis pre-
tendere illud quod ponit ista positio etc.,

⟨*Conclusio prima*⟩

maius ergo inconueniens est quod forma substantialis non det esse sim- 10
pliciter etc. quam quod conuersio fiat in solam materiam uel in com-
positum dicto modo, et quod corpus Christi fuerit unum numero dicto
modo, quia primum reputatur omnino impossibile a ponentibus illam
positionem, secundum autem reputatur possibile a ponentibus aliam,
licet dicant illa fieri aliter. Quamdiu ergo non est determinatum sic fieri 15
ut isti dicunt, uidetur rationabilius etc.

⟨*Conclusio altera*⟩

Et ideo talis positio negatur ab illis qui iudicant quod ⟨...⟩

⟨*Conclusio tertia*⟩

unde cum ponentes tantum unam formam in homine hoc ponant prop- 20
ter impossibilitatem omnimodam contrarii ex natura rei et propter inco-
nuenientia nature rei omnino repugnantia ad que estimant se ducere
ponentes plures formas quos credunt ponere omnino impossibilia et

1 signari] significari Mc. 3 positio] + si falsa sit *del.* G + si fiat sic *del.* Mc. | falsa] est *praem. del.* G non *praem.* Mc. | iudicatur propter rei] propter rei *praem. del.* G. | omnimodam] ut (?) dicitur (?) Mc. 4 contrariam] contrarium Mc. | non] s. v. G. 5 rei impossibilitatem] *ex* reinpossibilitatem G. 6 positionem] rationem Mc. 8 ista] istorum (?) G. 10–11 simpliciter] secundum Mc. 11 etc.] et (+ quod *del.*) c. G et cetera Mc. | fiat] fieret Mc. | uel] et Mc. 13 quia] Quoniam (?) Mc. | a] *om.* Mc. 14 positionem] rationem Mc. | aliam] alium Mc. 15 Quamdiu] quam (?) ... (?) Mc. | ergo] + rerum *del.* G Ergo (?) + hic *del.* Mc. | non] *ex* n(atura) G nisi Mc. | est] cum Mc. | determinatum] discordant (?) Mc. | sic] potest Mc. 15–16 fieri ut] fieri (?) ut (?) Mc. 16 isti] isti (?) Mc. | dicunt] dicunt (?) et (?) Mc. | rationabilius] rationabilior Mc. 18 Et ... quod] *scr. mg. inf. fol. 168^{ra} iuxta initium textus* Illa positio ex qua sequitur etc. *sed del.* G. 20–61.14 unde cum ponentes ... formam quam plures] *mg. sup. fol. 168^{rb} G om.* Mc.

impossibilia, ponentes autem plures formas in homine hoc ponant
propter quendam probabilem modum conuersionis substantie panis in
corpus Christi et propter quendam modum unitatis corporis Christi uiui
et mortui, que tamen non reputant de necessitate ita oportere esse, sed
5 concedunt quod aliter posset esse ex parte rei et etiam modo quo hec
ponuntur a dicentibus tantum unam formam esse, et propter quedam
inconuenientia, non nature rei repugnantia, sed predicto modo proba-
biliter ab eis estimato, sed non certo, et sic credunt se alios ducere non
ad aliquod impossibile, sed ad aliquod falsum siue inconueniens et re-
10 pugnans modo ab eis estimato, nec tamen iste modus ita euidenter osten-
ditur subponendus uel tenendus quin possit alius probabiliter sustineri,
nec ipsi uidentur posse probabiliter euadere inconuenientia ad que alii
inducere credunt tanquam ad omnino impossibilia, uidetur rationabilius
posse teneri tantum unam formam quam plures.

III

HENRY OF GHENT AND AVICENNA

JULES JANSSENS

For Henry, Avicenna was clearly an “auctoritas”—an authoritative source to whom he refers. Even a superficial survey of his two major works, the *Quodlibeta* and the *Summa* (*Quaestiones ordinariae*), shows that he was greatly familiar with Avicenna’s *Metaphysics*. Indeed, in both works Henry offers a rather wide variety of smaller and larger quotations from this text by Avicenna. Closer inspection however reveals that their number is smaller than the number of quotations from Augustine, who is undoubtedly Henry’s major authority, but also smaller than ones taken from Aristotle, and even Averroes, “the Commentator”. Moreover, Henry never refers to Avicenna’s *Physics* or *De Anima*, although both texts had been translated in the second half of the twelfth century and in all probability were available in Paris. Insofar as Aristotle’s *Physics* had only partially been translated (mainly parts 1 and 2, and the very beginnings of part 3), it seems to have received a somewhat restricted attention in Latin scholasticism:¹ Albert the Great appears to be the only scholastic who has dealt with it in a systematic way. But especially during the third quarter of the thirteenth century, there seems to have arisen a special interest in this text, which might explain why the abruptly ended old translation has been continued, although not to the very end of the text. Insofar as this continuation took place in Spain, and no scholastic thinker except Albert seems to have used Avicenna’s *Physics*, it is perhaps no real surprise that any reference to it is absent in Henry. But this is certainly not the case with regard to Avicenna’s *De Anima*. It was almost a key source for all psychological writings of the thirteenth century. Certainly, Henry deals above all with metaphysics, but from time to time one finds texts related to psychology, but even then one looks in vain for any references to Avicenna’s *De Anima*.² Hence, one wonders: was Avicenna really a major authority for Henry, or only a minor or secondary one?

¹ See Jules Janssens, “The Reception of Avicenna’s *Physics* in the Latin Middle Ages”, in *O ye Gentlemen. Arabic Studies on Science and Literary Culture*, ed. Arnoud Vrolijk and Jan P. Hogendijk, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science 74 (Leiden, 2007), pp. 55–64.

² Jules Janssens, “Some Elements of Avicennian Influence on Henry of Ghent’s

Until the end of the eighteenth century, Avicenna was obviously not considered to be an important source for Henry's thought.³ In fact, from the end of the sixteenth century onwards Henry was increasingly characterized as a "Platonic" thinker. One has to wait till the very end of the eighteenth century to find a work where Avicenna is presented as an important source for Henry. This honour is reserved to D. Tiedemann who in his major work, i.e., *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie* (1791–1797), clearly stressed the existence of a major Avicennian influence on Henry. Unfortunately, his observations received almost no attention in the scholarly world so that the "Platonic" interpretation remained dominant in the entire nineteenth century. Even though this interpretation was convincingly shown to be wrong by M. De Wulf in his 1894 monograph on Henry, one has to wait until 1938 in order to find the explicit affirmation that Avicenna constitutes a key source in the elaboration of Henry's thought. J. Paulus in his seminal study on Henry of Ghent, i.e., *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique*, not only points to a direct Avicennian influence on major doctrines of Henry, but also characterizes Henry as adopting an "avicennizing Augustinianism". He clearly derived this notion from Gilson, who considered it to be a kind of "school" or "current of thought", but who was very hesitant to include Henry among its adherents. For Paulus it is obvious that Henry was not a member of such a kind of school. But he seems to think that Henry's thought can be characterized in that way, insofar as there is identification of God and the Agent Intellect, and Aristotle is read in an Augustinian way. He hereby presents Avicenna as a major source, only surpassed in significance by Augustine. J.V. Brown has seriously challenged this view.⁴ According to him, Henry's theory of human knowledge nowhere reveals a need to accept a doctrine of acts, either special or general, of divine

Psychology", in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death*, ed. Willy Vanhamel, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy) Series I, vol. 15 (Leuven, 1996), p. 169; art. repr. in Jules Janssens, *Ibn Sinâ and his Influence on the Arabic and Latin World*, (Variorum Collected Studies Series), CS 843 (Hampshire, 2006), XVI, p. 169.

³ For an historical evaluation of Avicenna as a source for Henry, see Pasquale Porro, "An Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent", in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings*, pp. 373–403 and Matthias Laarmann, *Deus, primum cognitum. Die Lehre von Gott als dem Ersterkannten des menschlichen Intellekts bei Heinrich von Gent (d. 1293)*, (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters) n.s. 12 (Münster, 1999), pp. 405–457.

⁴ Jerome V. Brown, "Intellect and Knowing in Henry of Ghent", *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 37 (1975), pp. 490–512 and 693–710, esp. 708, note 37.

illumination. Note that Brown does not totally dismiss Avicenna as an authority. On the contrary, he is well aware of the fact that there is a significant Avicennian influence on particular ideas of Henry's thought. But for him Henry is above all a representative, or better: the authoritative representative of late thirteenth century Augustinianism. Whether or not one agrees with this latter characterization, Brown maintains that the classification of Henry's thought as an "avicennizing Augustinianism", at least when understood in Gilson's sense, is seriously questionable. However, Vital de Four (ca. 1260–1327), in his *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione*, had insisted that Henry had identified God with an Agent Intellect. Based on this testimony, M. Pickavé is convinced that for Henry God is a kind of agent intellect, insofar as the activity of the divine illumination resembles that of the "intellectus agens".⁵ In this sense, one may detect a kind of similarity with R. Marston's theory, which fits perfectly Gilson's description of an "avicennizing Augustinianism". For his part, J. Decorte also somehow defended this latter characterization as appropriate to Henry's thought.⁶ Accepting Henry's profound Augustinianism, he also detects a more than secondary Avicennian influence in major theories, including Henry's distinction between "esse essentiae" and "esse existentiae". No longer taking into account Gilson's specifications, he nevertheless thinks that Henry's "Augustinianism", which cannot be doubted, has to be qualified by adding the adjective "avicennizing". Insofar as no contemporary scholar seriously doubts the particular significance of Avicenna for Henry, there does not seem to be any serious objection against Decorte's view of Henry as adhering to an "avicennizing Augustinianism", understood in a broad, non-Gilsonian sense. However, with Pickavé it has to be recognized that Henry somehow identifies God with an "agent intellect". The way he does so undoubtedly deserves a further thorough investigation.

Before dealing with elements of Avicennian doctrinal influence on Henry, one must briefly consider the different ways in which Henry quotes Avicenna. Based on a systematic analysis of quotations of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* in the *Summa*, five kinds of quotations can be

⁵ Martin Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts*, (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 91 (Leiden, 2007), pp. 72–77.

⁶ Jos Decorte, *Een avicenniserend augustanisme: metaphysica, wilspychologie en vrijheidsleer bij Hendrik van Gent* [An Avicennizing Augustinianism: Metaphysics, Psychology of the Will and Doctrine of Freedom in Henry of Ghent] (Ph.D. Thesis, Catholic University of Leuven, 1983), 1: *passim*, but especially pp. 46–48.

distinguished: 1. The so-called “auctoritates Avicennae”, i.e., concise statements recurrent at different places in the work; 2. Paraphrases, mostly indicated by the expression “secundum Avicennam”, being sometimes followed by the number of the book of Avicenna’s *Metaphysics*, which gave rise to the paraphrase (in these cases, it is not always easy to identify the correct basis in Avicenna’s text); 3. Brief literal quotations, consisting of one or a few lines (these lines does not always follow immediately each other in the original text); 4. Combined literal quotations, i.e., passages from different chapters (taken sometimes from different books) that are put together; and 5. Long literal quotations, which consist of quoting an entire chapter, or, at least, large parts of it.⁷ A rapid survey of the *Quodlibeta* has not brought to the fore any other form of quotation. Generally speaking, Henry is faithful to the very wording of his source. Nevertheless, he regularly omits sentences, skipping sometimes several lines so that it is extremely difficult in such cases to determine where he starts to quote Avicenna and when he *de facto* stops to quote him. Moreover, based on doctrinal considerations, he now and then consciously modifies Avicenna’s text and presents a highly interpretative version. For example, Henry replaces (as far as I can see systematically) Avicenna’s notion of higher Intelligences (“Intelligentiae” in the Avicenna Latinus) with that of God. This “modification” undoubtedly facilitated an interpretation of creation as directly resulting from God’s “free will”, whereas Avicenna’s wording involved rather the idea of an intellectualistic, mediated creation. It has to be stressed that the Renaissance edition of Badius in no way allows one to identify possible modifications in a precise way, especially insofar as one detects in it a will to “latinicize” the (even from the point of view of the medieval Latin of the Church) unusual Latin of the Avicenna Latinus, especially where it remained close to the Arabic phrasing of the original text. A much more reliable source to do so is offered by the available volumes of the critical edition of the *Opera Omnia* (still in progress); otherwise, recourse to the manuscript evidence is necessary. Let me add however that a really critical identification and evaluation of such modifications will be possible only after it is known for sure which manuscript (or, at least, which family of manuscripts) of the

⁷ A more detailed survey is offered in Jules Janssens, “Elements of Avicennian Metaphysics in the *Summa*”, in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel, (Leuven, 2003), pp. 41–49; art. repr. in Jules Janssens, *Ibn Sīnā and his Influence on the Arabic and Latin World*, (Variorum Collected Studies Series), CS 843 (Hampshire, 2006), XVII, pp. 41–49.

Metaphysics of the Avicenna Latinus Henry used. A systematic research in this respect remains for the moment a major *desideratum*. Eventually, it has to be stressed that the quotations by Henry of Avicenna occupy in many cases a central place in his exposé. Most of them are present in the “solutiones” where Henry develops his own point of view. In other words, one may suspect that in such cases they had a strong impact on the elaboration of Henry’s own doctrines.

An examination of a few theories of Henry where an Avicennian influence is overtly present will be revelatory.

Although Henry was first and foremost a theologian, he also paid genuine attention to philosophy. Insofar as he was a philosopher, he was above all a metaphysician. But how has one to conceive of the science of metaphysics? What is its proper subject?⁸ Is this God, and hence has it to be characterized as a theology? Neither for Henry nor for Avicenna is this the case. For both, its first proper subject is “being *qua* being” as Aristotle has expressed in book *Gamma* of his *Metaphysics*.⁹ Also in full agreement with Avicenna is Henry’s designation of the science of metaphysics as the “first science”. However, Henry defends this primacy by positing “being” as the “*primum cognitum*” of the human intellect. This idea has perhaps been inspired by Avicenna’s affirmation that being is one of the concepts primarily impressed in the soul.¹⁰ However, by articulating “being” as the “*primum cognitum*” in the way he does, Henry clearly introduces an idea absent in Avicenna.¹¹ For Henry, metaphysics is a limited human science that never can replace theology, a science, which, thanks to Revelation and divine Inspiration, somehow can exceed the natural limits of human knowledge. This is an idea completely foreign to Avicenna’s thought. On the contrary, Henry’s emphasis on there being only one concept of “being” is again in line with Avicenna. Despite this conceptual uniqueness, “being” can be conceived

⁸ For a basic outline, see Martin Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik*, pp. 109–115, where Pickavé stresses that Henry, in view of his conception of metaphysics as universal science, seems to prefer the expression “ens simpliciter” over that of “ens in quantum ens”.

⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VII, q. 3, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 50; Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* 1.2, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven, 1977–1980), I, p. 12.

¹⁰ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, 1.5, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven, 1977–1980), I, pp. 31 and 33.

¹¹ See Martin Pickavé, “Heinrich von Gent über das Subjekt der Metaphysik als Ersterkanntes”, *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 12 (2001), pp. 493–522.

from different point of views. Hence, “being” can encompass both creatures and God, an idea that also fits the Avicennian approach. It is therefore no surprise that Henry accepts the existence of a “natural theology”, which is a part of metaphysics. In stating that the real abstraction of separated realities belongs to this natural theology, Henry even somehow clarifies Avicenna’s distinction between metaphysics, mathematics and logic, as O. Boulnois remarks.¹² Even if for Henry metaphysics is primarily ontology, it is also more than that. It is a well structured, encompassing science that includes ontology, aetiology and theology. In this respect, it owes probably—directly or indirectly—a lot to Avicenna, who seems to be the first thinker in history to have elaborated metaphysics as such an encompassing science¹³ (the basic outline for it having already been posited by his great Arabic predecessor, al-Fârâbî). In sum, Henry’s basic conception of the science of metaphysics has much in common with Avicenna’s.

One of Henry’s major innovative ideas in the field of metaphysics is his famous distinction between “esse essentiae” and “esse existentiae”. That Avicenna’s—also famous—distinction between essence and existence has somehow influenced Henry in the elaboration of this particular doctrine looks rather evident. Similarly, that Henry has also been inspired in this specific theory by Avicenna’s idea of the indifference of the quiddity (i.e., a quiddity is neither universal nor particular, neither actually existent nor actually non existent, as expressed by the well known formula: “equinitas ergo in se est equinitas tantum”)¹⁴ seems also to be rather evident.¹⁵ Much

¹² Olivier Boulnois, “*Abstractio metaphysica*. Le séparable et le séparé, de Porphyre à Henri de Gand”, in *Die Logik der Transzendentalen*, ed. Martin Pickavé, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 30 (Berlin, 2003), p. 56.

¹³ See Amos Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifā’*. A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science) 63 (Leiden, Boston, 2006).

¹⁴ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, 5. 1, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven, 1977–1980), II, p. 228.

¹⁵ Alain de Libera, *L’art des généralités* (Paris, 1999), pp. 580–581, presents Henry’s formulation of the indifference of the essence as directly opposed to Avicenna’s, but offers a much more qualified judgment in his *La référence vide* (Paris, 2002), pp. 73–74. Pasquale Porro, “Universaux et *esse essentiae*. Avicenne, Henri de Gand et le ‘Troisième Reich’”, in *Cahier de Philosophie de l’Université de Caen* 38–39 (2002), pp. 9–51 presents serious counterarguments against de Libera’s former opinion (but he stresses in an addendum that de Libera’s position in *Le référence vide* is less objectionable). Mario A.S. de Carvalho, *A novidade de mundo: Henrique de Gand e a metafísica da temporalidade no século XIII* [On the Origination of the World: Henri of Ghent and the Metaphysics of Temporality in the Thirteenth Century] (Coimbra, 2001), p. 274, links Henry’s theory of the indifference of essences with both Avicenna’s logic and metaphysics.

more difficult is to determine the exact nature and importance of the influence of both Avicennian theories. Regarding the essence-existence distinction, a serious problem immediately arises as soon as one tries to fix the precise nature of the concerned distinction, i.e., is it a real or an intentional distinction? If one accepts with Averroes that for Avicenna existence is a simple "accidens", the realistic interpretation is not only natural, but also inevitable. Averroes' "accidental" interpretation of existence in Avicenna was extremely authoritative in Latin scholasticism, and this realistic interpretation of Avicenna's distinction prevailed.¹⁶ A remarkable sign of Henry's critical and independent mind is his radical rejection of Averroes' interpretation. For him, the only correct interpretation of Avicenna's distinction can be an intentional one (and this is much more in accordance with Avicenna's original thought than Averroes' interpretation of it).¹⁷ For Henry, existence as "accidens" is not accidental in the usual sense, but in a broader sense, which makes it possible to think an essence without necessarily thinking that this essence actually exists. It is clear that for Henry Avicenna's essence-existence distinction is of capital importance and expressed a solid metaphysical insight. However, this does not mean that Henry follows Avicenna in every respect. Certainly, he fully takes over the idea that in God there is a complete identity between essence and existence. Moreover, his articulation of the idea of "esse essentiae" largely remains faithful to the Avicennian perspective. As Paulus has already noted, Henry keeps the Avicennian idea of an "esse proprium" of the essences.¹⁸ This "proper being" belongs to a thing, "res", and this in view of its "certitudo"—an Avicennian notion, chosen by the Latin translator in order to translate the Arabic term *haqîqa*, "reality," but which also implies the idea of "truth", hence this necessitates in English a kind of descriptive translation, e.g., something like "essence as truth". Henry seems to have been well aware that the notion of "certitudo" entails an element of truth. Indeed, for him the "esse essentiae" has

¹⁶ See Alain de Libera, "D'Avicenne à Averroès, et retour. Sur les sources arabes de la théorie scolastique de l'un transcendantal", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 4 (1994), pp. 165–175.

¹⁷ Recently Roland J. Teske, "Some Aspects of Henry of Ghent's Debt to Avicenna's Metaphysics", *The Modern Schoolman* 85 (2007), pp. 51–70, especially pp. 56–59, has argued that Henry derived his intentional distinction between essence and existence from various aspects of Avicenna's metaphysics, i.e., the idea that essence is only an essence; the qualification of being as accidental, but not as a real distinct accident, as well as the qualification of the being of both essence and existence as relational.

¹⁸ Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Études de philosophie médiévale) 12 (Paris, 1938), p. 98.

nothing in common with—more precisely is radically opposed to—any imaginary thing, and this due to the fact that the possibility to receive actual existence is implied in the “esse essentiae”. As such, the “esse essentiae” refers to the “res a ratitudine”, i.e., the thing insofar as it has a “certitudo” by which it is what it is. In strong opposition to it, one finds the “res a reor reris”, which is indifferent to both existential and essential being. Henry may have taken the distinction between both kinds of “res” from Bonaventure or Thomas Aquinas, who in any case mentioned it before him.¹⁹ Whether he effectively did so, and whether he understands the distinction in the same way as they did, is still in need of investigation. Even less clear is a possible Avicennian influence on the elaboration of this notion. This might have already been the case with respect to Bonaventure or Thomas Aquinas, or might be limited to Henry’s understanding, if it is really unique to his thought. As already shown, an Avicennian influence with respect to the notion of “res a ratitudine” is almost certain. A major element of influence appeared to be the idea of “certitudo”, an idea that Henry has clearly derived from the *Metaphysics* of the *Avicenna Latinus*, Book I, chapter 5. In the same chapter, Avicenna insists that the absolute non-existent is not a thing²⁰ (almost certainly in direct opposition to contemporary mu’tazilite “theologians”), but he at the same time strongly suggests that fictional beings are indeed “things”, and this because they are not absolutely non-existent.²¹ This is a way of thinking that might have inspired Henry in his elaboration of the notion of “res a reor reris”. Regarding this issue, a hypothetical affirmation is in the actual state of affairs the only possible one.

Henry’s acceptance of “existence” as being an “accidens” shows also a great affinity with Avicenna’s thought. Note that “accidens” is understood by Henry in a broader than its usual sense, i.e., as denoting something that is convenient to a thing, but that does not belong to the “intentio” of its essence.²² Thanks to this particular understanding Henry can explain the individuation of immaterial beings by stating that they have their particular being in a distinct supposite from agency. In all this, he clearly

¹⁹ See Jan Aertsen, “Transcendental Thought in Henry of Ghent”, in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings* (see supra, n. 2), pp. 10–14.

²⁰ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, 1. 5, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven, 1977–1980), I, pp. 36–37.

²¹ See Deborah L. Black, “Avicenna and the Ontological and Epistemic Status of Fictional Beings”, in *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 8 (1997), pp. 425–453.

²² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, ed. Robert Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 48.

uses Avicenna's idea of "accidens" as "adventia tantum", "just arriving".²³ Certainly, Henry analyzes "existence" differently from Avicenna insofar as he makes it directly dependent upon God, and more specifically God's free will that can choose between possible alternatives. Therefore, the willing by God of the actual existence of a being is never necessitated in any way whatsoever. Herein one can detect the only radical rupture with Avicenna. Even if one understands the latter's emanationism in a qualified way, i.e., as implying a creationist moment based on the idea of the divine will as the will of the best possible, one must admit that his system allows no place for a freedom of choice in God.

On the other hand, one may wonder: for Henry, is the order of the essences as having only "esse essentiae" also subject to such kind of freedom? P. Porro has argued in favor of the acceptance of a kind of necessitarianism in this case.²⁴ Indeed, it looks as if for Henry God is not able to change the hierarchical order of the essences as it has been established eternally by His will. Henry's articulation of the distinction between God's speculative knowledge and His practical knowledge in terms of His knowledge of the order of the essences as being according to a straight line and a circular line, seems to be significant in this respect. Moreover, the way by which Henry accounts for Avicenna's paradoxical formula "possibile ex se, necessarium ab alio", i.e., by simply affirming that everything is contingent *qua* "real" and necessary *qua* "possible", undoubtedly points also in the same direction. If Porro's interpretation is correct, and I think that he offers enough evidence in order to throw the burden of proof on those who would defend a contrary view, it is obvious that Avicenna, and especially his famous formula that has just been evoked, constituted an important source of inspiration in the elaboration of this doctrine.

Regarding the "esse" of the "esse essentiae" a serious problem exists: is it, according to Henry, to be understood as real or as mental? Godefridus de Fontibus, one of his contemporaries, already correctly observed that Henry went beyond Avicenna's threefold consideration of essence (the famous "triplex respectus essentiae") by introducing the idea of a "triplex esse", a threefold being.²⁵ This threefold being consists of the natural

²³ See Gordon Wilson, "Supposite in the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent", in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings*, p. 359.

²⁴ Pasquale Porro, "Possibilità ed esse essentiae in Enrico di Gand", in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings*, pp. 211–253.

²⁵ See Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand*, p. 142, note 2.

being, “esse existentiae”, the mental being, “esse rationis” and the “esse essentiae”. This latter corresponds to Avicenna’s consideration “ante rem”. For Henry, the essences have no separate reality, as stressed by e.g., Paulus and Marrone.²⁶ According to Marrone, Henry directly based his theory on Avicenna. This might be too strong an affirmation since Henry links the “esse essentiae” with the divine ideas. Certainly, he does this not in a primary theological sense, but clearly in a secondary one that implies that the possible essences are really distinct from God. For Paulus, Henry considers the production of the possibles to be a production *sui generis*.²⁷ Porro, for his part, believes that for Henry the “esse” of the “esse essentiae” is an “ens diminutum” that however is not so diminished that it would be nothing.²⁸ It is the “exemplatum”, or “defectum”, as opposed to the “exemplar”. It is a mental being in God, but since God’s thinking, contrary to ours, is cause of its contents, the qualification of mental does not really apply. Hence, the “esse” of the “esse essentiae” is neither real nor mental, but is pure potentiality. Both Paulus’ and Porro’s interpretations imply that Henry has introduced an important idea that is totally absent from Avicenna’s theory. However, Henry’s view may be conceived as a particular development of the latter without (necessarily?) contradicting its basic outline. W. Hoeres, on the contrary, states that Henry wanted to provide the possible world an ontological status and therefore has reified the possible.²⁹ In doing this, he undoubtedly creates an irreconcilable tension with Avicenna’s idea of the constitution of the essences. Hoeres’ position seems to have been inspired by Duns Scotus. Even if at first sight this position is less convincing than the earlier mentioned interpretations, a detailed examination of it is required before it would possibly be dismissed. Porro has certainly made a first important step into this direction, but perhaps more is needed. Eventually, one may wonder with Gómez-Caffarena whether the placing by Henry of “pure essences” in God resulted from a direct opposition to the Averroistic inspired concept of essence, as present in some of Henry’s

²⁶ Ibid., p. 85 and Steven P. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, (Speculum Anniversary Monographs), 11 (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 106–107.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 91–92.

²⁸ See Pasquale Porro, “Possibilità ed *esse essentiae*”, pp. 221–241, and id., “*Ponere statum*. Idee divine, perfezione creaturali e ordine del mundo in Enrico de Gand”, *Medievalia. Textos e estudos* 3 (1993), pp. 109–159.

²⁹ Walter Hoeres, “Wesen und Dasein bei Heinrich von Gent und Duns Scotus”, *Franziskanische Studien* 47 (1965), pp. 121–186, esp. 169.

contemporaries and near contemporaries, especially Siger of Brabant.³⁰ Was Henry's motivation to do so not more positive? In my view it looks as if he wanted to combine the theological Augustinian idea of exemplarism with the philosophical Avicennian idea of the possible as *in se* indifferent to being and non being, and therefore in need of a cause for its actual realization. Of course, this does not exclude that he at once opposes the Averroistic concept of essence, but then obviously in an indirect, secondary way. Anyhow, this matter deserves a further study in depth.

Pure essences are potentially in God. But does God exist? We have seen that not He, but "being qua being" is the first object of metaphysics. Therefore, for Henry, and this in full accordance with Avicenna, God's existence has to be proven. His scholastic predecessors had already developed a wide range of proofs with the aim of establishing that existence. Inspired by them, Henry offers a large number of *a posteriori* proofs, i.e., proofs based on the created nature of the creatures. They are mainly divided into two groups: *ex causalitate* and *ex eminentia*. The former have Aristotle's famous argument of the Unmoved Mover as their ultimate source. Among them, one discovers a variant, which corresponds to Thomas Aquinas' third way and is based on the distinction between necessary and possible. There is little doubt that the basic source of this variant is Avicenna's contingency proof. However, Henry seems not to have been satisfied by the totality of these *a posteriori* proofs. In his *Summa*, art. 22, q. 5, he seems to suggest that in order to prove God's existence, one has not always to take creatures as a point of departure, and hence that there exists an *a priori* way. Unfortunately, one looks in vain for a clear formulation of such a proof. It is therefore no surprise that one finds in contemporary scholarship a great divergence of views on this issue.³¹ Paulus and Pegis believe that Henry's proof shows a great similarity with Anselm's ontological argument. They both examine the articulation of

³⁰ José Gómez-Caffarena, *Ser participado e ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante*, (Analecta Gregoriana) 93 (Rome, 1958), pp. 24–35.

³¹ The following survey has been largely inspired by Roland J. Teske, "Henry of Ghent: The Existence of God", *The Modern Schoolman* 58 (2005), pp. 19–38. The works referred to are respectively Jean Paulus, "Henri de Gand et l'argument ontologique", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 10 (1935–1936), pp. 265–323; Anton Pegis, "Toward a new way to God: Henry of Ghent", "A New Way to God: Henry of Ghent (II)", "Henry of Ghent and the New Way to God, III", *Mediaeval Studies* 30, 31 and 33 (1968, 1969 and 1971), pp. 226–247; 93–116 and 158–179; Stephen Dumont, "The *quaestio* 'si est' and the Metaphysical Proof for the Existence of God according to Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus", *Franziskanische Studien* 66 (1984), pp. 335–367; Pasquale Porro, *Enrico di Gand. La via delle proposizioni universali*, (Vestigia) 2 (Bari, 1990), pp. 99–105;

the proof in *Summa*, art. 22, and also treat art. 24, q. 6, where Henry deals with the knowledge of the divine essence. However, most crucial is Henry's move from the knowledge of the divine essence to that of the divine existence. According to Paulus, Augustine's *De Trinitate*, VIII (idea of absolute Being, Good and Truth) and Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, I (identity of essence and existence in God) were the basis of Henry's move. Pegis, on the other hand, estimates that besides articles 22 and 24, article 25 also plays a crucial role since Henry there presents an argument in favour of God's unity. Pegis justly remarks that Henry does this along clear Avicennian lines. Dumont does not necessarily doubt this latter Avicennian influence, but he categorically denies that the argumentation for God's unity has any relevance for Henry's *a priori* proof. However, with Pegis, and also with Paulus, he detects a similarity with Anselm's ontological argument, although in a lesser way than the former did. In fact, based on epistemological considerations taken from *Summa*, art. 24, he rather detects a kind of "reformulation" of Anselm's argument. With Dumont, Porro agrees that art. 25 should not to be taken together with the *a priori* proof that Henry in his view expresses in art. 22, q. 5. But he qualifies Henry's proof in a totally different way from Dumont. For Porro, Henry's proof is a "metaphysical" proof in an Avicennian line. It is expressed by way of the universal intelligible propositions, and hence based on the first imprinted notions, as e.g., "being" or "thing". Certainly, understood in this way, it is not absolutely *a priori*, but Henry himself explicitly recognizes this. Laarmann interprets Henry's proof very similarly to Porro. For both, it results from a combination of an Avicennian doctrine with Augustinian elements. For Teske, although he does not deny any Avicennian influence, Augustine's *De Trinitate* VIII constitutes the major source of inspiration for Henry's proof.³² Thanks to Augustine, Henry can explain the different possible degrees of knowledge of God and, moreover, establish in which way God can be qualified as "primum cognitum". According to Teske, Henry's "metaphysical" argument involves the

Laarmann, *Deus, primum cognitum* (see supra, n. 3), pp. 174–188; Gómez-Caffarena, *Ser participado*; and Raymond Macken, "The Metaphysical Proof for the Existence of God in the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent", *Franziskanische Studien* 68 (1986), pp. 247–260.

³² More recently, Teske, "Some Aspects of Henry of Ghent", p. 54 has qualified the proof as a combination of an Augustinian form of abstraction and the Avicennian transcendentals. It is worthy to note that he, *ibid*, pp. 59–64, offers a survey of three arguments, which have been developed by Henry and are directly based on Avicenna, in favour of there being only one God.

formation of a concept of God in his general attributes that ends in the identity of all the first divine attributes, including the identity between essence and existence. Hence, Henry's argument is *a priori* in the sense that, like Anselm's argument, it moves from the concept of the divine quiddity to the existence of God. Note that Teske also insists, as Paulus and Pegis had done before him, on the importance of art. 24, q. 6 in order to clarify the argument. Contrary to all preceding interpretations, Gómez-Cafferena and Macken reject the idea of the present proof as an entirely new proof, even if it could be described as an "ontological" proof. They believe that it has to be linked with the proofs by way of eminence and final causality as expressed in art. 22, q. 4. But if this were the case, why would Henry then qualify the proof as *a priori*, and not simply as *a posteriori*? As stated before, this amazing divergence of interpretation is undoubtedly due to the absence of any clear formulation. But has Henry effectively offered one? Pickavé, in his recent study, is convinced that he did not.³³ He argues *inter alia* that any textual basis for it is totally absent in Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. This claim is correct: Avicenna, in the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifā'*, nowhere offers an ontological argument. His contingency proof is at best a "metaphysical" proof, but is certainly not completely *a priori*. But is it not possible that it has put Henry on the way to the very idea of an *a priori* proof? He maybe has hoped to find it expressed in Avicenna's text, but after having looked in vain for it, why would he never have tried to elaborate one himself? After all, Henry was never a slavish follower of his "auctoritates". Since Pickavé does not take into consideration this question, I will briefly deal with it. The absence of a clear formulation might result from a conscious choice, which was caused by a fundamental change of mind. Until a certain moment of his career, Henry would have been tempted by the idea that philosophy, and more specifically metaphysics, was able to offer a proof for God's existence that was fully free of any reference to creation. The major advantage of this proof would be that no reasonable man could still doubt the divine existence. But then one may wonder: is there then any reason for theology, or even revelation? Pushed by theological and / or religious considerations, Henry would afterwards have abandoned the project of establishing an *a priori* proof. This is a possible hypothesis, although in my view not a very probable one. A better explanation seems to be that Henry felt no need for an explicit finalized version, insofar as he thought he had

³³ M. Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik* (see supra, n. 5), pp. 337–347.

already presented enough for one to grasp the essentials of the argument. In view of *Summa*, art. 30, q. 3, it is rather obvious that he had in mind an argument the tenor of which corresponds to Anselm's argument in the *Proslogion* (a fact already referred to by Teske). In view of the same work, art. 24, q. 6, it is clear that he articulates the grasp of God's quiddity from a clearly Augustinian perspective. God is the "ipsum bonum", but Henry integrates into it the Avicennian idea of the divine necessity understood as the complete identity between essence and existence. In other words, taking a departure from Avicenna's theory of the existence of primary concepts, Henry, through an Augustinian modification, presents what he believes to be an *a priori* argument that respects the basic demarche of Anselm's argument. Since this latter was well known, there was no need for further elaboration or specification. If this is the correct interpretation, Avicenna, not Augustine was Henry's major source. It may be worthwhile to note that Henry in art. 22, q. 5, explicitly states that Avicenna indeed formed his basic source.³⁴ He does not even hesitate to stress that the latter, if at least he has correctly understood the way of proving that God exists from universal propositions rather than from the testimony of the senses, spoke in this matter like a Catholic. Noteworthy also is the fact that Henry directly refers to the article about the unity of God, i.e., art. 25, an article where Avicenna is largely used. To conclude: Henry never presents a clear version of an *a priori* proof, but he does more than just evoke the idea of the possibility of such an argument. Offering a lot of hints, Henry permits his reader to grasp, or, at least, to construct such *a priori* proof. It remains however delicate, not to say difficult, to determine in an exact way the contribution of each of the three "auctoritates" that lies at its basis, i.e., Augustine, Anselm and Avicenna. In this sense, the last word has probably yet not been said.

God exists, but he does not exist alone. He brings into existence other beings. However, before dealing with the issue of creation, a short discussion of Henry's theory of relation is appropriate. According to Decorte,³⁵

³⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 134; also available in English translation in *Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21–24)*, trans. Jos Decorte † and Roland R. Teske. Latin Text, Introduction and notes by Roland R. Teske, (Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations) 5 (Paris, 2005), p. 151.

³⁵ Jos Decorte, "Avicenna's Ontology of Relation: A Source of Inspiration to Henry of Ghent", in *Avicenna and His Heritage*, ed. Jules Janssens and Daniël De Smet, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy) Ser. I, vol. 28 (Leuven, 2002), pp. 197–224, and id., "Relation and Substance in Henry of Ghent's Metaphysics", in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation* (see *supra*, n. 7), pp. 3–14.

Henry's ontology deserves to be qualified as a relational ontology. This latter is founded on two major ideas derived from Avicenna: 1. The conception of relation as one thing having two beings, i.e., an accidental and a relational one; 2. The idea that a plurality of beings can be accumulated in one thing. With Avicenna, Henry not only distinguishes between real and rational relations, but also accepts the former as being authoritative. Zghal doubts that Henry underwent such a profound Avicennian influence.³⁶ He rather believes in a direct impact of Simplicius' *Commentary on the Categories*. Decorte does not deny an influence of this latter work, but in his view this was not before 1285, the year in which *Quodlibet IX* was written, and when Simplicius' work is for the first time explicitly quoted by Henry. Moreover, also from a formal point of view, Henry evokes Avicenna only when he presents his definition of relation in *Quodlibet III* (dated 1278). Finally, according to Decorte's view, Henry even in his final period continued to respect the deep Avicennian roots of his conception of relation. Of course, nothing excludes that Henry had always known Simplicius' commentary, since Moerbeke had finished his Latin translation in 1266. Whatever may be the case, it seems difficult to deny a serious impact of Avicenna on Henry's concept of relation, unless one attributes to the explicit references in *Quodlibet III* a purely rhetorical character. Nevertheless, the exact extent of that influence, as well as that of Simplicius, still deserves further investigation.

Relation also occupies a central place in Henry's understanding of "potentia" as a divine attribute.³⁷ In fact, for Henry that potency means the divine being "cum ratione relationis". Avicenna's *Metaphysics VIII*, 7, has undoubtedly inspired this relational qualification, insofar as it affirms that all the divine attributes designate the divine being either in a relational or in a negative way.³⁸ In view of this, it is almost natural that Henry also uses Avicenna's distinction between necessary and possible. However, as de Carvalho rightly stresses, Henry defines the possible in a way sensibly different from Avicenna's. Since Henry, in clear opposition to Avicenna, accepts the very temporality of creation, he identifies the possible with "what can be by a producer" instead of "what is necessary by its

³⁶ Hatem Zghal, "La relation chez Avicenne", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 16 (2006), p. 253, n. 33.

³⁷ See the articles of Jos Decorte, quoted in note 33, as well as Mark G. Henninger, *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250–1325* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 40–58.

³⁸ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, 8.7, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven, 1977–1980), II, pp. 429–430.

cause”.³⁹ Certainly, he accepts with Avicenna a divine “efficient causality”, but he conceives of it in terms of a kind of mobility (“*causa est motus*”), hence not in terms of a necessary relation between cause and caused. But Henry insists that there is above all need for a theological final cause, i.e., God. This idea is in itself not un-Avicennian, but the proper wording and the particular emphasis is specific to Henry. This particular view of creation implies clearly a fundamental rethinking by Henry of Avicenna’s conception of the relation between will and intellect in God. Just as Avicenna did before him, Henry does not oppose both attributes to each other, but—and this is in sharp contrast with Avicenna—he makes God’s spiritual nature, which is both intellect and will, a principle that posits liberty at the root of existence in time. It is striking that for Henry the will precedes liberty, and not the inverse, as will be the case in Duns Scotus after him. This precise order may result from his will to safeguard as much as possible of Avicenna’s theory of “creation”. This might sound strange, given Avicenna’s “emanationism” and given Henry’s “voluntarism”. But it looks more normal as soon as one realizes that Avicenna introduces—or, at least, tries to introduce—a creationist moment inside his emanationistic scheme,⁴⁰ and one understands that Henry’s voluntarism is not completely deprived of intellectual dimensions. Henry seems to have been especially attracted by the sharp distinction that Avicenna maintains between God and His creatures, while insisting at the same time that God is the ultimate source of the production and conservation of creatures. In this respect, it seems to be extremely significant that Henry, when he explains the divine name of “creator”, explicitly invokes Avicenna’s *Metaphysics*. In book VIII, chapter 7 of this work, more specifically in the description of God as “*primus*” and as “*potens*”, Henry finds a solid basis to define the notion of “creator” as expressing a positive relation to the created realm, even if that very notion is absent in Avicenna’s text. What is important to him is undoubtedly the way Avicenna’s text allows the establishment of a positive relationship between God and the world, namely by using a relational conceptualization. Also inspired by Avicenna seems to be Henry’s fundamental distinction between uncreated and created being, on the one hand, and immaterial and material

³⁹ Mario A.S. de Carvalho, *Henrique de Gand. Sobre a metafísica do ser no tempo* [Henry of Ghent. On the Metaphysics of Being in Time], (Textos Filosóficos) 41 (Lissabon, 1996), p. 40.

⁴⁰ See Jules Janssens, “Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sinâ”, in *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 8 (1997), pp. 455–477, repr. in Jules Janssens, *Ibn Sinâ and his Influence*, see supra, n. 2, IV.

substances, on the other. In all likelihood it has been inspired by Avicenna's famous distinction between the "necessary *in se*" and the "possible that is necessary *ab alio*". When Henry deals with the individual existence of separate substances, he designates it as a particular being in a distinct supposite from agency, which he characterizes as an accident, broadly speaking, or "*adventia tantum*". This reveals a direct Avicennian influence. Accident signifies here everything that pertains to a thing and is beyond the intention of its essence, as Wilson has well expressed.⁴¹ The latter moreover rightly stresses that Henry has developed his own theory of individuation that is based on a dual negation, i.e., the removal of all internal multiplicity and the removal of all external identity. Despite major differences between Henry and Avicenna in their theories of "creation", it has to be recognized that there were also important common ideas. However, the precise impact of Avicenna on Henry's theory of creation has still to be defined.

It has already been observed that for Henry "being" is a first concept and that he has derived this idea from Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, especially I, 5. However, Aertsen has pointed out that for Henry, as also for Thomas Aquinas, "*ens*" is only a "*primum inter paria*", i.e., it is only one of the four transcendentals.⁴² More specifically it is the primary transcendental. It needs to be identified with the "*res a ratitudine*". In Aertsen's view, it corresponds as such to Avicenna's notion of "*res*", which is considered by him to be the primary transcendental in Avicenna. Therefore, Henry uses "*res*" in a different sense than Avicenna. Although that use has mainly and, obviously, directly been inspired by Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, Avicenna's distinction between the extra-mental and the intra-mental being of a thing may have played a role in its elaboration, but clearly a secondary one. Eventually, Aertsen stresses the central role that Henry attributes to the intellect in the elaboration of his theory of transcendental ideas—these ideas specifying the modes of being so that Henry's doctrine can be characterized as an "onto-logy". This latter characterisation is correct, but Aertsen's contention that Henry's notion of "*ens*" corresponds to the Avicennian "*res*" may not be entirely exact. First for Avicenna, at least the *Metaphysics* of the Avicenna Latinus, four notions are primarily impressed in the soul: "*res*", "*ens*", "*necesse*" and

⁴¹ Gordon Wilson, "Supposite in the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent" (see *supra*, n. 22), pp. 343–372.

⁴² Jan Aertsen, "Transcendental Thought in Henry of Ghent" (see *supra*, n. 18), pp. 1–18.

“unum”. Aertsen has recognized the importance of this affirmation for the elaboration of the scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals, although he seems to believe that the notion of “necesse” should simply be dismissed. But if this were the case, could it be that a common notion as e.g., “ens” would be understood in totally different ways? Certainly, “ens” is not really presented by Avicenna as the “primary” transcendental: at first sight, that is rather “res”. Insofar as “res” is said to have a “certitudo”, i.e., a fixed (stabilitum) being,⁴³ it can be identified with Henry’s “res a ratitudine”. But the notion of “certitudo” always implies the idea of “truth”, and hence the idea of “truth” is also implied in the notion of “res” insofar as it has a “certitudo”. Also other passages in the Avicenna Latinus point to a close relationship between “res” and “veritas”. In this respect, one may wonder: could Avicenna’s notion of “res” be at the basis of the scholastic transcendental of “verum”? But when Henry accepts that the “res a ratitudine” can be converted with the true, is it then not obvious that he identifies “ens” with Avicenna’s concept of “res”, as Aertsen claims? One may remain hesitant to accept this for two principal reasons. In the first place, it seems to overlook that the Avicenna Latinus text qualifies the affirmation “certitudo est res” by adding “sed hic res intelligitur ens”. Therefore the most appropriate term to evoke a quidditative being, as referred to in Henry’s idea of “res a ratitudine”, seems also in the Avicenna Latinus to be “ens”, not “res”. Moreover, if one understands Avicenna’s notion of being not as univocal, as e.g., Duns Scotus does, but rather as analogical, as seems to be the case with Henry, “being” can indeed function as a transcendental. Secondly, the Avicennian notion of “res” includes all what is either *in re* or *in anima*, either intellectually or imaginary. It thus seems to include fictional beings—and such despite the fact that Avicenna elsewhere qualifies them as “impossible beings” (whereby he creates a heavy tension, but no contradiction in his system)—as Henry’s concept of “res a reor reris” does. If this is correct, Henry’s idea of “res” as a super-transcendental concept has profoundly been inspired by the Avicenna Latinus text. Finally a few observations regarding the two other transcendentals, i.e., “unum” and “bonum” need to be added. With respect to the former, Henry explicitly states that for Avicenna “unum” and “ens” are convertible. He categorically rejects the Averroes-inspired ultra-realistic interpretation of Avicenna’s concept of the one. As to “bonum”, it might be that the affirmation of *Metaphysics*

⁴³ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, 1.5, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven, 1977–1980), I, p. 34.

VIII, 6: “necesse esse per se est bonitas pura”, somehow prefigured it. Especially when one reads Avicenna through an Augustinian prism, and understands necessity primarily as referring to the absolute identity of essence and existence in God, it seems possible to discover a link between both notions. But this clearly needs further examination.⁴⁴

Thus far only elements of Avicennian influence on metaphysical doctrines of Henry have been discussed. But such influences are also detectable in some of Henry’s psychological ideas. However, in contemporary scholarship no great attention has been paid to them. This is perhaps due to the fact that Henry is above all a metaphysician. Moreover, the actual edition of his *Summa* lacks a section on creatures. Whether it has been lost, or even whether there has ever existed a plan for such section, as Macken claims, is open to serious doubt, as de Carvalho has convincingly shown.⁴⁵ In any case, more explicitly psychological doctrines seem to be present only in the *Quodlibeta*. They mainly concern the origin of the soul (including its link with the body) and its unity.⁴⁶

Regarding the origin of human beings, Henry specifies that it results from a combined action of two different agents, i.e., the semen and God. This appears to be a further refinement of Avicenna’s theory that affirms that a soul is created as soon as a (appropriate) body exists. However, Henry more so than Avicenna—and perhaps even in opposition to him—stresses the bodily-material aspects of man. But Henry fully agrees with Avicenna’s idea when he considers the “forma mixti” of man to be the most noble of all mixed forms. Surprisingly, he hereby does not refer to a text by Avicenna, but to one by Algazel (al-Ghazâlî) whom he characterizes as a good “expositor” of Avicenna’s philosophy. In view of the fact that only al-Ghazâlî’s *Maqâsid* (a work that offers a slightly interpretative translation into Arabic of Avicenna’s Persian encyclopaedia *Dânesh-Nâme*) had been translated into Latin, such a qualification is both natural and justified. When dealing with the double origin of the human person, Henry distinguishes between two modes of the actualization of

⁴⁴ One finds a very basic discussion of Avicenna as a possible source of the four classical transcendentals, but especially with regard to Henry in my “Elements of Avicennian Metaphysics” (see supra, n. 7), pp. 52–58.

⁴⁵ Mário S.A. de Carvalho, “On the Unwritten Section of Henry of Ghent’s *Summa*”, in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation* (see supra, n. 7), pp. 327–370; as to Raymond Macken, he expressed his opinion in his introduction, “étude critique”, to the critical edition of Henry’s *Summa*, art. 31–34 (Leuven, 1991).

⁴⁶ In what follows, I mainly summarize my “Some Elements of Avicennian Influence” (see supra, n. 2), where the reader can find all details of reference.

a thing, i.e., *ex aliquo* and *cum aliquo*. This time he invokes directly Avicenna's authority. He also insists with Avicenna on the necessity of the existence of a specific receptacle in which the possibility of a thing has to be realized, i.e., matter for the body, a corporeal mixture for the soul. From this perspective, the origin of the soul is quite different from that of the body. Nevertheless, Henry clearly favors a unitary vision of man in sharp contrast with Avicenna who clearly adheres to a dualistic, although spiritualistic vision.

Regarding the unity of the human soul, Henry conceives it as a unity *secundum rem*. He explains the diversity of the soul's faculties in terms of an intentional distinction. How deeply Henry has been influenced by Avicenna in his concept of "intentional distinction" is a difficult issue to settle. But it is almost certain that the notion of "intentio" as introduced by the Avicenna Latinus and/or Algazel formed its ultimate source of inspiration. One can only hope that in the future a more systematic research on this issue will take place. According to Henry, each faculty of the soul is "almost" acting by itself since it is in a natural way directed towards its specification. The qualification of the "acting by itself" by "almost" is not superfluous. In fact, God alone is totally "agens per seipsum". With Avicenna, Henry distinguishes two types of active potency, i.e., "by itself" and "through capacity" ("per virtutem"). The soul possesses an active potency in this latter sense. Without the consent of the total soul no faculty can really act. Henry unambiguously defends a strong unitary conception of the soul. Avicenna also favored such unitary conception, but it has not yet been determined whether or not it directly influenced Henry's view. Finally it should be noted that Henry clearly deviates from Avicenna by adopting a voluntaristic instead of an intellectualistic interpretation of the activity of the soul, although it should be stressed that his voluntarism is a highly qualified one.

In this study important elements of Avicennian influence on Henry both in the metaphysical and psychological domains have been presented. They are representative and significant, although not exhaustive. In fact, a systematic presentation of all (direct or indirect) influences of Avicenna on Henry would require a monograph. It should be noted that contemporary research has already dealt in a substantial way with a large deal of such elements. But there are obviously still lacunae. One of the most important ones is Avicenna's impact on Henry's theory of evil. As far as I can see, it has never been the object of any study. Henry not only defines evil as a "defectus boni", a "privatio", exactly as Avicenna has done, but he, in his exposé on evil in the *Summa* art. 41, q. 3, moreover exten-

sively refers to Avicenna's *Metaphysics* IX, 6.⁴⁷ He only disagrees with Avicenna with regard to the existence of evil in the super-lunar world. But he seems to suggest that Avicenna's denial of such existence is fully justified from the philosophical point of view, insofar as he insists that the depravity of "angels" is known alone thanks to faith ("fides"). Hence, Henry's precise indebtedness to Avicenna has still to be fixed. Nevertheless, it was obviously great. From the above it is clear that Henry considered Avicenna to be an esteemed philosopher, an "auctoritas". He was not a slavish follower of Aristotle. But, above all, even from the religious point of view, Avicenna offered most valuable insights and therefore deserves to be called a "quasi Catholicus".

⁴⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLI, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 16, where he quotes Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, 1X.6, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven, 1977–1980), II, p. 497.

HENRY OF GHENT AND AVERROES

JULES JANSSENS

The thought of Henry of Ghent may be characterised as expressing a kind of “avicennizing Augustinianism”.¹ However, this does not mean that Henry totally ignored the Aristotelian-Averroistic way of thought that was current at his time. Even a superficial reading of his works already reveals a great number of quotations of both Aristotle and the “Commentator”.² It also shows that Henry explicitly approves several of their ideas. This might be somewhat of a surprise insofar as Henry was a member of Tempier’s commission that prepared the condemnations of 1277. But Henry was anything but a lackey of Tempier. Occasionally he expresses his perplexity, not to say his reservation with respect to one or another condemnation.³ This clearly proves the independence as well as the brilliance of his mind. Hence, one may expect that his attitude towards Averroes was critical, and thus complex, i.e., both accepting and rejecting some of the latter’s major ideas. It is amazing that very little attention has been paid in scholarship to Henry’s attitude towards Averroes. It is at best examined with regard to a specific item, and even this happens only in a very limited number of studies. Therefore, in what follows a basic outline will be presented that hopefully may offer a valuable basis for further research.⁴

¹ See *supra*, “Henry of Ghent and Avicenna,” pp. 63–83.

² As far as I can see, one finds in Henry references to four of the five great commentaries that were available in Latin, i.e., *Physics*, *Heaven*, *Soul* and *Metaphysics*; to three middle commentaries, i.e., *Categories*, *Generation and Corruption* and *Nicomachean Ethics*; to one epitome, i.e., *On Sleep*, and to one independent treatise, i.e., *De substantia orbis*. However, this list results from a rather superficial survey of his writings. A more in-depth analysis is needed in order to fix definitely the list of Averroes’ works quoted by Henry.

³ See Pasquale Porro, “A Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent” *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th. Anniversary of his Death*, ed. Willy Vanhamel, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy) Series I, vol. 15 (Leuven, 1996), p. 379.

⁴ In the outline I have integrated different elements of a recent paper entitled: “Henri de Gand: lecteur critique d’Averroès”, held at the fourteenth annual symposium of the SIEPM at Geneva (Averroës, l’averroïsme, l’anti-averroïsme), October 2006 (forthcoming in the acts of the colloquium).

It has been observed that Henry, when dealing with Avicenna, quotes only one of the latter's works, i.e., his *Metaphysics* of the *Shifâ*. With regard to Averroes, the situation seriously changes. One finds references to a rather wide range of his writings. He refers to the four "Long Commentaries" that had been translated into Latin, i.e., on *Physics*, on *The Heavens*, on *Soul* and on *Metaphysics*. Compared to Avicenna, the presence of quotations from three "natural books" in addition to the *Metaphysics* merits attention. It seems to suggest that for Henry Averroes was more an authority in natural sciences than in metaphysics. This impression is apparently reinforced by the presence of the "Middle Commentary" on *Generation and Corruption* among Henry's Averroistic sources. Indeed, that commentary was the only available in Latin on this particular text of Aristotle. Also, the use of the *De substantia orbis*, a collection of treatises of which the Arabic original has been lost, as well the presence of at least one quotation from the "Epitome" on *De Somno et vigilia*, which is part of the *Parva Naturalia*, reinforces this impression. Hence, from the formal point of view Averroes clearly receives great attention as an "auctoritas" in the "physical" domain. But Henry did not limit his attention exclusively to Averroes' physical commentaries (including to the classical scheme the *De Anima*). As already observed, the *Long Commentary on Metaphysics* is used in a fashion similar to the three physical ones. Moreover, Henry refers to the *Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*. It has to be observed that it was not Michael Scot (or someone of his circle) who translated this latter work into Latin, as is most probably the case for the other already mentioned works. In fact, Hermanus Allemanus was most probably its translator. Insofar as this translation, unlike the others, seems to have circulated on a very limited scale in the Middle Ages (it was only preserved in four manuscripts), its use by Henry is less evident than one might think. Even more remarkable is a quotation in *Summa*, art. 34, q. 4, taken from the *Middle Commentary on the Categories*, a text that had been translated into Latin by Wilhelm de Luna, most probably during the third quarter of the thirteenth century. Given that Henry's text dates from approximately 1280, de Luna's translation was undoubtedly recent, and hence in all likelihood available in only a very limited number of copies. It may be worthwhile to note that Henry from time to time, although not systematically, quotes the Latin translation of Aristotle's text according to Commentaries of the Averroes Latinus. In view of this fact, it looks probable that he had direct access to Averroes' works, and hence does not quote them in an indirect manner, i.e., through the mediation of writings of his contemporary scholastics.

Attention now needs to focus on the doctrinal side.

The vast majority of quotations derived from works of Averroes have only a limited significance, i.e., they had no, or very little impact on Henry's deepest insights. In many cases they simply confirm ideas already expressed by Aristotle. After having offered the latter's basic statement(s), Henry, by way of emphasis, adds Averroes' approving formulation. This gives the impression that the latter's comments have at best rhetorical value, and, at once, seems to reduce the "commentator" to a "noble imitator". Among a myriad of possible examples, one can be singled out because it is extremely illustrative for all. Because it is so illustrative and representative, it renders citing other examples superfluous, and thus avoids needless repetition. It concerns a reference to Averroes' *Long Commentary on Metaphysics*, II, 1, where it is stressed that the existence of a natural desire in man to know cannot be in vain. Henry refers to this passage in *Summa*, art. 1, q. 1 in the context of a sharp criticism of any form of scepticism.⁵ Note that Augustine constitutes the major source of inspiration for this criticism. But for details other sources are sometimes used. This is the case with the idea that man possesses a natural desire to know, an idea well expressed by Aristotle and accepted by his followers. When Averroes somehow adds that this is not in vain, he in no way introduces a revolutionary idea compared to Aristotle, because for Aristotle "nature never does anything in vain". It is obvious that Averroes' "precision" is far from being crucial, and therefore possesses at best a very limited value.

However, there are cases where Henry evidently positively regards ideas proper to Averroes and does not hesitate to integrate them into his own system.

Henry, in *Summa*, art. 21, q. 3, while discussing the topic of essence and existence in God, evokes the common distinction between "propositio de re" and "propositio de dicto".⁶ However, he does this only after he has made an explicit reference to Averroes' *Long Commentary on Metaphysics*, i.e., book V, chapter 7. In that text, Averroes distinguishes between two meanings of the term "ens". One of them refers to the being

⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 1, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 8.

⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 3, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), fol. 125; also available in English translation in *Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21–24)*, trans. Jos Decorte † and Roland R. Teske. Latin Text, Introduction and notes by Roland R. Teske, (Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations) 5 (Paris, 2005), p. 65.

as comprehended by the intellect. According to Badius' edition, Henry designates this act of comprehending by the very term of "complexio". If this reproduces faithfully Henry's original wording, one has to recognise that Henry has consciously changed the translation present in the Averroes Latinus, i.e., "copulatio", which is a literal translation of the word *ribât* that is used in the Arabic original.⁷ He might have thought that this was an error by a copyist, or he might have felt the need to replace a rather unusual term in the given context by a more convenient one. The other sense of "ens" is the being outside the soul. To put it more commonly: "ens" either refers to "intellected being" or to "real being". Each time one affirms "X est", a double understanding is possible. One may understand the verb "est" as establishing an absolute, unconditional junction between a subject and its actual existence, and in this case one arrives at a "propositio de re". Or one may understand the verb "est" as confirming the truth of the proposition: "X est", and then a "propositio de dicto" is involved. In both cases a reality is concerned: in the former case this is extramental, whereas in the latter it is intramental. It has to be noted that Henry introduces this distinction in a context that is totally foreign to Averroes' original exposé, i.e., the possibility for humans to know God's being. Still, Henry clearly approves the distinction between both kinds of propositions in the very way Averroes has articulated it. This becomes even more evident when he, in the "ad argumenta" of question 4 of the same article 21, evokes two ways to qualify the knowledge that has God as its direct object.⁸ When God's being is considered according to the reality of His true essence, this knowledge has to be qualified as being "de genere"; on the one hand, when it results from a comprehension by a soul and hence is subject to a "complexio", it has to be called "de accidente"; and on the other hand, Henry makes it clear beyond any doubt that he took his inspiration for this latter distinction in Averroes' commentary on *Metaphysics*, *Delta* 7, fragment 14 as offered in the latter's *Long Commentary*.⁹ But he relies more on Avicenna than on Averroes, when he explains this distinction as being purely rational, i.e., as belonging to our human intellect, in exactly the same way one can (logically) distinguish between essence and existence in God. However, it is possible

⁷ Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 5.8. ed. Giovanni Battista and Marco Oddo (Venice, 1562–1574), VIII, fol. 117 vGH.

⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), fol. 128; English translation in *Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's Existence and Essence*, p. 93.

⁹ Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 5.8, VIII, fols. 116^{vM}–117^{rA}.

that he has understood Averroes as a defender of a transcendental analogy of being. In fact Henry, in question 3, i.e., immediately preceding the distinction of the double sense of “ens” evoked above, once more quotes a passage from Averroes’ commentary on *Metaphysics*, *Delta* 7. However, compared to the original text of the Latin translation, Henry’s wording, at least as it is present in Badius’ edition, involves a major modification. It affirms: “ens quod significat essentiam rei magis pertinet ad praedicamentum generis”, whereas the Latin translation of Averroes’ text reads “... ad praedicamentorum genera”. Henry’s wording naturally implies the idea of a being that encloses all kinds of being, i.e., both the uncreated being, God, and all created beings. They all have in common to be, but they are distinct through their essences. More precisely, in the common genre of being, one may distinguish two species of essences, i.e., one where there is a complete identity between essence and existence, and another where essence and existence are radically distinct. It is obvious that such interpretation is foreign to Averroes but rather evokes an Avicennian context. Such being the case, Henry seems to have made himself guilty of a serious “Hineininterpretierung”. But this is proposed with the due reservation that Badius’ edition is not always trustworthy.¹⁰ Whatever be the case, Averroes undoubtedly was an important source of inspiration for Henry in his development of a double concept of being.

Also in the field of psychology, one can detect elements of positive Averroistic influence. When Henry, in his *Summa*, art. 58, q. 2, distinguishes between three kinds of intellect, i.e., material (or possible), agent and speculative, he indicates Averroes’ *Long Commentary on The Soul*, more specifically, III, 5–6, as his major source of inspiration. According to his interpretation of the latter text, the material intellect is something entirely passive, and thus can be identified with the possible intellect; the agent intellect refers to the notion of the Aristotelian agent as purely active; the speculative intellect finally is the possible intellect after it has received the intelligible form.¹¹ This latter involves simple intellection at the point where it is ready to become actually and to know the truth. Certainly, this is a particular understanding of Averroes’ text. But that text,

¹⁰ I offer a striking example of this in my “Elements of Avicennian Metaphysics” *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel, (Leuven, 2003), pp. 45–46; art. repr. in Jules Janssens, *Ibn Sinâ and his Influence on the Arabic and Latin World*, (Variorum Collected Studies Series), CS 843 (Hampshire, 2006), XVII, pp. 45–46.

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LVIII, q. 5, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 131.

as well as Averroes' theory of the intellect in general, has been open to a wide range of interpretations. One can perhaps wonder whether Marrone is entirely justified in stating that "Henry has interpreted Averroes according to the demands of his own philosophical system"?¹² Henry certainly introduces and uses Averroistic ideas, and sometimes does not hesitate to modify them, but it seems that he does this in an explicit manner. He always gives the impression that he tries to understand his source as objectively as possible. This is also the case regarding his use of Averroes.

Earlier it was mentioned that Henry considers Averroes to be a great authority in the field of the natural sciences. Two examples illustrate this point. The references to the *Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum* that have been attributed to him will not be examined here. Hödl clearly inclines to believe its authenticity, but perhaps it is best to wait for a more thorough critical examination.¹³ If this were an authentic work of Henry, Averroes' influence on Henry would substantially increase.

In *Quodlibet IV*, q. 15, Henry quotes in a substantial way a passage from the *Long Commentary on The Heavens*.¹⁴ The general context concerns the problem of the intensification of forms, both with regard to degrees and magnitudes. Following Aristotle, a long tradition of commentators had radically denied the existence of more or less in the category of substance. Although Henry does not reject totally this view, he does not accept it in its entirety either. As observed by Solère, this is a very surprising attitude.¹⁵ Indeed, according to Henry there are two important exceptions to this doctrine: the substantial form of elements and the substantial form of man. The latter of these two is of course the most important, particularly because it allows the unique nobility of Christ's soul to be safeguarded. But it is with respect to the former that Averroes comes to the fore. Indeed, the latter affirms that the substantial forms of the elements, due to their lack of determination, are cognate to accidental forms. Therefore, when they become determined, i.e., actualised, they receive more or less. Their indeterminacy enables the reception of

¹² Steven P. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, (Speculum Anniversary Monographs) 11 (Cambridge, Massachussets, 1985), p. 83.

¹³ Ludwig Hödl, "Die 'doppelte Wahrheit' von unendlichen in den *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*) des Heinrich von Gent", *Mediaevalia. Textos e estudos* 3 (1993), p. 62, esp. note 23.

¹⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 15, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fols. 124–130.

¹⁵ See Jean-Luc Solère, "Les degrés de forme selon Henri de Gand (*Quodlibet IV*, q. 15)", in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy) Series I, vol. 31 (Leuven, 2003), pp. 127–155. The rest of the paragraph is largely indebted to this study.

more or less actuality in the mixtures, or to constitute new forms, and this occurs when they combine with each other. Thus it is obvious that one finds here a case of a substantial form that is open to more or less. Certainly, this kind of form does not play a major role in Henry's thought. Nevertheless, it somehow opens new avenues for Henry to explore. It thus will permit Henry to present later his "innovative" view on what really bothers him, i.e., the existence of different degrees in the substantial forms of man. Even if Averroes has no direct influence whatsoever on this latter doctrine, it is almost certain that his exposé on the substantial forms of elements in his commentary on *The Heavens* paved the way to develop a doctrine that departed from an well established Aristotelian way of thinking,—one which left no room for any exception. For Henry, Averroes had made a pioneering and important contribution in this sense. Still, Averroes had missed a most crucial exception to Aristotle's rule, i.e., that of the human substantial form. This even becomes a central theory in the thought of Henry, who clearly herein surpasses the "Commentator".

An explicit Averroistic influence also emerges in Henry's conception of time, especially in the way that he understands Aristotle's aporia.¹⁶ He believes that Aristotle in the beginnings of his exposé on time defends the view of a purely psychic existence of time, a view that Augustine defended, but, unfortunately, not in an aporetic way. The myth of the sleepers of Sardinia well illustrates this, as Averroes had already indicated in his *Long Commentary on Physics*, commentary 97.¹⁷ But Aristotle also presents the view of an extra-mental existence of time, especially where he defines time as the measure of motion. Using Averroes' form/matter scheme, Henry states that formally time is something psychic, but materially something extra-mental. Based on another scheme present in Averroes, i.e., the fundamentum/complementum scheme, Henry moreover claims that time exists outside the soul only in potency. Hence, Henry, following Albert the Great, accepts Averroes' explanation of Aristotle's time aporia in terms of potency/act. Time is continuous, hence imperfect, and in this sense time's existence manifests itself *in rebus*, i.e. extra-mentally. But time is also discrete, and therefore perfect, and in this sense

¹⁶ A detailed analysis of this problem is offered by Udo Jeck, *Aristoteles contra Augustinum. Zur Frage nach den Verhältnis von Zeit und Seele bei den antiken Aristoteleskommentatoren, im arabischen Aristotelismus und in 13. Jahrhundert*, (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie) 21 (Amsterdam, 1994), pp. 339–398.

¹⁷ Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Physics*, 4.97, IV, fol. 178^{rA-C}.

its existence is detectable only in the soul. But in order to grasp time in its real perfection, one has to synthesize both mental and extramental aspects. Exactly as motion, time then appears as being “something discrete in a continuum”. Both Jeck and Flasch have stressed that Henry’s preference for Averroes’ over Augustine’s theory of time is intimately linked, or even results from the condemnations of 1277, more specifically article 200 (condemning the opinion that time would be nothing “in re”, but only something “in apprehensione”).¹⁸

Eventually, one finds cases where Henry disagrees fundamentally with Averroes. He does not hesitate now and then to criticise vehemently ideas, or doctrines, defended by the latter. A few exemplary cases will illustrate this point.

Henry, in *Quodlibet VI*, q. 14, concentrates on the problem whether a monster with two heads, i.e., a Siamese twin, possesses either one soul or two souls.¹⁹ This question was prompted not by medical, but by religious reasons. What is really at stake is the fact whether one baptism suffices to guarantee divine redemption from the original sin for the complete “monster”. From the philosophical point of view, this problem raises a major question: how is the human individual to be defined? Can it be grasped by the sole existence of the body? Or does the brain, which is in the head, determine it? Hence, a multitude of brains—or to put it more precisely in medieval terms: of souls—would imply a multitude of individuals. Henry approves positively this latter vision. Regarding the former, he characterizes its adherents as “tenentes de anima humana positionem Averrois”. In other words, he clearly attributes the source of that view to the Arabic “Commentator”. Significantly, he insists that for Averroes the soul is not united to the body by way of a form or an act, as it was for Aristotle, but rather by a kind of “mover”.²⁰ To substantiate this interpretation, he surprisingly does not refer to Averroes’ *Long Commentary on Soul*, but to the latter’s *Long Commentary on Metaphysics*, VIII, commentary 16, 225 D–F. In fact, Henry does not give a literal quotation, but he offers a kind of paraphrastic summary. At first sight it might be surprising insofar as Averroes, in his *Long Commentary on The Soul*, e.g., II, commentary 5 explicitly affirms that

¹⁸ Regarding the former, see *ibid.*, p. 340. As to Kurt Flasch, see his “Welche Zeittheorie hat der Bischof von Paris 1277 verurteilt?”, in *Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance*, ed. Frierich Niewöhner and Loris Sturlese (Zurich, 1994), pp. 42–50.

¹⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 14, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), pp. 156–167.

²⁰ Henry of Ghent, *ibid.*, p. 162.

the soul is form, and, as such, is a “perfection” of the body. But Averroes does this in a most qualified way, as will be shown in the next paragraph. Moreover, the *Metaphysics* passage concentrates on the act of unification between soul and body, not on the nature of the actual link existing between them. In this respect, the given summary looks acceptable, and even “to the point”. However, for Henry, Averroes’ affirmation as understood by the master from Ghent is totally mistaken. He vehemently criticizes it by stating that it ignores basic experience. Indeed, the latter shows that one of the heads of a Siamese twin may incline to depravity, whereas the other may clearly tend to morality. Averroes’ doctrine cannot account for such diversity since it makes all kinds of phantasms directly dependent on a single intellect that would emanate from the unique material form, which is proper to that being. Therefore, Averroes’ view is simply mistaken and has to categorically be rejected.

A further criticism of Averroes’ conception of the soul can be found in *Quodlibet IX*, q. 8. There it is stressed that Averroes’ conception is fundamentally equivocal, and thus lacks clarity and philosophical coherence.²¹ Henry’s reproach remains basically the same: Averroes has somehow abandoned Aristotle’s definition of the soul as form and act of the body. This criticism might look strange insofar as Averroes, in his *Long Commentary on The Soul*, II, 7, explicitly subscribes to Aristotle’s definition of the soul in terms of “prima perfectio corporis naturalis organici”.²² He even insists that this definition is possibly the most universal as well as the most convenient to the substance of the soul. Has Henry overlooked this fundamental affirmation? Not at all! On the contrary, he brings it to the attention of his readers. But he—being an attentive reader of the text that he quotes, as usual—observes that Averroes presents Aristotle’s definition in the manner of a “dubitatio”. Averroes does this because he considers the perfection of the rational soul, as well as of the other faculties, to be almost (“fere”) purely equivocal. A further precision occurs in II, 11, where Averroes states that some, but not all faculties are perfections of bodily parts.²³ Henry declares such a view unacceptable since it flagrantly contradicts the profound unity of man. Certainly, Averroes’ theory does not result in a kind of sharp Platonic dualism between soul and body, as e.g., Avicenna had defended. However, Averroes’ analysis, in

²¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 8, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 174.

²² Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 2.7, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953), p. 138.

²³ Averroes, *ibid.*, 2.11, p. 147.

linking some of the soul's faculties with bodily parts, breaks the profound unity of the soul, which Avicenna had so well articulated. This rupture of the unity of the soul seriously threatens the unity of the human being, which for Henry is unquestionable. In view of this unity, Henry, in a way different from that of Thomas Aquinas (who had posited "contra Averroistas" the intellect as integral part of each individual),²⁴ insists on the indissoluble link between soul and body, and, at the same time, on the absolute unity of the soul. In affirming this, he opposes, at least partially, Averroes, especially the latter's equivocal approach to Aristotle's definition of the soul.

Henry, in *Quodlibet* VI, q. 33, condemns another theory of Averroes, but this time the theory is a metaphysical one. According to Henry, Averroes accepts the existence of beings that have no potency whatsoever to "non-being". Based on *De substantia orbis*, commentary 2, he claims that for Averroes the celestial bodies, the elements taken in their totality ("secundum totum") and all other corporeal beings according to their species ("res corporales secundum suas species") have only a "potentia ad esse".²⁵ However, if all these beings have only this kind of positive potency to being, in what way would their being be different from God's being? And even if one accepts the existence of a difference, it would be inescapable to conceive their being as absolutely necessary, and this would imply that it could be conceived without any reference to God. For Henry, Averroes' view is worthless, because it is contrary to faith. In stressing this latter point, Henry presents himself above all as a theologian. But he does not dismiss completely the voice of reason, and, more particularly, philosophical reason. In the further development of his exposé, he presents as a better solution the one elaborated by Avicenna, which is undoubtedly philosophical and which consists in making all possible beings, i.e. all beings outside God, ultimately dependent on the necessary being in itself of the first Cause, i.e., God. However, Henry notes that this solution is also not entirely satisfactory insofar as it posits the idea of a mediating causality between God and the lower creatures. However, this deficiency is small compared to that of Averroes' doctrine, i.e., the possible absence of any causal dependency of (some) creatures

²⁴ Alain de Libera offers an in-depth analysis of Thomas' position in the introduction and notes to his Thomas d'Aquin, *L'unité de l'intellect contre les Averroïstes suivi des Textes contre Averroës antérieurs à 1270*. Texte latin. Transl., introd., bibliography, chronology, notes and index by Alain de Libera (Paris 1994), *passim*.

²⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 33, ed. G. Wilson, pp. 285–286; Henry quotes Averroes, *De substantia orbis*, 2, IX, fol. 6^{vl-k}.

on God. If this were the case, creatures, or, at least, some of them, would have a kind of auto-sufficiency in their being, and hence feel no need whatsoever for God.

At times it happens that Henry accepts a theory of Averroes, but nevertheless dismiss one or more elements. For example, Henry agrees with Averroes' claim that our knowledge of God is essentially "ex creaturis". But he rejects Averroes' opinion that we may have a purely natural knowledge of separated beings, included God. According to Averroes, a natural desire to know them exists in man. Henry, in *Summa*, art. 4, q. 5, admits that this is not necessarily wrong,²⁶ but notes that Averroes' mistake follows from the latter's erroneous supposition that based solely on sensible phantasms, one would be able to attain the knowledge of supernatural things. For Henry this supposition cannot be true because the nature of the sensible phantasms is essentially limited. Therefore, Averroes has rightly defended the possibility of knowledge of supernatural beings, but he failed in specifying the means to acquire this knowledge.

Eventually, Henry's rejection of a few criticisms of Avicennian doctrines by Averroes deserves particular attention. It seems that no one among the former's scholastic predecessors had seriously questioned these criticisms.

In *Quodlibet* XV, q. 7 Henry suggests that Averroes wrongly has ascribed to Avicenna the view that generation is nothing else than the creation of form in matter. While enumerating different theories that had been proposed with regard to generation, he states: "Quintus est ponentium datores formarum, et generationem esse non productionem formae de materia sed in materia tantum, quasi generatio non esset aliud quam creatio formae ex materia, sicut Averroes imponit Avicennae".²⁷ The use of the verb "imponit" clearly indicates that Henry does not fully agree with Averroes' understanding, as will become evident in what follows. But he unfortunately does not explain in the present context the precise reasons of his reservation. However, the remaining part of his statement may offer a hint. The text continues as follows: "(Avicennae), secundum quem dicendum esset quod agens sua actione generandi attingeret nudam substantiam materiae, quod secundum illum ipsa manet

²⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. IV, q. 5, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 289. Henry refers to Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 2.1, fol. 29^{rb}.

²⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XV, q. 17, ed. G. Etzkorn and G. Wilson (Leuven, 2007), p. 39.

communis sola generato et corrupto". The evocation of the "nude substance of matter" seems to refer to the notion of "prime matter". It is clear that for Avicenna the latter is as such not open to receive any specific form. It is only "prepared matter" that can do this. Henry perhaps is criticizing Averroes for not having adequately distinguished these two Avicennian conceptions of matter. But this is clearly in need of further examination.

When dealing with the proofs for the existence of God, Henry evokes the possibility of a kind of *a priori* proof, i.e., a proof that does not have its point of departure in creatures in the usual way, i.e., *ex causalitate* or *ex eminentia*.²⁸ Henry, in his *Summa*, art. 22, q. 5, specifies as follows: "Iste ergo modus cognoscendi deum esse, licet non sit testificationis creaturarum, quod eleganter dicit Avicenna, ortum tamen sumit a creaturis", and continues "in quo, quasi hoc non concessit Avicenna, eum reprehendit Averroes et male".²⁹ According to Henry, Averroes has unjustly accused Avicenna of having excluded any reference to the creatures in this proof. In fact, the "Commentator" has completely neglected Avicenna's remark that this way to know God's existence is difficult to access for human beings, given the weaknesses of human souls. Moreover, Avicenna has stressed that this way is posterior to all possible others. In other words, his proof, which is by way of universal intelligible propositions, and hence based on the first imprinted notions, as e.g., "being" or "thing", does not absolutely exclude any reference to the realm of creatures. Averroes simply failed to see this.

Henry's explicit rejection of two further criticisms of Averroes against Avicenna are of particular significance. One of them is related to the conception of the "one", the other concerns the so-called "accidentality" of existence.

It has to be observed that Henry, in the very beginnings of his career, had at best some doubts about Averroes' objections, and even may have accepted them. In *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, Henry does not explicitly question Averroes' judgment that for Avicenna "ens et unum significant dispositiones additas essentiae".³⁰ Certainly, he offers a "qualified" explanation of this latter claim, but he never states that it is wrong. In this sense, one can

²⁸ I have already dealt with the different interpretations regarding the precise nature of this proof, see *supra* (Henry of Ghent and Avicenna), pp. 73–76.

²⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 135; also available in English translation in *Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's Existence and Essence* (see *supra*, n. 6), p. 155.

³⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven 1979), p. 51.

understand that Paulus considers Henry to be an unqualified adherent of an Averroes-inspired ultra-realistic interpretation of Avicenna's concept of the one.³¹ Nevertheless, this is a too strong affirmation. The characterization of the adherence as "unqualified" is especially difficult to accept, since Henry, as just indicated, proposes a qualified interpretation. Moreover, he continues to quote approvingly several Avicennian texts in the remaining part of his exposé on the one. Regardless, Henry clearly no longer ascribes to the ultra-realistic interpretation of Avicenna's concept of the one when he writes *Summa*, art. 25, q. 1.³² There he emphasizes that for Avicenna "one" is not an accident of being. On the contrary, "one" does not signify something really other than "being". If Avicenna calls "one" an "accident of being", he does so in a very special sense, namely one in which "one" signifies another intention added to the intention of being. Therefore, to pretend that he presents "one" as an ordinary "accident", and Henry explicitly adds: "ut imposuit ei Averroes", is totally mistaken. The addition "ut imposuit ei Averroes" shows that Henry considered the latter to be the originator of this faulty interpretation. In other words, Averroes' explanation is completely forced and does not take into account Avicenna's contextualisation. Henry overtly opposes Averroes' view. In doing this, he seriously deviates from what was the common opinion of his day.³³ As indicated above, he might have followed it in his early career, or, and this seems to be more probable, he may have always had his own interpretation of Avicenna's conception of the one, but subsequently specified it in his later work in clear opposition against Averroes' interpretation. Note moreover that if Henry has really changed his mind on this matter, the reasons for this change have to be determined, e.g., whether the condemnations of 1277 influenced any possible shift. It is obvious that all this is in need of further investigation.

Regarding the "accidentality of existence", Henry in his *Summa*, but this time in article 21, q. 3, once again offers an explicit rejection of Averroes' interpretation of Avicenna. He states: "secundum quod Averroes

³¹ Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Études de philosophie médiévale) 12 (Paris, 1938), p. 229.

³² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXV, q. 1, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 147; also available in English translation in *Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's Unity and Simplicity* (Articles 25–30), Latin Text, Introduction, Translation and Notes by Roland R. Teske, (Dallas Medieval Texts ad Translations) 5 (Paris, 2005), p. 23.

³³ See Alain de Libera, "D'Avicenne à Averroès, et retour. Sur les sources arabes de la théorie scolastique de l'un transcendantal", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 4 (1994), pp. 141–179.

imponit Avicennae, scilicet, quod posuit quod esse esset accidens enti, quod non est verum".³⁴ This time, he not only uses the verb "imponere", but also adds explicitly "quod non est verum". He thus eliminates any possible doubt about his radical disagreement with Averroes, at least regarding this particular topic. The latter's error is basically the same as his notion of "one": Averroes has missed the very point that Avicenna uses "accidens" in a special sense. This becomes evident when Henry in *Summa*, art. 28, q. 4 states: "Et per hunc modum posuit Avicenna esse accidere rei enti, non quod sit res aliqua absoluta rei adveniens, sicut est dispositio in albo et nigro, ut imposuit ei Commentator in quarto *Meta-physicae*".³⁵ Hence, Henry does not deny the obvious fact that Avicenna makes mention of the accidentality of existence ("esse"), or of the one, but he, in sharp contrast with Averroes and the vast majority of his contemporaries who followed the latter's interpretation, understands this "accidentality" in a specific sense that is radically different from the usual. It is worthwhile to note that the issue of how one has to understand Avicenna's notion of accidentality is still a greatly debated question among contemporary scholars. Although most of them continue to adhere to Averroes' reading, others now follow a line of interpretation similar to Henry's.³⁶ This shows that the latter's interpretation in this matter was not only unusual, if not innovative, but also tenable, or, at least, not totally lacking any foundation.

Regarding Henry's indebtedness to Averroes, it seems that it cannot be evaluated in a simple way. At times he fully accepts, then radically rejects ideas expressed by the "Commentator". But most of the time, Henry refers to him in order to confirm an Aristotelian point of view. One gets the impression that Averroes was not really an original thinker for Henry, especially not in his favorite field of metaphysics. It seems that, for Henry, Averroes has articulated a few interesting insights and theories only in the field of physics and related sciences. Finally, Henry judges that Averroes

³⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 126; also available in English translation in *Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's Existence and Essence*, p. 71.

³⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXVIII, q. 4, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 168; also available in English translation in *Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's Unity and Simplicity*, p. 209; the reference is to Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 4.2, IV, fol. 67 rB.

³⁶ Fazlur Rahman's "Essence and Existence in Avicenna", *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 4, (1958), pp. 1–16 was the first study in contemporary scholarship to seriously question the common interpretation (which had been clearly influenced by Averroes) of Avicenna's affirmation of the accidentality of existence.

has unjustly criticized Avicenna on several important doctrinal points, but this is certainly a sign of weakness rather than of strength. For Henry, Avicenna was undoubtedly a better thinker than Averroes.

HENRY OF GHENT'S THEOLOGY

THE THEOLOGIAN HENRY OF GHENT

LUDWIG HÖDL

In the catalog of the Dominican Henry of Erfurt's († 1370) *Book of noteworthy things*, Henry of Ghent's *Summa* received this high praise: "From the second year of (King) Adolf (of Nassau) the *doctor solemn*, Henry of Ghent, became very famous. He wrote a *Summa Theologiae*; it is not suited for dullards, because of its complicated, difficult expressions and broad scope, but it is highly prized by many insightful people, because it is rich and fruitful in its comprehensive conceptual acumen and wonderful depth. He also wrote in the same way 15 *Quodlibeta* and on the *Metaphysics*. To this day (1355), at Paris he is called the *doctor solemn*."¹

This judgment concerning the *Summa* of Henry of Ghent is noteworthy in two respects. It is not the 15 *Quodlibeta*, which subsequently and even until today have received the special attention of researchers, but rather it is the theological *Summa* which primarily justifies Henry's honorific title of *doctor solemn*. Accordingly, what was principally studied at first were not the problems of the *quaestiones disputatae* in the *Quodlibeta*, but rather Henry's theological ideas in his thoroughly systematic and encompassing theological vision presented in his *Summa*. The Master from Ghent did not write a theological *Summa* that, comparable to that of Thomas Aquinas, set forth the entirety of theological teaching (for the beginner), that is in the form of a medieval theological textbook, namely a commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Like other contemporary secular teachers, the Master from Ghent left behind no *Sentences* commentary; rather it was in his *Summa* that Henry organized his basic understanding of (Christian) theology. He wrote a survey of theological knowledge and research, based upon the (weekly) *quaestiones ordinariae*, which he discussed during his usual classes with his students of theology. These students would have already obtained a basic

¹ *Liber de rebus memorabilioribus sive Chronicon Henrici de Hervordia*, ed. August Potthast, Göttingen 1859, 213.

familiarity with theology in the *cursus minor* of the lectures on the *Sentences* and could then be introduced by Henry (in the *cursus maior*, so to speak) to the problems of theology as a science.

At Henry's death in 1293, the *Summa* of *quaestiones ordinariae* was incomplete, and it also lacked a title. While the *Quodlibeta*, which the master disputed between 1276 and 1291/92 at Paris, were regularly published by the university,—practically year by year, but sometimes after a delay of two years, as a double volume—, Henry systematically assembled his teaching questions into a *Summa* and published them (in a first part) towards the end of his life.²

A critical overview of the very nature of theology became necessary in the last quarter of the thirteenth-century in large part because of the university conflict that is often incorrectly described as the "Conflict of the Averroïsts", and correctly understood, with I. Kant, as the "Conflict of the Faculties", with both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" aspects.³ In determining cosmological and anthropological questions about the creation and the eternity of the world, divine providence and governance, individual immortality, and the rational freedom of human will, theology and philosophy arrived at opposite and contradictory understandings, "as if there were two truths", as bishop Stephen Tempier argued in the decree of the Condemnation of 1277.⁴ This intellectual historical conflict was entirely understandable and legitimate insofar as and to the degree that it preserved the different presuppositions of theological and philosophical

² Henricus de Gandavo, *Opera omnia*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion-Centre, Leuven University Press 1979–1998: *Quodl. I*, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1979); *Quodl. II*, ed. Robert Wielockx (Leuven, 1983); *Quodl. VI*, ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Leuven, 1987); *Quodl. VII*, ed. G.A. Wilson (Leuven, 1991); *Quodl. IX*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983); *Quodl. X*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981); *Quodl. XII*, q. 1–30, ed. Jos Decorte (1987); *Quodl. XII*, q. 31 (Tractatus super facto praelatorum et fratrum), ed. Ludwig Hödl—Mark Haverals (Leuven, 1989); *Quodl. XIII*, ed. J. Decorte (Leuven, 1985); *Quodl. XV*, ed. Girard Etzkorn—G. Wilson (Leuven, 2007); *Summa (Quaest. Ord.)*, art. I–V, ed. G.A. Wilson (Leuven, 2005); *Summa (Quaest. ord.)*, art. XXXI–XXXIV, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1991); *Summa (Quaest. ord.)*, art. XXXV–XL, ed. G.A. Wilson (Leuven, 1994); *Summa (Quaest. ord.)*, art. XLI–XLVI, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998); *Summa (Quaest. ord.)*, art. XLVII–LII, ed. Markus Führer (Leuven, 2007); besides the critical edition, early modern printed editions are available: for the *Summa* ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), (Ferrara, 1646) and for the *Quodlibeta* ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), (Venice, 1608, 1613).

³ Immanuel Kant, *Werke in sechs Bänden*. vol. VI. ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt 1964) 261–393.

⁴ *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. Henricus Denifle et Aemilius Chatelain, I (Paris, 1899), pp. 543, 558, n. 473.

thought, and perpetuated them argumentatively within the limits of these two disciplines. It was “illegitimate,” to use Kant’s term, insofar as it overstepped these bounds on both sides.

Henry of Ghent actively participated in Tempier’s condemnation of the 219 theses of contemporary heterodox philosophy on March 7, 1277, but he also knew the necessity of discussing the conditions and reasons for theological knowledge. His *Summa* is an overview of theological scientific doctrine. Within this doctrine, the theology of God the Creator and of creation had to be taught and discussed critically, and had to use the critical reason of philosophy. In his *Summa* Henry discussed neither Christology nor soteriology, i.e. he did not *systematically* teach about these specific truths of faith. For these themes, one must turn to his *quaestiones disputatae* in the *Quodlibeta*. Similarly he did not explicitly and systematically treat ecclesiology—for this one must consult both his *Quodlibeta* and *Tractatus super facto praelatorum et fratrum*. The result is that one can examine his theology in three ways and in three sources: 1.) in the *Summa*, one finds the conditions for and foundations of theological knowledge, 2.) in the *Quodlibeta*, there are Christological and ecclesiological issues; and 3) in the *Tractatus super facto praelatorum et fratrum* there are additional ecclesiological analyses.

I. *The Conditions for and Foundations of Theological Knowledge in the Summa.*

The *Summa* of *quaestiones ordinariae* of Henry of Ghent was, as noted, left incomplete and even without a title; the title “*Summa*” refers to a type of literary work. Often the author brings up the twofold nature of the work, namely “*De Deo*” and “*De creaturis*”;⁵ but he was unable to pursue the latter systematically because of his death. This dual nature should not, however, be understood exclusively in the sense of a two-part division, because the knowledge of God [= *De Deo*] is also the knowledge of creation [= *De creaturis*], and this knowledge of creation is to be found in the Bible. From a Biblical and philosophical point of view, the knowledge of God is the same as the knowledge of the *primum principium* of creation.

⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, prol., ed. Badius

It is probable that prior to 1275 Henry of Ghent as *magister artium* before 1275 conducted disputations on Aristotle's *Physics*, and engaged the defenders of Aristotle on the problem of whether or not the first principle was material-infinite.⁶ In the *Lectura ordinaria super sacram scripturam*, which is from 1275/76, Henry, as a newly minted master of theology, occupied himself with the history of creation and proto-history, discussed Genesis I–III, and maintained the revealed truth held that creation began in and with time.⁷ And from *Quodlibet I* (before March 1277) on, this controversial truth of the temporality of creation became a topic in the public disputations at the university in Paris. The temporality of the cosmos entailed its contingency and this issue also became a part of the debate. Philosophy contradicted Biblical revelation. In a matter-of-fact critique, Henry disputed the notion of the (material-)infinite first principle (of Aristotelian physics), in order to defend and explain the Biblical message of God's creation of the world in time.

In this discussion, theology and philosophy were pitted against each other. Theology could not easily end all debate by issuing official, doctrinal, and ecclesiastical condemnations of philosophical errors. To open up some free space for theological discourse, thinkers had on the one hand to test the arguments of Aristotle and Averroës, and on the other to show that the metaphysical knowledge of philosophy is fundamentally not self-contained and complete. Building upon Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, in his treatise *De primo principio*, fulfilled this pioneering work.⁸

Henry of Ghent made this task central to his *Summa*,⁹ which can be thematically understood under the following broad outline. First

(Paris, 1520), I, fol. 123r: "... ideo hic dubitandum est de duobus in summa. Primum est de Deo Secundum est de creaturis ..."; see *op. cit.*, art. XLI–XLVI, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. XLVIII.

⁶ René. Perron, *Les livres trois et quatre des "Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum" attribués à Henri de Gand. Texte inédit et introduction*. (Diss. Cath., Louvain 1961) (3 vol.) argues on good grounds for its authenticity. Silvia Donati, "Commenti parigini alla Fisica degli anni 1270–1300", *Die Bibliotheca Amploniana*, ed. Andreas Speer (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 23 (Berlin 1995), pp. 136–156 raised some doubts about it.

⁷ *Lectura ordinaria super S. Scripturam Henrico de Gandavo adscripta*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1980).

⁸ Johannes Duns Scotus, *De primo principio. Abhandlung über das Erstprinzip*, ed. and trans., Wolfgang Kluxen 2th (Darmstadt, 1987). (Wissenschaftl. Buchgesellschaft. Texte zur Forschung).

⁹ Concerning the discussion of the literary genre of Henry of Ghent's *Summa*, see Christoph Kann, "Skepsis, Wahrheit, Illumination. Bemerkungen zur Erkenntnistheorie

there is the influential preliminary section (art. 1–20) on scripture and theology, in which he described *sacra pagina* as the basis and foundation of theological knowledge. Then there is the second general topic in art. 21–52 which treats the principal knowability and nameability of God—not only does the God of Revelation have a name, He has many names! And finally there is the third which explains in art. 53–75 Biblical-Christian (Trinitarian) divine revelation as differing according to the various cognitions of God. What Henry had completed by the time of his death was his theological reflections *De Deo*. The theology of creation (*De creaturis*), which Henry was unable to complete because of his death, is nonetheless discernable in the articles on God, because creation belongs inseparably to the entirety of the knowledge of God, that is, the knowledge of God as Creator, Redeemer and Perfector of the World.

In the “Conflict of the Faculties” of the 1270s, the Master from Ghent’s discussion is framed against two backgrounds. First, it opposed the textual interpretation of his colleagues in the Arts Faculty, who casted doubt upon the Biblical revelation of theology through an appeal to Aristotle and the Commentator, Averroës. And second, he had simultaneously to oppose the *théologie nouvelle* of Thomas Aquinas, who philosophically founded the cognition of God on the *analogia entis* of Aristotelian metaphysics, and rejected the cosmological analogy of the Platonic-Augustinian worldview.¹⁰

1.) Broadly speaking, Henry’s dispute with the philosophers is a controversy concerning the appropriate and correct understanding of the philosophical textbooks of Aristotle and his Commentator which were present in different Latin translations, which in turn often greatly complicated the interpretation of the text and the understanding of the subject. Henry knew more than one Latin translation of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and *Physics*. He read the Arabic-Latin translation of the *Metaphysics* and referred to the earlier translation, the *media* as “*alia translatio*”.¹¹ He referred to the Greek-Latin version of Aristotle’s *Physics*, and used the

Heinrichs von Gent,” *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, ed. A. Speer (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) XXVIII (Berlin, 2001), pp. 38–58. Thomas Aquinas wrote his *Summa* for beginners in theology; Henry of Ghent disputed problematic issues with experts.

¹⁰ See Fernand Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*. (Philosophes Médiévaux) 21 (Paris 1977).

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLII, q. 1, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 38, 61.

Arabic-Latin version as “*alia translatio*”.¹² Just establishing the text on its own caused great difficulty for medieval thinkers, but additional difficulties arose in discussing the positions and opinions on issues in the textbooks. The uncritical fusion of textual scholarship and knowledge of the subject matter made the discussion particularly difficult. Henry of Ghent (along with his colleagues) had to indicate the philosophical errors in the textbooks, and to discuss these texts rigorously and honestly. It says much about Henry that, in this discussion, he barely refers to the condemned propositions of the Syllabus of 1277. In Articles 31–46, the *articuli condemnati* are of no importance. In the preceding articles, R. Macken notes only a single reference to an *articulus episcopalis*, and this one appears only in an early redaction of the article. Later, it would be struck from the text, even though it was appropriate to the subject matter.¹³

Henry of Ghent disputed the condemned philosophical theses in a matter-of-fact, philosophically sophisticated way. As an examination of art. 44 shows, Henry of Ghent was very familiar with the arguments of Aristotle, who himself in *Physics* III, c. 5–6 criticized the ancient natural philosophers’ understanding of a quantitatively infinite, and only subsequently presented the main characteristics of the infinite in the tenth book of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 10.¹⁴ Building upon Thomas Aquinas, and in a manner almost identical to Thomas’ exposition in *Summa theologiae* I q. 7 a. 1, Henry accused the ancient philosophers of philosophical errors. With Averroës, he showed that the concept of a *primum principium materiale* was a philosophical mistake.¹⁵ Henry used all of his philosophical knowledge for the sake of reconstructing the concept of the first principle not as a material principle but as an immaterial principle, and made a place for the Biblical notion of creation.

2.) In securing a place for theology, Henry of Ghent also opposed some contemporary and near contemporary theologians, especially Thomas Aquinas, whose teaching he feared would introduce a new philosophi-

¹² Ibid., art. XLIV, q. 1, ed. Badius, II, fol. 45.

¹³ Ibid., art. XXXII, q. 5, ed. Badius, I, fol. 119, 20.

¹⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaest. in Phys.* III, qq. 6–7. (Erfurt Bibliotheca Amploniana, lat. F 439, fol. 140^{vb}); id., *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXV, q. 6, ed. G.A. Wilson (Leuven, 1994), p. 44, 35–38; id., art. XLIV, q. 1, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 72, 31: “... multi philosophantium errabant in natura et substantia primi principii”

¹⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XLII, q. 1, q. 2, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 27, 48; 46, 80; see Averroës, *In Phys.* I, c. 5, comm. 83, (ed. Venetiis, 1562), IV, fol. 47^{r-v}.

cal infiltration and an departure from traditional theology. The *errores philosophorum* did not stop at the *sacra pagina* of theology. The condemnation decree of the Bishop of Paris in 1277 listed 219 errors that also (at least in their consequences) concerned theology.

Stephen Tempier had already, on Dec. 10, 1270, condemned 13 philosophical positions that according to his convictions (and those of his advisers) directly or indirectly pertained to the truth of faith (concerning creation, providence and governance).¹⁶ This list is essentially identical with a draft of theses that, before the episcopal condemnation, had been delivered to the Dominicans for comment on by four notable scholars of the order (including Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas). In an Erfurt dissertation, M. Hille has very carefully researched the history of the development and the impact of the Paris condemnations of 1270, and has shown the uneasiness in the Church towards university theology.¹⁷ Thomas had correctly and on good grounds warned, although in vain, against incriminating philosophical theses because of their suspected theological consequences. Henry of Ghent, though, was one of the advisors to the Bishop of Paris. He opposed the metaphysical adaptation of philosophical concepts and positions to theology. Without such a “neo-Aristotelian” orientation, he founded in the *Summa* the cognition of God, as well as the naming and the names of God, on the divine properties (a). Appealing to the Apostle Paul’s understanding of freedom, he rejected Thomas’ notion of *liberum arbitrium* (b) and established the voluntarist notion of virtue (c).

a.) Following the theology of Augustine, Henry of Ghent treated God both in His essential rational nature and in His creative knowing and absolute free willing, so that divine knowing and willing are the formally different relations of the divine essence in its personal existence. “In God, essence and relation are the same”, declared Juan C. Flores in his contribution to the Henry of Ghent volume in memory of Jos Decorte,¹⁸ and therefore these essential relations are the relational, personal existence of God. Although these relational modes of existence are called the

¹⁶ *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (note 4) I, n. 432, pp. 486 ff.

¹⁷ Markus Hille, *Die Pariser Verurteilung vom 10.12.1270 im Spannungsfeld von Universitätsgeschichte, Theologie und Philosophie*, (Erfurter Theologische Studien) 87 (Leipzig 2005).

¹⁸ Juan C. Flores, “Intellect and Will as Natural Principles. Connecting Theology, Metaphysics and Psychology”, *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought. Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte*, ed. Guy Guldentops—Carlos Steel, (Leuven, 2003), p. 302.

generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit, these expressions of activity must not be misunderstood as indicating natures. Trinitarian Christians confess one and only God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit and must know that they reduce the divine names to their relational meaning, and, starting from divine knowing and willing, they explain and support this meaning. Formal meaning and relational value are the two-in-one conceptual element of Henry of Ghent's Trinitarian doctrine. This element can only be mentioned here, but it remains operative throughout Henry's teaching on God.

The main tenets concerning the divine properties (attributes) belong to one of the most important chapters in the study of God in Christian, Jewish and Muslim theology. The divine names are central both to preaching and prayer. In his *Sentences* commentary, Thomas Aquinas maintained: "... ex hoc pendet fere totus intellectus eorum quae in I libro dicuntur ...".¹⁹ Even the Trinitarian divine names, "Father, Son and Holy Spirit" are (from a linguistic point of view) attributes and must be understood starting from Theo-Logic. Henry of Ghent did not share Thomas's opinion on the linguistic basis of the divine attributes; rather, he sought a different way to understand these, namely by means of a formal distinction. He was occupied with this issue for his entire Parisian teaching career (1276–1293).

In articles 32–33 of the *Summa*, as a transition from the contemplation of the divine essence to its existential perfection in knowing and willing, Henry discussed extensively in his school the unity and multiplicity of God's properties.²⁰ So provocative were the master's theses in his teaching during the school year 1279/1280 that they resulted in the follow-up questions of the students, which can be seen in *Quodlibet* V, q. 1 (1280). In articles 51–52 of the *Summa*, the master once again had to take up this problem, and here he referred back to the quodlibetal disputation of the previous year.²¹ The introductions to articles 32 and 51 match each other down to the wording and show that the school was still facing the same problem. Building upon his Trinitarian theological explanation of essential identity in God, the master discussed once again in articles 72–75 *appropriatio* and *praedicatio* in cognizing God.²²

¹⁹ Thomas de Aquino, *Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, (ed. Paris, VII, 1873), p. 36b.

²⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXII–XXXIII, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1991), pp. 29–162.

²¹ *ibid.*, art. LI–LII, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 52^r–60^r.

²² *ibid.*, art. LXXII–LXXV, II, fol. 255^r–313^r.

In this discussion there was no disagreement that the difference of the divine attributes lies in the intellect, in theological knowledge. There was however controversy over the question whether the intellect could recognize this difference by viewing only external things (creation), or whether this formal distinction can and must be constituted by considering (intention) the divine essence. Henry defended this following thesis vigorously: the overflowing light of the divine truth radiates into the faculty of reason illuminated by faith, and shows us God, as He is absolutely perfect and simple in His simplicity and Trinity, in all His properties, perfections, decisions, and actions.²³ According to Henry of Ghent, every other understanding or cognizing God boils down to a theophanic, indirect cognition. Therefore, all the attributes of God are understood not through viewing external things, but rather in the intentional consideration of and attention to the divine essence. The divine essence can never be absolutely denoted or explained by determinate propositions concerning its contents,—this can only be done in a determinate respect and consideration. But this does not mean that the essential attributes have their value and meaning only with regard to the reality of Creation, a thesis taught in all thirteenth-century schools.

In an extensive analysis, Henry then showed that the Aristotelian categories have their own special meaning in theology. Through an involved process, the master adapted the categories of substance (essence) and relation to theological knowledge.²⁴ Truth, wisdom and goodness designate only certain properties of the divine essence, but they apply formally and essentially, since the simple divine essence is infinite, and all differences fuse in the infinite perfection of God. From this point of view, Henry of Ghent can be viewed as an intellectual predecessor of Nicholas of Cusa. However, Henry's analysis of the divine attributes immediately provoked the rancorous objection of his Parisian colleagues, especially the students of Thomas Aquinas. But his (secular) colleague, Godfrey of Fontaines, also criticized him sharply.

²³ *ibid.*, art. XXXIII, q. 2, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1991), pp. 136–137.

²⁴ *ibid.*, art. XXXII, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1991), pp. 75–121: “Utrum ratio alicuius praedicati cadat in Deo.” Rolf Schönberger, *Die Transformation des klassischen Seinsverständnisses. Studien zur Vorgeschichte des neuzeitlichen Seinsbegriffs im Mittelalter*, (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie) 21 (Berlin—New York, 1986) has studied this criticism of the Aristotelian categorial table.

b.) In article 45 of the *Summa*, “On the will of God,”²⁵ Henry of Ghent treated more actively and intensely another issue against Thomas Aquinas. The notion of free will—and its relation to intellect—had been debated hotly and with much controversy in the schools of the 1280s. Henry of Ghent sharply contrasted his position from that of Thomas and, moreover, distinguished Thomas from Biblical and Patristic tradition; that is, he called into question Thomas’s orthodoxy. If *liberum arbitrium* (according to Thomas’s understanding) is the unjudging choice of the will, then cognition and judgment are respectively the foundation and the floor of the free willing of men, angels and even God. The Condemnation of 1277 revived the ancient philosophical and theological controversy over *liberum arbitrium* as an (intellectually) unwilling or (voluntarily) unjudging choice.²⁶ In the context of the question of God’s free will and willing, theology once again encounters the problem of the reality and efficacy of God as first principle of creation. But according to Aristotelian philosophy and some Muslim theology, absolute and essential necessity determines this issue. This principle of “necessitarianism” in the course of creation and the World would be rejected and attacked generally and firmly by the Church and by theology. Is God free in His creative activity, because He is the creative intellect, that is eternal wisdom and truth, or is divine willing free to will in and of itself alone, *gratia sui, causa sui*?²⁷ According to Henry, the divine will would not be free if it were determined by reason. Rather the divine will determines itself arbitrarily and by itself, and were it possible, (as it is in the case of human decisions of the will) even against knowledge and right judgment. This determinism of the will would be immediately and critically questioned by the students of Henry of Ghent in *Quodlibet* V, q. 22 (Advent 1279).²⁸ The *Ethics* of Aristotle propounded a rational foundation for human decisions of the will. The philosophical arguments against Henry’s position were obvious, and led to a Parisian theologian’s magisterial determination that in retrospect greatly irritated even Henry of Ghent: “Non est malitia in

²⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 1–3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), pp. 100–127.

²⁶ François-Xavier Putallaz, *Insolente liberté. Controverses et condamnations au XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1995), pp. 170–208.

²⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 117.

²⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 22, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518) I, fol. 140^{vZ-A}: “... in quaestionibus de voluntate alias expositum fuit possibilitas rationalis omnino per aequalem distantiam debet se habere ad opposita”

voluntate, nisi sit error vel nescientia in ratione.”²⁹ Only with the aid of distinctions could Henry maintain this position. For Henry, the weight of the Apostle Paul’s statements in Romans 7 on absolute free will was too great for him to be able to make concessions to this philosophical understanding of the will.

The Biblical message that placed freedom and grace together gave Henry no reason to doubt that the free will of God should be understood absolutely. Thomas Aquinas probably also knew: “liberum est quod sui causa est,”³⁰ but intellect-independent self-determination is bound to the practical judgment of conscience. Freedom requires reason, or as John Eriugena wrote: “ubi est rationabilitas, ibi necessario erit libertas.”³¹ Henry of Ghent could not follow the philosophical method of understanding the freedom of the “prophecy of Aristotle in Book VII of the *Nichomachean Ethics*”; the Apostle Paul knew otherwise: the human will can, in concrete cases, choose even against reason.³²

Through the whole series of *quaestiones ordinariae* on God and creation Henry pursues the problem of the absolutely free, creative action of God, the infinitely perfect first principle. God is infinitely wise and knowing, so that He may know everything that is freely created, and He is absolutely free and creative, in order freely to choose and to will every created being. The master could think or teach about the *primum principium* only by speaking of the God of Biblical revelation, and of the God of Biblical revelation he could teach only what he said about the *primum principium*. This overview of theological science is in itself consistent and logically coherent. Henry was not guilty of any philosophical opposition to the truth of revelation.

c.) In addition to his very original notion of free will, Henry of Ghent also produced a highly original analysis of the notions of virtue, grace and the habit of virtue. One particular determination appears in *Quodlibet IV*,

²⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), p. 245; see Ludwig Hödl, “Non est malitia in voluntate . . .” Die magistrale Entscheidung der Pariser Theologen von 1285/86 in der Diskussion des Johannes de Polliaco *Quodlibet I* q. 10”, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 66 (1999), pp. 245–297.

³⁰ Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theol.* I, q. 83, a. 1, ad 3, ed. Marietti (Taurin—Roma, 1952), p. 404a.

³¹ Johannes Eriugena, *De praedestinatione*, c. 8 n. 5, ed. Goulven Madec (C Chr. cont. med. 50, 1978), p. 51, 106.

³² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 10, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), p. 261: “In hoc prophetiam sequuntur Aristotelis in VII^o Ethicorum, dimittentes doctrinam clausam in libris sacris et a sanctis expositam . . .”.

q. 22, and once again the context is a dispute with Thomas Aquinas.³³ If free will is considered “in its rational nature, its deliberation and its freedom of choice”, then, contrary to what Thomas taught, virtue cannot lie in the rational soul, which has in its essence the intellect and the will, but rather it lies in the vital power of the will, which must guide and channel the lower powers of striving and desiring. As a rational power, the will is directed and determined to its goal just like the intellect; other than this, it needs no additional strength or capacity from a moral habit;³⁴ but the act of the will needs this moral reinforcement in order to act readily and freely. Free will is self-acting and autonomous, but in the moral order of the powers and faculties of the senses it requires a reinforcement so that it may act well and willingly. This habit is the moral power of “well and willingly”.³⁵

Sensitive striving and desiring underlies the practical judgment of reason, and Aristotle is certainly correct when he stated that practical judgment dominates “*principatu politico non despotico*”.³⁶ But the Philosopher did not know that the will was in the condition of being under the governance of sin. In this state, the sensitive powers are no longer amenable and obedient to moral reason, but rather “rebellious”.³⁷ Thus it can then be claimed that the will rules despotically. A general awareness that practical reason is superior to the powers of the senses does not suffice; Henry of Ghent examines this natural awareness very critically. The Philosopher knew nothing about the original and later depraved state of nature.³⁸ John Duns Scotus follows Henry of Ghent in this criticism as well as in the denial of the *virtutes infusae*.³⁹ Thomas Aquinas had picked *virtutes infusae*, given (“infused”) with grace to the acquired virtues, to direct univocally and resolutely the (acquired) virtues towards the ultimate goal, to God. Henry of Ghent rejects this “doubling” of moral virtue as “superfluous”. Henry of Ghent has no sympathy for a notion of righ-

³³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 138^r–141^v: “Sequitur de pertinentibus ad voluntatem, ut de eius habitibus . . . Primum erat, utrum morales virtutes sint in voluntate. Secundum si iidem habitus sint virtutes, dona, beatitudines et fructus.”

³⁴ *ibid.*, fol. 139^rs.

³⁵ See *ibid.*, fol. 140^ry.

³⁶ See *ibid.*, fol. 138^vR, 141^rB.

³⁷ See *ibid.*, fol. 140^ry.

³⁸ *ibid.*: “Aristoteles . . . credit statum esse naturalem naturae statum qui nunc est. Sed non est verum.”

³⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 12, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), pp. 139–142: “Utrum cum virtutibus acquisitis necessarium sit ponere alias infusas eis respondentes.”

teousness, prudence, and so on, being given with grace. Man naturally knows the moral goal of loving God and his neighbor, just as he naturally loves God above all; but on the way to this goal man needs grace as necessary for salvation. We know the goal, but we do not have the power to achieve it. Here as well, the scholar from Ghent follows a more Augustinian path.

d.) The last and ultimate end of a free will is the uncreated, infinite good, that, theologically speaking, is God. As a conclusion to his teaching on God, in articles 49 and 50 of the *Summa* Henry investigates God's beatitude and his joy in perfection.⁴⁰ Seven reasons are adduced in support of an intellective understanding of beatitude, and each of the seven are refuted by Henry. Any cognition can establish merely a formal, semantic unification. "But the will unites itself to ⟨God⟩ not as to the assimilating form, but rather as to the goal and the good as if by force of love through its own act, as if transubstantiating (*transsubstantiando*), or transforming and converting itself into this ⟨unifying Good⟩."⁴¹ The ultimate end for the Good is human beatitude, and the possession of the final goal is indeed human happiness. Man experiences his eschatological perfection in the free autonomous fulfillment of the choice of the will.⁴² The "*visio Dei*" is the grace of being captivated in God's infinite goodness. The naturally movable bodies find their rest in their destination; free human willing has its proper place in beatitude. Henry rejects the position that ultimate human beatitude springs from the intellect.

The eternal vision of God obtained by the blessed requires no intermediary *species*. The essence of God communicates His Glory as a shining only into the blessed, and as a shining again into the blessed's thankful joy and beatitude. From this understanding of the "reflexive vision" of the blessed in perfection comes also the realization of the *Gandavistae*, the followers of Henry of Ghent, that faith and hope are elevated and

⁴⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. II, q. 1–8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fols. 32^v–47^v: "de dei beatitudine", art. L, q. 1–2, *ibid.* fols. 47^v–52^r: "De delectatione Dei."

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, q. 6, fol. 42^{rp}; see Christian Trottman, "Henri de Gand, source de la dispute sur la vision réflexive", *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death* (1293), ed. Willy Vanhamel, (Leuven, 1996), pp. 309–342.

⁴² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XIII*, q. 9, ed. J. Decorte (Leuven, 1985), pp. 56–64: "Utrum primum et per se obiectum voluntatis sit bonum sub ratione boni simpliciter an sub ratione convenientis."

absorbed in the beatific vision, but nevertheless persist. John of Pouilly and Herveus Natalis OP severely criticized this thesis on the basis of I Cor. 13:13.⁴³

II. *Christological and Ecclesiological Problems in the Quodlibeta.*

A central task for Henry of Ghent in the *Summa* was to produce an overview of theological knowledge, and this task arose within the specific circumstances of his historical context. The overhastily thrown-together condemnation of philosophical teaching errors by bishop Tempier in 1277 solved none of the problems it addressed, but rather created new ones, requiring the re-examination of the conditions and procedures of theological knowledge. But Henry's entire work as theologian did not consist in a simple overview. Henry had to explain the basic foundations of theology when he lectured on the *Sentences*. But as far as we know, this commentary on the *Sentences* did not survive. He also had to treat the current questions of theological debate in the *quaestiones disputatae* of his nearly annual *Quodlibeta* (in Advent or in Lent during his regency). At these events the students would ask their questions, the Bachelors would display their knowledge and their art of disputation, and the masters their ability to judge. These disputations constituted one of the ways of self-representation for the university, which throughout the Middle Ages was not a state educational institution, but rather was more a type of *civitas academica*,—an autonomous corporation and supranational societal force,—which brought out and evaluated cultural, ecclesiastical and political developments.

1.) The division of university teaching into a *cursus minor*, as one might call it today, where the *Baccalarii biblici* and *Sententiarum* undertook lecturing on the Bible and commenting on the *Sentences*, and into the *cursus maior* of the master's *disputationes* produced the following result in the case of Henry of Ghent: only these latter question-based works, namely his *Quodlibeta* and *Summa*, have come down to us. But in these works only current problems were discussed. We have no systematic, cohesive

⁴³ Johannes de Polliaco, *Quodl. III*, q. 7, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15372, fols. 85^{vb}–90^{va}: “Utrum fides remaneat in beatis sive in patria.”

presentation of Henry's Christology and soteriology.⁴⁴ In the *quaestiones disputatae* of his *Quodlibeta* Henry addressed current issues. Any discussion of Christology by Henry, as is the case for most scholastic theologians, is subject to two limitations: first there is the priority of the mystery of the Incarnation over that of Easter, and second there is the theological-philosophical understanding of the eternal and historico-soteriological aspects of the birth of the (human) Son of God. For scholastic Christology, the central mystery of salvation was the becoming human of the Second Person of the Trinity; the mystery of the Crucifixion and that of the Resurrection were to be treated only after this central mystery.⁴⁵ From their theological textbook the masters and the students were aware of and knew the salvific mystery of the death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ; but the mystery of the Incarnation constituted the foundational and original sacrament of faith. According to the unanimous witness of Scripture and tradition, this truth of salvation implies the eternal generation of the Son by the Father and the historico-soteriological birth of Jesus Christ from the Holy Virgin Mary: the one and the same Jesus Christ is the only begotten Son of God and of the Virgin Mary.⁴⁶ Latin theology, closely following Augustine, understood the eternal generation of the Son as the generation of the eternal Word in God. The emanation of the Word revealed the divine essence in its personal relations. Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one unique divine essence.⁴⁷ Henry of Ghent considered the divine essence to be the original, relational, personal life in God. He saw no dogmatic importance in his contemporaries' polemical questions over the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.⁴⁸

After 1277, the temporal-soteriological birth of the (human) Son of God attracted (in the conflict of the faculties which was mentioned above) considerable attention in two aspects. The ecclesiastical and theological doctrinal authorities were both equally interested in what can

⁴⁴ From the beginning, the theologians of the religious orders gave more attention to discussing the *Sentences*, and their commentaries later became the central literary legacy of scholastic theology.

⁴⁵ See Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theol. III*, prol. ed. Marietti (Taurini—Romae, 1951), p. 1: "... duplex consideratio occurrit: prima est de ipso incarnationis mysterio ... secunda de his quae ... sunt acta et passa."

⁴⁶ See *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, ed. Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzger (34th ed., Freiburg 1967), p. 98, n. 272.

⁴⁷ Giorgio Pini, "Henry of Ghent's Doctrine of *Verbum* in its Theological Context," *Henry of Ghent* (note 18), pp. 307–326.

⁴⁸ Ludwig Hödl, "Das trinitätstheologische Fundamentalprinzip des Anselm von Canterbury," *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévale*, LXII:1 (2002), pp. 172–214.

be called the “anthropological” proposition ‘*anima forma corporis*’, not for purely philosophical-anthropological reasons, but rather more for the attention to and import for the Biblical message of the salvific crucified body of Jesus Christ. The Biblical message of the human body of Christ, crucified and resurrected, and the message of the sacramental body of Christ in the Eucharist belong together. The shortest and most elegant expression of this unity occurs in the late thirteenth century Eucharistic verse “*Ave verum corpus natum*”.⁴⁹

This reference to the Biblical message of the crucified body of Jesus Christ is necessary in order to underscore at the outset that, when the ecclesiastical and theological doctrinal authorities made statements about the body of the human Son of God and the rational soul as *forma corporis*, to them the matter concerns a truth of Revelation, which must also support the philosophical-anthropological truth and stand up to it. Scholastic theologians, especially Thomas Aquinas, had in this heated discussion of the philosophical proposition no other goal than to support and to clarify the truth of faith, and, in the truth of faith, to preserve from error the philosophical knowledge of the true (human) body of Jesus Christ. In the dispute among theologians over this philosophical proposition, in the so-called Controversy of the *Correctoria*, all the various positions sought just the same goal: to defend Biblical truth.⁵⁰

a.) In *Quodlibet X* (1286), q. 5, Henry of Ghent had to justify before his colleagues and students what and how he as a master had taught in his disputations from the beginning, and he had to do so under pressure of (supposed) instruction from the doctrinal ecclesiastical authority.⁵¹ In an autobiographical note, which the master expunged before the *quodlibet* was published, Henry provides one of the most important pieces of biographical information about himself, which we must provide in its entirety:⁵²

⁴⁹ Heinrich Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser. Ein Kommentar* (Düsseldorf, 1957), p. 175: “Dieser in alle Dimensionen sich erstreckende Leib Christi am Kreuz, den es zu erkennen gilt, ist das Anwesen der Liebe Christi, die alle Erkenntnis übertrifft. ... Im Innwerden der alle Welt umfassenden Dimension des Leibes Christi am Kreuz und seines Wesens, der Liebe Christi, eröffnet sich die Fülle Gottes ...”.

⁵⁰ Theodor Schneider, *Die Einheit des Menschen. Die anthropologische Formel “anima forma corporis” im sogenannten Korrektorienstreit und bei Johannes Olivi. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Konzils von Vienne* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. NF) 8, 2nd ed. (Münster, 1988).

⁵¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), pp. 55–131, esp. pp. 127–128.

⁵² L. Hödl, “Neue Nachrichten über die Pariser Verurteilungen der thomasischen Formlehre,” *Scholastik* 39 (1964), pp. 178–196.

But we are speaking of condemnation by a magisterial sentence, as I know, since I was there: it was ten years ago that all the masters of theology, both those regent and not, who could come were assembled in Paris, in order to examine (the suspect) articles at the behest of the Bishop of Paris, Lord Stephen, and of Lord Simon, (papal) legate, who later became Pope Martin; among these articles there was one that in man there is no other substantial form than the rational soul. They all univocally—with two excepted and one uncertain—said the same thing: ‘even if they said that the statement that there is only one single universal substantial form in man is false, they did not say it was erroneous.’ But because they did not say that the thesis was merely false, it seemed to them rather that they went against the teaching of faith with regards to certain articles of faith concerning the natural body of Christ and concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist; on the contrary, the doctrine of (multiple) forms was not discussed. Doubtless, insofar as they proved it to be false for such a reason, to that same extent they (ad)judged it erroneous and damnable, so that whoever should obstinately try to defend (it), was publicly censured as a heretic, as the aforesaid distinction between false and erroneous makes clear. And this was clear what is more: if, before such an article or a similar one is condemned by an authority, after long and difficult investigation by means of the disputations of the masters, it should be clear that such an article should be condemned, then it would be clear that it (the thesis) concerns a doctrine of faith and contradicts the articles of faith, darkening the light of truth to the eyes. In my opinion, that is what has happened in our time and I am afraid, but I dare not say it, that in the future whoever obstinately defends the aforesaid thesis will be a heretic, hidden from men, but manifest to God.

I doubt on the grounds of good sense that this article was condemned by an authority authorized to do so. It was ten years ago that certain (scholars) in Paris were known to hold that there was no substantial form in man (other) than the rational soul. At that time, in my first disputation *de quolibet* I left open the question whether in men there are multiple forms or only one. I was summoned to speak by Lord Simon, then legate, in the presence of Lord Stephen, then the Bishop of Paris, Lord Ranoldus, now the Bishop of Paris, and Master John of Orleans, at the time the Chancellor and now a Dominican friar, and asked what I meant: are there many substantial forms in men or just one? Lord Simon briefly consulted with the forenamed persons, called me forth and said to me: ‘We are resolute and ask you that you should publicly teach in your schools that there are multiple substantial forms in men, and not just one, the rational soul; scholars should henceforth not remain in doubt over this.’

Because he was suspicious of my opinion, lest I not follow his direction close enough, he added the warning: ‘Take care therefore that you publicly and clearly determine that there are multiple substantial forms in man! For in a matter of faith I would spare no one!’ It seemed to me therefore that he was of the opinion that there lies a matter of faith in the doctrinal

decision whether in man there are multiple substantial forms or just one. And further it would appear to me that he had condemned the proposition that there is only one form in man on the advice of the forenamed men, although not publicly. Lord Ranoldus, Bishop of Paris, and Brother John of Orleans should know even better what the truth is here, and they will give a reliable witness to what has been said.

Although the above autobiographical note was expunged from the text before the text was prepared for distribution by the university, the published text did indeed treat these anthropological issues which entailed Christological consequences. It was in Advent 1286 (or Lent 1287) that the master from Ghent disputed his tenth *Quodlibet*, nearly a decade after the Parisian Condemnation of 1277, and not quite ten years after the franciscan theologian William of Ware's criticism of Thomas (1278/79), and, as often occurred in the previous years, once again the anthropological proposition is treated for its Christological consequences: "Is the living body of Christ specifically the same as that of Peter?"⁵³ Is the unity and the (specific) identity of the body based on the fact that a (single and unique) rational soul freely makes the body from a foundation and basis in matter, as Thomas taught, or only as the ultimate form, formed on top of and completing a predetermined, vegetative and sensitive corporeal existence, as the supporters of the thesis of the plurality of forms said. Both schools of thought were concerned with the Christological questions of the unity, sameness and specific identity of the body of Christ. In these ten years of the Conflict of the *Correctoria* Parisian university theology had achieved clarity in two respects:⁵⁴ with respect to the distinction between *falsum* and *erroneum*—(philosophically) false and (theologically) erroneous (heretical)—and also with respect to the fact that in this period in Paris the anthropological proposition of the unicity of the substantial form had never been condemned by a doctrinal authority. Henry was keenly aware (from personal experiences and observations) that the unicity theory entailed a fateful error, one that he and his fellow Parisian masters had to make clear.⁵⁵

Henry of Ghent maintained that Thomas and his students' unicity thesis was not just false, but also erroneous and ecclesiastically condemned for the Christological consequences it necessarily entailed. This conviction was reinforced during the above mentioned encounter of Henry

⁵³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. X*, q. 5, ed. Macken (Leuven, 1981), pp. 55–131: "Utrum corpus Christi vivum et Petri vivum sit idem specie."

⁵⁴ See Theodor Schneider, *Die Einheit* (note 50), pp. 181–207.

⁵⁵ See Ludwig Hödl, "Neue Nachrichten" (note 52), pp. 178–196.

with the papal legate Simon of Brie in the presence of the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, and the University chancellor John of Orleans. After a short consultation with the representatives both of the Parisian church and university, the legate committed Henry to the multiplicity of human substantial forms, and from then on (from *Quodlibet II*, qq. 2–3, 1277/78), Henry maintained a dymorphic position in his school.⁵⁶ Henry of Ghent understood the directive of the legate in the sense of a non-public, indirect condemnation of Thomas' unicity thesis. Although it did not appear in the list of the 219 *errores* that bishop Tempier explicitly condemned on March 7, 1277, perhaps it should have, as the condemnation of 1286 in England clearly did.

A public condemnation of the unicity theory, however, did not occur in Paris, as the masters uniformly attested, and, according to the text of *Quodlibet X*, which was meant for public distribution indicates, Henry admitted this in front of his students. But this limitation by a doctrinal authority, which Henry had always assumed in preceding years and disputations, disappeared in 1286. Nevertheless the master held firm to his anthropological understanding of form (and essence), which took its bearings from Avicenna's metaphysics. *Ens* and *unum* had to be explained starting from the pure thing (*re absoluta*). The *ratio rei*, the real-true is not an augmentation of the real, rather it is the real as being in thought and as being true. In an essay, J. Aertsen has pointed out this different foundation of transcendentals in Henry of Ghent.⁵⁷ The real-true body of the Lord in life and in death, and even in the sacrament of the altar, is really true in a formally determinate corporality.

In *Quodlibet I* (q. 4), disputed in 1276, Henry, as he later expressly explained in *Quodlibet X*, left open the anthropological position concerning the number of human substantial forms; but from the second *Quodlibet* on, he defended his doctrinal opinion: if the matter of the body discussed by the anthropological proposition, is something determinate, and not simply an empty possibility, but a true thing, then this matter must also be formally determinate. The (second) Biblical account of the creation of Adam (Gen. 2:7) illustrates the stratification of the formal reality of humans: the substantial form of the rational soul forms

⁵⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. II*, q. 3, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 23, 54–61: "Ut sic ex duabus formis naturaliter constituatur homo: una naturaliter educta per naturam de potentia materiae, quae est forma mixtionis aliqua ...; et altera supernaturali supernaturaliter infusa, quae est anima rationalis"

⁵⁷ Jan Aertsen, "Transcendental Thought in Henry of Ghent", *Henry of Ghent* (note 41), pp. 1–18.

in and on top of the vegetative, vital powers of the human body and provides it with the unity and entirety of human existence.⁵⁸ The matter of the body comes from below, but the reason-endowed soul from above.⁵⁹ The substantial, life-giving soul can be just one, single, and unique; it elevates the vital existential layer of the human body and completes it in a specifically human soul-corporality. From such a perspective, the identity of the body of Christ as living and as lying in the tomb presents no problem.⁶⁰ It is a historico-soteriological miracle and sign that the body resting in the tomb did not succumb to decomposition, and one on which the anthropological proposition does not have any bearing.

b.) In *Quodlibet IV*, qq. 13–15 (1279) the master disputed the anthropological proposition in a twofold perspective, philosophical and theological, so that P. Bayerschmitt, in his 1940 Münster dissertation, correctly suspected that for publication the master had filled out the “skeleton of the present *quaestio*” into a comprehensive treatise, comparable to the numerous treatises on forms that appeared in these years.⁶¹ The reason-endowed soul can only be united and be one as *forma corporis* with the body whose matter has been formally adapted to this unity by its potencies. In procreation the vital existence is prepared and disposed for the creative infusion of the soul, but not in additive or consubstantial way, but rather formally, hylomorphically.⁶² Because Henry maintained that a formal-material adaptation of vital human existence occurs in procreation, he was in a position to align himself with Avicenna in criticizing the anthropological position of the unicity theory of human substantial forms.⁶³

⁵⁸ *Lectura ordinaria super sacram Scripturam Henrico de Gandavo adscripta*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1980), p. 145 where Henry explains according to Gen. 2:7 the twofold, external and internal creation of men, “secundum corpus” and “secundum spiritum”, without reference to the anthropological notion *anima forma corporis*.

⁵⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 6, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 54^{rB-C}: “Utrum (anima) vegetativa et sensitiva in Christo infusae erant cum intellectiva vel erant eductae de potentia animae.”

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ Paul Bayerschmidt, *Die Seins- und Formmetaphysik des Heinrich von Gent in ihrer Anwendung auf die Christologie. Eine philosophie- und dogmengeschichtliche Studie* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters) 36, 2–4 (Münster 1941), p. 219.

⁶² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 13, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518) fol. 112^{vB-C}.

⁶³ *ibid.*, q. 21, fol. 137^{rK}: “Ponendo autem intellectum creati prae paratis corporibus, sicut posuit Avicenna, et ponit fides catholica; quod tamen ... ponere non potuit secundum fundamenta magistri ... Aristotelis ...”

The body must formally be distinguished from the rational soul in order to explain transformation in the sacrament of the Eucharist. Transubstantiation does not occur (after the words of transformation) into the vital body or physical body, but rather into a substantially existing body, constituted out of corporeity and materiality (*materia*).⁶⁴ Jesus' words at the Last Supper must be considered and supported according to their entire meaning! It is false to say that the transformation of the bread and the wine would occur now as then into the *compositum* of rational soul and body.⁶⁵

The explanation of the Eucharistic transformation became the theological touchstone for the anthropological proposition. Jesus' words at the Last Supper—the proposition of faith—and the theologian's consideration of faith were put to the test at the same time. Indeed, in his discussion of transubstantiation Thomas Aquinas must have heard this argument:⁶⁶ if the rational soul were the only form of the body, then that would also mean that in the Eucharist the substance of bread and wine would be changed into the substantial rational soul of Jesus. But does this explanation match the words of the Last Supper in the Bible? In replying to this argument, Thomas explained that the rational soul is always the form (reality) of the body. Can this reply also secure the salvific reality of the *corpus Domini*?

Even Giles of Rome, an ardent defender of Thomas's unicity theory of the number of human substantial forms, was not satisfied with this explanation. To what end then served the offering of both meal and salvation in the sacrament? Henry of Ghent denied the validity of both Thomas' explanation and his supporters' interpretation of it.⁶⁷ If the sacramental body at the Eucharist is not formally and essentially the same

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, fol. 111^{vY}.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, fol. 112^{vaA}: "Falsum est ergo dicere quod transsubstantiatio fiat in compositum ex anima et materia corporis Christi secundum esse corporis seu carnis, et non secundum esse vegetabilis, sensibilis vel rationalis, immo non potest fieri transsubstantiatio in id secundum unum esse, ita quod non secundum alia. Dicere ergo in corpus praedictum fieri transsubstantiatio et ipsum manere idem in vivo et mortuo, nihil aliud est quam pervertere et depravare scripturas."

⁶⁶ Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theol.* III, q. 75, a. 6, arg. 2, ed. Marietti (Taurini-Romae, 1953), p. 501.

⁶⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 8, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), pp. 152–190: "Utrum dicendo: 'hoc est corpus meum,' tenet Ecclesia secundum usum et dicta sanctorum quod fiat conversio panis in substantiam animae rationalis secundum quod dat esse corporeum, vel in solam materiam ut habet partes suas extensas, vel in aliquod compositum." See Wenceslaw Plotnik, "Transubstantiation in the Eucharistic Theology of Giles

body of Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, if it is not the same body given on the Cross for the sins of the World, then it is not the gift and has not the power of forgiveness and reconciliation. And if the words of the Last Supper are really true, then they indicate the identical body of the Lord that has its specific human reality in the unity of the rational soul, but in itself and of itself in possession of its proper and unique corporeal shape and determination.

This deep concern for the correct understanding of the sacramental body of Christ also informed the decision by John Peckham, the Archbishop of Canterbury, to condemn Richard Knapwell, the eloquent and polemicizing defender of Thomas.⁶⁸ The solemn London condemnation of April 30, 1286 lists eleven propositions that relate either directly or indirectly to the unicity theory and also explicitly mention the condemned propositions on the Eucharistic transformation.⁶⁹ Shortly thereafter the condemnation also became known in Paris, and the Master of Ghent would be confronted with it in his tenth *Quodlibet* (1286). In the disputation's original redaction, he adduces verbatim a list of incriminated propositions, among which is the one on the sacramental body of Christ.⁷⁰ They reflect Henry's criticism: the unicity thesis cannot explain or secure the belief and knowledge of the corporeal presence of the body of Christ; therefore it is an avowed error. Later, at the publication of the *Quodlibet*, the master omitted these extensive citations, because in the meantime he must have (following the opinion of his Parisian colleagues) publicly explained that the anthropological position of the unicity theory had not been publicly condemned in Paris in the past ten years.⁷¹ The London condemnation thereby lost its meaning in Paris, where it could command no validity in canon law. But Henry of Ghent believed it was just and consequently left (in the published *Quodlibet*) the (condemned) fundamental error of the unicity theory: "Who intends to maintain ⟨these theses⟩ is required to give credence not to the authority of Pope Gregory or Augustine, or others like them, nor to that of a master, but rather only to the authority of the Bible, and to necessary proof."⁷² But he immedi-

of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines" in *Wahrheit und Verkündigung: Festschrift Michael Schmaus*, eds. Leo Scheffczyk, Werner Dettloff, Richard Heinzmann (Paderborn, 1967) II, pp. 1073–1086.

⁶⁸ Theodor Schneider, *Die Einheit* (note 50), pp. 95–101, 130–140.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*

⁷⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* X, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), pp. 106–110.

⁷¹ *ibid.*, pp. 127–128.; see note 52.

⁷² *ibid.*, p. 79.

ately amended the criticism: supporters of the unicity theory must follow the authority of Scripture not only in word, but also in deed. They follow Scripture as little as they follow the saints (the Church Fathers). Whoever puts aside the tradition of the Fathers also sets aside Scripture. In its consequences for the understanding of the body of Christ, the philosophical theory of the unicity of human substantial forms contradicts the truth of faith. From this conviction, he had to reject Thomas and his school.

III. *Additional Ecclesiological Reflections in the Tractatus*

The so-called University Controversy, also called the Mendicant Controversy, affected education and culture, as well as church and society in the late Middle Ages. The appearance and success of the mendicant orders (the Franciscans and the Dominicans) in the university and the *civitas academica*, which orders assumed and established their spiritual and academic position (*status*) alongside the seculars of the parish clergy, brought about a deep-seated ecclesiastical and societal upheaval, which was first noticeable in the university—opposing tradition and innovation in the understanding of the internal and external constitution of the Church and Christendom.

As archdeacon, Henry was a representative of the diocesan clergy, and he was a respected master of the university, a spokesman and advocate of the tradition of the diocesan church and its “Gallic” clergy. The antagonism towards the monastic theology of “evangelic perfection” and the resistance to the pastoral privileges of the mendicant orders impacted henceforth the history of the Church and of theology (and not only these) until the Reformation. In the thirteenth century, Henry of Ghent had a major influence in this double (but not twofold) dispute over the internal and external constitution of the Church.

1.) The two mendicant orders directed the ascetic striving for the perfection of Christ towards the evangelical counsels and appealed to obedience, poverty and celibacy (Mt. 19:16–22).⁷³ They wanted to convert the “secularized” church, and particularly the clergy, to following Christ absolutely. But the two orders differed in an essential point of doctrine. In

⁷³ On the notion of the “evangelical counsels” (*perfectio evangelica*) see *Lexikon des Mittelalters* IV (1989), pp. 131–135 (Ludwig Hödl).

the treatise of his *Summa* concerning the perfection of the spiritual life, Thomas Aquinas, to whom Henry of Ghent refers in this principal part of spiritual theology as a “*doctor religiosus valde excellens*”;⁷⁴ established that the aim of perfection in the spiritual life is not poverty as such, but rather love; the biblical appeals *merely* show the way.⁷⁵ The ‘merely’ is meant not to limit, but rather to emphasize. “But if the words of the Lord are considered carefully, then the Lord does not place perfection in the renunciation of riches alone, but rather he indicates renunciation as the *quasi* path (to perfection), as even the manner of speaking shows, as if it said: ‘if you want to be perfect, then go’ ...!”⁷⁶ The Franciscan theologians, first among them Peter John Olivi, held perfect poverty as such to be the spiritual perfection of the disciples in following Jesus, and criticized Thomas Aquinas. But the latter maintained without any qualification: “Christian perfection is tied to love.”⁷⁷ In accordance with his understanding of the perfect spiritual life, he chose the priority of the contemplative way of life over the active or working life, because the contemplative life makes the followers of Christ free for the vocation and demands of the appeals to follow Christ.

Although Henry of Ghent strongly agreed with Thomas that the ‘heart and soul’ of spiritual perfection consisted in the love of God, he just as firmly denied the priority of the contemplative life over the active one, and he accused Thomas of letting himself once again be inspired by Aristotle, who had no idea either of grace-bearing merit or of eternal life.⁷⁸ Consequently, in *Quodlibet XII*, q. 28 he rejected Thomas’s exposition by using the typological explanation of the two Biblical women, Mary and Martha (Lk. 10:38–42).⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XIII*, q. 14, ed. J. Decorte (Leuven, 1985), p. 148, 67–68.

⁷⁵ Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theol. II^a II^{ae}*, qq. 179–182; *Tract. De perfectione vitae spiritualis*, c. 8, ed. H.-F. Dondaine (Leonina XLIB–C) (Rome 1969), p. 73; see Ludwig Hödl, “Die theol. Diskussion des Heinrich v. Gent († 1293) über die thomasische Lehre vom vollkommenen christl. Leben, (*Quodl. XII* 28–29),” *Thomas von Aquino. Interpretation und Rezeption*, ed. Willehad P. Eckert OP (Walberberger Studien) V (Mainz 1975), pp. 470–497.

⁷⁶ Thomas de Aquino, *Tract. De perfectione*, (note 75), p. 73.

⁷⁷ Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theol. II^a II^{ae}*, q. 184, a. 2, ed. Marietti (Taurini-Romae, 1952), pp. 797 ff.

⁷⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 28, ed. J. Decorte (Leuven, 1987), p. 170: “quam rationem meriti nullo modo attendit Philosophus non ponens vitam futuram et ideo rationes sumptae a Philosopho modicum valent ad praesens catholico.”

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 164–188: “Utrum opera vitae activae sint praeferenda operibus vitae contemplativae tamquam meliora.”

These questions concerning the superior spiritual way of life in *Quodlibets XI* and *XII* paved the way for the foundational question 29 of *Quodlibet XII*: "Is the status of prelates higher and more perfect than the status of religious?"⁸⁰ The notion of "more perfect status" (in the hierarchy of ecclesiastical offices, authorities and powers) and that of the ethical and ascetic perfection of status overlapped in the debate, and complicated it. The higher hierarchical status does not also mean a higher perfection of status, as the mendicants sought to claim and as they asserted against the secular clergy in the dispute over pastoral privileges. If a vow, which is a solemn obligation, is a constitutive element of status, then the mendicant friars are in a higher status than the lower prelates and the local pastors, who according to church law may enter an order at any time. For the mendicants, only the bishops, as the successors of the Apostles, were in a higher status. Mendicant priests could therefore by papal privilege be given the status of preachers and have the pastoral care of souls.

Henry of Ghent rejected with good reason this self-conception of the *fratres* and their theologians. According to his understanding, the friars' status of highest ascetic perfection is no hierarchical status, but rather the *exercitium*, the actual practicing the perfect Christian life by following Christ. And insofar as the *fratres* of the mendicant orders are held by their vows to great ascetic endeavors, they are also in a higher status of striving for perfection, as Henry concedes.⁸¹ But this personal ideal of perfection cannot be a standard for a secular priest, who must prove himself in pastoral, social and public service. The perfection of the status of the prelates resides in the proficiency of being able to lead and care for the community. Henry strongly distinguishes between the ascetic-spiritual and the official-status perfection of the secular priests.

Although Henry could not dodge the goal of a personal ideal of perfection, he did not allow it to be constitutive of ecclesiastical office. "Although the status of prelates too was so founded by Christ such that they should be disposed in the aforesaid way to bringing about the perfect works (of celibacy and poverty), I (however) maintain that in consideration of the difficulty of those who cannot live without property and wife, both were allowed, in any case such that it greatly diminishes personal perfection, but not the perfection of status. While in no way

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 188–249.

⁸¹ *ibid.*, pp. 195–196.

could they have both (property and wife) without diminution of personal perfection, insofar as they are in the status and execution of their office, they remain in the status of perfection.”⁸²

Henry of Ghent could support and explain the spiritual status of the (lower) prelates as superior to the mendicants’ status only with great effort. The monastic way of life of evangelical perfection was certainly binding for the secular clergy, since it was the *vita apostolica*, that is, in the tradition of the Apostles. He read in Augustine’s *De civitate Dei* that the Apostles had also taken the “three vows of the religious.”⁸³ This pertained to the perfection of their life, not their office. If the renunciation of any and all property had been an essential element of Apostolic office, then the Apostles would have constantly had to follow the proclamation of the Gospel. By means of this distinction between a personal perfection and a perfection of one’s office or state, Henry could reduce the two different ways of life—the one followed by the secular clergy and the other followed by the *fratres*—to the *vita apostolica*.

Henry based the status and office of those charged with the care of the faithful on the ideal of the pastor and the father.⁸⁴ In the dispute over the superior nature of the pastoral office of the prelates, Henry invoked the Pauline claim and protest in I Corinthians (4:14–15), where the Apostle contrasted his unique father-relationship with community in Corinth to the endeavors of other teachers in the community: “For even though you have ten thousand schoolteachers in Christ, you do not have many fathers, for I (alone) have begot you in Jesus Christ through the Gospel.” (1 Cor. 4:15).⁸⁵ Henry did not deny that the *fratres* can be engaged in the converting sinners in certain cases, namely in the evangelization of the unbelievers and laypersons, but he firmly denied that they would normally be charged with the pastoral care of the faithful in the community.⁸⁶ And he was led to this point of view in the long, fateful conflict over the pastoral privileges of the mendicant orders.

⁸² *ibid.*, p. 218.

⁸³ *ibid.*, p. 211: “... et apostoli tria vota religionis voverunt, sicut dicit Augustinus XVII^o De civitate Dei eos vovisse paupertatem, hoc erat pertinens ad perfectionem personae, non status.” See Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XVII, c. 4, n. 6, ed. Bernard Dombart—Alphonsus Kalb (CCLat. 48, Turnhout, 1955), p. 559, 172–177.

⁸⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XI*, q. 27, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 477^r–482^r: “Utrum sit qui ex privilegio praedicat, maior sit et verius pater quam qui ex iurisdictione ordinaria.”

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, fol. 478^{rf}.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, fol. 579^{vp}: “In quibus casibus quodammodo proprie et vere dici possunt patres illi, ut puta quando sua praedicatione convertuntur infideles ad fidem ...”

2.) The university conflict concerning the privileges of the friars was at the same time a dispute over the mendicants' pastoral care of the faithful in the populous cities of Ile-de-France in the thirteenth century. The involvement of the orders with this pastoral care in the parishes had deeply influenced and changed the parochially organized and functioning care of the faithful by the diocesan secular priests. The care of souls was centered in the local baptismal and parochial church, and had developed according to a territorially limited and specific parish under the direction of the responsible priest (*proprius sacerdos*), i.e. a member of the secular clergy. A *praelatus* with his own established authority could only accept and consider the mendicants as nothing more than assistants. This missionary (evangelical) assistance and support developed in a necessarily local manner. Because of resistance from the greater and lesser prelates, new, additional pastors from the mendicant orders could only obtain a pastoral assignment through papal decisions (privileges). It was, after all, the plight of local pastors which initiated these decisions, and as a result pastoral authority, especially that of the bishops, was diminished.⁸⁷

From Pope Honorius III (1216–1227) onwards the popes gave the mendicant orders their pastoral authorization, and at first they protected the long-established rights of the secular prelates, but increasingly, as the prelates resisted, the popes by their Apostolic authority gave these powers to the mendicants against the prelates' rights. With the decretal *Ad fructus uberes* of December 13, 1281, Martin IV finished the task: when applicable, the *fratres* could under certain conditions operate as pastors in the community even without the permission of the prelates.⁸⁸ Right from the start the prelates defied these pastoral privileges granted by the popes in favor of the mendicants. They organized their resistance in synods, assemblies and sermons, and they even presented supplications, submissions and court cases at the Roman Curia. It goes without saying that to defend their newly acquired privileges the mendicants

⁸⁷ See the analysis of Pope Boniface VIII's decree *Super cathedram* (February 18, 1300) in L. Hödl, "Der Kommentar des Kardinals Johannes Monachus zur Dekretale *Super cathedram* des Papstes Bonifaz VIII. (18. Februar 1300)," *Revue Mabillon* 16 (t. 77) (2005), pp. 133–178. On this, see also Joseph Ratzinger, "Der Einfluß des Bettelordensstreites auf die Entwicklung der Lehre vom päpstlichen Universalprimat, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des hl. Bonaventura," *Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Festschrift Michael Schmaus*, eds. Johann Auer and Hermann Volk (Munich, 1957), pp. 697–724.

⁸⁸ For the following see: Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 31 (Tractatus super facto praelatorum et fratrum) eds. L. Hödl—M. Haverals (Leuven, 1989), pp. VII–CXVII.

mobilized through the superiors of their orders and their theologians, so that Pope Martin IV in 1289/90 had to determine officially the disputed matter of these privileges through two cardinal legates, Benedict Gaetani and Gerard of S. Sabina.⁸⁹

These two papal legates called the French bishops to Paris for a synod, which A. Finke has called the Parisian National Council of 1290.⁹⁰ The prelates and the *fratres* were able to present their complaints, but without further discussion Cardinal Gaetani recited the papal determination: in a gruff, and perhaps even harmful manner, he rejected the protest of the secular clergy and its demand for the revocation or reinterpretation of the pastoral privilege and chose the full validity and total application of this privilege. In a hastily called meeting of the masters of theology and other like-minded colleagues, particularly the canon and civil lawyers, Henry of Ghent, the theological advocate of the secular clergy, sought to force the discussion of the privilege. But the legate summarily deposed him of his teaching office. His friends and colleagues must have intervened with the cardinal in order to rescind his sentence of punishment. By this action the legate signaled to all masters of the university that the papal decision was not debatable, and that theology should serve salvation and not knowledge.

3.) From the start, Henry of Ghent defended the position of the secular clergy in his public and academic disputations. For discussions in Paris he had prepared a book of “12 peciae”—4 × 12 folios = 48 sheets, 96 pages—, but he would not publish it as a separate tract. But later, after 1304, it, along with question 31 of *Quodlibet XII*, which likewise concerned the pastoral privileges of the mendicants, was published (by his students) through the university.⁹¹ This treatise *On the dispute between the prelates and the friars* had in no way lost its significance and importance because of the Parisian determination of 1290;⁹² on the contrary, under Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303) and even more so after his death, the conflict took on new life, and the treatise by Henry took on new meaning, especially through his student John of Pouilly, who referred

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, pp. LXXXIX–CIX.

⁹⁰ *ibid.*, p. CV. See Henryk Anzulewicz, “Zur Kontroverse um das Mendikantenprivileg. Ein ältester Bericht über das Pariser Nationalkonzil von 1290,” *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 60 (1993), pp. 281–291.

⁹¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII, quaest. 1–30*, ed. J. Decorte (Leuven, 1987), pp. XXXI–XXXIV.

⁹² See note 88.

explicitly to his teacher in his second defense pleading at his trial in Avignon (1318–1321).⁹³ From the turn of the century onwards numerous theological and ecclesiopolitical treatises *De potestate* appeared, treatises that were initially inspired by this conflict.⁹⁴ In writing his *liber* for the 1290 case, Henry of Ghent composed one of the first treatises on the universal authority of the Pope. The master organized the treatise as a large-scale disputation with the mendicants over their pastoral privilege. This dispute was brought out into the open especially in the synods of the secular clergy in Bourges and Paris in 1286/87, where the prelates ruled that if a parishioner confessed to a mendicant priest without the authorization of his parish priest, the *proprius sacerdos* according to the determination of the Canon *Omnis utriusque sexus* of Lateran IV (1215), he had to confess them all again to his own parish priest—even after valid absolution was given.⁹⁵ This requirement was denied as vigorously by the mendicants as it was defended by the secular priests. It goes without saying that this conflict caused great uncertainty among the faithful.

In the first part of his *liber* Henry of Ghent argued for the canonical necessity as well as the ascetic utility and legitimacy of repeated confession, which gives the *fructus uberes* that the pope intended.⁹⁶ Next, he expounded the disputed decretal of Martin IV, *Ad fructus uberes*, word-for-word just as he had analyzed it in front of the members of the Paris Synod. He had to support canonically and theologically the idea of repeated confession with legitimate dialectical distinctions, especially the notion that sin has to be re-confessed another time. The proviso '*Nihilominus*' in the bull "Ad fructus urberes" in favor of the parochial rights of the proper parish priest is one of the dodges of Henry, who was also versed and trained in the *artes liberales*.⁹⁷

In the second part of the treatise Henry discussed a two-fold list of 26 arguments *contra*, which opposed the position of the *fratres*, and also

⁹³ Johannes de Polliaco, *Responsio I*, art. 5, Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, lat. B VII 9, fol. 161r: "Item, istam opinionem tenuerunt eximii sacrae scripturae doctores, magistri Henrici de Gandavo et Godefridi de Fontanis et in scriptis posteris reliquerunt."

⁹⁴ Jürgen Miethke, "Die Traktate 'De potestate papae'. Ein Typus politik-theoretischer Literatur im späten Mittelalter," *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales. Définition, critique et exploitation* (Publications de l'Institut des études médiévales, 2nd s.) 5 (Leuven, 1982), pp. 193–211.

⁹⁵ Lateranense IV, *De fide catholica*, c.21, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, ed. Henricus Denzinger-Adolfus Schönmetzer (34th ed. Freiburg, 1967), n. 812, p. 264.

⁹⁶ See further Henry of Ghent, *Tractatus* (note 88), pp. LXXI–LXXXI.

⁹⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 104–112.

16 proofs that the mendicants had adduced for their position.⁹⁸ The discussion increasingly involved the question of papal authority as *potentia absoluta* and *ordinata*.⁹⁹ Sometimes the universal papal authority in the church and that of the greater and lesser local prelates appear as competing pastoral powers.¹⁰⁰ Bishops and presbyters are the legitimate successors of the Apostles and the 72 disciples, who since their establishment by Christ have possessed their normal and proper pastoral power, and these should not be abrogated or limited.¹⁰¹ The pastoral power of the church is founded on and effective in these two *ordines*.¹⁰² The *fratres* may and must be called to help by the prelates (*in subsidium praelatorum*).¹⁰³ “And thus the *proprius sacerdos* is only the pope, the bishop, and the pastor of the parish church.”¹⁰⁴ Henry, a member of the secular clergy, did not succeed in establishing a balance between the universal pastoral power of the pope and the authority in pastoral care of faithful by the local prelates, because he incorrectly assessed and poorly applied the weight of the bishops’ local pastoral authority. In the notion of the (greater and lesser) prelates there lies a fateful error of ambivalence, an error which affected the pastoral conflict: it called into play the universal authority of the pope, because the local pastoral authority of the bishops is limited, since and insofar as the episcopal *parochia* (diocese) absorbed the territorially determined and limited parish. Henry of Ghent is thus also partly responsible for this development in theological and ecclesiastical history.

Conclusion: The Gandavistae.

Henry of Ghent had greatly influenced theology and the church around the turn of the fourteenth century. All schools, both those of the seculars and those of the mendicants, had to be aware of and critically engage his views. Open conflict broke out in 1307—30 years after the Parisian condemnation of philosophical doctrinal errors by bishop Stephan Tem-

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, pp. LXXXI–LXXXIX; pp. 167–235, 236–268.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 176.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, p. 194.

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*, pp. 198, 209.

¹⁰² *ibid.*, p. 211.

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, p. 216.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p. 250. In the primitive apostolic church the Apostles and the Disciples were the only local pastors. “Et hoc modo proprius sacerdos est solummodo papa et episcopus et curam habens ecclesiae parochialis.”

pier—, and it was once again in the *aula episcopi*, on the occasion of the promotion to master of Jean de Pouilly, who was the student of Godfrey of Fontaines who in turn as a secular bachelor had heard the lectures of Henry of Ghent. The incipient master selected as the theme for his disputation in the halls (*in aulis*) the questions that had been controversial since the Condemnation of 1277: whether and how God, in His foreknowledge and His governance, can know and determine the extradivine, the contingent and future, the individual and actual.¹⁰⁵ He also severely criticized Henry of Ghent, who several times in his *Summa* discussed God's knowledge and willing.¹⁰⁶ The *Gandavistae*, who were in the audience in the episcopal *aula*, were very agitated and embittered, and they accused the young master of *ignorantia* and *negligentia*; they tumultuously forced the disputation to be broken off.¹⁰⁷

In the same year (1307), in front of his own listeners, the master from Pouilly in his *Quodlibet I* was able to present his understanding of the freedom of God and men as grounded in the intellect, and to defend the honor of Aristotle, both in the original and longer version in q. 5, and again later in the shorter one in q. 7.¹⁰⁸ The audience of both disputations was entirely divided. In Paris, the reversal in the notion and support among the academic and political public of freedom rooted in the intellect had been achieved before 1310. Intellectual history does not point merely to the “deeply hidden course of the history of ideas” (F.W. Hegel), but also to a revolutionary upheaval. In the Parisian schools at the beginning of the fourteenth century, this upheaval achieved its fulfillment in the notion that the human will was independent of reason, and from those schools spread the notion of political freedom. At the end of his book *Insolente liberté*, F.-X. Putallaz came to this conclusion: “La conception intellectualiste de la liberté comportait néanmoins une

¹⁰⁵ L. Hödl, “Die Aulien des Magisters Johannes von Polliaco und der scholastische Streit über die Begründung der menschlichen Willensfreiheit,” *Scholastik* 35 (1960), pp. 57–75.

¹⁰⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520) I, fol. 127^{r-v}. See Jos Decorte, *Eine kurze Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie*, trans. Inigo Bocken and Matthias Laarmann (Paderborn, 2006), pp. 222 ff.

¹⁰⁷ L. Hödl, “Die Kritik des Johannes de Polliaco an der philosophischen und theologischen ratio in der Auseinandersetzung mit den averroistischen Unterscheidungslehren,” *Miscellanea M. Grabmann*, (Mitteilungen des Grabmann-Institutes der Universität München) H.3 (München 1959), pp. 11–30. esp. 19.

¹⁰⁸ Ludwig Hödl, “Die Opposition des Johannes de Polliaco gegen die Schule der Gandavistae,” *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter*, IX (2004), pp. 115–177.

charge explosive ... Mais c'est en dehors de l'université que la doctrine intellectualiste de la liberté allait être explicitement insérée dans le cadre d'une philosophie politique."¹⁰⁹

The school of Henry of Ghent did not last at the university in Paris. Of the *Gandavistae*, we know by name only Master John of Ghent, who is mentioned in Paris in 1303 and again in 1304–1306 as master of theology and *canonicus*.¹¹⁰ John of Pouilly firmly thrust his secular colleagues to the margin and on the defensive. Also, in nearly every disputation he opposed Henry of Ghent. Only when we understand the extensive question literature of John of Pouilly will we be able to obtain a more reliable picture of the school of Henry of Ghent. By criticizing Aristotle, this school ruined its future—but not the reputation of the *magister sollemnis*.

¹⁰⁹ François-Xavier Putallaz, *Insolente liberté*, (note 26), p. 312.

¹¹⁰ *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II (note 4) n. 635, 658, pp. 103, 121. See L. Hödl, "Die Opposition" (n. 108).

HENRY OF GHENT ON THE TRINITY

JUAN CARLOS FLORES

Henry of Ghent was devoted to an investigation of the Trinity. His thoughts on the topic appear often in his numerous *Summa* articles and quodlibetal questions. As a Christian, naturally, Henry saw the Trinity as the very origin and purpose of life and of all creation. However, the issue goes further than this. As a theologian and philosopher, Henry made special efforts to understand reality as indicative as well as in light of the Trinity. His intellectual project is ambitious and grand: to produce a system that refined and developed the wisdom tradition of Augustine and Bonaventure, and simultaneously take full account of the Aristotelian tradition that had recently arrived at thirteenth century Paris. Accordingly, Henry challenged Thomas Aquinas and his defenders, not merely on Augustinian grounds, but also on Aristotelian grounds.¹ For Henry, much can be learned and incorporated from Aristotle. However, true philosophy finds in the Trinity the ultimate source of all intellectual vision and reality. Accordingly, the genuine strength of Aristotle lies in the proper subordination and use of Aristotle within this Trinitarian vision.

Henry's writings on the Trinity are extensive and difficult, to say the least. A detailed analysis of the Trinity in the thought of Henry of Ghent has been published in a separate study.² Even though that study develops in more depth the topics introduced in this modest contribution, the present purpose is not to simplify Henry's complicated, subtle and

¹ See, for example, Stephen F. Brown, "Henry of Ghent's Critique of Aquinas' Subalternation Theory and the Early Thomistic Response", in *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Reijo Työriñoja—Anja I. Lehtinen—Dagfinn Føllesdal (Helsinki, 1990), pp. 337–345; S.F. Brown, "The Medieval Background to the Abstractive vs. Intuitive Cognition Distinction", in *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. Jan Aertsen—Andreas Speer (Berlin—New York, 2000), pp. 79–90.

² Juan Carlos Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, with a critical edition of question six of article fifty-five of the Summa Quaestionum Ordinariaum* (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1) XXXVI (Leuven, 2006), viii+239 pp. See also J.C. Flores, "Intellect and Will as Natural Principles: Connecting Theology, Metaphysics and Psychology in Henry of Ghent," in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. Guy Guldentops—Carlos Steel, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1) XXXI (Leuven, 2003), pp. 277–305.

profound discussions, which could easily lead to misrepresentation. Rather, the purpose is to provide a sketch of the importance of Henry's account of the Trinity, and suggest additional sources and avenues for research.

I. Background

Henry's Trinitarian theology was influenced by those who understood the distinctions among the divine persons in terms of emanations, by those who understood them in terms of relations, and perhaps more fundamentally by Augustine's psychology of the Trinity, which describes the Son as the word of the intellect and the Holy Spirit as the love of the will.³ This may be said of medieval Trinitarian theology in general, in the sense that all thinkers agree that in God there are emanations as well as relations, and that the Son is the Word and the Holy Spirit is Love. The issue about which there is disagreement concerns the ultimate cause of personal distinctions. Even though the Trinity is ultimately a mystery of the faith, medievals struggled to gain some understanding of what they believed.

The emanations account is closely associated with Richard of St. Victor, and the Platonic tradition in general. As Plato noted in the *Timaeus*, the first principle is properly called the Good, since it gives of itself in creation. The Christian Platonists, however, went further. Above all, the Good is good because of its immanent activity, which is the basis of its transitive or creative activity. The Good is subsistent Love, and thus gives of itself to itself, in a twofold way, namely through the first and second emanations (which produce the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively).⁴ The ways in which the divine persons originate distinguish these persons. The Father has no origin and is Himself the ultimate origin, the Son originates first and the Holy Spirit originates second. These ways are the key to understanding how God is both one and three. Bonaventure,

³ See Russell L. Friedman, "Relations, Emanations, and Henry of Ghent's Use of the 'Verbum Mentis' in Trinitarian Theology: the Background in Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 7 (1996), pp. 131–182.

⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LIV, q. 3, ed. Jodocus Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 79^{vp}: "[Divina natura] est summe activa, et ideo suiipsius summe diffusiva. Summa autem diffusio non est nisi per emanationem communicando alteri suam naturam in diversitate personae."

who placed the Trinity at the center of his reflections, breathed new life into this emanations tradition, and highly stimulated his immediate successor at Paris, Henry of Ghent.

Augustine and Boethius developed the account of personal distinctions through the Aristotelian category of relation. As Aristotle noted, a substance is not multiplied by the relations it may have to other things. The same individual can be a parent, a sibling etc., as well as similar to or greater than another being. These relations, whether they are increased or decreased, do not compromise the unity of the substance. Accordingly, relations are the key to understanding how God is one and three: God is one substantially, but three relatively. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are one substance, but three distinct persons according to the (self) relations of the divine substance.

Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure's contemporary at Paris, adopted this explanatory approach to the Trinity. Even though, as all Trinitarian theologians recognize, the emanations are God's inner life, relations are the cause of personal distinctions. Thus, Aquinas maintains that the Father generates because He is the Father. Bonaventure says the opposite. Even though, as all Trinitarian theologians also recognize, relations are necessary aspects of the Trinity, they are not the cause of personal distinctions. Rather, to Bonaventure, the Father is the Father because He generates. Bonaventure and Aquinas, sharing terminology and basic tenets, differ in the way in which they conceptualize the Trinity.⁵ Aquinas' chief insight is that activity flows from the supposite, and in God the supposite is relative, in this case the Father. Bonaventure's chief insight, on the other hand, is that activity causes the supposite; fundamentally, God is activity.

Aside from his use of the category of relation, another important aspect of Augustine's Trinitarian thought is his psychology of intellect and will, found most clearly in *De Trinitate*. In this text, Augustine spends much time analyzing how the mind is an image of God. The mind, more than exterior, sensible things, reflects God. In the mind, we may discover indications of necessity, eternity and immutability, when the mind appeals to unchanging standards and fixed principles. These cognitive aspects recall essential attributes of the divine substance. One may also gather indications of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, primarily through the analysis of memory, intellect and will. From the memory, the mind can produce a word, a present concept or knowledge of what

⁵ See R.L. Friedman, "Relations, Emanations," pp. 133–158.

was hidden, as it were, in the memory. Along with this present knowledge comes the joy or love found in this very knowledge. Even though producing and produced knowledge, and producing and produced love, are one in the mind itself, they are distinct aspects of the mind's inner life and self-awareness. They are necessary distinctions of the mind's own self-knowledge and self-love. Henry of Ghent follows along these Augustinian lines, but in a way that goes further than Augustine. What Augustine established primarily in the context of elucidating how the mind is an image of God, Henry will develop and apply as insights into how God is actually triune. Henry writes:

We must understand that all those things which are found in us regarding intellect and will through a temporal sequence, are found correspondingly in God in the permanence of eternity. For there is in God a certain essential knowledge in the Father, like there is in us a first incomplete knowledge of a thing which precedes all desire and love, and in a first instance excites love's desire to seek about what is known a perfect knowledge. "For no one," as [Augustine] says in [*De Trinitate*] book 15, chapter 27, "wills that of which he altogether ignores what or which kind of thing it is." To this love in us corresponds in the Father an essential love delighted in the Word conceived from the paternal mind informed, as it were, by an actual essential knowledge; and this delight corresponds in us to the desire seeking a perfect knowledge which, once obtained, that will is perfected and love out of the one that enjoys comes to be, proceeding both out of the generating mind and from the generated knowledge, to which corresponds in God the proceeding love which is the Holy Spirit.⁶

Henry is original both in synthesizing and departing from his predecessors. For Henry, the cause of personal distinctions is properly neither emanation nor relation, though both are to be incorporated. The ultimate cause is the intellectual and willing nature of God's substance. The persons are distinct in the real sense that the Father generates intellectually, the Son is generated as the Word of the divine intellect, and

⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LIV, q. 6, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 98^v: "Intelligendum quod omnibus illis quae inveniuntur in nobis ex parte intellectus et voluntatis et per discursum temporis, in Deo inveniuntur correspondentia in permanentia aeternitatis. Est enim in Deo quaedam notitia essentialis in Patre, quemadmodum in nobis est prima notitia rei incompleta quae omnem appetitum et amorem praecedat, et primo excitat appetitum amoris ad inquirendum de cognito notitiam perfectam. 'Nemo enim,' ut dicit [Augustinus] lib. XV, cap. 27, 'vult quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit.' Isti amor in nobis respondet in Patre amor essentialis cui complacet in verbi conceptu de mente paterna quasi informata actuali notitia essentiali, et respondet ista complacentia appetitui in nobis inquirenti notitiam perfectam, qua habita voluntas illa perficitur et fit amor fruētis, et de gignente mente et genita notitia procedens, cui respondet in divinis amor procedens qui est Spiritus Sanctus."

the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the Love of the divine will. These spiritual dimensions of God's inner life govern the emanations, and the emanations in turn ground the relations. In prioritizing emanation over relation, Henry may be seen as closer to Bonaventure than to Aquinas, as is also the case in most other aspects of his thinking. However, as indicated, Henry's position goes much deeper than its indebtedness to Augustine and Bonaventure. Henry is breaking new ground, while at the same time incorporating a thoroughly analyzed tradition.⁷ Most telling is Henry's use of the relations account in the following respect: the Aristotelian background is revised and developed within Henry's original project. This may be said of Henry in other areas as well.⁸

II. *The Divine Persons*

Two chief topics dominate in Henry's account of the Trinity: 1) intellect and will and 2) relation. The first is in many ways the basis for the second, since the relations among the divine persons are relations of intellect and will.

The divine mind knows and loves itself. Its relation of self-knowledge is constitutive of the Father and the Son, while its relation of self-love is constitutive of the Holy Spirit. The latter relation is constitutive of one person only, the produced one, since the Father and the Son, who produce the Holy Spirit, are already constituted through the first relation, namely that of knowledge. In spiration, which is the emanation of the Holy Spirit, the divine will directs its love to itself as known, since the will loves only what it knows. And the divine substance knows itself in the persons of the Father and the Son. Spiration, though dependent on the first emanation, is distinct. The relation of self-knowledge becomes also one of self-love through spiration and the Holy Spirit. Knowledge and love are both distinct and interdependent dimensions of the Trinity's inner life.⁹

⁷ On the originality and influence of Henry's Trinitarian theology, see R.L. Friedman, "Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325," *Studia Theologica* 53 (1999), p. 20.

⁸ Probably the best-known example of this is in epistemology, where Henry uses Aristotelian abstraction as a subordinated element within his own illumination theory. See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, 2005).

⁹ See J.C. Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity*, pp. 55–61.

The divine intellect knows itself, both in itself and as imitable or as the cause of creatures. Henry explains God's self-knowledge through the emanation of the Son by the Father, since the Father and the Son are the two sides of this very self-knowledge. As a first step in his explanation, Henry analyzes the nature of the human intellect. The human intellect is a principle that produces a proper product, namely a definition of a simple concept originally in the memory. The mind that generates a definition of this concept knows itself, since the mind is informed or actualized by the concept. Knowledge knows itself as knowledge. Simple knowledge generates a greater knowledge out of itself about itself. When the mind reflects on its concept, it also reflects on itself as informed by the concept. When the definition is produced, the mind is impressed with knowledge of itself. The definition of the concept impresses itself on the intellect that reflects on itself, that is bent back as it were, when seeing its own conceptual content. This is the generation of the word, the production of an analytical knowledge of a concept that was first only known simply.¹⁰ Aquinas and others, who understand the word simply as the concept, and not as the analytical knowledge of the concept, are mistaken.¹¹

Analogously, we should understand the generation of the Son, Henry intimates, but without any of the deficiencies or limitations associated with creatures. The first cause is pure act, as many philosophers have maintained. As such, it lacks both potency and limits. It is spiritual and all knowing. First and foremost, it knows itself. Secondly and consequently, it knows all that flows from it, namely creatures. The generation of the Son is not in any sense a process whereby potency is reduced to act, but rather God's eternal and completely conscious act of self-knowing. The divine intellect, as completely actual, is most naturally suited to scrutinize at once and perfectly the entirety of its infinite knowledge. It is most naturally suited for complete self-consciousness. Other intellectual beings, such as human beings, are self-conscious only in a limited sense. That is why in God there is generation to an utmost degree. In God, there is

¹⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LVIII, q. 2, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 131^{vm}: "Et quamquam verbum ... comprehendat actum notitiae quae est actualis intellectio in intelligentia et ipsum obiectum, propriissime tamen ratio verbi consistit in ipsa notitia discretiva ut comprehendit ipsum intellectum sive cognoscentem cum sua notitia eidem inhaerente de ipso intelligente, ut de potenciali educto quod erat notitia et verbum in potentia, formabile non formatum cum volubiliter inquerendo iactabatur."

¹¹ For this criticism and its implications, see J.C. Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity*, pp. 133–139.

complete intellectual communication, which is also a communication of nature, since the same, single divine nature comes to be possessed by the Father and the Son. The divine intellect completely and absolutely reflects on itself, and completely and absolutely is impressed with the entirety of its content. In this perfect self-knowledge, the side that impresses is the Father who generates, while the side that is impressed with knowledge is the generated Son.

The Father and Son are distinct as irreducible sides of the relation of self-knowledge, but they are also one in substance since they are grounded foundationally in the one divine mind.¹² They are one as modes of the same spiritual foundation, but are different in regard to each other. Their mutual regard, however, is as crucial as their foundational identity, since their mutual regard is the fruition of their foundational principle.

The sense in which God generates is genuine, since God is an intellectual entity that communicates itself to itself by means of knowledge. All other species of generation, i. e. the types of generation by which creatures communicate their natures, are imperfect in comparison to God. God's generation takes place within a singular nature and the Father and the Son possess the nature perfectly.¹³ Creatures, on the other hand, are deficient. Individually, each lacks the plenitude of its nature. That is why creatures need to perpetuate their natures in a succession of separate individuals. Accordingly, their existences are separate from their essences. Intellectual generation, therefore, is not merely a metaphor of the divine production. Rather, the production of the Son is the highest form of intellectual generation, and the human mind provides some indication of what this might be.

Henry understands divine generation as perfect on its own right, since it is the completion of intellectual fecundity. This generation, however, also serves the function of making the divine will fecund, fertile to spirate. Once the mind knows itself perfectly, it is naturally suited to love itself perfectly, since love or enjoyment follows from knowledge of the truth. However, each emanation, as flowing from rationally distinct principles, is distinct and perfect in its own right. Knowing is distinct from loving, even though knowing and loving are found together in one

¹² The intellect's self-reflection implies the real distinction between the Father and the Son. Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LIX, q. 2, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 140^vc: "Ubi enim est conversio alicuius super aliquid oportet quod sint distincta secundum rem quoquo modo, et quod convertitur et supra quod convertitur."

¹³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LVIII, q. 1, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 125^{rs}.

mind. One may know something and not love it. (As explained below, in God's case, His self-love is as necessary as His self-knowledge; however, He may will some creatures into existence and not others.) On the other hand, one understands that one wills and loves, and one wills and loves to understand. Intellect and will, knowing and loving, are not separate things, but rather rationally distinct and related aspects of the mind.¹⁴

The will of the mind that knows itself in the persons of the Father and Son is now naturally suited to produce the love for itself as thus known. The will was present in the generation of the Son as an assisting principle: the will enjoys knowledge and thus motivates the intellect to know more fully. However, the product of generation is properly the word of the intellect—an *impression* of knowledge. The will is yet to produce its own personal product, even though it did produce as the assisting principle of generation a simple love, as Henry puts it, a love or desire that assists the intellect in coming to the perfect knowledge embodied by the Son. This is not the full development of the will. The full development is rather the product that comes out of the simple love once perfect knowledge is obtained through generation. Hence, the intellect also assists the will in spiration, in the sense that generation is a necessary condition for spiration. However, spiration is elicited by the will itself.¹⁵ The proper product of the will—a personal *expression* of love—is the Holy Spirit.

The will, like the intellect, reflects on itself, but in its own way.¹⁶ The will wills itself to will. The will is free, and it moves itself. The divine will,

¹⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LIV, q. 6, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II fol. 93^{rN}: "[...] non enim velle est intelligere quoddam nec e converso [...] Intelligere enim possumus quae non volumus, sed velle non possumus quae non intelligimus sive cognoscimus, secundum Augustinum." See also the similar discussion in *Quodlibet VI*, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), pp. 4–7.

¹⁵ On how intellect and will assist each other in the emanations, see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LIV, q. 4, ad 2, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 88rD; *ibid.*, art. LIV, q. 3, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 83^{vD}; *ibid.*, art. LXI, q. 6, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 179^{rL}.

¹⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LX, q. 1, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 155^{rX}: "Sciendum est quod tam intellectus quam voluntas in quocunque habent esse propter separationem illius a materia, postquam habuerint esse in actu suo primo simplicis intelligentiae, aut volitionis naturae, sunt conversive super se et super actus suos simplices et eorum obiecta per actus conversivos intelligendi et volendi. Quia intellectus non solum intelligit verum simplici intelligentia, sed etiam intelligentia conversiva intelligendo se esse intelligere, et convertendo se super obiectum intellectum, et super actum intelligendi simplicem, et super se intelligentem per actum intelligendi conversivum. Similiter voluntas non solum vult bonum simplici volitione, sed etiam volitione conversiva volendo se velle, convertendo se super obiectum volitum, et super actum volendi simplicem, et super se volentem per actum volendi conversivum."

the will of the uncaused cause, is free to the utmost degree. However, unlike the intellect which is both passive and active, passive as receiving an impression and active as producing it, the will is purely active. When the will knows itself, it extracts the love out of itself and pours it on that which it knows. What it knows is itself in the persons of the Father and the Son, who are foundationally identical and relatively distinct as the two sides of the God's relation of self-knowledge. Foundationally, the will is one with the intellect, since intellect and will are one mind, even though intellect and will produce their proper products in their own ways. The love of spiration, the Holy Spirit, proceeds out of the divine mind itself, which serves as the foundation for the Father and the Son. It proceeds in the mode of will as the love of that which is known, and what is known is known through the Father and the Son, both of whom constitute God's very self-knowledge. Thus, the Holy Spirit proceeds out of the will, through the two sides of God's relation of self-knowledge, and in a mutual way, from the Father unto the Son and from the Son unto the Father.¹⁷

The Holy Spirit is the eternal, perfect and mutual giving and receiving of Love in the divine essence, God's inner life as mutual love. Since spiration proceeds through the two persons of self-knowledge (the Father and the Son), who are already constituted in generation, only the passive term of this emanation is constitutive of a person. This third person is distinct as an irreducible side of God's relation of self-love, as well as substantially one with the other two persons, as grounded in the divine essence, which is intellect and will. This person is the produced love itself. The producing principle, the divine will, though a genuine element of God's inner life, is not constitutive of a person by the very nature of spiration, which proceeds through the Father and the Son as the persons who spirate.

However, spiration, both the producing and the produced aspects, is a second and distinct emanation. The self-relation of knowledge constituted by the Father and the Son becomes, through active and passive spiration, also a relation of self-love, whereby the divine mind as will produces a mutual love for itself as known in the persons of the Father and the Son. This emanation marks the completion of all divine, immanent fecundity, the fecundity by which God lives as knowledge and love, by which God is the Trinity. All other divine fecundity is transitive or creative, not the very principles by which God is necessarily who He is.

¹⁷ See J.C. Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity*, pp. 95–103.

This understanding of the Trinity implies for Henry that the Holy Spirit is produced by both the Father and the Son, against the Greek Church, which sees the Spirit as the product of the Father alone. For Henry, as he explains at great length, both the Father and the Son are required to make the will fecund to spirare, since the knowledge that is required for spiration is the knowledge obtained through generation, which entails the identity as well as the distinction of the Father and the Son.¹⁸ Moreover, the will directs its love to itself as known, and the will knows itself through these two distinct persons who are nevertheless substantially one.

Henry's understanding of the Trinity also provides him with an argumentative basis for free creation. The only necessary divine productions are the emanations. Even though, as Henry explains, spiration is freely elicited as proceeding out of free will, spiration is completed necessarily. Similarly, a person may freely jump from a building, but his jump necessarily leads him downward. Spiration is free in the way it is elicited, but necessary in the way it ends.¹⁹ The Holy Spirit must be produced in order for the Father and the Son to freely give and receive this same Spirit as their mutual love. Emanation and spiration are the very (eternal) perfection of God's triune nature.

Other divine productions, subsequent to the total completion of immanent divine fecundity and directed to what is lower—creatures, are no longer necessary. Creation is a contingent act. However, it is not an arbitrary act. That God is absolutely self-conscious in terms of knowledge and love, as well as wholly free to create or not, implies His wholly undivided and responsible awareness of each and every creature and act of creation.

Finally, since God creates by means of His knowledge and love, Henry sees the personal emanations as the basis for creation and creatures. Divine intellect and will as operative in creation are grounded in intellect and will as constitutive of the Trinity itself. Naturally, creatures at their core bespeak the triune nature of their source.

¹⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art LIV, q. 6, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 95^{re}: "Sed in hoc interest ex parte intellectus ut sit foecundus ad dicendum verbum, et ex parte voluntatis ut sit foecunda ad spirandum Spiritum Sanctum, quoniam intellectus perfectam foecunditatem habere potest ad verbi productionem ut existit in una sola persona. Voluntas autem perfectam foecunditatem habere non potest ad Spiritus Sancti productionem nisi existat in gemina persona."

¹⁹ On this issue and the criticisms of Duns Scotus, see J.C. Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity*, pp. 84–88.

A proper interpretation of the Trinity is essential for a proper understanding of creation. The understanding of creation as a necessary event, common among Neoplatonists such as Avicenna, may be corrected with a sound basis in the Trinitarian emanations. Henry wrote:

Whence, because the philosophers denied or rather, as is more the case, ignored the production of the divine persons, they posited that God produces creatures from the necessity of his essence, not from the freedom of his will. For indeed they only posited in God the understanding of simple intelligence, whereby He understands himself and everything else, and similarly the simple will, by which all is pleasing to him, according to which all is good in his essence, and they posited these [principles] to differ only by reason. However, such an intelligence, being itself natural, by the fact that it relates naturally to the things understood that are to be produced by it, necessarily relates to those things in order to produce [them] according to one determinate way, and likewise is the case with the simple will that accompanies such an intelligence. For that reason they were forced to posit that God, through his essence and by the necessity of his nature, produced things according to the best way of producing, so that [things] could not be produced in a different way, and that intellect and will behaved in this regard as a nature, not as a cause that can dispose and elect . . . But this position of these [thinkers] could not suffice in order to maintain that there is a production of creatures, nor can the production of creatures be held from this fact alone, that in God there is only simple intelligence and simple will. And this is because they did not posit in the divine intelligence some knowledge functioning as an art that is manifestive and declarative of those things which [the divine intelligence] knows in the simple intelligence, and that disposes and orders those things, which also knows how things other than itself are to be produced, which is not determined to one way of producing things, but which disposes according to which way, out of many possible ways of occurring, it is fitting for things to be produced in accordance with the order of eternal justice. Likewise [this is so] because they did not posit in the divine will some love that functions as inciting and affectionate toward those things willed by the simple will, and that can elect among those things which please it so that things other than itself be produced—which knowledge and which love are not had in God without the production of the Word and Love over and above simple knowledge and love.²⁰

²⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), pp. 33–36, ll. 35–50, 71–85: “Unde philosophi quia negabant, immo potius ignorabant, divinarum personarum productionem, ponebant Deum producere creaturas de necessitate suae essentiae, non voluntatis libertate. Quia enim in Deo non ponebant nisi intellectum simplicis intelligentiae, qua intelligit se et omnia alia, et similiter simplicem voluntatem, qua placent ei omnia, secundum quod sunt bona in sua essentia, et ponebant ista differre sola ratione. Talis autem intelligentia cum hoc, quod, in se naturalis, modo naturali se habet ad intellecta producenda ab ipsa, necessario se habet ad eas ad producendum

In other words, although the philosophers have understood God as intellect and will,²¹ they have only understood Him as *absolute* intellect and will. They see divine intellect and will as belonging to a wholly unified being, rather than as constitutive of a being that is one and three. They have not understood the deeper sense of divine intellect and will. This limitation leads them to view creation incorrectly, namely as necessary. (Henry also criticizes Christian accounts of creation, notably Aquinas, largely for not being properly grounded in the Trinity.)²²

Fundamentally, divine intellect and will are principles that produce proper products within the Godhead. These are God's natural productions, since through these productions the divine nature is communicated among the divine persons. The Father communicates His nature to the Son by generation, and the Father and Son communicate their nature to the Holy Spirit by spiration. By definition, God's knowledge and choice

secundum unum determinatum modum, et similiter est de voluntate simplici concomitante talem intelligentiam. Idcirco necesse habebant ponere quod Deus per essentiam suam et necessitate suae naturae res produceret secundum optimum modum producendi, ita quod alio modo produci non possent, et quod voluntas et intellectus se haberent in hoc ut natura, non ut dispositiva et electiva ratio [...]. Sed haec ipsorum positio non potuit sufficere ad ponendum productionem creaturarum, immo nec productio creaturarum posset poni ex hoc solo, quod in Deo non esset nisi simplex intelligentia et simplex voluntas. Et hoc ideo, quia non ponebant in divina intelligentia notitiam aliquam se habentem ut artem manifestativam et declarativam eorum quae cognoscit in simplici intelligentia, neque ut dispositivam eorum et ordinativam quae cognoscit ut producenda et alia a se, quae non est determinata ad unum modum producendi res, sed disponit secundum quem modum ex pluribus possibilibus fieri conveniens est iuxta ordinem aeternae iustitiae res produci. Similiter quia non ponebant in divina voluntate amorem aliquem se habentem ut incentivum et affectativum in illa quae vult simplici voluntate, neque ut electivum eorum quae ei placent ut producenda et alia a se, quae notitia et qui amor non habentur in Deo sine productione Verbi et Amoris super notitiam et amorem simplicem."

²¹ Intellect and will are the two immanent divine activities, according to philosophers and theologians. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), pp. 11–12, ll. 30–40: "Actus autem in Deo manens intra non est, neque potest esse, nisi actus voluntatis et intellectus. Plures enim in Deo non possunt, nec pauciores. Non plures, quia in tota rerum natura continente Creatorem et creaturam, non possunt esse plura principia agentia per se nisi natura et voluntas, secundum omnes philosophos et theologos loquentes de principiis agentibus per se. Non pauciores, quia non est intellectus sine voluntate, nec e converso, ut dicit Damascenus libro II^o, cap. 17. Neque cognitivum potest esse sine appetito, etiam in sensibili tantum, ut determinat Philosophus in II^o De Anima. Omnis autem substantia separata a materia, qualis maxime Deus est, necessario intelligentia est [...]."

²² See J.C. Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity*, section 2B (Emanation and Creation: Henry vs. some philosophers and theologians).

of creatures depend on these immanent emanations, since these immanent emanations are constitutive of God Himself. Analogously, a person's free choices presuppose the very being of the person.

The immanent emanations are necessary, since God is necessary. Creation is not necessary, since the divine potencies of intellect and will are fully actualized in the personal emanations. No further action is needed for their perfection. Such an action, as is God's choice of creatures, is inherently a free gift. Moreover, creatures are lower than God. God's will is not necessarily ordered to them. God's will is necessary only in spiration (with the qualifications mentioned above), since God's essence is supremely lovable and the natural end of the will.²³ Through the Word, God knows Himself as Himself, knows Himself as imitable, and knows creatures themselves; through the Love, God loves Himself as Himself, loves Himself as the cause of creatures and loves creatures themselves. In constituting the Trinity, the personal emanations thereby also ground God's all-knowing and wholly free creation.

The philosophers, on the other hand, fail to understand divine intellect and will as immanent natural principles that eternally generate and spirate, that eternally constitute the Trinity. Hence, they misinterpret creation, since to them God's necessity implies the identity between His knowledge and choice of creatures. According to them, God must create what He knows concerning creatures. Otherwise, a distinction between God's knowledge and God's choices would compromise the divine unity. Thus, they see creation as a necessary or natural process: the eternal and fixed flow of being from the One.

This is precisely what Henry sees himself as overcoming through his account of the Trinity. Because of the personal emanations, God is a personal Creator. Through the Word, God knows Himself as imitable and thus knows all possible creatures. Because of the production of the Holy Spirit, God's will is wholly free to choose to create among these possible creatures. Accordingly, God is wholly conscious and responsible for each and every one of His creatures.

Moreover, as shall be seen more fully below, the Trinity not only grounds the act of creation. It also grounds the very being of the creature.

²³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LX, q. 1, ad 4, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 157^vl.

III. *Metaphysics*

Henry understands the divine reality fundamentally in spiritual terms. God by essence is pure self-communicating knowledge and love. However, like other theologians who use philosophy, Henry also analyzes traditional philosophical concepts to clarify the divine reality. In doing so, Henry shows with special clarity his own development of the philosophical tradition, as well as his consistent account of reality based on the Trinity as the first principle. A brief indication here of the importance of this intricate discussion is in order.

As is well known, for Henry a relation, whether in God or creatures, is identical to its foundation.²⁴ For example, one white thing may be similar to other white things and if all white things were destroyed except one, the remaining white thing would be as white as when it was also similar to others according to whiteness. Relation, in this case similarity, is not an added reality to the foundation, in this case whiteness. Relation is the way in which the foundation stands toward some other thing(s). The other is only a necessary condition for the relation. The relation itself, however, springs from the very nature and reality of the foundation.

In large part, Henry develops this (metaphysical) position in the context of the Trinity. The divine substance is identical to its personal relations. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are the divine relations; they are relative modes of the divine substance. They are identical to their substance or foundation, and in this sense they are identical to one another, since they are all grounded in the same spiritual source. However, they are distinct in reference to each other, namely as irreducible sides of the very self-relatedness of the source, as explained above.

Naturally, Henry analyzes creatures as indicative of the Creator, as he does when giving *a posteriori* proofs for the existence of God. However, he also assesses creatures in light of his understanding of the Creator. These two dimensions are not discrete, but rather mutually informative,

²⁴ See Mark Henninger, *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250–1325* (Oxford, 1989), chapter 3; Jos Decorte, “Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent on the Reality of a Real Relation,” *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 7 (1996), pp. 183–211; J. Decorte, “Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent on God’s Relation to the World,” *Mediaevalia* 3 (1993), pp. 91–106; J. Decorte, “*Creatio* and *conservatio* as *relatio*,” in *John Duns Scotus (1265/6–1308). Renewal of Philosophy*, ed. Egbert P. Bos (Amsterdam, 1998), pp. 27–49; J. Decorte, “Modus or Res: Scotus’ Criticism of Henry of Ghent’s Conception of the Reality of a Real Relation,” in *Via Scoti: Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti*, ed. Leonardo Sileo (Rome, 1995), pp. 407–429.

as is evident in any thinker who draws from both reason and revelation. (The way in which they are mutually informative will differ, naturally, from thinker to thinker, and this makes all the difference.) We cannot spell out here the details of Henry's approach to philosophy and theology.²⁵ Suffice it to say that Henry's chief goal is understanding the highest reality, as far as this is possible for a human being in this life, and thereby the lower realities. This approach is difficult; there is no guarantee for its success. Yet it is sound in its orientation. Anything short of this leads *inherently* to misinterpretation.

Relation is a good example of the metaphysical import of Henry's Trinitarian discussion. To Henry, relation is central to the very being of things. The reason is that relations actualize substance. The principles of divine intellect and will produce Trinitarian relations as their consummation. Moreover, creatures are constituted by a twofold relation, by a relation to the divine intellect which determines the essence of the creature, and by a relation to the divine will which determines the existence of the creature. In other words, the creature is a substance or foundation constituted by its relations to divine intellect and will.²⁶ Without any of the limitations associated with creatures, the divine substance is also constituted by its (personal) relations. Henry's view of essence and existence depends in great part on his understanding of the very causes of these metaphysical principles. These causes are divine intellect and will as creative principles. In turn, divine intellect and will function as creative principles as grounded in the personal emanations.

Finally, to Henry, the dependence of all being on the Trinity shows the superiority of theology as the first science. The philosophical sciences study essences absolutely. Theology, however, considers in addition the relations to the Trinity that ground the being of creatures in the first place. Theology, therefore, can obtain the most adequate knowledge of being.²⁷

²⁵ See J.C. Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity*, pp. 13–35, 198–202.

²⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 9, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 61^{ro}: "[...] tale esse [essentiae] non convenit alicui nisi cuius ratio exemplaris est in intellectu divino, per quam natum est fieri in rebus extra. Ita quod sicut ex relatione et respectu ad ipsam ut ad causam efficientem, habet quod sit ens in effectu, sic ex relatione quadam et respectu ad ipsam ut ad formam extra rem, habet quod sit ens aliquod per essentiam."

²⁷ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VII, q. 6, ed. J. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 56^{vt}.

IV. *Concluding Remarks*

That Henry is seminal in the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions of philosophy and theology is well known and well documented. For example, his discussion of the relation between nature and individual, developed in depth in the context of the Trinity, influenced Duns Scotus as well as William of Ockham, both of whom gave crucial importance to the issue of the relation between nature and individual. However, we will not conclude with a list of indications of Henry's influence. Other chapters in this volume provide this quite competently. Rather, we wish to stress the following. Since Henry developed a consistent account of reality based on the Trinity, the connections between his Trinitarian discussion and the other aspects of his thought and influence are a fruitful focus of research, about which there is still much to be learned. If this modest contribution provides some indication of this, it has served its purpose.

HENRY OF GHENT'S PHILOSOPHY

A. METAPHYSICS

VII

HENRY OF GHENT ON METAPHYSICS

MARTIN PICKAVÉ

It is not surprising that we can refer to one and the same thing in multiple ways and under different descriptions. Consider the example of an artfully crafted kitchen knife. For the craftsman or the connoisseur of good craftsmanship it is simply a beautiful object; for the chef it is an extremely useful tool to prepare food; for the police investigator it is a harmful device and potential weapon; for the chemist it is a certain aggregation of molecules; and for other people a knife is still something else. These diverging descriptions are normally unproblematic because the contexts in which they appear are very different. However, one might wonder which of them provides us with the most appropriate account of what it is to be this knife.

Or consider a more medieval example: the different ways in which an individual human being can be conceived. For some this individual is an agent to whom different sorts of voluntary action can be ascribed, for others it is a composite of an intellective soul and a body, and for yet others it is a certain kind of substance. The first point of view is obviously that of moral philosophy. On the second account, the human being is described as a hylomorphic union of a material component (here, the body) and a formal one (the soul). Since form and matter are essential parts of objects that undergo change,¹ we can consider this description as proper to the “physicist” or natural philosopher, who examines changeable things. Finally, the third description is proper to the metaphysician, who examines everything insofar as it is being and who inquires into the different kinds of being. If all three approaches are correct, we can expect somehow to get from one to another. And again, we might wonder which of them is more fundamental.

Prima facie, there seem to be good reasons for considering the “physical” perspective as the most fundamental. Leaving moral philosophy aside, one might concede that metaphysics has a broader focus, but it is apparently only through an examination of the physical world that we

¹ It was in order to explain change that Aristotle (in *Physics* I) introduced hylomorphism.

discover (a) that more things exist than just those that undergo change and consequently (b) that an examination of reality in terms of being (as undertaken in metaphysics) is different from a physical inquiry. Moreover, everything we perceive and know of we perceive and know of primarily through sensory experience. Yet sensory experience is both of changeable objects and involves change (of the sensory organs). Whatever an inquiry into being insofar as it is being exactly amounts to, it seems to require prior, to itself, an investigation into the world of physical (changeable) entities.

I shall begin the present chapter by sketching out why Henry of Ghent nevertheless holds that metaphysics is the first and fundamental scientific discipline and how, according to him, metaphysics is independent of the kind of inquiry into material changeable objects that medieval philosophers consider as the domain of “physics”. This way we can expect to get some sort of answer as to whether metaphysics is possible at all. The remaining sections of my contribution all deal in one way or another with the question of *how* metaphysical knowledge is possible for Henry. According to Aristotle’s account in the *Posterior Analytics*, knowledge in the strict sense (*scientia*) is about the necessary properties and parts of its subject-matter. But what could be the properties and parts of being if, as we shall see, metaphysics considers being *qua* being as its subject-matter? Finally, I will add some remarks about the way in which God is, according to Henry of Ghent, the object of metaphysical knowledge.²

I. The Primacy of Metaphysics

According to Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics* I.1 and I.10), we can find in any scientific discipline (*scientia*, ἐπιστήμη) certain things that are presupposed and taken for granted in that discipline and others that are sought after. In mathematics, for example, the existence of numbers or

² Many of these issues receive more detailed attention in my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft: Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Leiden, 2007). Note that Henry uses mainly two expressions when he refers to metaphysics. On the one hand he employs the transliteration *metaphysica*, on the other hand—and even more frequently—he talks of *prima philosophia*. So far as I can see, both expressions mean exactly the same thing. Unlike Thomas Aquinas Henry does not attach separate meanings to these names. For the “names” of metaphysics see Władysław Stróżewski, “Metaphysics as a Science,” in *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy* (S.I.E.P.M.), vol. I, ed. Monika Asztalos et al. (Helsinki, 1990), pp. 128–157.

geometrical figures is normally taken for granted, whereas their properties are part of the mathematician's research agenda. Likewise, the existence of the natural world is not an issue for the natural scientist but its parts and phenomena are. However, the distinction between things that are taken for granted and things that are sought after in a scientific discipline does not exclude that what one discipline takes for granted can be the object of inquiry and demonstration in another discipline. For the Arabic philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rushd) this is exactly how metaphysics and physics are related to each other. Physics deals with motion and things undergoing change. But in the course of her inquiries the physicist comes to understand that not everything is changeable and composed out of matter; she discovers for instance that the existence of motion points to the existence of an unmoved mover. Physics thus establishes the existence of a different kind of being but leaves its examination to another discipline, namely, metaphysics.³

If Averroes is correct in his account of the relationship between physics and metaphysics, then it follows, according to Henry, that metaphysics could not be first and fundamental. For then metaphysics would receive its subject-matter from physics, a fact that would render impossible that metaphysics could in turn be primary with respect to physics.⁴ But if Averroes is wrong, the following question arises: from where does metaphysics receive its subject-matter if it is not something established by physics? Or in less technical language: what justifies a metaphysical perspective on what there is?

No doubt Henry believes Averroes to be wrong, but unfortunately he does not engage directly with Averroes' views. In fact, he never raises the question of the foundations of metaphysics in an explicit way. This,

³ See *Commentum magnum in Aristotelis Physica*, lib. I, com. 83, ed. Juntina (Venice, 1562; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1962), fol. 47^{r^f-v^k}: "Sed notandum est, quod istud genus entium esse, scilicet separatum a materia, non declaratur nisi in hac scientia naturali ... Omne enim de quo loquimur in hoc libro principaliter est propter illud principium. Et iste est primus locus, in quo Naturalis inspicit alium modum essendi ab illo, de quo considerat. Et apud illud cessat et dimisit considerationem de eo usque ad scientiam nobiliorum"; *ibid.*, lib II, com. 26, fol. 59^{r^c}: "... quoniam in hac scientia apparet istud genus formarum esse, deinde prima philosophia considerat de quiditatibus et dispositionibus earum."

⁴ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VII, q. 6, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520; repr. St. Bonaventure, NY, 1953), fol. 56^{r^Q}: "Quando scientia una supponit ab alia subiectum suum, vel principium aliquid probandi suas proprias conclusiones, tunc illa scientia a qua tale supponitur, est scientia principalis."

however, does not mean that he has no determinate views on this issue. Rather the contrary. Notice the following passage in which he argues for the existence of first concepts:

As in the case of complex understanding (*in intellectu complexo*) there is a need for a reduction (*reductio*) to some complex first principle which is completely self-evident to the intellect—otherwise there would be an infinite regress—so all concepts have to be reduced to a first and best known first non-complex concept, to which all other concepts have to be reduced and which is included in all other concepts. And this concept is the concept of being insofar as it is being, according to Avicenna in book I of his *Metaphysics*.⁵

The argument is well known from Thomas Aquinas's *Questions on Truth* and his commentary on Boethius's *On the Trinity*, but it goes back to Avicenna who uses it to show, at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*, that 'being' (*ens*), 'thing' (*res*), and 'the necessary' (*necesse*) are first concepts of the mind. Its basic structure is an analogy: if there is a first principle in the order of "complex understanding," i.e., in the order of propositions and demonstrative reasoning, then there also has to be a first principle in the order of "non-complex understanding." For there is not only an act of the intellect through which we grasp propositions, but also an even more fundamental (simple) act of the intellect through which we come to have concepts, the elements of (mental) propositions.⁶ Unfortunately, in the passage quoted above Henry simply assumes the truth of the first part of the analogy, i.e., he does not provide an argument for why there is a first principle in the order of "complex understanding." If pressed, Henry would refer his interlocutor to the law of non-contradiction. The law of non-contradiction is the necessary condition for meaningful speech and predication and is thus implied in each instance of a proposition. In this sense Henry can say that every proposition has to be reduced to this first principle.

⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIV, q. 3, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1991), p. 190.

⁶ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, tract. I, cap. 5, ed. Simone van Riet (Leuven/Leiden, 1977–1983), vol. I, pp. 31–32. The wording however indicates that Henry takes this argument directly from Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 1, a. 1. See Jan A. Aertsen, "Heinrich von Gent und Thomas von Aquin über die Transzendentalien. Ein Textvergleich," in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought. Studies in the Memory of Jos Decorte*, ed. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel (Leuven, 2003), pp. 101–125 at 102–106. For a detailed analysis of the argument in Aquinas, see Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden, 1996), pp. 73–79.

What makes the argument quoted above different from Aquinas's use of the very same line of reasoning is the last line in which Henry calls the first concept of the mind not simply the concept of being but rather uses a variation of the expression "being insofar as it is being" (*ens inquantum est ens*) and refers to the first concept as "concept of being insofar as it is being" (*conceptus entis inquantum ens est*). The phrase "being insofar as it is being" (a translation of Aristotle's τὸ ὅν ἢ ὅν) refers usually to the subject-matter of metaphysics. By drawing a connection between the first concept of the human understanding and the subject-matter of metaphysics, Henry seems to indicate that metaphysics deals with what our intellect first conceives.

There are other texts in Henry's works which confirm this interpretation. Although the context of the following passage is slightly different, Henry is still concerned with what our intellect understands first:

As soon as it is known from what is conceived in the meaning of the name that the name is indicative of, for example, what a man or a goat-stag is, a person immediately has a doubt about what the meaning of the name did not of itself determine, namely, whether it is or is not a thing or some nature . . . , and this first doubt is founded upon the first concept of the mind (*super primum conceptum mentis*), which is being . . . Thus, just as in the precognition of what something is, what is expressed by the name is known without qualification, without determining whether it is or is not, so in non-complex knowledge of whether a thing is, being without qualification is known about the thing about which it is understood whether it is, without determining whether it is this or that, the creator or a creature, a substance or an accident. And this is what it is to grasp the being of a thing in that sense in which being is the subject of metaphysics.⁷

The passage mentions different stages in a scenario describing how we acquire knowledge. According to this scenario, there is a first stage in which we understand what a word (e.g., 'horse') means, i.e., in which we understand the *quid sit nominis*. On this level we do not have any real knowledge of the thing that is referred to by the word, yet we begin to know something about it when we grasp that the thing named is indeed a real thing and nature (and not just a fictitious being). At this moment,

⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 138^{vp}; The translation is taken from Jos Decorte and Roland J. Teske, transl., *Henry of Ghent's Summa: The Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21–24)* (Leuven, 2005), pp. 193–195. See also Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 12, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 190; *ibid.*, art. VII, q. 6 ad 2, ed. Badius, fol. 56^{pr-S}.

according to Henry, we understand it as a being; in other words, we form the concept of being.⁸ Besides drawing an explicit connection between the first concept of the mind (*primus conceptus mentis*) and the subject-matter of metaphysics, the passage does tell us one more thing: what is grasped first by our intellect is not that something exists, but rather “whether it is or is not a thing or some nature.” The kind of being grasped in our first concept has to do with an object’s essence and nature; the first concept of our mind is a quidditative concept by which we grasp that the object has what Henry calls “being of essence” (*esse essentiae*). This is important for our understanding of Henry’s views concerning the nature of metaphysical inquiry: since the subject-matter determines the scope of the discipline, metaphysics is consequently not concerned with existence but with the being of essence and the realm of essences.⁹

At this point someone might object and deny that being is what the mind first grasps of an object. Does not experience tell us that our mind first notices concrete particular properties (such as particular colors, sounds etc.) when we grasp an object? To this objection Henry would most likely respond by giving the following clarification: we cognize objects in different ways through the senses and through the intellectual power of the human soul. It is true that through our senses we first perceive particular sensible qualities of objects, but our intellect is different insofar as it has as its object something universal and proceeds from an indeterminate cognition towards a more and more determinate one.¹⁰ According to the order of human cognitive faculties, particular sensible properties are what is first cognized, for human cognition is grounded in sensory perception. But according to the order of intellectual cognition, being is the first thing we grasp.

⁸ What Henry means by *conceptus entis* is not a separate entity produced in our mind (a mental representation of being) but the understanding (the “conceiving”) of being itself (which may or may not be accompanied by a mental representation). In other words, when the *conceptus entis* is said to be the first concept of our mind (*primus conceptus mentis*), this means simply that being is the first thing understood by our mind. We might be better off rendering *conceptus* as “the conceiving.” For the sake of convenience, however, I will continue to use the English word *concept*.

⁹ Henry confirms this point in another passage of his *Summa* by pointing out that being of existence (*esse existentiae*) cannot be the object of knowledge (*scientia*) because it is in a sense purely accidental. See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXVI, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 157rd.

¹⁰ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXIV, q. 7, ed. Badius, fol. 144rd; *ibid.*, fol. 144^{rg}.

We are now in a position to see why Henry thinks that metaphysics can be independent from physics: the point of departure of metaphysics is strictly speaking not something established by physics but something having to do with the nature of our intellect. This does not mean that metaphysics collapses into logic, a discipline dealing with the items produced by our mind and with how reasoning works. Metaphysics is about extra-mental reality, yet it deals primarily with what the intellect first grasps of that reality. Only in this sense is metaphysics bound up with facts about the nature of our intellect. Of course, being insofar as it is being is something elusive, and the metaphysician will often have to rely on physical considerations to make progress in her inquiry. But strictly speaking the role of physics is merely supportive and not that of justifying metaphysical conclusions.¹¹ In other words, physical knowledge might assist metaphysics with respect to the order of discovery but not with respect to justification, except perhaps *a posteriori*.

As we can see, for Henry of Ghent metaphysics merits the traditional label “first philosophy” not because it deals with what is ontologically first, the first being, i.e., God (though it does this too), but because it deals with what the intellect first understands, i.e., being. Henry conceives of metaphysics as ontology, the discipline that examines being. And metaphysics is more fundamental than other disciplines because it is concerned with being insofar as it is being, whereas other disciplines consider being only under some special aspect. Yet, knowledge of being as such supposedly has importance for the knowledge of different specific forms of being. For how can we really understand particular forms of being if we do not know anything about being as such?¹²

II. *God as primum cognitum and the Analogy of Being*

At this point one can anticipate another objection. Can this interpretation regarding the subject-matter and the primacy of metaphysics be correct? Henry of Ghent is well known as a defender of the theory according to which God is what our intellect knows first; God is the *primum*

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VII, q. 6, ed. Badius, fol. 56^{rQ}.

¹² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. III, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson, p. 254; *ibid.*, art. VII, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 47^{vB}.

cognitum.¹³ Is this theory not incompatible with the idea that being is what the intellect first grasps? One cannot respond to this challenge by suggesting that a *primum cognitum* must be something different from a *primus conceptus*. Of what is first known to the intellect, the intellect must have a first concept (how else can the intellect be said to know it?). There seems to be a real tension between the two views.

Henry was by no means the first medieval author to teach that God is in some sense the first thing that we know.¹⁴ The doctrine was particularly prominent among Franciscan theologians of the 13th century, but Henry provided it with its most sophisticated defense.¹⁵ That God is the *primum cognitum* does not of course mean that everybody has at some initial stage in this life a full cognition of God. This is simply impossible—and counterintuitive: why then would people doubt that God exists and why would there be so many religious disputes? The proponents of the doctrine only claim that God is in some sense co-cognized in our first and most universal concepts, those concepts that our intellect forms at the beginning before it understands an object through a more determinate understanding. Again, the doctrine is based on certain ideas about the nature of our intellect, namely that the intellect proceeds from an indeterminate understanding to a more determinate one and that the intellect does so by further determining what it first grasped in a universal manner.

But how can God be the first known thing (*primum cognitum*) as something that our intellect grasps in the first concepts of the mind? Crucial for Henry's explanation is the distinction between two kinds of indeterminateness (*indeterminatio*):

Indeterminateness is of two kinds: one is taken in a privative sense, the other in a negative sense. For, when something is said to be this good or that good, it is understood as determined to the highest degree both by its matter and by its supposite. Privative indeterminateness is that by

¹³ See Matthias Laarmann, *Deus, primum cognitum. Die Lehre von Gott als dem Ersterkannten des menschlichen Intellekts bei Heinrich von Gent* (Münster, 1999); Wouter Goris, 'Absolute Beginners'. *Der mittelalterliche Beitrag zum Ausgang vom Unbedingten* (Leiden, 2007).

¹⁴ Notice that the doctrine of God as *primum cognitum* has nothing to do with the theory according to which the proposition 'God exists' is a self-evident truth, a view often ascribed (at least by 13th-century authors) to Anselm of Canterbury. The former doctrine claims a primordial knowledge of God's *essence*, whereas the latter deals with the way we allegedly know God's *existence*.

¹⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, qq. 7–9, ed. Badius, fols. 141^{rl}–147^{rz}.

which the good is understood as universal, as one in many and of many, as the good of this or of that, although not as this or that good; it is that which is naturally able to be determined by this or that good, because it is a participated good. Negative indeterminateness, however, is that by which the good is understood without qualification as subsisting good, not as this or that, nor as of this or of that, because it is not a participated good and cannot be determined. And the indeterminateness of this latter good is greater than that of the former. Since, therefore, our intellect always naturally grasps the indeterminate before the determinate ... in understanding any good whatsoever, our intellect understands in it by a natural priority the good that is indeterminate in the negative sense. And this is the good that is God. As it is with good, so it is with all the other things understood about God from creatures.¹⁶

The reference to goodness in this passage is due to the Augustinian background and of no specific importance for our concern; as Henry remarks himself, the analysis of the two *indeterminationes* also applies to other first concepts (like the concept of being). His main idea is clear: before our intellect forms a determinate understanding of this or that (particular) good thing, it has to have an understanding of good characterized by indeterminateness, or more precisely, by a privative indeterminateness. But since there exists an indeterminateness that is greater than privative indeterminateness,¹⁷ the intellect first “runs through” that maximal (negative) indeterminateness and so cognizes something divine.

Henry’s argument gives rise to a series of questions. To mention only one: it is tempting to regard ‘indeterminate’ and ‘determinate’ as qualifying the mode of understanding, as opposed to that which is understood. I might say that the intellect first grasps something indeterminately, but it does not immediately follow from this that the intellect first grasps something indeterminate. Yet Henry seems to make exactly this move when he insists that the intellect first understands the negatively indeterminate good, being etc. (i.e., God). Unfortunately, I have no space to discuss how Henry could respond to this challenge, but we might expect the reply to consist in a defense of a certain parallelism between the ontological and the gnoseological orders.

¹⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 7, ed. Badius, fol. 144^{rH}; transl. J. Decorte and R. Teske, pp. 247–249.

¹⁷ Henry never explains why negative indeterminateness is greater than the privative one. Maybe he thinks that an indeterminate good capable of determination has thereby the property ‘determinable’, whereas the negatively indeterminate good lacks this property and is thus more indeterminate. But then one might wonder whether the negatively indeterminate good does not have the property ‘indeterminable’, which would make it equally determinate.

Whether or not the theory of God as first known can be defended, none of us seems to be aware of having had primordial knowledge of God's essence in the first concepts of the mind. Henry does not deny the undeniable, but he denies the presupposition of this objection, namely that every cognition has to be a distinct understanding and one with attention to that which is cognized:

It must be noted that it is one thing to know something, but another thing to distinguish it from another thing in knowing it. For knowledge (*cognitio*) is any simple grasping of a thing through the intellect, even if the intellect does not pay attention (*advertat*) to the thing known ... But discrete knowledge (*cognitio discretiva*) is awareness with attention (*cum animadversione notitia*) by which one distinguishes one object known from another.¹⁸

This distinction is crucial because it provides Henry with a tool to reconcile the cognitive primacy of being with that of God. Being, Henry explains, is the first thing we grasp by discrete knowledge (*cognitione discretiva*), whereas absolutely speaking God is what the intellect knows first.¹⁹ The subject-matter of metaphysics is thus constituted not by what the human intellect knows absolutely first, but rather by what the intellect knows first as something discrete and distinct.

Henry's explanation of how God can be the *primum cognitum* also sheds some light on his understanding of the so-called analogy of being.²⁰ Traditionally, 'being' is taken to be an analogous term. All things that exist are said to be, but it does not follow that all existing things have something in common, i.e., a common nature. The term 'being' does not pick out a common feature in every thing. In particular, the being of God and the being of creatures have nothing real in common, for

¹⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 9, ed. Badius, fol. 146^v; transl. J. Decorte and R. Teske, p. 269 (with minor changes).

¹⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VII, q. 6 ad 2, ed. Badius, fol. 56^r: "Isto modo considerandi deum ut scilicet consideratur in scientiis philosophicis, non est deus id quod primo mens in rebus concipit (dico cognitione discretiva discernendo ipsum ab aliis, conceptione enim absoluta est id quod etiam in naturali notitia mens primo concipit, ut infra ostendetur [i.e., *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, qq. 7–9]). Immo primus conceptus discretivus naturalis cognitionis ex creaturis est ratio entis simpliciter."

²⁰ For Henry on analogy see Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris, 1938), pp. 52–66; José Gómez Caffarena, *Ser participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gand* (Rome, 1958), pp. 182–193; Jos Decorte, "Henry of Ghent on Analogy. Critical Reflections on Jean Paulus' Interpretation," in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death* (1293), ed. Willy Vanhamel (Leuven, 1996), pp. 71–105.

this would jeopardize divine transcendence. However, it is not purely by accident that we refer to both God and the creatures as beings. Ultimately creatures are said to be because they have an “agreement of imitation” (*convenientia imitationis/similitudo imitationis*) with the being of God. It is for this reason that we predicate ‘being’ of God and creatures neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically.²¹ So far, Henry’s teaching on analogy is relatively traditional. It also implies that the subject-matter of metaphysics is not constituted by a proper (univocal) genus, but by one which has unity only by analogy.²² This unity is considered to be sufficient to guarantee the unity of metaphysical knowledge.

However, Henry’s rejection of the univocity of being has caused a great deal of confusion. At the origin of this confusion is his response to the following objection:

Something said of many things, which is understood by itself on account of our understanding of those things, is something real and common to them, because every real concept is founded upon some thing. Being is something of this kind, because according to Avicenna being is ‘imprinted by a first impression,’ even before there is imprinted an understanding either of God or of a creature.²³

According to this objection, being must be something really common to God and creatures (and thus the basis for univocal predication) because it is grasped by our intellect before the intellect grasps that it is the being belonging to God or to a creature. And since such a first understanding is, under normal circumstances, an adequate understanding (or in Henry’s terminology: a *conceptus realis*), there must also be some real thing that is understood in this way. In his response, Henry appeals to the now familiar distinction between the two *indeterminationes*. When the intellect

²¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2, ed. Badius, fol. 124^r. See also *ibid.*, art. VI, q. 3 ad 2, ed. Badius, fol. 46^r. The “agreement of imitation” is opposed to the “agreement of similitude” (*convenientia similitudinis*). The latter is a real similitude of the kind that can, for instance, be found among things of the same genus or species.

²² See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 126^r: “Ens simpliciter dictum . . . est ens largissimo modo acceptum, quod secundum Avicennam est subiectum metaphysicae. Et est commune analogum ad creatorem et creaturam, continens sub se ens principium et ens principiatum.”

²³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2 obj. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 124^r; transl. J. Decorte and R. Teske, p. 47. The importance this objection has for Henry can also be gathered from the amount of space he uses for his reply. His reply is longer than the proper solution of the question.

grasps the being of a creature, it first grasps, according to Henry, something indeterminate, but the indeterminateness in play here is different from the one that applies to the being that the intellect would grasp if it were to grasp the being of God. Once we make this distinction, nothing forces us to hold that God and creatures have, with respect to being, something real in common and that consequently 'being' is predicated univocally of God and creatures. However, as Henry adds,

it is the nature of an intellect, unable to distinguish things that are close, to conceive them as one thing, though they do not, nonetheless, in the truth of the matter produce one concept. And so, there is error in its concept . . . a correct understanding (*intellectus rectus*) correctly distinguishes these things by conceiving indeterminate being either negatively or privatively.²⁴

The point of this passage seems obvious: it is wrong to think that the being of God and the being of creatures are the same, or in other words, it is an error to produce one concept of it. Moreover, for Henry such a philosophical error is similar to the ones committed by those philosophical ancestors who did not see that being is not a genus or who did not recognize the difference between substance and accidents. However this may be, many commentators see a connection between the passage just quoted and a passage from Henry's discussion of God as *primum cognitum*:

And although the good of the creator and the good of the creature in themselves produce different and distinct concepts—as 'being' also does concerning God and a creature—our intellect, nonetheless, conceives the two of them in a confused way as one, because they are very close to each other. And thus in this way our intellect understands the goodness of God, which is his quiddity, in a confused way and not distinctly from the good of a creature.²⁵

The similarities between these two passages are indeed striking. But what are we supposed to make of that? Because the second passage clearly expresses Henry's considered view of how we know God in our first concepts, it is generally taken as a guide to interpreting the first passage (from the question on analogy). As a result, many commentators take Henry to say that we do have a concept common to God and

²⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2 ad 3, ed. Badius, fol. 125^{rs}; transl. J. Decorte and R. Teske, p. 61.

²⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 6, ed. Badius, fol. 142^{vs}; transl. J. Decorte and R. Teske, p. 235. See also *ibid.*, art. XXI, q. 2, fol. 130^{vQ} and art. XXIV, q. 9, fol. 146^{vY}.

the creatures, a common concept of being based on a mistake.²⁶ Other commentators follow the same line of interpretation but are reluctant to take the expression *error* literally, but instead try to give the term a more positive meaning.²⁷

I believe both interpretative strategies are unsuccessful. How likely is it that a philosopher would hold that all concepts of the intellect can be traced back to (and founded on) a first concept (of being) and yet that this first concept is based on an error? Notice also that the passage describing the error of the intellect also mentions a correct understanding! If the human intellect makes this systematic mistake in its first concepts, what sense would it make to allude to a correct understanding? It is more promising to keep the two quoted passages apart. The first passage really is about a mistake, the mistake of those philosophers who believe in a univocal concept of being. That Henry compares their failure to the misgivings of earlier philosophers should make this point clear enough. To his judgment Henry then adds a diagnosis of how such a mistaken view could have come about in the first place; but this diagnosis is not meant to explain how we all come to make that mistake systematically.

The second passage refers to the way in which God is known in the first concepts of our intellect. It is about something that systematically occurs when our intellect conceives of something as good or as a being. Although, as Henry says, the divine good and the created good are normally capable of producing different concepts in our mind, the doctrine of God as the *primum cognitum* teaches us that we also grasp the divine good and the created good at the same time when the intellect moves from the most indeterminate to the less indeterminate. As we learned above, the first thing we know with a discrete understanding is being; somewhere further down the line we understand something discretely as substance or as accident etc. Something similar is the case when our intellect aims at goodness. The first thing “discretely” understood is then the good, which under normal circumstances presumably means the good of

²⁶ See, e.g., J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand*, pp. 59–60; J. Gómez Caffarena, *Ser participado*, p. 190; Stephen F. Brown, “Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being,” *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965), pp. 117–150 at 122: “The simple unity of our indistinct concept of being is only an apparent unity, a unity due to an error made by the mind.”

²⁷ See Olivier Boulnois, *Jean Duns Scot. Sur la connaissance de Dieu et l'univocité de l'étant* (Paris, 1988), p. 29 (“errance”); M. Laarmann, *Deus, primum cognitum*, p. 114 (“ein irrumbefangenes Schwanken”).

privative indeterminateness.²⁸ If this interpretation is correct, Henry's remarks become somewhat less enigmatic: since the good of privative indeterminateness is the first thing the intellect understands distinctly, the good of negative indeterminateness, which the intellect—proceeding from the more indeterminate to the less indeterminate—understands before (and in) understanding the good of privative indeterminateness, cannot itself be understood distinctly. For this reason Henry says that the latter is understood only “in a confused way and not distinctly from the good of a creature.” The two indeterminate “goods” must indeed be very close, because otherwise the intellect would grasp them each distinctly, in the way it distinctly grasps being as such and being as a substance or being as an accident. We could speak of a weakness here: our human intellect is in a sense too weak to grasp first the good of negative indeterminateness as distinct from the good of privative indeterminateness. However, a weakness is not to be confounded with an error.

III. *Metaphysics and the Principles, Parts, and Properties of Being*

Although we can now be sure that for Henry metaphysics deals with being as its subject-matter (and is therefore conceived of as an ontology), we so far have not learned much. For the character of a scientific discipline is not fully captured by its subject-matter. And if after all a scientific discipline presupposes the existence of the subject-matter, one might wonder what one knows if one has metaphysical knowledge. In Aristotle's terms, knowledge in the strict sense (i.e., demonstrative knowledge) is about the necessary properties of the things falling under the subject-matter. Someone searching for botanical knowledge looks for the necessary properties of plants. But of course she also aims at knowing different kinds of plants and the parts of plants. Moreover, someone who knows is expected to give an explanation of why what she knows is the case. Our botanist is therefore also expected to give causal explanations. This example illustrates why Aristotle was justified in holding that the range of a scientific discipline is not exhausted by the subject-matter, but also includes

²⁸ By “under normal circumstances” I mean cases where we cognize creatures. I add this qualification because in the exceptional case of a direct cognition of God the first thing understood by the intellect will be good of negative indeterminateness.

principles and causes, parts of the subject-matter, and necessary properties.²⁹ What, however, are causes, parts, and properties of being? Or may-be there are no real causes, parts, and properties of being, and metaphysical knowledge finally does not count as knowledge in the strict sense.

Causes of being pose an obvious problem for Henry's understanding of metaphysics as demonstrative knowledge. Despite the fact that Aristotle alludes to such causes,³⁰ it is unclear how there can be causes of being qua being in the first place. For if there were such causes, i.e., if these causes were beings, then they would have to be causes of themselves. But nothing can be strictly speaking a cause of itself because this would entail that the same thing is at the same instant prior and posterior with regard to itself. Following Avicenna, Henry therefore dismisses the idea that there can be causes of being as such and that metaphysics deals with them. Yet one can still maintain that metaphysics considers the causes of being insofar as it considers the causes of some beings. For Henry this is apparently enough; other scientific disciplines too are only concerned with causes of some beings.³¹

The requirement that metaphysics also investigate the parts of being is less problematic. The ten kinds of being described by the ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation etc.) are among the parts of the subject-matter of metaphysics. Surprisingly, Henry also counts God among the parts of being. The duty to examine being in general leads the metaphysician to examine all different kinds of being. Yet the divine being, whose existence the metaphysician and the physicist establish by way of different proofs, is a kind of being that cannot be subsumed under any of the ten categories, for the categories only capture finite modes of being. Henry also calls God the "noble part" of the subject-matter of metaphysics (*pars nobilis subiecti*), for it is a more eminent kind of being

²⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XIX, q. 1 ad 7, ed. Badius, fol. 116^{ro}: "... et ideo dicit Philosophus: Una autem scientia est quae est unius generis subiecti, quaecumque ex primis componitur et partes et passiones horum sunt per se. Unde et partes et principia et passiones omnia simul cadunt sub unius scientiae consideratione." See Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* I 28 87a38–39.

³⁰ See, e.g., *Metaphysics* IV.1 1003a31–32.

³¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XIX, a. 1 ad 4, ed. Badius, fol. 115^{vl}: "Unde de prima philosophia quae est de ente simpliciter ut de subiecto non considerat principia aliqua subiecti, quia non habet ulla. Ens enim simpliciter ut dicit Avicenna primo *Metaphysicae* suae non habet principium, sed est principium aliquibus entibus. Quapropter illa scientia non inquit principia entis absolute, sed alicuius entium, sicut faciunt aliae scientiae." See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, tract. I, cap. 2, ed. S. van Riet, vol. I, p. 14.

than the other kinds examined by the metaphysician.³² All this shows that for Henry the philosophical study of God belongs to the one discipline of “metaphysics” and is not, as for later authors, the duty of a so-called “special metaphysics” (*metaphysica specialis*). According to Henry, a metaphysical inquiry into the divine cannot be conceived of as separate from an examination of being insofar as it is being.

However, the question of whether there are necessary properties of being is the most important for settling the scientific character of metaphysics. For to know something in the strict sense is precisely to know of some object that it has this or that essential property (or *per se accidens*, in the Latin terminology).³³ A nuclear physicist, for instance, aims at knowing how nuclear particles behave not just in one case in her laboratory, but generally, i.e., she wants to know their essential behavior. Essential properties are different from merely accidental ones insofar as they belong essentially, and not just incidentally, to that of which they are predicated. However, they are not themselves part of the definition of the object of which they are predicated. ‘Capable of laughter’ and ‘having a sum of angles equal to two right angles’ are two examples of such properties. The first is an essential property of human beings, yet human beings are not defined by it; something similar is true of the second property.

In order to count as a scientific discipline in the strict sense, metaphysics therefore must investigate the essential properties of its subject matter, i.e., the essential properties of being insofar as it is being.³⁴ Using traditional vocabulary, Henry refers to these properties as *passiones entis*. But whatever we propose as candidates for such properties, certain problems arise.³⁵ Under normal circumstances, the thing to which an essential property belongs is part of the definition of the property. ‘Capable of laughter’ is defined as a property of human beings in virtue of which human beings are able to exhibit a certain behavior. That the subject of the property is part of the property’s definition normally rules out that

³² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VII, a. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 50^{rE}; see also *ibid.*, art. VII, q. 5 ad 2, ed. Badius, fol. 54^{rH} and art. VII, q. 6 ad 3, ed. Badius, fol. 56^{vT}.

³³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III.2 997a19–21; see also *id.*, *Posterior Analytics* I.10 76b11–16; *ibid.* I.7 75a39–b2.

³⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV.1 1003a21–22; *ibid.* IV.2 1004b5–17.

³⁵ For more background see Rolf Darge, “Die Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Theorie der transzendentalen Eigenschaften des Seienden bei F. Suarez,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 54 (2000), pp. 342–364.

the predication of the property could be reversed such that the subject is predicated of the property.³⁶ It is correct to predicate 'capable of laughter' of a human being (i.e., 'a human being is capable of laughter'), but it is incorrect to say 'capable of laughter is a human being'. One way of explaining this is by saying that the property of being capable of laughter adds something extrinsic to the subject,³⁷ which renders it impossible for the subject ('human being') to be predicated of the property. With being and its properties the picture is different. For any property *x* that being is said to have in a predication such as 'being is *x*', the converse (essential) predication '*x* is a being' is always true.

Like the problem concerning the causes of being, the problem concerning the *passiones entis* stems from the fact that the Aristotelian model of scientific knowledge applies primarily to particular disciplines with a well delineated subject-matter. Problems arise when this model is used to explain the scientific character of a discipline concerned with everything there is. Two options seem available: one can either deny that metaphysics aims at scientific knowledge in the strict sense, or one can try to explain how metaphysics nevertheless fulfills the requirements of being a science. Henry obviously opts for the second alternative. This is particularly clear in the case of the properties of being (*passiones entis*). He admits that being cannot have true properties (*verae passiones*) in the sense in which 'capable of laughter' is a true essential property of every human being and something extrinsic to and really different from its subject, but he denies that this is necessary:

It has to be said that regarding the subject-matter [of a scientific discipline] it is not necessary to investigate true properties (*verae passiones*), but some quasi properties (*aliquae quasi passiones*) ... It is not necessary that they are really (*re*) accidents with respect to being qua being ... they are called accidents because they behave in the way of an accident insofar as they are outside the concept (*intentio*) of being qua being.³⁸

The contrast here is between accidents that add something really different and accidents that only add something to an *intentio*. Henry seemingly denies that all essential properties must be accidents of the first kind. If

³⁶ Although an essential predication it might be true that the subject can be predicated of the property *secundum accidens*.

³⁷ This means that although the subject is part of the property's definition, there is also something else included in its definition; and this something else is really distinct from the subject.

³⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XIX, a. 1 ad 4, ed. Badius, fol. 116^{rl}.

the minimal requirement for an essential property is to express something extrinsic to the *intentio* of which it is predicated, then there is no reason to deny that being can have properties. To a modern reader this debate might look a bit baroque, yet medieval authors took the question of whether being can have essential properties very seriously. The problem even led some authors to conclude that metaphysics cannot be demonstrative knowledge, i.e., knowledge in the strict sense.³⁹

According to Henry, the metaphysician is thus concerned with properties that can be predicated of being and that are not already included in the concept of being. How this works and to what kind of knowledge this will lead will become clearer if we look at some of the *passiones entis* that Henry mentions. One and many, act and potency, universal and particular etc. are among the properties of being, because they are not limited to beings of a specific kind.⁴⁰ However, the most important properties of being are the so-called “transcendentals,” properties like being one, being good, and being true. Again, unity, goodness, and truth are not limited to beings of a specific kind, but they express properties that every being has. Every being is one, true, and good; it is one because it could not exist without a certain degree of unity; it is true because it can, at least in principle, be an object of knowledge; and it is good because every being has some degree of perfection. Yet if the metaphysician discovers and proves that every being is one, true, and good, she does not discover an extrinsic property of being. What the predication of that property adds to being is “some other aspect (*aliqua ratio*) or mode

³⁹ See, e.g., Ps-Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* [ms. Escorial h. II. 1], q. 119 [lib. IV, q. 1], ed. Pasquale Porro [in “Le Quaestiones super Metaphysicam attribuite a Enrico di Gand: elementi per un sondaggio dottrinale,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 13 (2002), pp. 507–602], p. 578: “Duplex est modus scientiae principalis, demonstrativus scilicet et definitivus. De scientiis vero demonstrativis solum verificatur illa propositio, unde sumitur ex illo verbo I *Posteriorum* ‘scientia una est unius generis subiecti partes et passiones considerans’ [Anal. Post. I.28 87a38–39], ubi principaliter docet modum scientiae demonstrativae. Talis autem non est ista scientia de ente simpliciter: non enim est demonstrativa sed definitiva.” It is obvious that there is a big difference between the view expressed here and the position defended by Henry of Ghent. Henry puts much effort into explaining how the requirement expressed in *Anal. Post* I.28 and other passages applies to metaphysics, whereas the author of the passage above just brushes it away as irrelevant. This is one of the reasons why I do not think that the Escorial commentary on the *Metaphysics* should be ascribed to Henry of Ghent.

⁴⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XIX, a. 1 ad 4, ed. Badius, fol. 116^{rl}. How they can be properties of being is clear: every being is either one or many, every being is either in act or in potency, etc. These properties will later be called “disjunctive transcendentals.”

of being that is not explicated (*explicatur*) and understood by the term 'being'.⁴¹ The primary goal of metaphysics is thus the *explicatio entis*, an analysis of the inner aspects and modes of being as such.

IV. *Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology*

Although God is not its subject-matter, the study of divine being has a prominent place in metaphysics: the knowledge of God seems to be one of its main goals.⁴² For some this does not come as a surprise. After all, Henry is a theologian, they will say, and he is interested in metaphysics and all the other forms of philosophical knowledge because they serve to elucidate faith and theological truths. From his perspective, all philosophical disciplines are indeed directed to just one goal. However this may be, there are also some deeper philosophical reasons why the study of the divine is the goal of metaphysics. We have seen earlier that the study of being insofar as it is being includes the study of the "parts" of being, i.e., the different types of being. For how can we really know what being is if we do not know what forms it can take on? As we will see later, Henry believes the existence of God, an immaterial being, can be demonstrated philosophically (and is not just a matter of faith). If God exists (i.e., if there is a divine being) then the philosophical study of being insofar as it is being also involves an examination of God. Yet no one is directly acquainted with God. Philosophical knowledge of God in particular can be achieved only through the knowledge of creatures, through what can be known by means of our purely natural capacities, i.e., the senses and reason. Thus, the more I know about creatures, the more I will be able to know about the divine being, and the more I will finally also know about being as such, for being cannot fully be understood if the first being is not understood. For this reason, philosophical knowledge of God is the goal of metaphysics.

⁴¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIV, a. 3, ed. R. Macken, p. 190. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 1, a. 1 and a. 21, a. 1. For more on the similarities between Henry and Aquinas see J. Aertsen, "Heinrich von Gent und Thomas von Aquin über die Transzendentalien."

⁴² See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXII, q. 2 ad 3, ed. Badius, fol. 131^{vz}: "... metaphysica quae est de dei cognitione ..."; *ibid.*, art. XXIV, a. 6, fol. 141^{vn}: "De quaestione ergo in prima philosophia propria ad sciendum quid est de deo ex creaturis, sciendum est ..."; *ibid.*, art. XIX, q. 1, fol. 115^{vk}: "Inter scientias philosophicas ultima est metaphysica, quia finis speculationis in tota philosophia est cognitio dei et celestium spirituum."

This view has some important consequences. That knowledge of God is part of the metaphysical enterprise presupposes that philosophical knowledge of God is within our reach, otherwise metaphysics would simply be impossible. And here I have in mind not only knowledge of existence (knowledge of the *an est*) but also quidditative knowledge (knowledge of the *quid est*), for nothing can properly be said to be known if its quiddity is not known. It is therefore not surprising that we find Henry affirming the possibility of quidditative knowledge of God, even if he considers such knowledge as extremely limited.⁴³ Henry's view is directly opposed to that of Thomas Aquinas, who strictly denies that we can know the *quid est* of God in this life. For Aquinas, all we can know, apart from God's existence, is what God is not.⁴⁴ But although Henry seems to have a much more optimistic perspective on our cognitive possibilities, he also emphasizes the impossibility of any immediate philosophical knowledge of God's quiddity. All we know philosophically about the divine is known through creatures and never by direct acquaintance. Strictly speaking, therefore, our quidditative knowledge of God is only *per accidens*, not *per se*. So in the end there is less distance between Henry's and Aquinas's positions than it seemed at first, for when Aquinas denies quidditative knowledge of God he denies precisely the possibility of direct acquaintance with the divine essence in this life.⁴⁵ We may be witnesses to a merely verbal dispute here, but in this case the wording is key because it is his understanding of metaphysics that guides Henry's exact statement of this point.

It remains to be seen how we can be sure that God exists and how we proceed in acquiring knowledge of God's *quid est*. Henry of Ghent, like many of his contemporaries, is convinced that God's existence can be demonstrated, and for this purpose he presents a whole set of proofs—nineteen altogether—in art. XXII, q. 4 of his *Summa*. None of the proofs is very original: the so-called *Summa Halensis* (also known as the *Summa*

⁴³ See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 137rd: "Sed ad tantillam cognitionem eius quod quid est de Deo devenire, etsi summe est difficile, est tamen possibile."

⁴⁴ See, e.g., *Summa contra Gentiles* I, cap. 30: "Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est." See also Anton Pegis, "Penitus Manet Ignotum," *Mediaeval Studies* 27 (1965), pp. 212–226; John Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC, 1984), pp. 215–241.

⁴⁵ For the debate between Henry and Aquinas see Jan A. Aertsen, "'Von Gott kann man nichts erkennen, außer daß er ist' (Satz 215 der Pariser Verurteilung)," in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen et al. (Berlin, 2001), pp. 22–37.

Fratris Alexandri) and Aquinas's "Five Ways" (from the beginning of the *Summa Theologiae*) served Henry as main sources.⁴⁶ Surprisingly, Anselm of Canterbury's so-called ontological argument is not on the list. Like Aquinas, Henry believes it has no real value in establishing God's existence.⁴⁷ The one proof that stands out among the nineteen is the proof from motion. Using Aquinas's own words, Henry calls the way of establishing the existence of an unmoved mover from the sensible presence of motion "more manifest" than all the other ways.⁴⁸

So far, Henry's exposition is quite traditional, but in the immediately following question (q. 5) he entertains the idea of a completely different way of proving the existence of God. What leads him to this idea is a passage from Avicenna's *Metaphysics*:

In the path of knowing that God exists, the opinion of Avicenna belongs to the first way (at least if he spoke as a pure philosopher), namely, that besides the knowledge which we have about God from sensible things *a posteriori*, it is possible to have another *a priori*. In accord with that, he promises that way of knowledge in book one of his *Metaphysics*, where he says: 'Afterwards it will be shown to you that we have a way for establishing the first principle, not by way of testimony from sensible things (*via testificationis sensibilium*), but by way of universal intelligible propositions (*via propositionum universalium intelligibilium*), which make it necessary that being has a principle,' also that this principle 'is necessary being ... and that the whole has to exist through it, according to the order of the whole. But on account of the weakness of our souls, we cannot proceed through this demonstrative way, which proceeds from principles to the consequences and from the causes to the effects, except ... in certain orders of the universe of things that exist.'⁴⁹

In the first line of the passage as well as the context, Henry seems to express some hesitation as to whether or not Avicenna's remarks really

⁴⁶ For the sources see Stephen D. Dumont, *Henry of Ghent as a Source for John Duns Scotus's Proof for the Existence of God* (unpubl. Dissertation, University of Toronto 1983), p. 14 and M. Laarmann, *Deus, primum cognitum*, pp. 155–174 (Laarmann's references to sources depend heavily on Dumont's unpublished thesis). Henry does not spell out all nineteen demonstrations; in some cases (especially at the end of the question) he simply refers to the authors and the texts in which these proofs can be found.

⁴⁷ Henry mentions Anselm's argument in *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXI, q. 1.

⁴⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXII, q. 4, ed. Badius, fol. 132^{vm}. Compare Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 3.

⁴⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius, fol. 134^{rvb}; transl. J. Decorte and R. Teske, p. 151 (with minor corrections). See Avicenna, *Liber de prima philosophia*, tract. I, cap. 3, ed. S. van Riet, pp. 23–24.

refer to a demonstrative (philosophical) proof.⁵⁰ Other passages, however, make it clear that he really takes Avicenna to be talking about a philosophical argument. Moreover, it is puzzling that he says there is an *a priori* way of establishing God's existence. Henry generally holds that God can be known only through effects, i.e., *a posteriori*. Since God has no causes, *a priori* knowledge seems to be ruled out right from the start. So what does *a priori* mean here?

What makes this alleged proof peculiar is that it is supposed to derive, like all human knowledge, from (material) things that are objects of the senses (*ex sensibilibus*) without proceeding "by way of testimony of sensible things."⁵¹ As Henry explains, the "way of testimony of sensible things", which is apparently the way followed by the proofs in q. 4, argues on the basis of the "connection and dependence of existence." The existence of some things indicates the existence of others and ultimately the existence of a first cause. Yet, according to Henry, there is another way of establishing the existence of an object, at least in the case of God. This alternative way is said to proceed from the "knowledge of the nature and essence" of the object to the knowledge of its existence.⁵² This way is a possibility here because God's essence is said to include God's existence. At this point the "universal intelligible propositions" come into play, for they are, as Henry explains, about "being, one, good, and the first intentions of things."⁵³ To sum up: the alternative method of establishing God's existence takes its starting point in a cognition of God's essence by means of the first concepts, and concludes that something with this nature necessarily exists. What makes this way *a priori* is its reliance on first concepts.

Art. XXII, q. 5 of the *Summa* offers its readers hardly more than a sketch of a (possible) demonstration. But before I examine where exactly Henry's *a priori* proof can be found, let me first point out two passages that obviously presuppose this "new way to God" (Pegis) and its soundness. The first passage is from Henry's discussion of God's unity and uniqueness, where he scrutinizes Aristotle's proofs for the existence

⁵⁰ In the second half of q. 5, Henry even gives an alternative theological presentation of the Avicenna passage.

⁵¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius, fol. 134^{vB}.

⁵² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius, fol. 134^{vC}.

⁵³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius, fol. 134^{vD}.

of God and examines how far they also establish God's uniqueness, where he admits that thanks to the Aristotelian proofs "it is infallibly shown that the first principle is one and unique,"⁵⁴ but he also notices a problem: due to their starting point in the sensible world these proofs cannot demonstrate that there is necessarily only one God. But there are, Henry thinks, arguments that can establish exactly this conclusion by way of an *a priori* proof. After alluding to this way he continues:

And by those arguments one also has a necessary proof that the first principle is that which a is necessary being through itself in a way other than *a posteriori* from creatures. Avicenna understood this when he said in book one of his *Metaphysics*: 'We will have a way of establishing the first principle, not by way of the testimony of sensible things, but by the way of universal intelligible propositions ... that make it necessary that being has a principle' and 'that it is necessary being'. ... And because the question of entity precedes the question of unity and necessity and of all other things, we do not therefore have a way to prove *a priori* that God is one and that God is a necessary being or any of the other things, unless it is first known from creatures that God is. And for this reason Avicenna says: 'On account of the weakness of our souls we cannot proceed through this demonstrative way, which proceeds from principles to the consequences and from the causes to the effects, except in certain orders of the universe of things that exist.'⁵⁵

According to Henry, the *a priori* method not only provides us with a proof of God's existence, but also with a proof of God's necessary uniqueness, something which can never be established *a posteriori*. However, as he notices himself, the proof of God's uniqueness presupposes God's existence, or rather, the existence of a necessary being. But since the present question is only concerned with uniqueness and not with establishing the existence of a necessary being, Henry takes the *necesse esse* as a starting point to show, employing arguments from books 1 and 8 of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, that there cannot be more than one necessary being.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXV, q. 2, ed. Badius, fol. 150^r; The translation is taken from Roland J. Teske, transl., *Henry of Ghent's Summa: The Questions on God's Unity and Simplicity (Articles 25–30)* (Leuven, 2006), p. 47. For reservations Henry has with respect to Aristotelian proofs for the uniqueness of God see also Roland J. Teske, "Henry of Ghent's Criticism of the Aristotelian Arguments for God's Existence," *The Modern Schoolman* 82 (2005), pp. 83–99.

⁵⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXV, q. 3, ed. Badius, fols. 153^v–154^r; transl. R. Teske, p. 81 (with minor modifications).

⁵⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXV, q. 3, ed. Badius, fols. 155^{vl}–156^{rs}. See Avicenna, *Liber de prima philosophia*, tract. I, cap. 6–7, ed. S. van Riet, pp. 46–54 and tract. VIII, cap. 5, pp. 404–411.

The second reference to the *a priori* proof occurs in Henry's discussion of how we can know what God is. This passage is especially interesting because in it Henry draws a distinction between the philosophical methods of natural philosophy ("physics") and those of metaphysics.

It must be known that knowledge of a supernatural, non-sensible substance can be acquired from material, sensible substances in two ways. It can be acquired in one way insofar as the substance [from which this knowledge derives] is moveable and sensible, that is, in terms of its being a natural substance, and from the consideration of the natural philosopher. It can be acquired in the other way insofar as the substance [from which this knowledge derives] is a being and a substance without qualification and from the consideration of a metaphysician. In the first way knowledge of whether God exists is obtained from created, sensible substances, that is, from the relation of effect to cause and of something moved to its mover. In this way the proof that God exists pertains essentially (*per se*) to the physicist and natural philosopher and not to the metaphysician, except insofar as the metaphysician wraps himself in the guise of the physicist by accepting the conclusions of the physicist. But in the second way our knowledge of whether God exists and our knowledge of what God is . . . is obtained from created, sensible substances in another way, that is, in a way other than by deduction from creatures (*alia via quam deductione ex creaturis*), which we discussed above. This is achieved by the way of eminence through abstraction (*via eminentiae per abstractionem*) from creatures of intentions that belong to the creator and to creatures in common by analogy. In that way the knowledge from creatures that God exists and what God is pertains essentially (*per se*) to the metaphysician.⁵⁷

The passage is interesting for various reasons. For one thing, it confirms that the metaphysician aims at knowledge not only of God's existence, but also of what God is, whereas the natural philosopher is capable of knowing at most that God exists. But I want to focus instead on another aspect. By endorsing the *a priori* proof as the way of the metaphysician, this passage also indicates what, if anything, is wrong with the nineteen proofs from art. XXII, q. 4. To be clear, for Henry all the proofs mentioned there establish "irrefutably" (*irrefragabiliter*) the existence of God. It is not that they do not manage to fulfill their goal; similarly, it is not a problem that they all argue *via causalitatis*, by reasoning from effects back to their cause(s).⁵⁸ The crucial difference lies rather in the fact that the "second

⁵⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 6, ed. Badius, fol. 141^{rvN}; transl. J. Decorte and R. Teske, pp. 221–223. (with modifications).

⁵⁸ Some commentators think that Henry regards all the proofs in art. XXII, q. 4 as physical proofs because they all rely heavily on the notions of cause and effect. But Henry clearly believes that only the proofs based on motion belong to physics; all other

way” from sensible creatures to God takes its point of departure in a purely metaphysical consideration of those sensible things. For this reason, the alleged *a priori* proof is more appropriate for the metaphysician.

But where exactly do we find the mysterious *a priori* proof? Q. 5 of art. XXII, where the proof is mentioned for the first time, does not contain more than a rather sketchy description of its general lines. And although some interpreters see the proof hidden exactly in the remarks Henry makes in that question,⁵⁹ there are reasons to be doubtful. Henry himself makes clear that the proof is to be found somewhere else, since he writes: “But below, when we speak about the unity of God, we will look at this way of proving that God exists from universal propositions otherwise than, as we said above, from the testimony of sensible things.”⁶⁰ Yet as we just saw, Henry’s Avicennian arguments for God’s uniqueness in art. XXV presuppose the existence of a necessary being (*necesse esse*) but do not establish it.⁶¹

For Raymond Macken, the expression “*via eminentiae*” in the passage quoted above indicates that the *a priori* proof is identical with the two *via eminentiae* demonstrations among the nineteen arguments of art. XXII, q. 4. This too is implausible: why would Henry make all the fuss about two fundamentally different ways of proving God’s existence if one of them can be subsumed under the other? The most promising attempt to locate the proof was undertaken by Jean Paulus and refined by, among others, Stephen Dumont.⁶² Remember, in art. XXII, q. 5 Henry described the *a priori* proof as proceeding from essence to existence. This leads the two commentators to locate the proof in the

demonstrations have a place in metaphysics. See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXIV, q. 2, ed. Badius, fol. 149^v: “Procedit enim solummodo via motus, quam solam habet naturalis philosophus considerare, quia impossibile est declarari in naturalibus alia via substantiam abstractam esse nisi ex motu, et si sint aliae viae illae monstrantur in philosophia prima.”

⁵⁹ See, e.g., R. Teske, “Henry of Ghent’s Criticism,” p. 84: “In article 22, question 5, Henry presents his own *a priori* proof for the existence of God . . .”

⁶⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius, fol. 135^{re}; transl. J. Decorte and R. Teske, p. 157 (with minor corrections).

⁶¹ For this reason I am skeptical about Anton Pegis’s interpretation. He writes (in “Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent (III),” *Mediaeval Studies* 33 (1971), pp. 158–179 at 91): “*Summa*, Article 25, contains the main elements of Henry’s own proof of God. He had prepared the way for his efforts in Articles 22 and 24.” I take the expression “main elements” as a sign of a certain hesitation; Pegis too apparently had trouble in finding in that article a clearly outlined argument for God’s existence.

⁶² See S. Dumont, *Henry of Ghent as a Source for John Duns Scotus’s Proof for the Existence of God*, esp. pp. 155–187.

questions discussing how we know God's *quid est*, in particular in art. XXIV, q. 6. However, there are problems with this view as well. I see at least three crucial difficulties: (1) The existence of God seems to be presupposed in Henry's argument for the possibility of quidditative knowledge about God (in art. XXIV, q. 6); we run into a vicious circle if such a quidditative knowledge is then used to establish God's existence. (2) If Henry really meant to give his *a priori* proof in the questions on quidditative knowledge of God, why did he refer in art. XXII, q. 5 to the question on God's uniqueness? (3) As noted earlier, the demonstration of God's uniqueness presupposes the notion of a necessary being (*necesse esse*) and the *a priori* proof allegedly establishes the existence of a necessary being. But the notion of *necesse esse* is surprisingly absent from Henry's discussion of quidditative knowledge of God (in art. XXIV, q. 6).

I therefore suggest we consider seriously the possibility that Henry never actually wrote down the *a priori* proof. Notice that the proof was supposed to have been formulated by Avicenna. When other medieval philosophers refer to an Avicennian proof for God's existence, they usually refer to a demonstration arguing from the contingency of creatures to the necessity of a first cause. They consider this line of reasoning to be metaphysical because it operates with the notions of possibility and necessity, which are properties of being insofar as it is being.⁶³ Without mentioning Avicenna, Aquinas employs the argument from possibility as his "Third Way" in the *Summa Theologiae* (I, q. 2, a. 3). And because Henry, in turn, used Aquinas's "Five Ways" for his list of nineteen proofs in art. XXII, q. 4, we can find it there as the second argument from efficient causality. In other words, whatever the reasons are, Henry considered the traditional Avicennian argument as an *a posteriori* argument for God's existence. Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that Henry, understandably, had trouble finding another Avicennian argument for God's existence, and so he simply did not know how Avicenna's *a priori*

⁶³ See, e.g., Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, lib. XII, q. 6d (ed. William Dunphy [in "The Quinque Viae and Some Parisian Professors of Philosophy," in *Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies*, ed. Armand Maurer et al. (Toronto, 1974), vol. 2, pp. 73–104], p. 102). Notice that among interpreters of Avicenna there is a debate about where exactly in the *Metaphysics* one can find Avicenna's metaphysical proof for God's existence. For more about this, see Amos Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof for God's Existence and the Subject-Matter of Metaphysics," *Medioevo* 32 (2007), pp. 61–97, esp. 77–82.

argument was supposed to work in all its details. This would explain why he did not manage to give an account of it anywhere in his *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*.⁶⁴

The missing *a priori* proof leaves a serious gap in Henry's account of the scientific status of metaphysics. But although this aspect of the metaphysician's method remains obscure, it is relatively clear how the metaphysician attains quidditative knowledge of the divine being. Crucial here is Henry's commitment to the principle that every agent produces something similar to itself.⁶⁵ Admittedly, the effects of the first cause are only very remotely similar to it, but such a similitude (a *similitudo imitationis*, in Henry's words) is still enough to bridge the gap between sensible, material substances and the immaterial first substance. Since the first cause is supposed to be the cause of literally everything, its quiddity is best understood by starting from its most common effects, i.e., from the properties that all creatures have in common. Here again the transcendental notions 'being', 'truth', 'goodness' etc. play a decisive role.⁶⁶ In examining these first intentions (*primae intentiones*) of creatures, the metaphysician arrives at an understanding of God as the first and unlimited being, the first and unlimited truth, the perfect good etc. To understand God philosophically, as, for instance, the perfect good, is not much more than having a merely general knowledge of God—as opposed to particular knowledge.⁶⁷ Yet this is the only knowledge of divine things we are capable of by means of our natural capacities. In its attainment, the metaphysician not only reaches the limits of natural human cognition, but also arrives at a more complete understanding of being insofar as it is being.

⁶⁴ Further evidence for the claim that the proof is absent from the *Summa* can be gathered from the structure of art. XXII, q. 5. As mentioned earlier (see above nt. 49), Henry seems unsure whether the description of the *via propositionum universalium* refers to a philosophical method or to a theological one. For this reason, the first part of the response to q. 5 offers a philosophical interpretation, whereas the second part offers a theological reading of the same Avicennian passage.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2, ed. Badius, fol. 124^r_g. For a detailed interpretation of this principle see Philipp W. Rosemann, *Omne agens agit sibi simile. A 'Repetition' of Scholastic Metaphysics* (Leuven, 1996). Unfortunately, Henry does not offer an argument for this important principle; all he offers are examples.

⁶⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 6, ed. Badius, fol. 142^r_q.

⁶⁷ In *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 6, Henry further distinguishes different degrees of such a general knowledge.

VIII

HENRY OF GHENT ON INDIVIDUATION, ESSENCE, AND BEING

MARTIN PICKAVÉ

We commonly attribute two basic features to our everyday objects: on the one hand, every such object is a singular, individual object, distinct from every other thing; on the other hand, there is hardly an object that does not—at least potentially—resemble something else. Even more, some resemblances are so strong that we talk of things of the same kind. For Henry of Ghent, these two features, sameness and individual difference, are due to two different metaphysical principles. Things resemble each other and belong to (natural) kinds because they have the same specific form or nature and one thing differs from another through its individuating principle.

In this contribution I will use Henry's discussion of individuation as a point of entry into his ontology. This may come as a surprise since there does not seem to be a clear consensus among interpreters about what exactly Henry's account of individuation amounts to.¹ In some sense Henry himself can be regarded as the source of the confusion, for in different texts he emphasizes different factors involved in individuation. I shall try to show, however, that Henry does have a consistent account (I.). Henry's views about the relationship between the individuating principle and that which it individuates will put the spotlight on the general question of the extent to which individual objects can be considered as ontological composites. I shall explore this question further by looking at Henry's arguments for why creatures can be considered as composites of an essence and existence (II). As we will see, Henry not only defends the somewhat traditional distinction between essence and existence, but also distinguishes between essence and a special mode of being proper to

¹ According to Stephen Brown, for instance, subsistence is Henry's candidate for the principle of individuation; for Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin it is a double negation. See Stephen Brown, "Henry of Ghent," in *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650*, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia (Albany, NY, 1994), pp. 195–219; Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin, *Le 'De ente et essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1926), p. 128.

essences themselves: the so-called being of essence (*esse essentiae*). After we will consider what Henry has in mind by referring to the being of essence or essential being (III.) I will turn to the question of why Henry thought it necessary to introduce this special mode of being in the first place (IV.). I will end with some general remarks about Henry's ontology and its reception (V.).

Henry developed his metaphysical views in debate with his contemporaries and defended his views against their criticism. It is therefore almost impossible to write about Henry of Ghent without also writing about Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Godfrey of Fontaines, among others. His polemical exchanges with the latter two in the period around *Quodlibet X* and *Quodlibet XI* (1286/1287) are notorious. Unfortunately, I will have no space to explore these fierce debates in their own right. I will only allude to them to the extent to which they help to clarify Henry's views. In any case, the criticism of his colleagues did not make Henry change his mind.²

I. Individuation

Let's start with a simple case: human beings. According to Henry, we are human beings because each of us shares a specific form, i.e., the form that accounts for the 'humanness' (*humanitas*) of that which it informs.³ In this sense one can say that such a form is distributed or divided among all the individual human beings. However, this form is

² For Henry's debate with Giles and Godfrey on being and essence see Jean Paulus, "Les disputes d'Henri de Gand et de Gilles de Rome sur la distinction de l'essence et de l'existence," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 13 (1940–1942), pp. 323–358; John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington, DC, 1981), pp. 39–99; id., "The Relationship between Essence and Existence in Late Thirteenth Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, James of Viterbo," in *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval*, ed. Parviz Morewedge (New York, 1982), pp. 131–164; Concetta Luna, "Nouveaux textes d'Henri de Gand, de Gilles de Rome et de Godefroid de Fontaines. Les questions du manuscrit Bologne, Collegio di Spagna, 133. Contribution à l'étude des questions disputées," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 65 (1998), pp. 151–272. For their debate about individuation see my "The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in *Quodlibeta* (1277–ca. 1320): A Forest Map," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages*, vol. II: *The Fourteenth Century*, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden, 2007), pp. 17–79, esp. 23–51.

³ I use the term 'specific form' in its literal meaning as form that belongs to/is constitutive of a species.

fully in Plato, Socrates, you, me and every other human being; there are no degrees of 'humanness'. The form is not divided like a cake is divided among the people eating it; in fact, the form enjoys a special kind of unity that makes it impossible that it could be divided like a cake at all. What it means to be human (i.e., to be rational, having a body etc.) is indifferent to the fact that it might be instantiated in this or that individual, but there are many distinct human beings. The upshot of this is that specific forms cannot be divided into many individuals by something intrinsic to the forms or by other substantial forms, for this would ultimately mean that Socrates and Plato differ in humanity. Such a form can only be divided *per accidens*, i.e., by something extrinsic or accidental to it. For this very reason we talk about individuation of forms, and not about their division; individuation applies to something that, as the name indicates, is in itself indivisible. As we see, for Henry the issue of individuation concerns primarily the multiplication of forms.⁴

What is the feature extrinsic to forms and capable of multiplying them, the "cause and reason of individuation" (*causa et ratio individuationis*)? Although it must be something accidental, for it relates to forms merely extrinsically, the principle of individuation is of course not an accident in the proper sense of accident. Accidents are ontologically posterior to the things in which they inhere. Hence, they cannot cause the individuality of their underlying substances. Rather the opposite: accidents are individuated by their subjects and only render their subject's individuality manifest.⁵

At least in case of material objects, matter is often taken to be what causes the multiplication of forms. Henry agrees with this, broadly speaking, Aristotelian picture of individuation. What allows matter to individuate forms is the fact that matter, before it receives a substantial form, first receives the form of quantity and so has extension and dimensions. But in

⁴ For Henry's explanation of the meaning of *individuat*io see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518; repr. Leuven, 1961), fol. 164^{vGH}; id., *Quodlibet* II, q. 8, ed. Robert Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 36. For the different meanings the term *individuat*io can adopt in the late 13th and early 14th centuries see my "The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation". This article also contains a more detailed interpretation of Henry's teaching on individuation than the one proposed here. In particular, it also reflects on Henry's sources.

⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V, q. 8, ed. Badius, fol. 165^{rIK}; see also id., *Quodlibet* II, q. 8, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 55.

virtue of being extended and having dimensions, matter is divisible into many different parts, and thus capable of individuating the forms that inform the bits of matter.⁶ Henry, however, opposes the tendency to generalize the individuation-by-matter view to such an extent that matter is considered as the exclusive principle of individuation, a tendency he attributes to the philosophers and the “philosophizers” (*philosophantes*), i.e., to fellow theologians who slavishly follow Aristotle at all costs.⁷ His point is that there also has to be an individuating principle for immaterial forms. For if matter is the only principle of individuation, then it follows that non-material forms cannot be individuated at all. What then accounts for the singularity of non-material substances? Nothing, it seems. But since everything that exists, exists as something individual, forms of immaterial substances must then be individuals through themselves and by their own nature. For Henry this amounts to saying that immaterial substances exist through themselves, which would make them into necessary beings.⁸

It is Henry’s considered opinion that “matter and quantity cannot be called the precise reason (*praecisa ratio*) and cause of individuation and of the distinction of individuals belonging to the same species,” although matter and quantity are clearly causes in the individuation of material things.⁹ That matter is not the precise reason and cause of individuation can mean two things. Either it means that matter is not the only principle and that there are other principles for different

⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 8, ed. Badius, fol. 165^{rvl}. Here someone might object that quantity is an accident and therefore, as was said earlier, unable to account for the individuation of its subject, which is ontologically prior. Henry counters this with the distinction between determinate and indeterminate dimensions. The quantity that individuates forms in matter simply gives extension and dimensions to matter, but not determinate extension or dimensions. Understood in this sense, indeterminate dimensions are ontologically prior to the composite substance, whereas determinate dimensions are always posterior. For the background of this distinction see Silvia Donati, “Materia e dimensioni tra XIII e XIV secolo: la dottrina delle dimensiones indeterminatae,” *Quaestio 7* (2007), pp. 361–393.

⁷ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 42. For this expression see Etienne Gilson, “Les ‘philosophantes,’” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 27 (1952), pp. 135–140; Pierre Michaud-Quantin, “Pour le dossier des ‘Philosophantes,’” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 43 (1968), pp. 17–22.

⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 39; id., *Quodlibet V*, q. 8, ed. Badius, fol. 165^{vm}.

⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 47; id., *Quodlibet V*, q. 8, ed. Badius, fol. 165^{vl}.

kinds of beings; or it means that even in the case of material beings, it is not completely adequate to call matter the principle of individuation. Henry obviously endorses the second alternative, yet, so he assures his readers, once we have discovered the “precise and proximate cause of individuation”, we will also see why it is true that material forms are individuated by matter.

At this point we need to step back for a moment. I started by pointing out that for Henry every created thing has one distinct metaphysical element in virtue of which it resembles other objects and falls under a natural kind (or species) and another element in virtue of which it is a singular, individual object. The second element thus determines and limits the first element. In line with this general picture, Henry often refers to created things as ‘suppositi’, which consist of a nature (or form or essence—in our context Henry uses these terms often interchangeably) and something that limits the nature and makes the whole into this or that supposit.¹⁰ From this point of view the individuating principle is simply what determines the nature and therefore accounts for the *ratio suppositi*. The question can thus be rephrased: What exactly confers the *ratio suppositi*?

Whatever it is that confers the *ratio suppositi*, it seems to be an intrinsic feature of the supposit. This does not rule out that there also can be extrinsic causes of individuation (and of the supposit). The agent, for instance, that causes an individual/supposit to exist, can thus also be called an individuating principle; especially since every real action happens with regard to singulars. This explains why Henry sometimes refers to God as the principle of individuation, for God is the first efficient cause.¹¹ In comparison with the role of the agent, it becomes clear that matter too functions for Henry as an extrinsic cause of the supposit and thus of individuation. This explains why matter cannot be the precise

¹⁰ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 8, ed. Badius, fols. 165^v–166^{rM}. The expression ‘supposit’ has its origin in discussions on the nature of Christ. In the vocabulary of medieval theologians, Christ has two natures (divine and human) in one supposit. On Henry’s understanding of *suppositum* see Gordon Wilson, “Supposite in the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent,” in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293)*, ed. Willy Vanhamel (Leuven, 1996), pp. 343–372. Wilson also discusses *Quodlibet V*, q. 8 at some length at pp. 354–362.

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XI*, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 439^{rV}. See also id., *Quodlibet III*, q. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 50^{vL}. For God as the ultimate *causa individuationis* see id., *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 51.

cause of individuation even for material things.¹² The internal or formal principle, the principle that makes a supposit into a supposit, is the precise or proximate cause.¹³

Henry presents two accounts of the “precise cause” of individuation. In *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, he refers to subsistence (*subsistentia*) as that principle determining the form and constituting a supposit. Two objects of the same species are distinct from each other, because the subsistence of the one is not the subsistence of the other.¹⁴ Although he leaves open what he exactly means by ‘subsistence’,¹⁵ it looks as if this candidate for a principle of individuation matches all of the criteria that turned out to be essential for a principle of individuation. Subsistence is not limited to material beings, it also accounts for the individuation of immaterial substances. Although subsistence is something exterior to the form and can therefore be called an accident in a broad sense, the argument demonstrating that a real accident cannot individuate a substance does not apply.

If the second *Quodlibet* offers what one could call a positive account of the principle of individuation, Henry’s fifth *Quodlibet* provides a negative one. In the latter text Henry argues in favor of a double negation as the principle of individuation. He begins by asking himself whether the feature individuating a form and establishing a supposit can be something positive and absolute (*aliquid positivum et absolutum*) in itself. This, however, seems impossible, for as a complete being this positive and absolute item must itself be a supposit and one can ask of it too which positive item caused it to be a supposit. And so we run into an

¹² Henry must have in mind here what his contemporaries refer to as “designated matter” (*materia designata*).

¹³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 8, ed. Badius, fol. 166^{rM}: “Sed quid est in supposito super formam quo habet esse hoc et quo per ipsam formam habet esse hoc, quia est huius? Dico aliquid praeter materiam et praeter agens quod est quasi dispositio suppositi in quantum suppositum est, quod non potest esse materia nec agens. Haec enim dispositio derelicta est circa formam in supposito et facit suppositum esse suppositum, ut habens formam et rationem compositionis ex forma et ratione determinationis in ipsa. Hoc enim viso videbitur ratio suppositi et individuationis proxima et quid est quod suppositum formaliter faciat in creaturis.” See also id., *Quodlibet XI*, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 439^{rV}.

¹⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 51, 81–88: “Et sic non est dicendum quod hoc solo differunt quia natura unius non est natura alterius—eadem, dico, secundum numerum—, sed quia subsistentia unius non est subsistentia alterius, quae facit differre essentiam ut est in uno ab ipsa ut est in altero . . . Ipsa enim subsistentia in supposito omnino necessaria est ad essentiae existentiam actualem, tam in uno quam in altero, non secundum idem numero, sed secundum aliud et aliud numero, consimile tamen specie.”

¹⁵ On the meaning of the term ‘subsistence’ see below p. 195.

infinite regress. But since that is impossible, then the individuating element must be either something negative or a positive relation. The latter can be ruled out right away. For a relation is grounded in some really existing thing, i.e., in a thing that is already a complete supposit. Thus, there remains only something negative, a negation, and so Henry concludes that individuation happens by a negation. He explains the nature of this negation in the following terms:

This negation is not a simple one, but a double negation. For it removes from the inside any possibility for plurification and diversity and removes from the outside any identity, so that in this way the form is called this form, because it is only this form, not having inside of it the possibility to be this and another one, a possibility possessed by the form of a species. And moreover, it is only this form because it is not the form of other things of the same species.

Henry goes on to call such a double negation the principle that individuates essences and that establishes a supposit.¹⁶

John Duns Scotus had the negative account of individuation in mind when he objected to Henry that a merely negative principle could never cause individuation, because it could not cause anything at all.¹⁷ However, it should be clear that the negative account is only one side of the coin, and the positive account, according to which subsistence individuates, is the other side of the same coin. Modern interpreters too are often unaware of this, but Henry explains the relationship himself. In *Quodlibet* XI, q. 1 he concludes his discussion of the individuation of angels with the following remark:

And in this way the positive individuation of the form takes place effectively only through the producing agent and formally only through this being [i.e., the being proper to the supposit]. But I have explained somewhere else how individuation happens to take place negatively.¹⁸

Notice that Henry here describes the subsistence (through which a form has being in a supposit) as that which “formally” causes the individuation of a form.¹⁹ This does not mean that subsistence is a form, but that among all the causes involved in individuation (such as the

¹⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V, q. 8, ed. Badius, fol. 166^{rM}. See also id., *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXIX, q. 3 ad 2, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, 1994), pp. 187–190.

¹⁷ See, e.g., *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 2, nn. 48–56, *Opera omnia* VII, ed. Vaticana (Vatican City, 1973), pp. 412–416.

¹⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XI, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 439^{vV}.

¹⁹ See also the texts in above in nt. 13.

agent, matter etc.) subsistence plays a role similar to that of a form.²⁰ But the main point of the passage is that both accounts of individuation, the positive and the negative, are supposed to complement each other.²¹

This leaves us with a puzzle: How can a negation be also a positive principle? In other words: Are these two accounts really compatible? It is important to keep in mind that Henry's reference to a double negation does not mean that individuation is not caused by some metaphysically robust principle. What brings about that a nature or form is individuated is not identical with that very form or nature and it is not something that differs from the form only to the extent that we have different concepts of it and the form. On the other hand, the individuating principle cannot, as we saw, be some added thing in the proper meaning of 'thing', i.e., something positive and complete. Henry holds that there is something half-way between the Scylla of a real addition and the Charybdis of a merely conceptual addition, something that accounts for a robust metaphysical composition or distinction without turning the composite into a composite of two things: it is the composite that results when an "intention" (*intentio*) is added to something else. On this picture subsistence adds to a form or nature merely an "intention", so that form or nature differ from the individuating factor "intentionally", i.e., by an "intentional difference".²² Now, because the individuating principle is not another thing and because it therefore does not itself have a distinct nature, it is hard to grasp it in positive terms. It can best be grasped by reference to what it does, namely to determine the form or nature. It is presumably for this reason that Henry talks about a double negation as the individuating principle. For according to our human capacities we best grasp this principle as something that manifests itself in a double negation.²³

²⁰ The idea to analyse individuation in terms of the four causes was quite common in the late 13th century and it seems to have become even more common after Henry of Ghent. See my article "The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation."

²¹ In *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIX, q. 3 ad 2, ed. G. Wilson, pp. 187–190, Henry seems to anticipate Scotus's objection. But there he simply refers to the (extrinsic) agent as the positive thing effectively causing the individuation of a universal essence.

²² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, ed. R. Wielockx, pp. 49–50 and 53–54; id., *Quodlibet III*, q. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 50^{vl}.

²³ This explanation is influenced by Henry's general remarks about unity. According to Henry, we grasp and define unity in terms of a negation: one is what is not divided in itself. But in reality unity is something positive. See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones*

In summary it is worth pointing out that on Henry's account various causes are involved in individuation and that subsistence is only one of them, although arguably the most important one. This is important, for otherwise Henry would be open to criticism of the following sort: It looks as if subsistence is always the subsistence of essences and there are no independent 'subsistences'. Subsistence (like existence) is therefore incapable of individuating forms or essences, because it depends on them ontologically.²⁴ Henry would not have found this objection very troublesome, since for him it assumes a series of questionable premises. The most salient is that it seems to assume that subsistence was proposed as an efficient cause of individuation, and for Henry it is obvious that subsistence cannot be—and does not have to be—such an efficient cause.

II. *Essence and Existence*

Henry's treatment of individuation makes clear that he considers all created things as metaphysical composites of some sort, as composites not of two real things, but rather of items that differ only intentionally. What this means and what he means by subsistence will become more clear if we look at another way in which creatures are composites, according to Henry of Ghent, namely if we look at the difference between essence and existence.²⁵

ordinariae (*Summa*), art. XXV, q. 1, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520; repr. St. Bonaventure, NY, 1953), fol. 147^{vE}. For Henry's views about (transcendental) unity see my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft: Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Leiden, 2007), pp. 255–265.

²⁴ This sort of criticism was put forward by Thomas Sutton. See his *Quaestiones ordinariae*, q. 27, ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich, 1977), pp. 753–754. See also Gyula Klima, "Thomas Sutton on Individuation," *Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics* [<http://faculty.fordham.edu/hlima/SMLM/PSMLMS.pdf>] 5 (2005), pp. 70–78.

²⁵ For some of following see my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik*, chapter IV. A survey of the debate about the distinction between essence and existence (and its sources) can be found in John Wippel, "Essence and Existence," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600*, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 385–410. Henry's ontology is also discussed in a series of older studies: see Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris, 1938); Paul Bayerschmidt, *Die Seins- und Formmetaphysik des Heinrich von Gent in ihrer Anwendung auf die Christologie: eine philosophie- und dogmengeschichtliche Studie* (Münster, 1941); José Gómez Caffarena, *Ser participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante* (Rome, 1958).

For Henry, every single existing thing has an essence, which determines what it is, and also has existence. Obviously there must be a distinction of some sort between the two. If my actual existence were identical with or part of my essence, then my existence would be necessary. My existence would be part of my essence in the same way in which the sum of angles equal to two right angles is part of the essence of triangle. But that is obviously not the case, for it is clearly possible for me not to exist. If, however, there is a difference between actual existence and the essence of an object, how can we best capture this difference?

Maybe essence and actual existence differ in the way two things (*res*) differ. Henry, who accuses Thomas Aquinas of holding such a position about the relationship between essence and existence,²⁶ opposes this view strongly. But rather than Thomas Aquinas, it was Giles of Rome's recent defense of the so-called real distinction between essence and existence that prompted Henry to take a position on this issue in his first *Quodlibet*. Henry uses four main arguments against the real distinction. The first argument points out that if essence and existence were two things, then every creature or contingent being would be a real composite of two things and could never really be one substance (i.e., a true *ens per se*). The second and third of Henry's standard arguments ask what kind of thing this added existence could be. Presumably the thing 'existence' would itself be something created. But if that were so, then this existence would have its own existence from something else. For it seems to be a feature of creatures that they do not have their existence from themselves but from their creator. But then we have to ask the same question about this other existence. This leads to an infinite regress unless we stop at one existence which has its being from itself. Yet there seems to be no good reason why a particular created being should have its existence from itself and why this should not have applied to the essence from which we started. The third argument asks even more specifically: Of what sort is the added thing 'existence'. Is it a substance or an accident? Henry then goes on

²⁶ See Henry's remarks in *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1979), p. 51, where he blames certain theologians (*theologi*) for not spotting the apparent falsity of this view. The direct quotations from Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* in other parts of the quodlibetal question (see pp. 48–49) leave no doubt that Henry has Aquinas in mind. According to Edgar Hocedez, Henry is here mainly targeting Giles of Rome's teaching; see Edgar Hocedez, "Le premier quodlibet d'Henri de Gand (1276)," *Gregorianum* 9 (1928), pp. 92–117.

at length to show that neither alternative will do.²⁷ Moreover, fourth, if essence and existence are both different things (*res*) on their own, then it looks as if an essence has some kind of existence on its own before it receives as a subject its existence. For only to something that is can we add something else. Yet proponents of the real distinction introduce it for the very reason that they do not believe that an essence has existence on its own. But now it seems as if their own view forces them to accept a version of the view that they intend to refute.²⁸

It follows that for Henry an object's essence is to a certain degree the same thing as the object's actual existence. Does this mean that the distinction between being and essence is merely conceptual? But that will not do either. For then it would follow that my existence is really identical with or is a part of my essence, although I do not grasp them by the same concept. It is hard to see how such a view could avoid making my existence necessary.²⁹ As in the case of individuation, Henry concludes that there must be an intermediary distinction between a real and a merely conceptual distinction and that this distinction applies to the relationship between existence and essence, an "intentional distinction". In other words: the addition of existence to essence is an instance of an intentional addition.³⁰

Keep in mind that existence is strictly speaking the actuality of the essence, as the use of knowledge in contemplation is the actuality of the knowledge. There is no existence except the existence of things with a

²⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, pp. 51–52. Henry repeats some of these arguments in *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. Raymond Macken, (Leuven, 1991), pp. 155–159. The second argument can also be found in *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXVII, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 161^{vM}. For an 'Averroistic' background of Henry's arguments argues Ruedi Imbach, "Averroistische Stellungnahmen zur Diskussion über das Verhältnis von *esse* und *essentia*: von Siger von Brabant zu Thaddaeus von Parma," in *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, ed. Alfonso Maierù and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani (Rome, 1981), pp. 299–339 at 316–319.

²⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, pp. 48–49. In other words: For Henry the proponents of the real distinction have a misguided understanding of what participation in being (and therefore creation) amounts to. For other passages in which Henry accuses proponents of the real distinction of a mistaken understanding of participation see *ibid.*, pp. 58–59; *id.*, *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. R. Macken, pp. 166–175; *id.*, *Quodlibet XI*, q. 3. For another error allegedly committed by them see *id.*, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIX, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 171^{rF}.

²⁹ For Henry this amounts to making creatures into necessary beings like God. See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, p. 55.

³⁰ See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, pp. 55–57; *id.*, *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1981), p. 166. In this last text Henry writes that he is not picky about what this distinction (or addition) is called.

nature or essence, just as there is no active contemplation (e.g., instances of actually 'doing' mathematics) without knowledge (e.g., without having mathematical knowledge). Existence is not independent of the essence, but it is something over and above the essence.³¹ However, and this is precisely Henry's point, there is a difference between this close relationship between essence and existence on the one side and the relationship that applies between two real things on the other.

Many of Henry's contemporaries objected to Henry's idea of an intentional distinction. One of his most vociferous critics was Giles of Rome who discussed Henry's ontology in a series of works. In q. 9 of his *Questions on being and essence*, Giles declares that the intentional distinction is simply unintelligible, insisting that things are either really distinct or merely conceptually distinct.³² In *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, Henry replies to Giles's objection by analyzing three examples of distinctness.³³ The first examples is the distinction between a rational animal and a human being, a case of a merely conceptual distinction, for a rational animal is nothing else than a human being. Here we refer to the same reality by two different concepts, and that is the only distinction there is. Henry also adds a more technical characterization of the conceptual or rational distinction: this distinction applies when one of the items of the distinction is incompatible with the negation of the other and vice versa. In our case: it is impossible that a human being is not a rational animal and vice versa. Rational and white are Henry's examples for the real distinction. If something is both rational and white it is a real composite, and consequently the two features are really distinct. The difference from the rational distinction is obvious, for it is possible that something is rational but not white and vice versa. Now look at the difference between a genus and its difference, say animal and rational. A rational animal, i.e., a human being, is not a composite of two independent things (say, two substances), one being 'animality' and the other 'rationality', nor is what is rational only concep-

³¹ See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius, fol. 127^v. In this passage, as in many others, Henry explains the relationship between essence and existence by using the example of light (*lux*) and the act of shining (*lucere*) or life (*vita*) and living (*vivere*). There is no act of living without life and no actual shining without light. However, life is not strictly speaking the same as the act of living. One can observe this in the way we speak: for if they were strictly identical it would be true to say 'life is the act of living' or 'light is the act of shining', which is not true. For these examples see also *ibid.*, fol. 128^r and *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, p. 56.

³² *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 9 (ed. Venice, 1503), fol. 19^{va}.

³³ For the following see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. R. Macken, pp. 164–165.

tually distinct from an animal. There are many animals that are not rational. That this case is different from the other two can also be gathered from the fact that it is certainly possible that an animal is not rational, whereas it is impossible for something rational not to be an animal.³⁴

Henry is convinced that the previous examples are strong evidence of the need for an intermediary distinction, but I doubt his opponents were much impressed. After all, a genus does not really exist without a specific difference, so it is not clear what the example is supposed to show.³⁵ But Henry's general point is less opaque than it seems. His point is only that some items, when added to something, simply add something else (as an accident adds to a substance), but that other items do not really add anything but rather contract that to which they are added. To make this clear is the primary goal of the example of genus and difference. In the same way, existence contracts the essence, i.e., makes it an essence that exists at a certain time and place.

The comparison between Giles of Rome, a defender of the real distinction between being and essence, and Henry makes clear that Henry has a very strict understanding of what a thing (*res*) is supposed to be. A thing is "whatever is a nature or some absolute essence having an exemplary reason in God."³⁶ Hence it is obvious why being is not a thing different from the essence. Being itself does not have an essence or a corresponding divine idea. Being is simply the act of an essence. But what does count as a true thing (*res*)? Henry's teaching on divine ideas provides us with some cues. For Henry there are divine ideas only of species and moreover only of species of substances, quantities, and qualities. Genera, numbers, relations, fictitious beings etc. have no corresponding ideas in the divine mind.³⁷ The fact that he denies

³⁴ Henry's three examples are influenced by a similar distinction that we can find in Thomas Aquinas's *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 21, a. 1. For this background see my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik*, pp. 210–215. After Henry's response to Giles in *Quodlibet* X, q. 7, Giles responded to Henry with questions 12 and 13 of the *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*. Here again he accuses Henry of proposing an unintelligible distinction. A short time after (in 1287), Henry replied in his eleventh *Quodlibet* (q. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 444^{VR}–445^{TX}), accusing Giles of misunderstanding the nature of the intentional distinction by failing to see that it is a distinction *sui generis*.

³⁵ As we will see later, Henry himself holds that a genus does not have real existence outside the soul (unlike species). See below p. 205.

³⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, ed. Badius, fol. 161^{rk}. For Henry's understanding of *res* see also my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik*, chapter IV.

³⁷ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VII, qq. 1 + 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1991), p. 18, 31–33. For this text see Theo Kobusch, "Heinrich von Gent und die neuplatonische Ideenlehre," in *Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale*, ed. Leo Benakis (Turnhout, 1997), pp. 197–208 at 205–208.

relations the status of a thing, because they do not correspond to an idea in the divine mind, is revealing. For relations, say the relation of similitude between me and my next door neighbor, can apparently be real without being things (*res*). In other words: not everything that is real is a thing (*res*). The intentional distinction is in this sense real (as opposed to merely mind-dependent) without being real as a distinction between two things.³⁸

It remains, however, to be seen how the distinction between essence and existence relates to the distinction between form or nature and subsistence. On the surface the two distinctions seem to refer to different things. We cannot assume, for instance, that a form is identical with an essence. This might be true for immaterial beings, but in material beings it is not the case. The essence of human being is not constituted by the soul alone but also involves the body.³⁹ Henry, however, has no scruples switching back and forth between form and essence when he discusses individuation. Maybe it is not the form alone that makes up the essence of a material object, but when a form is received in the appropriate matter, it is the form that finally gives the object its actual essence. In this respect the individuation of forms is identical with the individuation of essences. That form and essence are used almost interchangeably in Henry's discussion of individuation can also be gathered from his arguments for the unity of forms and for the accidentality of the principle of individuation, arguments that borrow heavily from Avicenna's theory of essence.⁴⁰

So maybe these two distinctions actually amount to the same thing. After all we are told that in both cases the elements involved differ 'intentionally'. Moreover, there is an obvious connection between the arguments against a real distinction between essence and existence and the arguments establishing that the intrinsic principle of individuation is not an added thing.⁴¹ And Henry himself says that we find a supposit

³⁸ According to Henry, the mistake of the proponents of the real distinction (like Giles of Rome) is that they do not see this difference and that they think everything that is not distinct from something else by a real difference is strictly identical with it. See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 441^{rQ}.

³⁹ See, for instance, Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 4.

⁴⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V, q. 8, ed. Badius, fol. 164^{rE-F}.

⁴¹ Compare also the third argument against the real addition of existence (see above nt. 27) and the argument in *Quodlibet* II, q. 8 ad 1, ed. R. Wielockx, pp. 54–55. Henry argues in the first instance that existence cannot be a thing because it does not fall under any of the ten categories (which he apparently considers as an exhaustive classification of things); in the second case he uses this same line of thought to show that that which causes something to be an individual form cannot be a thing.

when it is caused to exist in actuality. Moreover, for many medieval authors the term 'subsistence' denotes simply the act of existence proper to substances.⁴² But despite all this, Henry seems to draw a distinction between actual existence and subsistence. Describing the relationship between essence and actual existence he writes the following:

All other conditions [of the essence] are somewhat accidental to it [i.e., the essence]. And of such a sort are being in the soul or in the intellect as in a cognizer (*ut in cognoscente*) and being in a supposit existing outside the soul as in something subsisting (*ut in subsistente*). To this latter thing not only belongs (*accidit*) being of existence (*esse existentiae*), which it has in the supposit existing outside the soul, but to it also belongs in a certain way being in a supposit (*esse in supposito*).⁴³

This passage is a good example of Henry's endorsement of Avicenna's theory of essence. An essence, such as 'humanness' or 'horseness', is itself indifferent to existing in the mind or existing outside the mind, or to existing in a singular or being a universal etc. All these conditions are simply outside the essence of a human being or the essence of a horse.⁴⁴ What is important for our purposes, however, is that in the passage above Henry separates the condition of being in a supposit from the condition of actual existence. This would be surprising if he considers them as one and the same. Moreover, in some of the texts in which Henry defends the indifference of essences with respect to their subsequent conditions, he explicitly speaks about a twofold indifference (*duplex indifferentia*): one with respect to actual existence or non-existence, another with respect to existence as singular or as universal. Again, it would be hard to understand this if existence is the same as subsistence in a supposit.⁴⁵

⁴² This is, for instance, what Godfrey of Fontaines takes subsistence to be (according to John Wippel). See Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, p. 225.

⁴³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XI*, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 438^vQ. See also *Quodlibet II*, q. 8, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 51, where Henry distinguishes *subsistentia in supposito* and *existentia essentiae* by explaining that the former is a necessary requirement for the later.

⁴⁴ See also Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 9. On Avicenna's influence on Henry's understanding of essences see Pasquale Porro, "Universaux et *esse essentiae*: Avicenne, Henri de Gand et le 'Troisième Reich,'" *Cahiers de Philosophie de l'Université de Caen* 38–39 (2002), pp. 9–51.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 1, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 4, 32–42: "Quantum est ex ratione essentiae ut est essentia absolute, duplex est in ea indifferentia. Uno enim modo indifferens est ad esse actualis existentiae et ad non esse ... alio vero modo est indifferens ad esse universale et particulare." For the distinction between subsistence and existence see also Walter Hoeres, "Wesen und Dasein bei Heinrich von Gent und Duns Scotus," *Franziskanische Studien* 47 (1965), pp. 121–186 at 140.

So it is incorrect to say that for Henry individual things (and their forms) are individuated by their existence, although the actual existence outside the soul is intimately related to subsistence in a supposit. In the context of the quoted passage, Henry does not tell his readers why he is so keen on separating subsistence and (actual) existence. But the reason may simply be this: If objects are individual supposits only through their existence, what about individuals that no longer exist? What about the dead Plato or Socrates? In a certain sense they are still individuals (and supposits), but individuals that do not have actual existence anymore.

III. *Further Complications: Two Kinds of Being*

Henry is famous not only for defending an intentional distinction between essence and existence, but is equally notorious for distinguishing two kinds of being: being of actual existence (*esse actualis existentiae*) and being of essence (*esse essentiae*).⁴⁶ Distinguishing an object's essence from its existence might be a good thing to highlight the contingency of objects, but why does there have to be yet another kind of being? Does the talk of an essential being or being of essence not reintroduce the very reification of essences that the intentional distinction was meant to avoid?

Here is how Henry presents the two kinds of being in *Quodlibet I*, q. 9:

The first being belongs essentially (*essentialiter*) to the essence of a creature, though by way of participation (*participative*), insofar as the essence has a formal exemplar in God. And through this it falls under that being which is essentially common to the ten categories . . . And this kind of being is the being belonging to the definition of a thing (*esse rei definitivum*) . . . The second being is such that a creature does not have it from its own essence, but only from God, insofar as the creature is an effect of the divine will according to the exemplar of the thing in the divine mind.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Although this is sometimes claimed in the secondary literature on Henry of Ghent, Henry is by no means the first to use the expression *esse essentiae*. It can already be found in Roger Bacon's questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. See *Questiones supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis*, lib. VII, ed. Robert Steele (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi X, Oxford, 1930), p. 207; *Questiones altere supra libros prime philosophie*, lib. II, ed. Robert Steele (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi XI, Oxford, 1932), p. 47. The history of this expression has still to be written.

⁴⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, pp. 53–54. For the distinction between *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae* see also id., *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*),

What is important in this passage is the contrast between these two kinds of being: actual existence is something extrinsic to the essence of an object, something an object receives from its efficient cause (and ultimately from God as the first efficient cause), whereas the essential being is intrinsic to it. The origin of both kinds of being is in God, but the essential being is more immediately connected with the essence than is actual existence. This difference further highlights the accidentality of existence. But if actual existence is somewhat accidental, then it cannot be the object of any scientific knowledge. For knowledge is primarily concerned with what is essential to the object known.⁴⁸ This puts some new light on the dictum that knowledge is primarily of essences.

Other texts are even more explicit on the relations to God involved in the two kinds of being. In the third *Quodlibet*, Henry writes the following as a further clarification of essential being:

Such a being does not belong to anything unless there is an exemplary reason (*ratio exemplaris*) of it in the divine intellect through which it is capable of existing in extra-mental reality, so that as a thing has from a relation and respect (*ex relatione et respectu*) to the plan of God as to the efficient cause that it is a being in effect (*ens in effectu*), so it has from a relation and respect to the plan of God as to the exemplary form that it is a being by essence (*ens per essentiam*).⁴⁹

One has to be careful here to avoid misunderstanding. Neither existence nor essential being is a relation itself.⁵⁰ And when it is said that both forms of being result from a relation to the first cause, this should not be

art. XXI, q. 2, ed. Badius, fol. 124^{vk}; *ibid.*, q. 3, fol. 126^{re-vG}; *ibid.*, q. 4, fol. 127^{ro-vR}; *id.*, *Quodlibet III*, q. 2, ed. Badius, fol. 49^{ve}; *id.*, *Quodlibet III*, q. 9, ed. Badius, fol. 61^{ro}; *id.*, *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. R. Macken, p. 151, and many other texts.

⁴⁸ For the accidentality of actual existence see, for instance, Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, p. 54; *id.*, *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. R. Macken, p. 190; *id.*, *Quodlibet XI*, q. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 441^{rvQ}. For the view that *esse existentiae* is not the object of knowledge see *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXVI, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 157rd. Henry does of course not claim that actual existence is an *accidens*—this would be at odds with his rejection of the real distinction—but only that it behaves “in the way of an *accidens*” (*modum accidentis*).

⁴⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 9, ed. Badius, fol. 61^{ro}. The edition has *ad formam extra rem*, but that is almost certainly a misreading of *formam exemplarem*.

⁵⁰ There are occasional passages in Henry’s writing that seem to show that he takes being itself to be a relation. See, for instance, Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXVII, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 161^{vm}: “*Esse existentiae cuiuslibet creaturae non sit nisi esse quod est ad aliud se habere.*” However, this means only that existence is related to something else, but not that existence is a relation. For otherwise Henry should rather have said that existence *non sit nisi ad aliud esse*. For Henry’s theory of relations

understood in the sense that there is one relatum, the creature, and the other, God, and by means of the relations existing between them, the first receives being. This would make the creatures somewhat independent of the relation to God; but the creatures exist only as a result of the divine production, namely as the endpoint (*terminus*) of such a production. Thus without the relation existing in the first place there is nothing that could be related to God at all. The talk about being resulting from a relation to God simply means that creatures are dependent on their first cause because they are caused by God insofar as God is their formal and efficient cause. However, the two relations according to which the creatures are related to the first cause are not only distinct with respect to what they refer in God and to what they cause in the creatures, they also differ from each other insofar as the relation to God's ideas is eternal, whereas the relation to God as the first efficient cause is only temporal.⁵¹

As was already said, we should not imagine that there really exists a set of essences of which some have essential being and some also existential being, depending on their relation to God. In many places Henry make clear that he considers it wrong to think that essences are something absolutely prior in reality and that they receive, as subjects, being of whatever kind.⁵² This picture has only heuristic value; it follows our human way of capturing the ontological structure of a creature, for we first think of a thing's essence and then of its various modes of being.⁵³ Keeping this in mind, the reference to the formal exemplar in God, the divine ideas, indicates that one of the roles of essential being is to demarcate those essences that can possibly exist from those

see Mark G. Henninger, *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250–1325* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 40–58; Jos Decorte, “Relation and Substance in Henry of Ghent's Metaphysics,” in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel (Leuven, 2004), pp. 3–14, and Decorte's publications mentioned below in nt. 66.

⁵¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius, fol. 128^r; id., *Quodlibet XI*, q. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 449^r^G.

⁵² See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, pp. 49–50 and 57, where he denounces the proponents of the real distinction for committing this mistake.

⁵³ Similarly, I consider the many passages where Henry analyses creatures starting from the notion of *res* as passages aimed at a structural analysis of the different ontological features of creatures. See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 2, ed. Badius, fol. 154^r^D; id., *Quodlibet VII*, qq. 1 + 2, ed. G. Wilson, pp. 27, 59–28, 96; id., *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2, ed. Badius, fol. 124^v^K; id., *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIV, q. 2, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1991), p. 174. On these passages see my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik*, pp. 219–233 and 240–244.

that cannot exist and are pure figments of the mind.⁵⁴ Presumably the essences of goat-stags and unicorns—if it is even correct to talk about essences here—have no essential being. For this would indicate that goat-stags and unicorns are not only producible in principle (because they do not involve a contradiction), but also actually producible, because God would have decided that the actual world is a world in which goat-stags and unicorns can exist. The reference to God may sound odd here. Imagine that someone asks “Why do these animals exist in our present world and not those?”, and someone else responds “Because only the first have a corresponding idea in God.” Not everyone will be happy with such an answer and many people will wonder whether this counts as an answer at all. But that seems to be exactly Henry’s point: for things that involve no contradiction in themselves we cannot give a reason why they rather than other things have the capacity to exist, because that depends entirely on God, and is therefore unknowable to us in this life. This does not mean that it is up to God’s free will which essences the world exhibits and which not. For Henry, creatures and their essences are likenesses of God, and so are determined by God.⁵⁵ However, in our present state we have no cognitive access to God except by means of the created essences themselves. And this process of gaining knowledge of the divine will never lead us to a non-circular criterion for possible essences.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 8, ed. R. Macken, pp. 201,90–202,95: “Est autem ista participatio divini esse in essentia, esse essentiae, in quantum essentia illa exemplatum est divini esse secundum rationem causae formalis, quia per ipsum esse essentiae ut per actum sibi proprium essentialem habet id quod res est ex ratione sui generis, quod sit ens et natura et essentia proprie dicta, non solum figmentum.”

⁵⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, pp. 53–54 and id., *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. R. Macken, p. 151, where Henry makes the distinction between the *esse essentiae* as based on the creatures’ imitational similitude with the divine essence and the *esse existentiae* as grounded in God’s will. Notice that there is no contradiction involved when Henry sometimes says that *esse essentiae* derives from a relation to the ideas in God and sometimes claims that creatures and their essences are likenesses of God (or the divine essence). The ideas in God are nothing else than the divine essence under the aspect of its imitability. See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 2, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1983), pp. 28–29.

⁵⁶ For a more detailed account of Henry’s teaching on *possibilia* see Pasquale Porro, “Possibilità ed *esse essentia* in Enrico di Gand,” in *Henry of Ghent*, ed. W. Vanhamel, pp. 211–253 at 241–252; John F. Wippel, “The Existence of Nonexisting Possibilities According to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines,” *Review of Metaphysics* 34 (1981), pp. 729–758. It is necessary to add that Henry distinguishes here between two kinds of possibility: essences are possible not because they can receive

But at this point one might reiterate the question regarding the relationship between being and essences on the level of essences themselves: how do essences differ from essential being? It is hard to imagine that there could be a difference at all: Is it not through the same relationship to a divine idea that something is an essence and has essential being? In some texts, Henry therefore states that essence and essential being differ only rationally (*sola ratione*). The being of essence (*esse essentiae*) is so intimately connected to the essence itself that there is no more robust distinction possible.⁵⁷ But in *Summa* art. XXI, q. 4, Henry seems to be of a different opinion. There he explicitly speaks of an intentional distinction between essence and essential being.⁵⁸ Scholars have tried to explain this discrepancy by assuming a change of mind on Henry's part,⁵⁹ but for two reasons that is not entirely convincing. First, Henry goes on to describe the relationship between essence and essential being as a rational distinction even after the question in the *Summa*.⁶⁰ Second, article XXI, q. 4 of the *Summa* is written in close temporal proximity to the first *Quodlibet* and is full of cross-references to q. 9 of the latter, in which he defends the rational distinction between essence and essential being. The puzzle disappears when we become aware of the two different ways in which Henry uses the term 'essence' in these two sorts of texts. In the *Quodlibet* and texts emphasizing the rational distinction, 'essence' is taken to signify the essence as a whole including its essential being. A real essence, i.e., an essence that falls under one of the ten categories and that can really exist because it corresponds to a divine idea, is not distinct from its essential being. It is only conceptually distinguishable. But if we use 'essence' not to denote the essence as a whole but to denote the "thingness" (*res*) or "content" to which an idea may or may not correspond in the divine mind, then such an essence only forms part of a real essence as a whole. Here, essential being and the essence it qualifies

a form (for instance, a form that makes them actually existing), but rather insofar as they can be the endpoint of a (possible) production. For this distinction see especially Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. R. Macken, pp. 152–153.

⁵⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, p. 55.

⁵⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius, fol. 127^vQ.

⁵⁹ See, e.g., Gómez Caffarena, *Ser participado y ser subsistente*, pp. 69–71; Porro, "Possibilità ed *esse essentiae*", pp. 235–236.

⁶⁰ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XI*, q. 1 ed. Badius, fol. 419^vQ.

are more distinct, because together they make up the essence as a whole. And since in this sense the essential being is said to contract the essence to that which is actually possible, their distinctness must be of a different kind.⁶¹

IV. *Why Essential Being (esse essentiae)?*

For some people, Henry's talk about essential being sounds like the symptom of an overly baroque ontology. Why introduce kinds of being? Is not existence the only intelligible form of being? In the previous chapters we have already encountered one of Henry's motives for introducing essential being. We can imagine "essences" of things, but only some of them are actually capable of existing; essential being distinguishes those from the rest. Moreover, only of things that have this capacity of existing in reality can we give a true definition, for only these things can be objects of the intellect,⁶² the cognitive faculty through which we are able to form definitions. And a definition expresses what a thing "is".⁶³ So real essences must have some sort of being.

One of the worries is that the idea of essential being seems to lead to a sort of Platonism. Remember that for Henry the relationship between the divine ideas and the essence is eternal: does this not also mean that the essential being is a being that the essence has from eternity? But if something has such an eternal being, does it not then exist somewhere from eternity? Maybe in a separate realm of intelligibles? Some interpreters approach the *esse essentiae* by asking whether it is a sort of real being or a sort of mental being. In line with Avicenna, Henry insists that everything that exists exists either in the mind or in (extra-)mental reality. So the question is whether essential being is closer to the first or to the second kind of being. But as Pasquale Porro and others

⁶¹ In the passage where he allegedly applies the intentional distinction to the relationship between essence and essential being, Henry himself remarks on the different ways of talking about essence and essential being. See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius, fol. 127^{vp}. For more on this see my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik*, pp. 230–232.

⁶² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 3, ed. Badius, fol. 157^{vp}.

⁶³ There are various passages in which Henry identifies the *esse essentiae* with the being indicated in a definition. See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9, ed. Macken, pp. 53–54.

have argued, to ask these questions is to commit a category mistake. Essential being is not a diminished form of existence, but something entirely different. Henry himself does not get tired of insisting on this point.⁶⁴ Essences exist nowhere except in really existing objects or in the mind.

One might wonder whether Henry's account of possible beings is the only motive for his talk of essential being. In the following I want to argue that there is another, more fundamental one. To see this other motivation we have to go back to the issues discussed at the end of the preceding chapter. There we discovered that for Henry a creature is not only a composite insofar as it is composed out of essence and existence (and subsistence), but that we can also talk about a composition at the level of essences, a composition of a sort of "thingness" (*res*) and essential being. But what exactly moves Henry to consider the essences themselves as (intentional) composites? In recent scholarship on Henry of Ghent we can find two types of responses to this question. (1) For some interpreters, Henry introduced the doctrine of the two modes of being and the twofold composition of creatures to emphasize the divine simplicity. God is not only simple because God's essence is identical with God's existence (according to the traditional view), but also because God's essence is strictly identical with its essential being.⁶⁵ (2) For others, the aspect of dependence is key. According to Jos Decorte, Henry aims at replacing an Aristotelian ontology, which is basically a substance ontology, with an ontology of relations. The two modes of being, which a thing has only in relation to the divine, express the fundamental dependence creatures have to God and thus highlights Henry's relational account of objects.⁶⁶ Both explanations are plausible and can be supported by many passages

⁶⁴ See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 9, ed. Badius, fol. 60^{vo}. Porro, "Possibilità ed *esse essentiae*," pp. 204–205. The most prominent defender of a "realist" understanding of *esse essentiae* is John Wippel. See "The Existence of Nonexisting Possibilities," pp. 744–746.

⁶⁵ Porro, "Possibilità ed *esse essentiae*," p. 236. See, for instance, also Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXII, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, p. 80, 32–34: "A cuius simplicitate deficit omnis creatura, scilicet quia ipsa res quae ipsa est non est cuius esse, sed habet ab alio esse tam essentiae quam existentiae."

⁶⁶ See Jos Decorte, "Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent on God's Relation to the World," *Mediaevalia* 3 (1993), pp. 91–107 at 105–106; id., "'Modus' or 'res': Scotus' Criticism of Henry of Ghent's Conception of the Reality of a Real Relation," in *Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, Roma 9–11 marzo 1993*, ed. Leonardo Sileo (Rome, 1995), pp. 407–429 at 419–421 and 429; and id., "Relatio as *Modus Essendi*: The Origins of Henry of Ghent's Definition of Relation," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10 (2002), pp. 309–336 at 328.

in Henry's works. However, I consider them rather as theological explanations for Henry's compositional account of creatures. But there are also clearly philosophical reasons for why Henry considers essences themselves as composites, reasons which originate in Henry's understanding of the categories.

According to Henry, every being falling under one of the ten categories is composed of a *res praedicamenti* and a mode of being, a *ratio praedicamenti*.⁶⁷ At first sight, this may sound surprising: Do the ten categories not stand for ten general modes of being and thus for ten different *rationes praedicamenti*? But Henry does not think a mode of being alone makes for a complete categorical being. A substance is not 'being by itself' but a thing (*res*) having a certain kind of being, namely "being by itself" (*esse non in alio*); a quality is another kind of thing (*res*) having "being in something else" (*esse in alio*) etc.⁶⁸ Nor would a *res praedicamenti* on its own be enough to constitute a categorical being. Only the so-called three absolute categories (substance, quantity, and quality) are distinguished in terms of different *res praedicamenti*. Relations do not possess their own *res*, and all the other six forms of categorial being are various sorts of relations. A relation is "a thing" insofar as it is grounded in the *res praedicamenti* of its foundation. Henry advances a series of arguments for this claim. One of them goes like this: Let us assume that relations have their own "thing" (*res*) or "reality" in things they relate and that this *realitas* is different from the reality of a related thing. In this case, an object not related to something else—say, the white Socrates who is not related to the black Plato—cannot enter into a relation if there is not something new produced in it that was not there previously. There has to be some kind of transmutation, a real change; Socrates who is not similar to Plato cannot become similar without being transformed. For Henry, however, this conclusion is wrong. For imagine that a

⁶⁷ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V, q. 2, ed. Badius, fol. 154^{rd-vE}: "Res creata in simplicitate essentiae suae absque essentia actuali considerata rationem compositionis habet ex eo quod est et quo est, sive ex essentia in quantum est ipsa realitas dicta et ipso esse participato . . . Et secundum illa duo quae cadunt in creatura secundum esse quidditativum considerata, constituitur natura praedicamenti, et hoc ex illis duobus quae sunt res praedicamenti et ratio praedicamenti." For Henry's understanding of the categories cf. Henninger, *Relations*, pp. 48–52 and my "Simon of Faversham on Aristotle's *Categories* and the *Scientia Praedicamentorum*," in *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories*, ed. Lloyd A. Newton (Leiden, 2008), pp. 183–220 at 201–206.

⁶⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXII, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, pp. 80–81.

quality in Plato is changed so that he, Plato, becomes white. Socrates will immediately become similar to him, and this without any kind of real change (i.e., without the acquisition of a “thing”) in Socrates.⁶⁹ This argument shows that a too realist conception of relations would lead to the absurd consequence that things are constantly changing and in transformation because they constantly enter into relations with new objects.

The details of Henry’s teaching on relations do not have to occupy us here. I used the example of relations only to illustrate that each categorical being is a composite of a *ratio* and a *res praedicamenti*, although in the case of relations the latter is even borrowed from that categorical being on which the relation is founded. What is important here is that Henry connects his compositional account of categorical being with the essence/*esse essentiae* distinction: the *esse essentiae* is the *ratio praedicamenti*.⁷⁰ If this interpretation is correct, one of the philosophical motives for Henry’s introduction of essential being lies in his account of the categories and what falls under them.

V. The General Character of Henry’s Ontology and its Reception

For Henry creatures are complex things. They are complex not because they are composed out of many different things nor because they only appear to us as complex, but because they have an intrinsic ontological structure below the level of a real composition.⁷¹ An individual substance, a human being, for instance, is composed out of a *res* (which accounts primarily for what a human being is), and a series of ‘intentions’ added to it: essential being, being in a supposit, existence and maybe others. The *res* itself can be further analysed in term of the intentions that

⁶⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VII*, qq. 1 + 2, ed. G. Wilson, pp. 24,98–25,9: “Si relatio poneret propriam realitatem a realitate sui fundamenti in suo subiecto relato, tunc de se non relatum aliqua relatione, puta similitudine, quia nullum habet in se respectu alicuius alterius, puta Sortes albus in respectu ad Platonem nigrum, non fieret relatum ad illud similitudine quam haberet in se de novo et prius non habuit, nisi quia res aliqua de novo facta est in eo, quae prius in eo non fuit. Hoc autem non est possibile fieri in aliquo sine propria sui transmutatione. Sortes ergo similis Platoni non posset fieri similis eidem sine sua transmutatione reali. Consequens falsum est, quia Platone transmutato ..., ut de nigro fiat albus, statim Sortes sine omni sua transmutatione de novo factus est similis Platoni.”

⁷⁰ See, e.g., the text in nt. 67 above. For more on this see my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik*, pp. 233–239.

⁷¹ On this kind of composition see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 12.

make it up: in our case, in the intentions 'animal', 'rational' etc. Such an analysis of objects in terms of their intentional composition characterizes the metaphysician's point of view.⁷²

Henry's choice of the term 'intention' (*intentio*) might not have been so fortunate. *Intentio* is sometimes used as a synonym for *ratio*, which, when used in contrast with the term *res*, often simply means 'concept' or that aspect of a thing that has been captured by a concept, whereas for Henry the *intentio* is clearly more than a mere concept or its content. For each of the intentions corresponds to something distinct *ex parte rei*; or to be more precise: to each intention corresponds something *ex parte rei intellectae et conceptae*, because without an intellect capable of grasping the various ontological aspects of a thing there would be no such intentions.⁷³ This explains why Henry says that every *intentio* is also a *ratio*, but not every *ratio* is an *intentio*, for it is not necessary that *rationes* correspond to a distinction *ex parte rei*.⁷⁴

At this point someone might object and point to Henry's views regarding the distinction between species and genus. For Henry (ultimate) species have a natural unity, independent of the human mind, whereas a genus has only unity through the mind.⁷⁵ In other words: species seem to be truly real, but a genus does not. If the intentional analysis of an object leads to intentions like 'animal' or 'substance' etc., which are intentions corresponding to genera, then it looks as if it leads to something to which nothing corresponds *ex parte rei*. Note however that Henry's remarks about the unity of species and genus do not translate into statements about their reality. Ultimate species have a special sort of

⁷² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 4, ed. Badius, fol. 91^{rB}. Henry himself calls such an analysis a "resolution" (*resolutio*); see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 7, ed. R. Macken, p. 171. In the latter text Henry also gives some indications as to how such a *resolutio* is supposed to work.

⁷³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXVIII, q. 4, ed. Badius, fol. 168^{rX}. See also *ibid.*, art. XXVII, q. 1, ad 5, ed. Badius, fols. 161^{vM}–162^{vR}; *id.*, *Quodlibet V*, q. 6; *ibid.*, q. 12, ed. Badius, fol. 171^{rXY}. See also Hoeres, "Wesen und Dasein," pp. 132–133; Porro, "Possibilità ed *esse essentiae*," pp. 217–219.

⁷⁴ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 12, ed. Badius, fol. 171^{rV}: "Quaecumque differunt intentione, differunt ratione, non e converso. Propter quod frequenter intentio ratio appellatur."

⁷⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 8, ed. Badius, fol. 164^{rE}. The passage in question was later quoted word by word by William of Ockham in *Ordinatio I*, dist. 2, q. 7, ed. Stephen Brown and Gedeon Gál (*Opera Theologica II*, St. Bonaventure, NY, 1970), pp. 226–227. Ockham's modern editors, however, have not recognized the author of the quote and attributed it to Thomas Aquinas (without being able to point to an exact passage).

unity, because they cannot be further divided into subspecies, whereas a genus always has something under it. To capture this difference Henry uses the difference between natural and conceptual unity.⁷⁶ But it does not follow that the generic features of an object are therefore unreal. On the contrary, as Henry's examples for the intentional distinction and in particular his favorite example of the distinction between animal and rational show, he considers genera as real (although, of course, not as things).

Intentions and the intentional distinction thus track the internal ontological structure of an object.⁷⁷ Yet, given the number of things that Henry considers as intentionally distinct, one wonders whether there are not various subspecies of intentional distinctions.⁷⁸ When Henry argues for an intentional distinction between essence and essential being, he remarks himself that these differ less than essence and existence.⁷⁹ In question 6 of his fifth *Quodlibet*, Henry consequently distinguishes six degrees of the intentional distinction. The highest degree of intentional distinctness can be found where that which is captured in one intention is not captured in another intention (and where there is no overlap), such as in the case of the intention 'rational' and the intention 'vegetative'; lower degrees of distinctness can be found in the opposite cases, of which Henry list four separate ones.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ For we cannot find in nature beings that are instantiations of genera but not of species.

⁷⁷ That, according to Henry, the intentions and the intentional distinction deal, in a certain sense, with really existing differences (without dealing with differences among things), can also be gathered from passages where Henry approaches the intentional distinction to the real distinction. See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXVII, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 162^{rN}: "... et sic quodammodo re differunt essentia creaturae et esse eius ..." But only *quodammodo*! For further discussion of the differences between *res*, *intentio*, and *ratio* see Roland J. Teske, "Distinctions in the Metaphysics of Henry of Ghent," *Traditio* 61 (2006), pp. 227–245; Hoeres, "Wesen und Dasein."

⁷⁸ On the general importance of the intentional distinction in Henry's philosophy see Raymond Macken, "Les diverses applications de la distinction intentionnelle chez Henri de Gand," in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Akten des VI. internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale*, 29. August–3. September 1977 in Bonn, ed. Wolfgang Kluxen et al. (Berlin/New York, 1981), pp. 769–776.

⁷⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius, fol. 127^{vP}.

⁸⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, ed. Badius, fol. 161^{rV}. See also Teske, "Distinctions," pp. 238–239; Hoeres, "Wesen und Dasein," pp. 134–136.

Compared with that of Thomas Aquinas, Henry's ontology strikes us as very different. But is his ontology original? And what did his contemporaries and successors think of it? I doubt that Henry would have considered his teaching with regard to the main issues discussed here, individuation, being, and essence, as very original. In all these topics Henry makes it look as if he is merely developing ideas from Avicenna. Although Henry does not acknowledge Avicenna for considering subsistence as the principle of individuation, he nevertheless pictures his own account of individuation as an explanation of what Avicenna had in mind when he calls the individuating principle an "accident" and a "merely adventitious item" (*adventitium tantum*).⁸¹ Henry's account of individuation is unthinkable without Avicenna's theory of essence. Modern interpreters agree that the idea of an intentional distinction is also tributary to Avicenna. The terminology is directly lifted from the famous chapter 5 of the first book of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*.⁸² From the same key text, where Avicenna also talks about a being proper to a thing (*proprium esse*), a being that is different from existential being, Henry derives the idea of an essential being (*esse essentiae*).⁸³ And presumably Henry would also call Avicenna one of his allies regarding his conception of the categories.⁸⁴ Moreover, next to Boethius, Avicenna is one of the major sources for the idea of distinguishing essence and existence.⁸⁵

If Henry is ultimately not the inventor of all the various philosophical theories presented in this contribution, he is at least their most prominent proponent and defender. His ontological views exercised an enormous influence in the late 13th and early 14th centuries. This is hardly surprising given the energy with which medieval philosophers discussed the very questions Henry tried to answer. Even when later

⁸¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 8 where Avicenna is omnipresent.

⁸² *Liber de prima philosophia*, lib. I, chapter 5, ed. Simone van Riet (Leuven, 1971), p. 34.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35. See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 4, fol. 127^{rO-vP} for the identification of Avicenna's *esse proprium* with Henry's *esse essentiae*. For Henry's Avicennian background see also Porro, "Universaux et *esse essentiae*."

⁸⁴ See my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik*, pp. 233–239.

⁸⁵ There is of course the question whether Henry interpreted Avicenna correctly. This does not have to occupy us here. But given Avicenna's importance regarding the issues mentioned, the debate Henry's ontological views triggered also show elements of a debate about the correct interpretation of Avicenna's ontology.

authors disagreed with Henry, they often used considerable effort to describe the view against which they would advance their arguments.⁸⁶

And indeed, most of the reactions to Henry of Ghent's ontology were critical. Notorious is Henry's debate with Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines during the years 1286–1287 when all three taught at the University of Paris.⁸⁷ Giles and Godfrey criticized all aspects of Henry's ontology and defended very different views in response to them. There is almost no master at the University of Paris or Oxford in the late 13th century who would not engage with Henry's views in one way or another.⁸⁸ Particularly hard to swallow for Henry's contemporaries were Henry's intentional distinction and his account of *esse essentiae*. However, authors who reacted to Henry's teachings cannot simply be divided into those who defended his views and those who rejected them. Henry's positive influence can often also be detected in authors who oppose him. One good example is John Duns Scotus. Scotus rejects Henry's *esse essentiae* and Henry's account of the categories,⁸⁹ as well as his account of individuation—or at least what he takes it to be.⁹⁰ But one of Scotus's most original contribution to philosophy, the idea of a formal distinction, shows clear similarities with Henry's intentional

⁸⁶ For the debate about individuation see my "The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation"; Ruedi Imbach's list of authors involved in the debate over the distinction between being and essence also includes many who are influenced (either positively or negatively) by Henry. See "Gravis iactura verae doctrinae: Prolegomena zu einer Interpretation der Schrift *De ente et essentia* Dietrichs von Freiberg O.P.," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 26 (1979), pp. 369–425 at 377–386.

⁸⁷ See the literature in nt. 2 above.

⁸⁸ For a general survey of Henry's influence see Pasquale Porro, "An Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent," in *Henry of Ghent*, ed. W. Vanhamel, pp. 373–403. For more reactions to Henry's ontology see Francis E. Kelley, "Two Early English Thomists: Thomas Sutton and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent," *The Thomist* 45 (1981), pp. 345–387. Raymond Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo* (Leuven, 1979), vol. 2, pp. 1133–1209 contains an impressive repertory of both abbreviations of Henry's works and of works composed to attack Henry's teachings. A survey of Henry's influence on theologians at Oxford can be found in Jeremy I. Catto, "Theology and Theologians 1220–1320," in *The History of the University of Oxford. Vol. I: The Early Oxford Schools*, ed. J.I. Catto (Oxford, 1984), pp. 471–517, esp. 501–513.

⁸⁹ For his criticism of *esse essentiae* see, e.g., *Ordinatio II*, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 61, *Opera omnia* VII, ed. Vaticana, p. 418. On Scotus's response to Henry's teaching on categories see Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: an Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Leiden, 2002); id., "Scotus's Realist Conception of the Categories: His Legacy to Late Medieval Debates," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), pp. 63–110.

⁹⁰ See nt. 17 above.

distinction.⁹¹ I am convinced that greater familiarity with Henry's philosophical positions will enable us in the future to evaluate much better the profound influence he exercised on several generations of philosophers and theologians.

⁹¹ This has been shown, already some time ago, in Hoeres, "Wesen und Dasein."

B. EPISTEMOLOGY

HENRY OF GHENT'S EPISTEMOLOGY

STEVEN P. MARRONE

Among historians of medieval thought, Henry of Ghent is commonly taken as the epitome of a high-medieval Augustinian. Nowhere is this truer than with regard to his epistemology. Henry's account of human knowledge represents for many scholars the plainest embodiment of Augustine's doctrine of divine illumination in the technical language of thirteenth-century Scholasticism. From this perspective, Henry's works provide the *locus classicus* for the defense of the presumption that the human mind perceives the truth only when bathed in an intelligible light streaming from God, himself. Attention to Henry's writings reveals, however, that he was also a close reader of Aristotle, indeed a determined exponent of Aristotelian criteria for human cognition. A full participant in the effort, stretching from Robert Grosseteste in the early thirteenth century to John Duns Scotus at the beginning of the fourteenth, to understand Aristotle's epistemology and extract from it a theory capable of establishing university discourse on a truly apodictic or "scientific" basis, he was a major force in the "Aristotelianizing" of much of scholastic intellectual activity in the later thirteenth century. Viewed this way, Henry's theory of knowledge can be thought of as taking the first decisive steps outside Dominican circles influenced by Thomas Aquinas to undermine the place of Augustinian illumination in normal human cognition.

In fact, both points of view are valid. That is to say that each offers a defensible interpretation, while at the same time revealing only part of the truth. Simply put, Henry's epistemology managed a remarkable fusion of what are typically taken as Augustinianizing and Aristotelianizing themes. And although no major thinker following Henry reproduced precisely his amalgam of these two competing tendencies, Henry's mixture was a potent catalyst for the more stable epistemological stances that established themselves in the fourteenth century. Comprehending Henry, therefore, marks an important first step in coming to terms with late medieval theories of knowledge of all stripes. The primary complication—in addition to the fact that Henry combined Augustinianizing and Aristotelianizing inclinations—arises from the fact that Henry's

thought was also profoundly developmental. As much as any other medieval thinker, he changed and deepened his understanding of philosophical issues over the course of his career. A salient principle of the following presentation is the insistence that one must pay attention to chronology when giving an account of most aspects of his thought. In the case of epistemology, it is necessary at minimum to separate the position advanced in his earliest works from a somewhat different formulation he managed to articulate in his mature years.

From the very beginning of Henry's career as theologian comes his single most focused statement of a theory of knowledge. It appears in the first articles of his massive *Summa of Ordinary Questions*, put into final form only progressively over the course of nearly the entirety of his long magisterium.¹ These early articles received their present redaction by the year of Henry's induction, or "inception," into his theological professorship at Paris in 1276. Befitting their place at the start of an exposition of the whole discipline of theology, they were inspired by a concern to show to what extent the discipline could be treated as a "science." That, in turn, demanded precise consideration of the levels of cognitive certitude available to the human mind. The epistemological schema laid out as a result surely represents the culmination of many years thinking about the subject and lecturing on it while Henry was a student, and perhaps master, in arts and then bachelor of—we would say graduate student in—theology. Because of their incisiveness of presentation and their critical placement at the head of all of Henry's published work, these articles are often read together as a comprehensive treatise on epistemology and taken to constitute Henry's definitive statement on the matter. The warning given above about the developmental character of Henry's work should be sufficient to keep us from falling into a similar error. All the same, in this, his first pronouncement on human cognition, Henry lays out the fundamental considerations that would characterize his approach throughout his career. Their careful exposition provides the indispensable foundation for appreciating even Henry's later revisions to his theory of knowledge.

¹ Most citations here to Henry's *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum* will be to the on-going critical edition of all of Henry's works issuing from the University of Leuven. Whenever possible, references will be to the volumes in the Leuven series. Wherever that is not possible, however, the *Summa* will be cited from the two-volume Paris edition of 1520 (reproduced in the publication from St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953). References to this latter work will be made to *Summa*, followed by volume and folio numbers.

Like all scholastics of the thirteenth century, Henry opened his discussion of knowledge with consideration of the meaning of "truth." Since in Aristotelian terms, "science" was comprised of the set of assertions that could be made about any subject with the highest degree of formal certitude, the sort of truth most fully relevant to an investigation of the scientific status of a discipline was, strictly speaking, that attaching to complex forms of cognition. In the end, determining truth was to make a judgment about the reliability of a proposition. Product of the thirteenth-century university curriculum in arts, Henry recognized that this was so. Still, for most scholastic purposes, judging a proposition as true meant evaluating the appropriateness of its conjunction of terms. This depended in the end on making a decision about the exact contours of each term's meaning. Reliant on a tradition in the Latin world as old as Augustine, Henry therefore quickly turned his attention to a sort of "truth" that attached to simple objects of mind. Most broadly speaking, he insisted, truth thus pointed to precisely that aspect of any thing by which it was made an object of understanding. "The truth of a thing is [just] that by which it is known and understood—that is, that [aspect] by which it is a proper object of intellect."²

Of course, for this designation to be turned to use, it had to be given formal content. In Henry's case, that again entailed drawing on a tradition associated at least since the days of Anselm, in the late eleventh century, with Augustine. More precisely, Henry explained, a thing should be characterized as true "insofar as it contains all that is set forth in the exemplar according to which it has been fashioned."³ As had been the case for Augustine, therefore, and for all other Platonists as well, truth was for Henry a measure of how closely a thing approximated a standard or ideal towards which it was directed and from which it had derived. Truth thus represented at the same time an assessment of the content of a thing—even a simple existing object—and a reckoning of its relation to something else. It was because, of all natural powers, mind or intellect alone was capable of making such an assessment and doing such a reckoning, that truth just happened to pick out the specific aspect of a thing by which it was an intelligible object.

² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. II, q. 6, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 235, 27–28.

³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 38, 199–201: "[Quaelibet res potest considerari] in quantum in esse suo habet quod de ea exemplar ad quod est repraesentat. Sic convenit ei intentio veri".

On this spare theoretical platform, Henry erected the entire edifice of his theory of knowledge. The goal of cognition was to seize the intellectual object as it actually was without falling into error or being deceived. Knowledge in the broadest sense reduced in short to certain perception of what was objectively true.⁴ That was so from beginning to end, from the grasping of a simple intelligible content to judgment of the complex relations of the terms of a proposition. It was in fact upon the reliability of the intellection of simple objects that the worth of all more complex forms of cognition would have to rest. Henry was aware, of course, that there was a philosophical tradition already well established in his day which maintained that real knowledge, freedom from error and deception, certain possession of the truth, were possible for the human intellect only with the assistance of an infusion of divine intelligible light. That assumption lay at the heart of the Augustinian doctrine of illumination mentioned at the outset above. Given Henry's formal characterization of truth as the measure of an object's approximation to an exemplary ideal, one might easily imagine that he would adopt that position as his own. Instead, he took great pains to distance himself from it.

As he put it, there were those who would say "that nothing of the truth can be known by any human being relying on its natural powers alone, without a special divine illumination entailing the infusion of a supernatural [cognitive] light. And they believe this to be the view of Augustine."⁵ In Henry's eyes, their claim was not only wrong about Augustine; it was also in itself philosophically indefensible. Laying such restrictions on human cognition was no less than an offense to the dignity of the rational soul. One should, to the contrary, be absolutely confident that, reliant only on its natural powers, and absent any special divine illumination, every human intellect could acquire at least some valid knowledge.⁶ Indeed, it would appear that Henry thought at the most primitive level true knowledge came to the mind almost naturally, as if by necessity upon the activation of its powers.

⁴ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 10, 93–94: "Dicendum quod scire large accepto ad omnem notitiam certam qua cognoscitur res sicut est absque omni fallacia et deceptione".

⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 32, 68–71: "Quidam [dicunt] . . . quod nullum verum contingit sciri ab homine ex puris naturalibus, sine speciali illustratione diuina lumine aliquo supernaturali infuso. Et credunt hoc esse de mente Augustini . . .".

⁶ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 35, 118–120.

To sustain his view, Henry sketched out a hierarchy of knowing, from lowest to highest, from incomplete to full, from least certain to most secure. It was at the lower reaches that human intellect's reliance on itself was absolute. As has been shown above, all knowledge, for Henry, entailed the mind's seizing an object under the attribute of its truth. How fully that attribute was grasped, however, made all the difference in the world. Henry's own words make the point in no uncertain terms: "It is one thing to know of an object that which is true about it, and quite another to know its truth. By the first type of knowledge the thing is perceived, but only by the second is laid hold of its truth."⁷ At the very initial stages of cognition, therefore, Henry introduced a fundamental distinction between knowing an object as true and knowing the truth attaching to it, between grasping the *verum* and perceiving *veritas*. As the statement quoted just above already indicates, Henry's notion of cognition at the level of knowing "the true" satisfied itself with in effect a diminished version of his definition of truth, tying it to no more than just the intellectual apprehension of an objective content. The knowledge it represented remained for him, throughout his career, decidedly inferior, adequate perhaps for daily human activity but unworthy of the deliberations of the scholar. Perhaps for that reason, he never quite managed—or even much bothered in the early articles of the *Summa*—to express with precision exactly what he thought that sort of cognition entailed.

The most he did was to reveal from the outset that there were two different, though not necessarily incompatible, approaches one might take to distinguishing knowledge of the true from all higher forms that followed. The first emphasized the bare content of the intelligible object. From that perspective, knowledge of the true could be said to reveal to the mind what object it confronted while falling short of giving access to the object's full "whatness." In Henry's Latin, the distinction lay between knowing "id quod res est" and knowing of it "quid sit."⁸ At play was presumably something like Aristotle's dichotomy between nominal knowledge of a thing and knowledge of its essence—or what the scholastics liked to call its "quiddity," the precise formal arrangements that made a

⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 36, 144–146: "Aliud tamen est scire de creatura id quod verum est in ea; et aliud est scire eius veritatem: ut alia sit cognitio qua cognoscitur res; alia qua cognoscitur veritas eius".

⁸ See the extended description in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 36, 155–39, 224.

thing what it was. Henry glossed the distinction by adding that knowledge of the true presented the object “simply” (*simpliciter*) to the mind, the higher knowledge—that is, of the truth—rendering the cognitive content more “distinctively” (*discretive*) or “distinctly” (*distinctive*).⁹ In any case, it was to be stressed that at the lower level—knowing only “the true”—intellect remained closely bound to the perceptual ingredients already registered by the senses. As he said, “In such understanding our intellect follows the senses completely, nor is anything conceived in the intellect that wasn’t already present in sensation.”¹⁰ At times he even hazarded to call such cognition a “fantastical understanding” (*intellectus phantasticus*) in obvious reference to the inner-sense power, imagination or “phantasia.”¹¹

When it came to the second approach, Henry looked more to the process involved in the act of intellection. Here he introduced a phrase he would employ continuously throughout his whole career to designate this first and lowest kind of intellection, noting that in it mind performed merely as a “simple understanding” (*simplex intelligentia*). Moving beyond knowledge of the true to that of truth required a greater effort. In that case, intellect had to bring to bear the complicated mental processes of compounding and dividing (*intelligentia componens et dividens*).¹² It is clear that in this regard Henry did not mean to imply so much complexity as in the authentically compound process of joining or dividing terms to formulate a proposition. Rather than such formal, logical complexity, he intended instead something more noetic or psychological. In passing from knowing the true to knowing the truth, intellect had to stretch beyond merely registering what had already been impressed upon the senses and reflect upon what it knew so as to make a decision about it. The crucial word here was “judgment” (*iudicium*).¹³ A mental judgment—foreign to Aristotle’s notion of simple cognition but always present in any knowledge by Augustine’s terms—was requisite for all knowledge above the absolutely lowest reception of intelligible content.

⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 8, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 71, 38–51.

¹⁰ Refer to the passage cited above, n. 8.

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 145^{rN}.

¹² The phrases appear already in the passage cited above, n. 8.

¹³ Again, it can be found already in the passage cited in n. 8.

Whatever sense one can draw from these descriptions of knowing "the true" in Henry's early work, it was only later, in his middle years, that he returned to them in earnest, making good on the considerable potential they held for integrating Aristotle's epistemology more fully into his own. For the time being, they stood more as a marker for some sort of incomplete intellection the serious mind should hasten to leave behind. Meanwhile, Henry's real interest, already here at the start, bore on the second stage of knowledge and beyond. That was where intellect began to know not merely an object as intelligible content but that about the object that was its truth. Here, for the first time, Henry could exploit the full implications of his original definition of truth. While till now he had ignored that part of the definition involving comparison to a standard and appealing, beyond the object alone, to the venerable Platonic notion of an exemplar, from this point on these as-yet dormant aspects became intensely relevant.

Here, too, human cognition began to take on real value. In the closest Henry came to a technical distinction fitted to his entire hierarchy of ways of knowing, the early articles of the *Summa* appear consistently to discriminate between knowing in the broadest sense (*scire large*) and knowing strict and proper (*proprie scire*). All knowledge, both complex and simple, and including the rudimentary grasping of "the true," fell under the former rubric, while to satisfy the terms of the latter, the conditions of intellection—again indifferently simple or complex—had to pass over to Henry's second stage, whereby "truth" itself was perceived.¹⁴ In a fundamental sense, then, the line between knowing the true and knowing truth marked for Henry the threshold where scientific knowledge—actual "scientia"—began. Of course, this was still "science" more loosely regarded than Aristotle's tight restriction to a body of demonstrated propositions, for it presumably included non-demonstrated propositional knowledge as well as a newly deepened understanding of simple terms. But by moving the mind to the point of registering not merely an object but also an objective truth, this cognition, even if still of simple content, provided the basis at last for all that Aristotle demanded for the status "scientific."

¹⁴ For *scire large*, see the quotation given above, n. 4. *Proprie scire* appears at Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 39, 221–222, where Henry speaks of the "[modus] sciendi et cognoscendi aliquid per intellectum quo scitur veritas rei, quod est proprie scire ..."

From what might be thought of as the subjective perspective of intellect, knowledge in this proper if still only loosely scientific sense added alongside the freedom from error or deception Henry had associated with knowledge at its most basic—the *scire large* entailing perhaps no more than knowing “the true”—the additional benefit of allowing mind to set aside all doubt.¹⁵ That constituted an appreciable step along the path to greater certitude. More important for our present concerns, however, were the formal dimensions of the knowledge in itself. Here the notion of exemplar at last began to make its mark. If this sort of cognition were to manifest the truth, it had to attend assiduously to the terms of truth’s definition. And for Henry, that meant revealing how closely the object corresponded to the prescriptions an exemplar set forth.¹⁶ Simply put, in knowing truth the mind had to make a comparison of two intelligible contents, that of object alone but also that of some exemplary form.

One might guess that at this point Henry would immediately turn to the language of Augustinian illumination. Surprisingly, and most significantly for his place in the history of scholastic thought, that is not what he did. Instead, he insisted that there were two exemplars relevant to the case at hand. One was, in accordance with the tradition established by Augustine’s version of Plato’s theory of mind, the ideal reason of the thing in the divine intellect. The other was, in line with a more Aristotelianizing noetics, the intelligible species of the thing residing in the perceiving mind, a causal effect of the object’s action on the intellect and the means by which it was known.¹⁷ Because there were these two exemplars, there were, as Henry put it, two kinds of truth (*duplex veritas*) and two ways truth could be known (*duplex modus sciendi veritatem*).¹⁸ For yet a second time recourse to an Augustinian paradigm of epistemology was set aside in deference to an account of knowledge reliant solely on intellect’s natural powers.

¹⁵ That appears to be the significance of the difference between Henry’s description of *scire large* in the passage quoted in n. 4 above, and his words in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. II, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 202, 40–41 concerning the first level of knowing the truth, where he adds the comment that of this higher sort of cognition “nequaquam de ea dubitare possumus.”

¹⁶ Refer to n. 3, above.

¹⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 41, 260–43, 281.

¹⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 45, 329–330: “Sic ergo patet quod duplex est veritas et duplex modus sciendi veritatem”.

As Henry explained the process, the mind, looking back over the intelligible species or "exemplar" that had been generated in the course of its grasping the object at the primary level of knowing "the true," proceeded to knowing the "truth" of the object by "forming in itself a mental concept of the thing in conformity with the intelligible exemplar."¹⁹ When turning to this intelligible species or exemplar, the intellect—it was important to note—did not gaze upon it as itself an object known which subsequently suggested to the mind the contours of a third element, the thing in external reality. That was how the eyes made use of a portrait of someone painted on a wall as a way of coming to know that person. Instead, the species itself remained nothing more than a means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*) resting in the knower but never directly apprehended—the way, Henry said, sensible species functioned in sensation.²⁰ Technically speaking such a means of knowing was a pure formality (*esse formale*) activating the intellectual power of the mind to grasp an external object.²¹ It never comprised, in other words, its own objective content. When used in this reflexive way, it did, however, enable something more than the rudely transparent conveyance of mind to object at work in knowledge of the true. In knowing "truth" the intellect somehow drew upon the species to fashion a more revealing and richer "concept" of the object, which it then deposited in itself as, again in Henry's technical language, a "mental word" (*verbum mentis*).²²

The account of knowledge laid out in the opening articles of the *Summa* never delved any more deeply into the mechanics, either epistemic or noetic, of the procedure leading to this first-level apprehension of truth. Since the formal definition of truth fastened upon the object as containing that which was represented by its exemplar, grasping such truth presumably entailed at minimum the mind's comparing object and exemplar so as to measure how well one stood up against the other. Indeed, strictly speaking, it would seem to be the object that would have

¹⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 41, 260–42, 263.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXIV, q. 5, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1991), p. 205, 2–4.

²² For example, Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I, q. 5, ad 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 131, 162–165: "Species enim universalis recepta ... movet [intellectum] ... tanquam ratio concipiendi verbum mentis in quo speculatur notitiam veritatis, ut dictum est supra quaestione secunda ...".

to be judged by the standard of the exemplar. Suffice it to say that the early Henry did not remotely manage to explain how his call for forming a mental word conforming to the cognitive exemplar—the intelligible species—worked to promote this goal. There is even reason to believe that at this point in his career Henry could not have provided such an explanation. The heart of the problem almost certainly rested with the ambiguous status of the intelligible species itself. As pure means of knowing in the Aristotelianizing theory of mind from which Henry borrowed it, it was ill-suited to being employed as one term in an act of comparison. By mid-career, he confronted the difficulty head-on by simply expunging intelligible species from his theory of mind—and thus his theory of knowledge—altogether.²³

Henry went on to comment that this way of knowing the truth was what Aristotle had in mind as the absolutely natural basis for the scientific understanding of natural things, the formal principles for which were laid down at the outset of his *Metaphysics* and the end of his *Posterior Analytics*. Equally fascinating is the insistence that this was by and large what Augustine was thinking of in many of his references to the normal business of human intellection.²⁴ In short, this was an account of scientific cognition valid for both pagan and Christian philosophical traditions. What it was not, was perfect or even the most that could be desired in the world of sin. For all its freedom from error and immunity to doubt, compared to the sort of knowledge of the truth that remained to be described, it was deficient in clarity. Only at the second level of “knowing strictly and properly”—still not yet the science narrowly speaking of demonstrated propositions—did mind attain full access to the simple truth (*aperta veritatis visio*). Only there would it achieve an intellectual vision in the intellectual light comparable in degree of lucidity to visual perception in the light of the sun.²⁵ In fact, perhaps intentionally calling to mind his earlier disparagement of knowing the true as “fantastical

²³ Consult Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 22–23; and more importantly Theophil Nys, *De werking van het menselijk verstand volgens Hendrik van Gent* (Leuven, 1949)—in a Latin abbreviation as *De psychologia cognitionis humanae secundum Henricum Gandavensem* (Rome, 1949).

²⁴ The comment about both Aristotle and Augustine comes in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 42, 263–43, 281.

²⁵ For these remarks about clarity, refer to the second passage cited above, n. 15.

understanding," Henry sometimes designated his first level of knowledge of *scire proprie* as in all candor a "fantastic knowledge of the truth" (*veritatis notitia phantastica*).²⁶

For its second, higher and more enviable sort of knowledge of the truth, the mind turned to the other of the two exemplars relevant to the definition of an object's truth, the ideal reason or divine idea. Still keeping to the loose notion of scientific knowledge as inclusive of the simple understanding preliminary to demonstration of propositions comprising "science" in the strictest sense, Henry called this second-level apprehension of the truth "certain science" (*certa scientia*) or "perfect science" (*perfecta scientia*), the highest level of cognition that the wayfarer could hope for short of mystical revelation.²⁷ In what he clearly intended as a technical designation of the sort of truth it made available to the intellect, Henry insisted that only at this point did the mind's object rise to the status of "pure truth" (*sincera veritas*). To his ears the phrase was immediately evocative of Augustine.²⁸ And indeed here is where Henry's epistemology first entered the territory customarily associated with Augustinian illumination. At long last, having already covered two entire stages of cognition that counted as true knowledge, adequate to the demands of "*scire large*," Henry finally drew into human intellectual processes that "special illumination" (*specialis illustratio divina*) he had mentioned earlier but so far kept at bay.²⁹

It was, of course, just because the ideal reasons of things resided exclusively in the mind of God, that any knowledge formally implicating them in the business of cognition automatically entailed a divine intervention beyond the ubiquitous and ordinary workings of general providence. God had, himself, actively to intrude in knowing of this sort, voluntarily, as Henry insisted, encroaching on procedures he had otherwise ordained as sufficient for the natural workings of intellection.³⁰ Once he did so, he

²⁶ For example, Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 46, 355–356.

²⁷ See "*certa scientia*" in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 45, 323, and "*perfecta scientia*" in *ibid.*, art. I, q. 4, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 103, 268.

²⁸ In Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 43, 294–299, Henry misquoted Augustine's reference in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 9, to the "*sinceritas veritatis*" as making use of his own preferred phrase, "*sincera veritas*."

²⁹ See the passage quoted above, n. 5.

³⁰ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 62, 639–661.

made possible a knowledge of the truth—even simple truth—superior to, “truer than,” anything Aristotle had considered.³¹ By Henry’s understanding of the history of philosophy, though Plato had originally uncovered the parameters of knowledge aspiring to truth of this second, higher type, Augustine was the thinker who, contradicting Aristotle and correctly interpreting Plato as linking intellection with access to the divine ideas, had driven home the importance of such illumination for any full access to the truth. This was the kind of knowledge, in contrast to that mentioned above, that Augustine was targeting when, as in *De Trinitate*, he spoke of real certainty as reaching beyond the realm of sensibles to the objective field of an incorporeal and eternal world above.³²

The difficulty, as always, lay with explaining precisely how the constituent factors combined to enable an act of human understanding. By the terms of truth’s definition, in play here at the very least should have been the divine idea as exemplar, the objective thing as ultimate object, and the perceiving intellect, all brought together in a judgment yielding truth. As before in the case of the intelligible species serving as exemplar at the first level of knowing truth, Henry resorted to the distinction between viewing the exemplar—in this instance, the divine idea—as object known pointing to the knowledge of something else and viewing it as solely a means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi tantum*). Again, quite predictably, he opted for taking it as acting exclusively as means of knowing.³³ The cost of holding otherwise was even greater on this occasion than it had been previously, since the exemplar, resident in the divine mind, had by the fact of God’s simplicity to be identical with that mind, itself. Perceiving it as object would mean attaining to the beatific vision. What Henry was looking to account for was instead an element of knowledge in the world, in theory obtainable by any wayfarer, even the most sinful. Echoing what he had said before concerning knowledge of the first level of truth, Henry asserted that, tailoring its understanding to the contours of the higher exemplar, the human intellect proceeded to fashion a second, more elevated concept of the object’s truth—a concept of its pure truth, that is—which it then also stored in itself as a mental word,

³¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 60, 594–596: “... verior modus acquirendi scientiam et notitiam veritatis quam ille quem posuit Aristoteles ex sola sensuum experientia”.

³² See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 1, ad 4, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 25, 390–26, 404.

³³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 50, 417–52, 464.

repository in the mind of this more perfect science.³⁴ He took pains as well to emphasize that because on this occasion the exemplar was equivalent to the divinity, it was available to the mind not by inhering in it as a form in its subject—which would derogate from the sublimity and transcendence of God—but by flowing into it in a more subtle and less constrictive means.³⁵

Beyond these abstract comments, the best Henry could offer by way of a concrete mechanism of intellection was to point to a three-fold analogy between the intellectual attainment of the pure truth and perception in sensory vision. Focusing primarily on the role of the exemplar on this occasion, the ideal reason identical to the divine mind, he suggested that this Godly ingredient be thought of as taking part along lines comparable to that of three constituents of sight: light (*lux illuminans*), the species of color (*species coloris*) and the object's determinate shape or figure (*figura determinans*).³⁶ Although one would think that each way should be taken as bearing equal weight, in point of fact Henry placed greatest emphasis on the third.

As spiritual light acting by analogy to visible illumination, God's mind dispersed itself by shining on the intelligible species by which the human intellect came to know its cognitive objects and thereby indirectly (*obliquo aspectu*) suffused its radiance throughout the intellect as well.³⁷ Functionally speaking, what the divine light accomplished by this means was to sharpen the human faculty of intellection. It did not present itself thus in any way as object but rather served as a sort of fortifying precondition for knowing the pure truth, purging the human mind of "the clouds of base affections and the smoke of sensible images (*phantasmata*)."³⁸ As form or species acting by analogy to the species of color in sight, the same divine factor transformed (*immutare*) or informed (*formare*) the human intellect so that it could in some way be disposed ultimately to fashion the more determinate concept, or word, by which it would know the

³⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 55, 515–56, 524.

³⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 75, 122–76, 148.

³⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 73, 84–87.

³⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 80, 219–223.

³⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 77, 158–159.

aimed-for truth.³⁹ Because Henry would seem in this instance to be talking about the impression of a cognitive species in addition to the intelligible species more primitively available to mind by means of abstraction from sensibles in knowledge at the two lower levels, both of “the true” and of the first kind of truth, the great medievalist Etienne Gilson read him as laying out here a doctrine of double species. According to this understanding, human intellect would compare the species it had received from the divine mind with the species generated naturally by abstraction—or perhaps with the word it had formed from that species in arriving at the first level of knowing truth—to generate a revised and more perfect word of pure truth.⁴⁰ Several other scholars have followed Gilson on this score. Yet in fact, there is little to suggest that Henry was actually thinking in any such literal way of two impressed species for the mind to compare. His words imply instead a concentration on the role of color in sensory vision, through its sensible species providing a vehicle for vision’s eventual grasp of a determinate object, though in itself, or through its effects, capable of nothing perceptually much distinct.⁴¹ Neither analogy, therefore, goes very far towards revealing the mechanism by which this higher form of truth was perceived.

All the real philosophical work was left for the third analogy, by which the divine element entered the process, in Henry’s words, as a sort of “figure” or “character” shaping human intellection in its very content, and this time more distinctly.⁴² In the broadest terms, the divine mind took part in this operation according to its most literally exemplary status as the authentic “divine art,” containing within itself the eternal rules or standards (*aeternae regulae*) in conformity to which all created things were produced. Those rules, in fact, represented the most sublime expression of the truth of the things themselves, the truth those things possessed, in line with Henry’s original definition, just insofar as they followed the prescriptions the rules laid down. Moreover, this sublime standard or ideal art performed its epistemic role by impressing on the human mind a concept, a mental word most perfectly conforming to the truth the standard represented and which each created object, insofar as it existed, intrinsically contained. Drawing on Augustine’s famous image,

³⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 81, 239–245.

⁴⁰ Classically laid out in Gilson’s “Roger Marston: Un cas d’augustinisme avicennisant,” *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 8 (1933), n. 1.

⁴¹ Refer to n. 39, above.

⁴² Again, refer to the passage cited above, n. 36.

itself derived from Plato, Henry added that the impression was generated in the same way that a signet ring left behind an image of itself in the sealing wax of a letter.⁴³

There can be no doubt that what Henry was describing here deserves to be called Augustinian illumination, admirably fitted to all he had said so far about knowledge of the pure truth. Moreover, lest there be any ambiguity about the precise mechanism by which the process worked, this time Henry was ready to supply the details. With regard to constituent elements, he actually introduced the phrase "double species" (*duplex species*) that Gilson has been shown as anticipating above. Two species, he explained, were involved in this procedure, one the species abstracted by the intellect from the objective thing—the intelligible species mentioned so often up till now—and the other the divine exemplar, cause of the thing's existence in external reality but now also present in the knowing mind by that mysterious "flowing" Henry had already referred to.⁴⁴ Still, no more than in the case of the analogy to the species of color did Henry have in mind here anything like a genuine comparison of two species productive of a concept of truth the way Gilson had imagined. Instead, he envisioned an entirely different scenario.

Required for knowledge of the pure truth was the mental word of the first level of truth, formed upon the basis of the intelligible species derived from the external object and stored in the mind as marker of its scientific cognition of the lower sort. This process Henry had already explained. Once the first concept or word was present to mind, the second species, which was the divine art or exemplar flowing into mind as its superior illuminator, could act upon it, reconfiguring it, so to speak, by means of a new, now divinely driven impression in order to make it the most perfect possible similitude or expression of the object's truth. Here then arose a second word in the intellect, vehicle for and sign of its knowledge of the pure truth.⁴⁵ The crucial intellectual constituents, therefore, were the mind's two words, expressive of the progressive refinement of knowledge of the truth, and not the two species, which instead served primarily as transmitters of cognitive content to the words.

⁴³ This whole paragraph is based on a remarkable passage in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 82, 228–83, 280.

⁴⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 84, 305–85, 323. On the "flowing," see above, n. 35; for Gilson, n. 40.

⁴⁵ This process is described at length in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 85, 324–87, 361.

In what comes close to an exclamation of delight, Henry even commented on just how nicely the whole structure tied together external reality, the human intellect and the Godly ideal, revealing at its fullest the creative significance of truth. Knowledge of the pure truth staked out at the level of intelligibility a triangular set of relationships: that of object to the divine exemplar through the object's truth, that of intellect to object through the mind's first word of truth, and that of intellect to divine exemplar through the second, more perfect word. In coming to know the truth at this higher level, mind was thus brought to participate, by means of a divine impression, in the very truth enjoyed objectively by the thing itself.⁴⁶ In knowing pure truth, intellect itself became true.⁴⁷

This was for Henry as far as human mind could progress under normal conditions in the world towards knowledge of the simple truth. Absolute perfection would have to await the direct vision of God in beatitude. Meanwhile, of course, Henry assumed that practicing intellectuals would proceed to erect on the basis of such simple cognition the complete structure of complex knowledge of the propositions constituting "science" in the strictest sense of the term. Presumably, there would be two such structures, congruent in form or content but at least epistemologically distinct since drawing upon two different degrees of certitude. More precisely put, for each structure there would be initially the vast sets of primary true propositions formulated on the basis of the evident meaning of the concepts acquired with knowledge of simple truth, whether limited by Aristotelianizing naturalism or "pure." These constituted what were technically designated the principles in each domain of science. From them would be generated the even more capacious collections of propositions demonstrated from the principles by means of formal syllogism. Held with certitude because apodictically inferred from certain premises, these latter would constitute each area of inquiry's body of scientific truths. So far as concerns a knowledge-theoretical defense of the entire enterprise, Henry felt at liberty to do no more than refer his reader back to the logic of complex cognition outlined in the

⁴⁶ See the passage in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 85, 318–321, concluding with the following words: "Ut eadem idea veritatis qua habet res suam veritatem in se, habeat de ea veritatem ipsa anima, ut sic sit expressa similitudo verbi ad rem ipsam, et utriusque ad eius exemplar primum."

⁴⁷ In Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 86, 348, Henry spoke of the mental word present at the end of the whole process as a truth "qua mens formaliter vera nominatur."

latter part of Aristotle's organon, what medieval scholastics knew as the *Logica nova*, especially *De interpretatione* and the two *Analytics*.⁴⁸ Anyone who had studied in the arts faculty at a medieval university would be more than familiar with the epistemological apparatus Henry had in mind.

Once he had put into final form the beginning articles of his *Summa*—that is, after 1276—Henry never again returned to his epistemological schema in its entirety. Which is to say that he never again attempted a comprehensive survey of the parameters of human cognition. That does not mean, however, that he stopped inquiring about the formal constraints of knowledge of the truth or investigating the theoretical basis for science. In fact, Henry had much to say about both truth and science throughout his later works. On the occasions when he did so, he often revealed that he continued to develop his thoughts throughout his maturity, sometimes even changing his mind from what it had been at the start, before 1276. What is interesting is that for the most part he neglected the pieces of his early theory of knowledge tied to Augustinian illumination. Instead, the mature Henry took his periodic forays into epistemology as an opportunity to explore, articulate more clearly and amplify the Aristotelianizing aspects of his initial position.

Another way to put this is to say that in his later attempts to examine problems of truth and the character of scientific knowledge, Henry generally focused on a matter that had been left ambiguous in the opening articles of the *Summa*. The question was precisely how to draw the distinction between true knowledge and knowledge of the truth, a dichotomy, of course, that also marked for him the boundary between non-scientific cognition and science. While the early epistemology had essentially forsaken any effort to be clear and consistent about what constituted knowing the true, devoting its energies instead towards elaborating with great precision the defining attributes of the two ways to know truth—either along Aristotelianizing lines or in its Augustinian purity—in nearly every instance the mature engagement with theory of knowledge ignored the division between ways of knowing truth, setting a single, global notion of knowledge of truth against the lesser knowledge of the true and trying to describe in technical terms how these two were different. In the process, it was almost exclusively the epistemic and noetic mechanisms attached in the early account to knowledge of the pure truth that suffered

⁴⁸ An excellent statement, representative of Henry's view throughout his life, can be found in Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8 ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), I, fol. 97^vN.

eclipse. Knowledge of truth as it entered into the epistemological theory of Henry's later work amounted in practically all cases to some variant on the procedures associated in the *Summa's* initial articles with grasping truth at the first and lower level. And here Henry made every effort either to deepen his reliance on an Aristotelian model or come up with something quite novel on his own.

A sign of the change can be found in an extensive and formally significant, although to be fair somewhat uncouth, handling of truth in article 34 of the *Summa*, composed in 1279 or 1280.⁴⁹ In question 1 of that article, Henry introduced the idea that there were two ways to look at "truth," hence two different types of truth. One was the truth of a thing (*veritas rei*); the other the truth of a sign (*veritas signi*).⁵⁰ For present purposes, only the truth of the sign is important. Though Henry listed four types of sign relevant to truth—sentences, concepts, desires and actions—just the first two were fundamental to a theory of knowledge, and of these two, Henry concerned himself largely with the second, inquiring after the truth of a concept (*cogitatio*).⁵¹ To do so was, of course, consonant with his already noted Augustinian preference for attacking problems of truth and knowledge at the level of simple cognition. Following a definition of the truth of a sign dependent upon the function a sign performed in doing what it should—that is, signifying properly—Henry then identified the truth of a concept as the property attributable to it insofar as it presented its referent as the latter really was in the external world.⁵² In that case, knowledge of truth should consist in knowledge of an appropriate—one might say, honest or reliable—relation between concept and object. Obviously, Henry was back to the second tack on separating knowing the truth and knowing the true from his early years, that requiring a judgment by mind of the concept with regard to something else.

⁴⁹ For fuller discussion of this article, and the possible dependence of its distinctive approach on Aquinas's ideas about knowledge of truth, see Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge*, pp. 50–69.

⁵⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIV, q. 1, ed. Raymond Macken, (Leuven, 1991), p. 164, 18.

⁵¹ For the list, see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIV, q. 1, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1991), p. 164, 18–20.

⁵² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIV, q. 1, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1991), pp. 164–165, 33–36: "... veritas signi tunc est, quando signum facit hoc quod facere debet ... sive quod natura sua requirit ... videlicet quod faciat omne id quod pertinet ad suam significationem, scilicet ut indicet ipsum significatum secundum quod est in re extra."

Leaving aside the details of Henry's new application of this notion to the operations of human mind, here it is important to draw attention just to three advances the account of epistemology given in article 34 made over—maybe they amount to radical revisions made to—the broad lines of his original schema. First of all, it was now the case that at the level of knowing the true, intellect seized the object in its very essence, grasping the “whatness” or “quiddity” making it that which it was.⁵³ Earlier, quiddity had been first attained at the higher level of knowing truth.⁵⁴ Second, since Henry was already moving towards giving up the idea of intelligible species, he forged a description of the process of human intellection making it easier to say precisely what cognitive entities the mind manipulated in its passage to knowledge of the truth and how such manipulations were possible. A long passage in article 34, question 5, reveals that, the intelligible species having disappeared, he now held that in coming to know “the true,” the intellect formed a “conceptus”—a Latin term he used interchangeably with “verbum” or word throughout his career—of it that could be stored away. Then, when it came to seek the truth, intellect could call up this “conceptus,” and by comparing it to the object itself in external reality, calculate their similarity, which it then made the basis of a second “conceptus” or word, expressive of the truth.⁵⁵ Thus, Henry was now positing a mental word at the level of knowing the true as well as another at the level of knowing truth. And because a word was an intellectual entity denser than a species, mere “ratio cognoscendi” by Henry's understanding, he was also able to say without confusion what cognitive contents the mind compared in making its judgment of truth.

Third, it would seem that Henry now felt no need for a doctrine of illumination. At least there is no mention in article 34 of the normative action of God's intellectual light. Of course, one might argue that he was simply abbreviating his account, stopping with the first level of knowing truth and leaving out the second as unnecessary for making his point about the contrast between knowledge of true and of truth. But

⁵³ For example, Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIV, q. 1, ad 1, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1991), p. 167, 94–97, which identifies the mere “verum” with “quod quid est rei apud animam”; and also *ibid.*, art. XXXIV, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1991), p. 215, 43–44, referring explicitly to “ipsum verum, quod est res ipsa aut quidditas.”

⁵⁴ See above, n. 8.

⁵⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIV, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1991), pp. 219–220, 46–69.

then there is the inconvenient fact that he was now willing to concede to a description of knowing truth that remained resolutely within the world an accolade he had previously restricted to a knowledge appealing beyond the worldly to a divine ideal. This knowledge of the truth the mind attained simply by comparing its initial apprehension of the thing to the objective content outside in the world was, Henry commented quite explicitly, not only perfect truth but also pure (*perfecta et sincera veritas*).⁵⁶

For all its clarity about procedures of mind and cognitive entities, however, article 34 of the *Summa* fails to suggest the full extent to which Henry's mature epistemology embodied theoretical development and transformation. More common in Henry's later works was an approach to the matter of truth bypassing the comparison of content at different levels of intellection in favor of a progressive realization of the epistemic obligations—though still at the level of simple cognition, before formation of propositions and syllogisms—of an Aristotelianizing program of science. Here Henry relied mostly on the first tack for separating knowledge of truth from that of “the true” in his early years, focusing on the content of the object as understood. As one might expect, given what Henry had already said regarding this tack in the beginning articles of the *Summa*, that meant formalizing the difference between knowing the true and knowing truth on the basis of the degree of distinctiveness with which the object was perceived.

Again, only a summary of the novelties Henry thereby introduced into his epistemology is needed here. The first signs of innovation appear in question 8 of *Quodlibet IV*, dating from 1279 or 1280, maybe just prior to article 34 of the *Summa*. As Henry explained human cognition in that article, the intellect, starting out a clean slate (*tabula complanata*), first confronted its intelligible object as presented to it by means of abstraction from a phantasm in the imaginative power. Stimulated by this confrontation, the intellect then generated its own act of understanding terminating in the object as in something known. In consequence there emerged in the mind an intellectual formality constituting, in Henry's words, actual knowledge of the object (*notitia actualis*), which could equally well be described in more Augustinian terms as a mental word

⁵⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIV, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1991), p. 215, 38–44. The word “divino” in line 42 should probably be replaced by “omnino,” as given in the *apparatus criticus*, p. 214, sixth line from the bottom.

(*verbum*).⁵⁷ Henry often referred to it as an expressed form (*forma expressiva*), to contrast it with an impressed form (*forma impressiva*) like the passively received intelligible species the early Henry had adopted from an Aristotelianizing noetics.⁵⁸ Significantly, this word, as Henry made clear, represented mind's knowledge of the object as "true," and he specifically characterized it as a "simplicium comprehensio," quite obviously a variant on his earlier "simplex intelligentia" at mind's most primitive level of knowledge.⁵⁹

To advance beyond this first level to knowledge of the truth required a second intellectual act. Reflecting back on the knowledge of the true it had just received, intellect had to ask itself exactly what it was (*quid est*) that it knew. When it managed, often after much investigation and consideration, to come up with the answer, it then terminated this second round of activity with a second word, representative of the new, higher understanding.⁶⁰ Because the new word provided access to not just "the true" but indeed the very truth about the intellect's object, it could be designated a "word of truth" (*verbum veritatis*). As was the case with knowledge of the truth in the early articles of the *Summa*, here, too, the human mind first entered the territory of the scientific. Dipping into the lexicon of Aristotle's theory of knowledge, Henry stated with greater technical precision that the "word of truth" furnished the mind with knowledge of its object's *quod quid est*.⁶¹

Clearly, already in *Quodlibet IV* Henry was espousing the position adopted as well in the nearly contemporaneous article 34 of the *Summa*, that knowledge of the true involved production of a mental word, which did not have to await, as he had claimed at the beginning of his career, cognition at the higher level of knowledge of the truth. To that degree, both of his new approaches to the theory of knowledge started out in parallel. Such was not long to be the case. By *Quodlibet VI*, no more than two years later, Henry had again abandoned—this time for good—the idea that at the level of knowing the true the intellect generated

⁵⁷ This description condenses two long accounts in Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), I, fol. 97^{rm} and fol. 98^{rp}.

⁵⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), I, fol. 96^{vi}.

⁵⁹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), I, fol. 97^{r-v}[M]: "... notitia illa solummodo simplicium est comprehensio, in qua non percipitur nisi id quod verum est ... non autem ipsa veritas."

⁶⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), I, fol. 97^{vn}.

⁶¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), I, fol. 98^{rp}, but also the comments at the top of the folio, *ibid.*, fol. 98^{ro}.

a mental word. Consistently from then on, he reaffirmed his earliest insistence that the mind was engaged with mental words only at the level of science, in the first instance, of course, with knowledge of the simple truth. Which is not to say that he went back precisely to his original views. Instead, he progressively elaborated a more daring noetics that did away with impressed species and had the intellect, in knowing “the true,” immediately grasp the object itself as presented by the phantasm without any other formal intellective element coming into play.⁶²

More important is what this alternative new approach said about the cognitive content of the various objects as known. Article 34 had rejected the early view that at knowledge of the true the intellect did not yet seize its object’s quiddity. Though question 8 of *Quodlibet IV* remains elusive on this matter, by *Quodlibet V*, composed most likely right after article 34, Henry was prepared to confirm his just-announced position that in knowing “the true” the intellect apprehended the essence of its object specifically as “quiddity.” It was the technical phrase “quod quid est,” not “quiddity,” that was now to be taken as distinguishing the objective content at the level of knowing the truth.⁶³ The task, therefore, was to work out with exactitude what was entailed in moving from quiddity to *quod quid est*. Henry succeeded in doing so already in *Quodlibet VI*, producing the solution he would continue to expound, though with ever finer elaboration, throughout the rest of his career. According to question 1 of *Quodlibet VI*, knowledge of the true—Henry’s invariable “simplex intelligentia”—was confused and indefinite precisely in the sense that intellect’s object was at that point definable but not yet defined. Raising understanding to the level of knowledge of truth reduced, therefore, to formulating the definition, explicitly picking out the object’s essential parts. In uttering this definition to itself, the mind produced the mental word of truth, earliest indicator that it had reached the level of scientific knowledge.⁶⁴

Of course, Henry realized that in committing himself to this position, he was bringing his epistemology of simple cognition into line with the

⁶² For this whole paragraph, see *Quodlibet VI*, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), p. 14, 82–87; pp. 14–15, 93–97; p. 16, 25–31; p. 17, 53–55; and p. 19, 82–91. Whenever, as in this case, one of Henry’s *Quodlibeta* has appeared in the critical edition, it will be cited just like articles of the *Summa*, namely with reference to the volume edited in the Leuven series, Henrici de Gandavo, *Opera omnia*.

⁶³ See the extended discussion, Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. V*, q. 14, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518) I, fols. 176^v–177^r[O].

⁶⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. VI*, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), pp. 14, 88–15, 7.

logical principles of Aristotle's science. *Quodlibet VI* makes this clear. The process of lifting knowledge of the true to knowledge of truth was nothing more than an application of the rules for the art of defining (*ars definitiva*) as Aristotle had laid them out in the *Posterior Analytics*.⁶⁵ Already in *Quodlibet IV*, question 8, Henry had pointed to the same general set of procedures as fundamental for science, referring to them as the logical technique of division (*via divisiva*) and directing the reader again to the *Posterior Analytics* as well as Boethius's *De divisione*.⁶⁶ With this approach to the business of human cognition, the mature Henry was, therefore, just as we have seen in article 34 of the *Summa*, presenting a recipe for knowledge of the truth that, as with his first level of knowing truth in the early articles of the *Summa*, did not reach beyond evidence or procedures firmly grounded in the world but still promised a remarkable degree of certitude and precision. And as in article 34, so in all these instances in his later works where he turned to this content-oriented way of understanding what it meant to know the truth, he not only completely neglected any appeal to the normative assistance of a divine illumination but also gave no indication that he thought there was a place, in normal intellection in the world, for anything like his earlier, higher-level of knowledge of the truth. To the contrary, much as in article 34, he lavished upon his worldly account of cognition praise that would at the beginning of his career have been limited to knowledge of the pure truth dependent on divine intervention. In a late article of the *Summa*, he claimed his Aristotelianizing model for knowing truth yielded to mind a "true and perfect knowledge."⁶⁷

Again, of course, beyond this simple cognition lay the formal business of scientific reasoning in the strictest sense of the term, beginning with knowledge of principles and moving on to science pure and simple, which consisted in demonstrated knowledge of valid conclusions. Also as before, the later Henry never felt compelled either to put before his reader the logical infrastructure supporting the propositional edifice of the sciences or to justify the whole system theoretically, assuming that the universal training of his readers in the logic of the arts curriculum relieved

⁶⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. VI*, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), p. 15, 96–97, where Henry explained the mind worked towards the definition "iuxta regulas artis definitivae traditae in II^o Posteriorum."

⁶⁶ This comes in the same passage cited above at n. 48.

⁶⁷ In the words of Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LVIII, q. 2, ad 3, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 130^{vl}, "vera et perfecta de incomplexo notitia."

him of any need to do so.⁶⁸ It might seem, having reached the end of this “revised” epistemology of Henry’s middle and later years, that we can therefore stop. Perhaps we have arrived at his final and most deeply considered position on human knowledge and scientific truth. Some readings of Henry make just that claim. It was noted above that in most cases in his maturity where Henry set himself to clarifying or commenting on his theory of knowledge, he neglected the whole aspect of epistemology that had come at the apex of his scheme in the early years, what is generally said to fall under the heading of Augustinian illumination. There are those who take this to mean that “divine illumination” thus eventually fell away from the apparatus he used to account for true and certain cognition.⁶⁹ Yet as the majority of modern interpretations contend, that was surely not the case. Throughout his mature works he issued enough positive appeals to his earliest renditions of a direct divine involvement in even normal human perception of the truth in this world to make it impossible to believe he ever really abandoned, or even simply lost interest in, his early estimation of the need for an exemplary and normative role for God’s light.

The most trenchant reassertion of the early, illuminationist views occurs in *Quodlibet IX*, which Henry composed in 1286, at the height of his powers. The short but densely packed question 15 of that work asks whether there is in normal human intellection a “hidden knowledge” (*intelligere abditum*) of the sort Augustine had sometimes referred to and that came to mind as if outside the worldly course of perception through the senses and intellectual recourse to phantasms in the imagination.⁷⁰ In response, Henry not only insisted that there was, and that Augustine fully intended us to accept the fact, but he also explained that the phrase “hidden knowledge” stood as shorthand for the complicated cognitive process whereby the divine intelligible light shone on human intellect, shoring up its imperfect knowledge of objects as first contacted through the senses and rendering it capable of attaining to the “pure truth” (*sincera*

⁶⁸ The reference to *Quodlibet IV* given above, n. 48—coming right at the tipping point between Henry’s early and later career—suffices, therefore, to make the point here that it did before.

⁶⁹ Two primary examples are Henri Paulus, in his classic *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris, 1938); and Prospero Stella, in “La prima critica di Herveus Natalis O.P. alla noetica di Enrico di Gand: Il ‘De intellectu et specie’ del cosiddetto ‘De quatuor materiis,’” *Salesianum* 21 (1959), pp. 125–170.

⁷⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 15, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 258, 2–5.

veritas).⁷¹ The text then goes on to describe the whole intellectual procedure from sensory beginning to illuminated end so as to reproduce all the stages in Henry's account of human cognition at the start of the *Summa*, although not always by employing precisely the same terminology. Most important, it makes clear that in this process there were two stages at which the truth was grasped, the first yielding an "imaginaria veritas" evocative of the early "fantastic knowledge of the truth" and the second, of course, the "pure truth" available only by reliance on divine intervention.⁷² Henry even explicitly directed his reader for greater instruction back to the *Summa*'s preliminary articles.⁷³

It is common among modern scholars to conclude that Henry thereby set his mature imprimatur on the epistemology of his early years, pure and simple, including his notion there of God's illuminative intervention. The present author takes a somewhat different stance, arguing instead that Henry was in this moment embracing his original views while at the same time transforming them in accordance with a reconsideration of both the operations of human mind and the objective realities of created things. A critical indication of this complicated maneuver would appear to be an absolutely astonishing line that Henry produced just after he had reasserted in question 15 the need for the truth-seeking intellect, having grasped its objects to the extent possible with recourse solely to the phantasms, to turn for normative guidance to the ideal reasons (*incorporeae rationes*) in the divine truth. His intention seems to have been to show how such a switch from a worldly to a celestial referential ground was not only possible but also in fact the simplest of procedures to conceive. His words were: "For those [abstracted] objects known in the phantasms and the incorporeal reasons themselves in the eternal truth are exactly the same: they are indeed none other than the very natures and essences of the things [to be known]."⁷⁴

⁷¹ See especially Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX*, q. 15, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 261, 96–99: "Et est ista lux increata in qua sola Augustinus posuit sinceram veritatem posse cognosci, tamquam in quodam representativo omnium cognoscibilium circa creaturas quae Deus ab aeterno cognovit."

⁷² For both "imaginaria" and "sincera veritas" see Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX*, q. 15, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), pp. 264–265, 92–99. See above, n. 26, for the early "fantastic knowledge."

⁷³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX*, q. 15, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 264, 85–87.

⁷⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX*, q. 15, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 262, 29–31: "Sunt enim eadem cognita et praedicta intellecta in phantasmatis, et ipsae incorporeae rationes in ipsa veritate aeterna: non sunt enim aliud quam ipsae naturae et essentiae rerum."

To my eyes, there is no way to understand this assertion without turning for enlightenment to a complicated theory of essence—more specifically, essence in itself or “absolute essence”—that Henry had been working out for all those years between 1276 and 1286. Here is not the place to lay down the parameters of Henry’s views on essence. The interested reader is encouraged to consult the chapters above on Henry’s metaphysics and on his idea of essence and existence. But sketched out in brief, my argument with regard to the present epistemological concerns is that for Henry’s metaphysics, the essence of each thing, considered absolutely in itself, remained numerically the same in any of its possible particular instantiations, whether as an objective entity in external reality or as cognitive object in a mental word.⁷⁵ Moreover, over eternity, the cognitive objects for God’s mind—that is, all the divinely exemplified essences—were identical to the divine ideas and thus, in some ultimate sense, identical with the divinity. Now at least as early as article 34 of the *Summa*, Henry indicated that he realized that by the terms of his account, knowledge of the truth of an object—no matter what the level—directed mind to the cognitive plane of the object’s essence.⁷⁶ The upshot, for theories of knowledge and of mind, was that in progressing from what in the early articles of the *Summa* was described as knowledge of “the true” to knowledge of the truth at the first level and then on to knowledge of “pure truth,” the human intellect did not so much change referents or bring in added species or exemplars as view the same objective item with an intensifying awareness of its ontological constitution. In short, coming to know simple truth was, in Aristotelianizing terms, penetrating to definitive understanding. Yet since that entailed a more intimate grasp of the object’s essence, it necessitated at the same time sharpening the mind’s focus on the very aspect of the object by which it was wrapped up in an exemplary relation to the divine idea. That meant, in the end, homing in on that very facet of objectivity that, over eternity, was ultimately reducible to the idea itself.

No wonder that in the works of his maturity, Henry could attend to matters of knowledge formation and the criteria for grasping truth by elaborating an Aristotelianizing understanding of the basis for science

⁷⁵ Anyone wanting to follow out this argument should consult my more complete presentations of it in *Truth and Scientific Knowledge*, Ch. 4; and *The Light of thy Countenance. Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden, 2001), pp. 379–388.

⁷⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXIV, q. 2, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1991), pp. 175–176, 70–74.

without, on most occasions, drawing attention to his early explication of divine illumination. For in the light of his increasingly elaborate understanding of the metaphysics of essence, it would appear that his two early levels for knowing the truth, one more Aristotelianizing and the second more Augustinian, had effectively collapsed into one. Knowing the truth as adequate to the requirements of Aristotle's science entailed, on an objective plane, being open to conditions of existence revealed by and at work in Augustine's paradigm for the shining of God's intelligible light on the mind. To this way of seeing things, an Aristotelianizing philosophy of knowledge resonated with Augustine's vision of God's intimacy to all acts of human understanding. The transformations of Henry's theory of knowledge in his mature years thus represented neither a repudiation of his earliest position nor a fundamental reiteration of his former views in only superficially different words or terms. On the contrary, his deepening understanding of both ontology and processes of mind had enabled him to redeploy the old philosophical constituents so as to fashion a genuinely innovative structure of much greater analytical versatility than the model from which it arose. In the process, he reconciled, but also sharpened his understanding of, both Aristotle and Augustine.

HENRY OF GHENT ON THE *VERBUM MENTIS*

BERND GOEHRING

Introduction

The notion of a ‘word’ of the mind, a *verbum mentis* in Latin, suggests an analogy between language and thought: just as in language our means of expression are spoken words, and, by extension, written words, so in thought there may be similar means by which we express internally whatever mental content we have.¹ The Parisian master Henry of Ghent develops an account of the mental word in his two major works—his unfinished *Summa* and his *Quodlibeta*—and continues to refine it throughout his career because he seeks to determine precisely what kind of content a mental word expresses, and what functional role the mental word plays in thought and understanding. Henry is interested in the psychology of both human and divine cognition, since he wants to address not only philosophical issues of human cognition but also central theological questions regarding God’s trinitarian nature as conceived by the Christian tradition.²

Christian doctrine holds, based on a number of Scriptural passages, that God is both one divine essence and three persons, namely Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In Scripture the Son Jesus Christ, the second person of the Trinity, is given various names; in the influential and philosophically rich prologue to the Gospel according to John (1:1), he is called ‘the Word’ (*lógos* in Greek, *verbum* in Latin). As Jaroslav Pelikan has stressed in the first volume of his account of *The Christian Tradition*, “the climax of

¹ On this theme and its development see Claude Panaccio, “From Mental Word to Mental Language,” *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992), pp. 125–147; id., *Le discours intérieur: de Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham* (Paris, 1999).

² For a detailed discussion of Henry of Ghent’s views on the trinity see the chapter by Juan Carlos Flores in this volume and the scholarly literature cited there. The present chapter focuses on Henry’s account of the mental word with special regard to his psychology of cognition and issues of representation. This analysis incorporates material from my Ph.D. dissertation *Henry of Ghent on Cognition and Mental Representation*, Cornell University, 2006.

the doctrinal development of the early church was the dogma of the Trinity. In this dogma the church vindicated the monotheism that had been at issue in its conflicts with Judaism, and it came to terms with the concept of the Logos, over which it had disputed with paganism.”³ The controversies in the early church over the right understanding of the Trinity and especially of the second person led to clarifications that are preserved in the Creed of Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381), and other *symbola* of Christianity: most significantly the dogma that the Son, the Logos, is not made but rather born, or generated, from the Father (*gennêtheis*), and that the Son is consubstantial with the Father (*homooúsios tô patrí*—a rejection of Arianism).⁴ However, despite such theological achievements and intellectual efforts by Augustine and others, developing a deeper understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity was, as Hans-Georg Gadamer noted, “surely the most important task for the thought of the Christian Middle Ages.”⁵ It is thus not surprising that much of Henry of Ghent’s reflection on the inner word, the *verbum* generated by the mind, occurs in the context of theological questions that deal with trinitarian issues.⁶

Henry’s main sources for developing his own account of cognition and knowledge are Augustine and Aristotle as well as Aristotle’s ‘Arabic’ commentators. In Augustine Henry finds the idea that the human mind, as *imago Dei*, has a fundamentally trinitarian structure; it comprises understanding, will and *memoria*, the most basic cognitive capacity. With Aristotle Henry asserts that the human intellect or understanding is both passive-receptive and active-constructive. At the beginning of his career Henry appears to identify any concept as a mental word, including simple concepts that synthesize and initially categorize sensory input that is received from a cognitive object. Although Henry does

³ Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, vol. 1: *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600)* (Chicago, 1971), p. 172. Another magisterial treatment of these issues can be found in Alois Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*, 5 vols. (Freiburg i. Br., 1979–2002). See especially the first volume: *Von der Apostolischen Zeit bis zum Konzil von Chalcedon (451)*.

⁴ See Heinrich Denzinger, ed., *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Freiburg i. Br., 1955), nos. 54, 86. On Arianism and related issues see the major study by Richard Hanson, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318–381* (Edinburgh, 1988); for a different account see Rowan Williams, *Arius: Heresy and Tradition*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, 2002).

⁵ See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, 2nd ed. (Tübingen, 1965), p. 396.

⁶ For background and a helpful overview see Russell Friedman, “Relations, Emanations, and Henry of Ghent’s Use of the ‘Verbum Mentis’ in Trinitarian Theology: the Background in Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure,” *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 7 (1996), pp. 181–182.

not yet seem to distinguish between a mental word and a concept, he suggests that in forming a mental word a cognizer aims at understanding a thing's essential features. Henry develops an initial account in his works up to 1279, before he begins to re-interpret Augustine's views, in his *Quodlibet IV* and related discussions in his *Summa*. Henry refines his conception of the mental word because he wants to reserve the expression of an internal 'word' to call attention to our ability to acquire and apply a certain range of conceptual content, namely highly theoretical concepts through which we articulate a greater understanding of the natures and causal relations of things. Thus, in his mature account Henry aims at showing how such conceptual content functions in our acquisition of theoretical knowledge (*scientia*) and the demonstrative arguments that accompany it. Moreover, according to Henry the mental word includes a self-reflexive reference to the cognizer herself, so that she comes to understand herself as a cognitive subject that is related to a cognitive object via some representational content in the act of understanding or knowing.

I. Henry's Initial Account of Concept-Formation

According to Henry human cognition, and particularly the acquisition of concepts, can be described as a sequence of processes that includes both receptive and productive stages. Intellect at first lacks both actualized and dispositional content. Henry originally introduces the notion of forms (*species*) to capture the receptive function in cognition, and the notion of a concept (*conceptus* or *notitia*)⁷ to account for the productive functions. Especially early in his career, before the elimination of forms—intelligible species—in the intellect, Henry appears to identify a concept with a mental word. *Quodlibet I*, qq. 12–13, is one of the first texts in which Henry links the notion of form or *species* to that of a concept or mental word: "For a *species* is an image or picture of a thing with which the soul is informed, with the result that the soul conceives and forms from the species a determinate mental word about that very thing,

⁷ It is difficult to capture adequately the meaning of the term *notitia* in Henry's works: *notitia* can mean 'notion' or 'concept' or indeed 'knowledge', and at times *notitia* in Henry may even refer to the act of cognition or understanding rather than to its result. See Jerome Brown, "The Meaning of *notitia* in Henry of Ghent," in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, ed. Jan P. Beckmann, Ludger Honnefelder, Wolfgang Kluxen et al., vol. II (Berlin, 1981), pp. 992–998.

which it can do in no way without the species. However, a mental *word* is that very concept of the mind which is the truth of the thing's essence in the soul, in which the soul formally understands the thing, which it understands through the species as through a potentiality and through a power that is formative of the mental word and that exists in the soul's potentiality".⁸ In Henry's view, a species is an image-like representation of a cognitive object. It is a functional intermediary in the receptive stage of cognition. (At this point Henry still thinks that species are needed both at the level of the senses and at the level of the intellect.) In any case, Henry can maintain generally that some species, some representation, at least in the sensory, materially realized powers, provides the basis for generating a concept or mental word. Henry claims that the cognizer needs a representation of this sort to be able actively to produce a concept of a given object. In his early account Henry claims that unless an intelligible species informs and disposes the cognizer's mind in the right way no concept of any object can be formed.

In forming a concept or mental word a cognizer aims at capturing a thing's nature, its essence; such a word or concept of the mind is, as Henry puts it, "the truth of the thing's essence in the soul." The Latin term '*quidditas*' and its English equivalent 'essence' pick out what a thing is (*quod quid est*). In stating the essence of some x a cognizer addresses the kind of question that Socrates made prominent: "What is x?" The human intellect, as our capacity for universal thought and understanding, seeks to grasp what x is by conceptualizing its essential features, for instance by considering the humanity of a particular human being. Henry uses expressions such as 'the thing's truth' or 'the truth of a thing's essence' to refer to a thing's essence in its being related, as something intelligible, to an intellect, "since nothing is called 'truth' except with respect to intelligibility."⁹ Accordingly, when he discusses

⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, qq. 12–13, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), p. 82, 12–17: "*Species enim est imago vel idolum rei qua anima informatur, ut determinatum verbum de ipsa re concipiat et formet de illa, quod nullo modo posset facere sine illa. Verbum autem est ipsa notitia mentis quae est veritas quidditatis rei apud animam, in qua formaliter rem intelligit quam per speciem intelligit tamquam potentia et vi formativa verbi in potentia animae existente*" (my emphasis). Here and elsewhere I often render the Latin *verbum* as 'mental word'.

⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXXIII, q. 2, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1991), p. 140, 2–3: "nihil dicitur veritas, nisi respiciendo ad intelligibilitatem." See *ibid.*, p. 140, 18–21: "quod quid est, est quod intelligitur de re, et id quod veritas est. Quidditas enim suo nomine quidditatis ut est deitas, intelligitur tamquam obiectum tantum, veritas vero intelligitur tamquam obiectum sub propria ratione respectus

epistemological issues Henry is more likely to use this terminology, as in this passage from the second article of his *Summa*: “a thing’s truth is that through which [*id quo*] a thing is known and understood, for it [*scil.* the thing’s truth] itself is intellect’s proper object.”¹⁰ In examining in his *Summa* art. I, q. 4, whether it is possible for a human being to know things by nature or through acquiring contents, Henry suggests that a cognizer’s encounter with a particular sensory, material object results in an incomplete conception of the object’s essence: “For an agent cannot impress the complete knowledge of a thing [on another] unless it has in itself its complete truth and it acts through it. Thus, since a stone cannot bring about the word of its truth in the intellect through itself but [only] through a species, which is not its truth, which it brings about in the intellect, it cannot form a complete word of the truth about it in the mind.”¹¹ Hence the human mode of cognizing through mediating species is deficient compared to an ideal mode of understanding that would give a cognizer a direct grasp of a thing’s essence. But this is not available without special divine assistance, and thus all that human cognizers can do on their own, by purely natural means, is to abstract from sensory input and use reasoning to establish some conception of what a thing is. In the following passage on the possibility of knowledge from the first article of his *Summa*, q. 2, Henry concentrates on the role of species as a thing’s ‘created exemplar’ or model in the human mind (as compared to a thing’s ideal, archetypal exemplar in the divine mind): “The first exemplar of a thing is its universal species existing within the soul, through which the soul acquires a notion of all its individual

intelligibilis ad intellectum.”—“the what-it-is, is what is understood of a thing, and that which is the truth. For, an essence, through the name of its essence, for instance ‘divinity,’ is understood as an object unqualifiedly, whereas the truth is understood as an object under its character of being related, as something intelligible, to an intellect.”

¹⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. II, q. 6, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 235, 27–28, my emphasis: “veritas rei est *id quo* res scitur et intelligitur, quia ipsa est proprium obiectum intellectus.” The reading ‘*id quo*’—the instrumental sense—is confirmed by the manuscript tradition.—Jerome Brown, “Abstraction and the Object of the Human Intellect according to Henry of Ghent,” *Vivarium* 11 (1973), pp. 80–104, at 98, and Katherine Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham* (Leiden, 1988), p. 35, read ‘*id quod*’ instead, which does not make sense.

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 4, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 106, 318–322: “Non enim aliquod agens potest imprimere perfectam scientiam rei, nisi habeat in se perfectam veritatem eius et per illam agat. Unde quia lapis non agit verbum veritatis suae in intellectu per se ipsum, sed per speciem, quae non est veritas sua, quam agit in intellectu, ideo non potest formare verbum perfectae veritatis de se in mente”.

instantiations; and this exemplar is caused by the thing.”¹² The species is here characterized as something universal, a mental model that serves as a means for conceptualizing the individual instances represented by it. As a functional intermediary in cognition it is not considered an object of cognition (a representation considered in itself) but rather a principle for forming a concept: “by looking at the exemplar taken from the thing itself, so as to look at the principle of cognizing in the cognizer himself, the truth of the thing itself can indeed be cognized in some way: by forming a mental concept of the thing, conforming to that exemplar.”¹³ To be sure, this raises questions about the kind of conformity at issue, even if we grant that an external thing is what first causes us to generate a representation: exactly what kind of conformity needs to obtain between a thing in the world and our representations and especially conceptual content? Moreover, Henry claims that in addition the cognizer needs to apprehend the conformity-relation itself because “a thing’s truth cannot be cognized except on the basis of a cognition of the conformity of the thing as it is cognized to its exemplar.”¹⁴ Successfully grasping a thing’s truth or essence would seem to work only for a cognizer who is in a position to assess the adequacy or ‘match’ of her representations in light of a divine, archetypal exemplar rather than a created one in her own mind.

Nonetheless Henry says about this process of forming concepts that “it was in this way that Aristotle held that human beings acquire knowledge of things and a cognition of truth by purely natural means—and this with respect to natural, changeable things, and he held that such an exemplar is acquired from things through the senses as the first principle of skill and knowledge.”¹⁵ Fittingly, Henry provides quotations from the first chapter

¹² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 40, 235–237: “Primum exemplar rei est species eius existens apud animam universalis, per quam acquirit notitiam omnium suppositorum eius, et est causata a re.”

¹³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 41, 260–42, 263: “[...] aspiciendo ad exemplar acceptum ab ipsa re ut ad rationem cognoscendi in ipso cognoscente, bene potest aliquo modo veritas ipsius rei cognosci formando conceptum mentis de re conformem illi exemplari.” See Steven Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), p. 22: “Such a concept is surely what Henry also called the mental word (*verbum*), more precisely the simple word as opposed to the perfect one of illumination.”

¹⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 39, 235–40, 227: “veritas rei non potest cognosci nisi ex cognitione conformitatis rei cognitae ad suum exemplar”.

¹⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 42, 263–267: “Et per hunc modum posuit Aristoteles scientiam rerum et

of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and the final chapter of the *Posterior Analytics*, which maintain that a universal conception is gained via perception, memory, and experience.¹⁶

Even though Henry believes, appropriating a dictum of Augustine's, that "the pure truth cannot be expected from the sensible characteristics of a body,"¹⁷ he nonetheless points to the mind's ability to produce some—however incomplete—conception of a thing's essential features. Henry thinks that the human mind can indeed, "through the diligence of natural reason," start out from what is sensible and reach an understanding of what is non-sensible "on the basis of a natural connectedness of sensible to non-sensible" characteristics.¹⁸

Henry interprets intellect's activity accordingly: "For 'understanding' [*intelligere*] is said, as it were, from 'reading internally' [*intus legere*], that is, to bring to light what is hidden—for instance, under the conception and sensible species received from sense lies the truth and essence of a thing."¹⁹ To sum up, in the earliest version of these passages Henry claims that the truth or essence of a thing itself can indeed be cognized *in some way*, by forming a mental concept of the thing. This concept needs to

veritatis cognitionem acquiri ab homine ex puris naturalibus et de rebus naturalibus transmutabilibus, et tale exemplar acquiri ex rebus per sensum tamquam primum principium artis et scientiae".

¹⁶ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 1, 981a6–7; *Posterior Analytics* II, 19, 100a3–9.

¹⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. 1, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 43, 296–297: "a sensibilibus corporis non est expetenda sincera veritas"; some manuscripts have "sensibus" but Wilson's decision to read "sensibilibus" as the *lectio difficilior*, with two important manuscripts, seems right; see Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 9, ed. Almut Mutzenbecher (Turnhout, 1975), p. 16: "Non est igitur expectanda sinceritas veritatis a sensibus corporis."—"Thus the purity of truth cannot be expected from a body's senses."

¹⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. 1, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 28, 440–443: "[...] mathematica et quidditates substantiarum, materia et forma et huiusmodi quorum notitiam mens sub speciebus sensibilium ex naturali colligantia sensibilium ad insensibilia naturalis rationis industria colligit quasi fodiendo sub ipsa specie a sensibili re ei praesentata."—"[...] mathematical entities and the essences of substances, matter and form, and things of this sort, whose notion the mind gathers through the diligence of natural reason under the species of sensible things, on the basis of a natural connectedness of sensible to non-sensible things [or: characteristics], as if it [i.e. natural reason] were digging under that very species of a sensible thing that is presented to it."

¹⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. V, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 333, 125–127: "Dicitur enim intelligere quasi 'intus legere', id est enucleare quod latet, ut sub intentione et specie sensibili accepta a sensu latet veritas et quidditas rei [...]."

be in conformity with the exemplar in the human mind, the universal species or model that results from intellect's abstraction from sensible data, which is initially caused by an extramental, sensible object.

However, the manuscript tradition shows that Henry continues to revise his early statements in the opening questions of his *Summa*. The critical edition established by Gordon Wilson reveals important marginal corrections in key manuscripts that suggest that Henry sought to strengthen the role of divine illumination even in cases of ordinary human cognition. It seems that Henry lectured on these issues more than once and indeed qualified some of his claims, even after an earlier version had already been obtained by Godfrey of Fontaines by 1276. Thus, in a later version Henry adds at the end of *Summa*, art. I, q. 2 a longer passage that denies even the possibility of cognizing the truth *in some way* through abstraction from sensory information, by purely natural means: "Or, if we want, we can say, and perhaps better, that a human being by his purely natural means, without any supernatural illumination of an assisting divine exemplar, can, through his intellect alone, cognize that which is true with respect to a thing following the senses [...]"²⁰—hence the scope of natural intellect's cognition is now seen as restricted to sensory characteristics. Henry then stresses that "the truth itself of a thing can *in no way* be perceived—be it to a small or great extent—without the illumination by a divine exemplar," and he continues that "the exemplar that is abstracted from the thing does not by itself suffice for this, but it is necessary that the concept of the thing (that is related to the exemplar received from the thing) be made determinate by the divine exemplar [...]"²¹ Henry adds similar qualifications to related texts, including cross-references to the new conclusion of art. I, q. 2.²²

²⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 66, 726–67, 729: "Vel si velimus, possumus dicere, et forte melius, quod homo ex puris naturalibus suis sine omni supernaturali illustratione divini exemplaris assistentis potest per intellectum solum cognoscere id quod verum est de re sequendo sensum [...]" See Wilson's "Critical Study" that accompanies the edition, especially pp. XXXVIII–LXVII.

²¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 2, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 67, 733–737, my emphasis: "veritatem ipsam rei *nequaquam*, sive in modico sive in multo, sine illustratione divini exemplaris possit percipere [...] et quod exemplar abstractum a re ad hoc non sufficiat per se, sed oportet conceptum de re ad exemplar acceptum a re determinari per divinum exemplar."

²² Two examples of significant additions: Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 3, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), p. 86, 332–336: "quia forte, sicut in fine illius quaestionis dictum est, illud exemplar acceptum a re, quod dicitur similitudo rei incompleta, non sufficit ad hoc, ut mens ex solis naturalibus veritatem rei, etiam

II. *Processing a Cognitive Object as Object*

Henry offers a closer examination of our cognitive powers and their functioning in *Quodlibet II*, q. 6, which considers whether a mental word is formed necessarily through an act of understanding. Henry argues that in order to cognize the intellect needs to have some awareness of the cognitive object as an object. Indeed, given its nature the intellect will 'turn itself' towards the object. To clarify this Henry considers two principles: one regarding natural activity, and a more specific one regarding cognitive activity.

According to Henry "every natural action is such that the patient does not only undergo change but also acts in some way, and the more it is something formal, the more it acts and the less it undergoes change, and, conversely, the more it is something material the more it undergoes change and the less it acts."²³ Henry applies this principle to our cognitive capacities, as instances of a patient's undergoing change naturally, from the five external senses and the so-called universal sense, which combines particular sense-impressions of one object, to the imaginative power and finally the intellect. He ranks these capacities in terms of their degree of separation from material constituents, in ascending order, and describes the intellect as to the highest degree immaterial and thus most active.

Now, "in any cognitive act there are two kinds of action: one from the object [acting on] the cognitive power, which is undergoing change only; the other from the changed power itself when it turns itself towards the object through a concept, and if the concept is complete, conceives the essence of the object."²⁴ These two corresponding actions are required for cognition. The object acts on the cognitive subject, and the subject 'turns

quantumcumque incompletam, concipiat sine illustratione divini exemplaris." — "for perhaps, as has been said at the end of that question [*scil.* art. I, q. 2], that exemplar received from a thing [via the senses], which is called an incomplete likeness of the thing, does not suffice for the mind to conceive the thing's truth, however much incomplete, without the illumination and information of a divine exemplar." See art. I, q. 7, p. 145, 73–75 later addition in italics: "Ad tale etiam exemplar aspiciendo potest homo per se scientiam investigare, *non tamen sine adiutorio divini luminis menti assistentis*, ut supra dictum est."

²³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 6, ed. Robert Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 31, 23–26: "sic est in omni actione naturali quod patiens non solum patitur, sed agit aliquo modo, et tanto magis agit et minus patitur, quanto magis est formale, et e converso magis patitur et minus agit, quanto magis est materiale."

²⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 6, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 33, 73–77: "in actu quolibet cognitivo duplex est actio: una ab obiecto in virtutem cognitivam, quae est passio tantum, altera ab ipsa virtute mota convertendo se per notitiam super obiectum, et, si perfecta sit notitia, concipiendo quod quid est obiecti."

towards' the thing that affected it. The subject registers the thing as a cognitive object, which sets cognition apart from other cases of undergoing change. This ability to relate to something as an object marks off a cognizer from other types of recipients: while I perceive the heat of the summer sun on my skin, a stone does not perceive the heat even though the stone equally undergoes a change in temperature because it is heated.²⁵

No cognitive capacity is entirely passive; rather, as Henry points out in a later passage in *Quodlibet XI*, q. 5, "the life-activities of sensation and intellection are not mutations or changes but they are the proper functions of sense and intellect, and they have the nature of an activity that remains in the agent, in the way in which the function of light is to shine in itself."²⁶

According to Henry a greater degree of immateriality in a cognitive power allows for greater activity, which is a higher function to cognize a thing as a whole, in its universality, rather than just a particular aspect of it. While the external senses are primarily receiving information, the human intellect conceptualizes, that is, constructs internally what sort of thing a given object is: "because of [its] greater immateriality it is necessary that the intellect act in conceiving a word when it understands, whereas the sense conceives no word when it senses, and this is because it is less active due to its greater materiality."²⁷

²⁵ Hence perception cannot be merely passive, a mere reception of some form or *species*. As Henry points out, "this is clear in sight and hearing from the fact that, although an object acts by impressing 'itself' through its species in the organ, based on this, however, a human being does not see or hear, except if the power of sight or hearing turns to perceiving the object through the change [caused] by the species [...]"—"Quod patet in visu et auditu ex hoc quod, quamvis obiectum per speciem suam agit imprimendo se organo, ex hoc tamen non videt vel audit homo, nisi vis visiva vel auditiva ad percipiendum obiectum per motum speciei se convertat ad obiectum [...]", *Quodlibet II*, q. 6, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 31, 36–39. See Giuseppina Cannizzo, "La dottrina del 'verbum mentis' in Enrico di Gand," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 54 (1962), pp. 243–266, at 253: "La *conversio*—è la figura dell'obiettivazione, la figura che puntualizza quell'atto *ideale* secondo cui il soggetto, in *corrispondenza* ad un'azione dell'oggetto, si rende presente, ossia 'obbiettivizza' a suo modo la realtà da conoscere." (Emphasis in the original.)

²⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XI*, q. 5, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 451^r: "Actiones autem vitales quae sunt sensatio et intellectio non sunt mutationes aut motus, sed sunt propriae operationes sensus et intellectus, et habent rationem actionis manentis in agente, quemadmodum operatio lucis est lucere in seipsa."

²⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 6, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 33, 79–82: "propter maiorem immaterialitatem necesse est intellectum agere concipiendo verbum cum intelligit, licet sensus nullum verbum concipit cum sentit, et hoc quia propter maiorem materialitatem suam minus est activus."

For Henry there cannot be an act of understanding that does not include such a conceptualization, hence “in every act of understanding, however modest it may be, it is necessary to form a word,” and thus “it is necessary for the intellect either to not understand anything, or to form in itself the essence of a thing.”²⁸ The metaphor of an internal light is meant to illustrate how the intellect conceives what something is, and to explain how the intellect, via this conception, can ‘see,’ that is, have a cognition of, the (particular) thing: “For the proper object of the intellect is the essence. Indeed this is, insofar as it exists in an actual concept, some light, as it were, conceived in the intellect, in which it sees and discerns the thing mentally, which is called its (mental) ‘word,’ without which the intellective act is in no way completed, without which it would not have any better notion of the truth of the thing than sense [has], nor could it, after the reception of the species, investigate, combine [*scil.* contents in a proposition] and elicit a conclusion from principles.”²⁹ Even in this early text Henry regards the mental word not merely as our conceptual means for grasping what a given object is, but as a prerequisite for propositional thought and inferential reasoning. He will elaborate on this idea in his mature account of the mental word.

One other feature is worth highlighting. When a cognizer has processed some *x* as a cognitive object and produced a conception or mental word, she can use this independently of any occurring cognition of *x*. Indeed, no matter what kinds of change *x* undergoes, the conception formed by the cognizer will not be affected by such external changes, even if the thing should go out of existence: “[...] the entire human being that is understanding [*scil.* generates] through that [likeness], by means of the act of understanding, some intention of the thing itself as it is understood, which is called mental word or concept, and whatever of the thing is in the soul, in which the thing is understood.” And Henry continues by drawing out the implications: “The thing itself is seen indifferently—whether it has been present or absent, or actually existing or not existing,

²⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 6, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 32, 67–71: “[...] in omni actu intelligendi, quantumcumque modicus sit, necesse est formare verbum [...] necesse est eum aut nihil intelligere, aut quod quid est de re in se formare.”

²⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 6, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 32, 60–66: “Proprium enim obiectum intellectus est quod quid est. Quod quidem, ut in actuali notitia existit, est quasi quaedam lux in intellectu concepta, in qua rem mentaliter videt et discernit, quod appellatur verbum eius, sine quo actio intellectualis nullo modo perficitur, sine quo non plus haberet notitiam veritatis rei quam sensus, neque post receptionem speciei posset investigare et conferre et elicere conclusionem ex principiis.”

so that the true understanding and the true knowledge of the thing do not depend at all on what is outside [of the mind], except accidentally, namely insofar as [each of them] needs to have received intelligible species from a phantasm [i.e. from sensory representations], [but] when those have been received, knowledge and understanding remain uniformly, no matter how the extramental thing is changed or varied.”³⁰

Again, at this point Henry has not yet fully eliminated intelligible species; by the time of *Quodlibet IV* he will argue that the representational content of phantasms, that is, particular sensory representations in the imaginative power, will suffice as a basis for intellect’s abstraction and production of concepts. Once produced, the conceptual content is not in itself dependent on the extramental thing, and the cognizer can use it to think at will. This also suggests the thinker’s ability to reflect on conceptual content that she has already formed, an important characteristic of Henry’s mature conception of the mental word.

III. *Excursus: The Mental Word in Augustine’s De trinitate*

Since Henry gives special attention to Augustine’s views in order to develop his own mature conception of the mental word, it seems useful to provide first a brief sketch of Augustine’s reflections, especially on mind and the Trinity.³¹ In his work *De trinitate* Augustine explicates the idea of thinking as a kind of internal speaking (*dicere intus*), as an expression in one’s heart (*in corde suo*). To be sure, the suggestion that thinking has language-like features goes back at least to Plato’s *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*,³² and it has recently been revived by Jerry Fodor’s influential work.³³

³⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 15, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 76^{ra}: “[...] totus homo intelligens per ipsam [scil. similitudinem] mediante actu intelligendi [scil. format sive generat—See *supra*] intentionem quandam ipsius rei intellectae quae dicitur verbum sive notitia, et quicquid est rei in anima, in qua intelligitur. Videtur res ipsa indifferenter, sive praesens fuerit, sive absens, sive existens in existentia actuali, sive non existens, ita quod verus intellectus et vera scientia rei non dependet omnino ab eo quod est extra nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet indiget receptione specierum intelligibilium a phantasmate, quibus receptis uniformiter manent scientia et intellectus, qualitercumque mutetur et varietur res extra.”

³¹ For Augustine’s views on soul and mind see Gerard O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley, 1987).

³² See Plato, *Theaetetus* 189e–190a and *Sophist* 263e.

³³ See Jerry Fodor, *The Language of Thought* (New York, 1975).

Although Augustine identifies a word as the primary means of expression in both language and thought, in his mature writings he seeks to explain how the mind forms thoughts and expresses contents internally, whether or not those thoughts are then communicated to others through spoken or written words.

Augustine's goal in *De trinitate* is to elucidate the Christian doctrine of the Divine Trinity. He wants, "to the extent that we can, justify the claim that the Trinity is one single and true God, and that nonetheless it is right to say, believe and understand that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are of one and the same substance or essence."³⁴ Augustine takes a lead for his project from the first biblical creation story, where God says, "Let us make man in our image and likeness." (Gen 1:26) Augustine interprets the plural syntax as evidence for a trinitarian God,³⁵ as Henry of Ghent notes,³⁶ and his inquiry into the best image³⁷ of God in a human being leads him to the human mind: "the argument has now progressed so far that the Trinity appears in the image of God, that is, the human

³⁴ Augustine, *De trinitate* 1.2.4, ed. William Mountain (Turnhout, 1968), p. 31: "[...] quantum possumus, reddere rationem quod trinitas sit unus et solus et verus deus, et quam recte pater et filius et spiritus sanctus unius eiusdemque substantiae vel essentiae dicatur, credatur, intellegatur." In the latter three verbs we can find a climax that seems to reflect Augustine's principle of faith seeking understanding: the formulation, the belief, and eventually the understanding of a proposition. See *ibid.*, 15.2.2, ed. W. Mountain, p. 461: "Fides quaerit, intellectus invenit; propter quod ait propheta: 'Nisi credideritis, non intellegitis.'"—"Faith seeks; understanding finds; wherefore the Prophet says: 'Unless you believe, you shall not understand.'" Here, as elsewhere (see *De libero arbitrio* 2.2.6, ed. William M. Green, (Turnhout, 1970), p. 239), Augustine refers to the old Latin (Itala) version of Isaiah 7:9, whereas the actual text reads: "Unless you believe [or: stand in faith], you shall not stand at all."

³⁵ Augustine, *De trinitate* 14.19.25, ed. W. Mountain, (Turnhout, 1968), p. 456: "At vero illa imago de qua dictum est: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, quia non dictum est, ad meam vel tuam, ad imaginem trinitatis factum hominem credimus [...]"—"But regarding that image of which it was said: 'Let us make man in our image and likeness' we believe that man has been made in the image of the Trinity because it was not said 'in my' or 'in your' image [...]"

³⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Lectura ordinaria super sacram scripturam*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1980), p. 144, 66–67: "Ergo secundum Augustinum tota trinitas, tres scilicet personae, loquitur sibi ipsi."—"Thus according to Augustine the entire Trinity, namely three persons, is talking to itself."

³⁷ For Augustine an image is not merely a likeness since an image expresses, or makes appear, what it is an image of, the origin from which it is generated. On the notion of *imago* see Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus* 16, ed. Joseph Zycha (Vienna, 1894), pp. 497–498; *id.*, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 74, ed. A. Mutzenbecher (Turnhout, 1975), p. 213.

being according to the mind”.³⁸ The trinitarian structure is found in the mind’s three basic capacities: first, *memoria*, the fundamental capacity of acquiring and retaining cognitive contents, and—ideally—knowledge, secondly, *intellegentia*, the rational capacity of thinking and understanding, and thirdly, *voluntas*, the power of the will, which includes both practical, appetitive functions (*amor*) and cognitive functions, since the will controls the mind’s ability to attend to a given object (*attentio*, or *intentio*). In Augustine’s view the human mind is an image of the Divine Trinity to the highest degree when these three mental capacities are actualized in a formed thought (*cogitatio formata*)³⁹ that expresses contents in a true mental word (*verbum verum*). A true mental word is a thought generated from, and based on, a person’s knowledge. Near the end of *De trinitate* Augustine emphasizes how God’s intellectual light provided to a human thinker reveals the internal trinitarian structure: “It reveals to you that there is a true word in you when it is begotten from your knowledge, that is, when we express what we know, even if we neither utter nor think of a sound that is significant in the language of any people; [and it reveals to you that] rather, our thought is formed from that which we know; and that there is in the gaze of the thinker an image that is most like that cognition which the *memoria* contained, with the will or love as a third joining these two together, namely, just as the parent and the offspring. And he, who is able, sees and discerns that even though the will proceeds from cognition [...] it is nonetheless not an image of cognition [...]”⁴⁰ Henry of Ghent includes excerpts from this passage in art. LX, q. 1 of his *Summa*, focusing on Augustine’s final suggestion, which for Henry marks the difference between the generation of the word and the spiration of love: “the love that is the Holy Spirit

³⁸ Augustine, *De trinitate* 15.3.5, ed. W. Mountain (Turnhout, 1968), p. 467: “[...] et eo pervenit disputatio ut trinitas appareat in imagine dei, quod est homo secundum mentem [...]” See *De trinitate* 12.7.12; 15.1.1.

³⁹ On Augustine’s notion of *cogitatio*, which can refer to a thought process or to its product, see Gerard Watson, art. “Cogitatio,” in *Augustinus-Lexikon*, vol. I, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel, 1986–1994), cols. 1046–1051.

⁴⁰ Augustine, *De trinitate* 15.27.50, ed. W. Mountain (Turnhout, 1968), pp. 532–533: “Ipsa ostendit tibi verbum verum esse in te quando de scientia tua gignitur, id est quando quod scimus dicimus, etsi nullius gentis lingua significantem vocem vel proferamus vel cogitemus; sed ex illo quod novimus cogitatio nostra formetur, sitque in acie cogitantis imago simillima cognitionis eius quam memoria continebat, ista duo scilicet velut parentem ac prolem tertia voluntate sive dilectione iungente. Quam quidem voluntatem de cognitione procedere [...] non tamen esse cognitionis imaginem [...], cernit discernitque qui potest.”

proceeds from both [kinds of] conceptual content [i.e. in Father and Son], but it is not an image of a conception from which it proceeds.”⁴¹

IV. *The Mental Word as a Definitional Account Based on a Prior Concept*

In his mature conception of the mental word Henry makes clear that the mental word is not just *any* kind of concept but a definitional concept or account that is expressive and explanatory of a thing’s essential structure—a concept that marks the result of a discursive inquiry into a thing’s essence. In *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, Henry examines whether in the case of the beatific vision a cognizer forms a word about God, the object of cognition, and uses this context for developing in more detail his own conception of the mental word. He observes that “Augustine speaks in various ways about the word and about scientific knowledge or conceptual content, as is clear to anyone who carefully studies his book *De trinitate*.”⁴² Yet Henry’s project is only exegetical to some extent, since he wants to analyze the intellectual processes that result in the formation of a mental word. He now states more clearly than before that the mental word requires a specific kind of conceptual content. Henry claims that “nothing existing in us can be called a [mental] word unless the understanding has been informed by an actual and determinate concept”⁴³ After citing related passages from book XV of Augustine’s *De trinitate* Henry presents what he considers the core of these passages, and what in fact marks the nucleus of his own view: “This is the expressed view of Augustine, what he would call [mental] ‘word’: the formed concept in the understanding of a thing whose concept we have in the *memoria*.”⁴⁴

⁴¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LX, q. 1, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 156^{VC}: “de utraque autem notitia procedit amor qui spiritus sanctus est, et tamen notitiae de qua procedit imago non est.” See Juan Carlos Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity* (Leuven, 2006), pp. 56–57.

⁴² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 98^Q: “[...] Augustinus varie loquitur de verbo et de scientia sive notitia, ut patet perscrutanti librum eius *De trinitate*.”

⁴³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 96^{VK}: “nihil existens in nobis verbum dici potest nisi intelligentia actuali notitia et determinata fuerit informata”.

⁴⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 96^{VL}: “Ecce expressa sententia Augustini quid appelleret [mss.—Badius has ‘appellet!’] verbum, quoniam formatam notitiam in intelligentia de re cuius notitiam habemus in memoria.”

For Henry a mental word requires forming a concept or account on the basis of some other, prior concept, which is accessible in intellectual memory. While Augustine in *De trinitate* explains that a mental word is primarily a conscious actualization of cognitive content accessible via the *memoria*, Henry interprets Augustine differently because Henry thinks that a mental word is a newly formed, numerically distinct concept based on some prior concept in intellectual memory. The fact that in his formulations Henry uses Augustinian terms in order to develop his own conception (for instance *notitia de notitia*) does not mean that Henry's conception is entirely in accord with Augustine's views.⁴⁵ Henry is interested in the mental word as a definitional account based on a prior concept. Before examining *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, in greater detail to see how Henry integrates his own conception into a broader theory of how we acquire theoretical knowledge, it seems worth considering how a mental word relates to intellect's functioning.

Henry gives a systematic account of the mental word as completing an act of intellectual understanding in *Quodlibet VI*, q. 1, which discusses whether there are exactly three persons in God and examines specifically the processions of the divine persons. In this context Henry considers intellect and will in general, whether human or divine, and how their respective acts of understanding and willing are completed. Henry argues that the mere actualization of intellect or will is not yet the completion of the respective capacity: "For the *intellect* in the one who is understanding is not completed according to the act of understanding until from the act of the intellect something proceeds that is a [mental] word and is called 'word'. Nor, similarly, is the *will* in the one who is willing [completed] according to the act of willing until from the act of willing something proceeds that is proceeding love, and is called, 'proceeding love,' for which we have no proper name."⁴⁶ In Henry's view the operations of intellect and will are best understood by considering their respective endpoints or *termini*: "For just as in the [mental] word the intellect comes

⁴⁵ Against Theophiel Nys, *De werking van het menselijk verstand volgens Hendrik van Gent* (Leuven, 1949), p. 104, who claims that in *Quodlibet IV* Henry "bouwt een nieuwe formule op, geheel overeenkomstig met de leer en met de uitdrukkingen van Augustinus." (My emphasis)

⁴⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), p. 13, 67–71, my emphasis: "*Intellectus* enim in intelligente numquam secundum actum intelligendi perficitur donec ex actu intellectus procedat aliquid quod sit et dicatur verbum. Similiter neque *voluntas* in volente secundum actum volendi [*scil.* perficitur] donec ex actu voluntatis procedat aliquid quod sit et dicatur amor procedens, cuius proprium nomen nobis deficit."

to rest in the true and is not completed in the intellectual activity until it reaches it, so in the proceeding love, which we can suitably call 'fervor' [...], the will comes to rest in the good and is not [completed] in the activity of willing until it reaches it."⁴⁷

The intellect, the mind's cognitive capacity, is directed at what is true, while the will, the mind's desiderative capacity, is directed at the good. Only later does Henry address the issue whether it is one and the same object that appears to each capacity under different perspectives, i.e. as true or good. He argues in *Quodlibet* X, q. 15, that "the same object of both [*scil.* intellect and will] is, insofar as it exists, something real. For, the conception of the true and the conception of the good are not the objects of the intellect and the will, but rather the thing itself under the conception of the true is the object of the intellect, and under the conception of the good, [the object] of the will"⁴⁸

To clarify how the human intellect generates an inner word based on prior content Henry distinguishes two levels of our intellectual functions: a first and a second operation that correspond to intellect's receptive and productive features.⁴⁹ It is the second operation that produces a mental word. In *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1, Henry explains these two levels, beginning with the first: "It [*scil.* the human intellect] is however passive because of the fact that it is completed by a change that comes about from the thing understood in the intellect, through which [change] the very act of understanding is completed out of the intellect and the intelligible [object]; the act of understanding is the intellect's first operation, through

⁴⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), pp. 13, 71–14, 75: "Sicut enim in verbo quiescit intellectus in vero et non perficitur in actione intellectuali donec ipsum attingat, sic in amore procedente quem 'zelum' possumus appellare competenter [...], quiescit voluntas in bono et non in actione voluntaria donec ipsum attingat."

⁴⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* X, q. 15, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), p. 301, 24–26: "idem obiectum utriusque est secundum quod est, aliquid reale. Ratio enim veri et ratio boni non sunt obiecta intellectus et voluntatis, sed res ipsa sub ratione veri est obiectum intellectus, sub ratione autem boni, voluntatis [...]."

⁴⁹ Henry holds on to this distinction but later puts more emphasis on his insight that no cognitive capacity is entirely passive, and so he considers the twofold *activity* even of the receptive, or 'possible' intellect in *Quodlibet* XIV, q. 6, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 566^v: "Dico quod duplex est actio intellectus possibilis. Una qua intelligit prima intelligentia et simplici, ad quam determinatur per obiectum. Alia vero est eius actio secunda quae se exercet et discurrit ab uno in alterum dividendo, congregando et conferendo."—"I say that the activity of the possible intellect is twofold. One, by which it understands through a first and simple understanding, to which it is determined by the [cognitive] object. Another, however, is its second activity which it carries out itself, and it goes (discursively) from one item to another, dividing, bringing together and combining."

which it is completed in a simple concept received from the thing understood. And this concept, an accident inhering in our intellect, is different from the intellect and the thing understood, even [in the case] when the intellect understands itself.”⁵⁰

Human intellect’s first operation is a change brought about by an object (a universal in representational content) that is understood, or thought about, by the intellect. The act of understanding is constituted by both the intellect (as the subject) and something intelligible (the object). The result of this first operation is a simple, as yet undifferentiated concept of the object of cognition. Such an initial, simple concept is representative of some thing (*notitia de re*) and a manifestation of it, although in a cognitively and conceptually imperfect manner: “This concept of the thing is, as it were, some confused and indefinite manifestation of it since through it a thing is cognized as something confused and indistinct that is definable, like a circle, which is not completely cognized by the intellect until [the intellect] forms in itself the definition of the circle, by cognizing about it that it is a plane (geometrical) figure etc.”⁵¹

As the example illustrates,⁵² a thing grasped in a confused conception is recognized as something that could be defined, although the preliminary confused conception is not itself any kind of definition. The elements in it are, as it were, ‘fused together’ and not yet differentiated. In other words, the thing’s essential characteristics are not yet conceptually distinct; no complete definitional account can yet be given of what the object is. A circle that is expressed in such an “indefinite manifestation” may appear indistinct from an ellipsis or other figures, and hence it is not (yet) completely cognized as what it is.

For Henry the intellect’s activity of understanding is not completed until (*donec*) it comes to rest in a mental word, which provides the desired definitional account of a given object, through which it cognizes the

⁵⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), p. 14, 82–87: “Est autem passivus per hoc quod perficitur ex motu qui fit a re intellecta in ipsum, per quem perficitur ex intellectu et intelligibili ipse actus intelligendi, qui est eius operatio prima, qua perficitur in simplici notitia habita de re intellecta. Et est ista notitia accidens inhaerens in intellectu nostro aliud ab ipso intellectu et ipsa re intellecta, etiam cum se ipsum intelligit.”

⁵¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), p. 14, 88–92: “Est etiam ista notitia de re quasi quaedam confusa et indefinita manifestatio eius, quia per ipsam cognoscitur res tamquam quiddam definibile confusum et indistinctum, ut circulus qui complete ab intellectu non cognoscitur donec formet in se eius definitionem, cognoscendo de eo quod est figura plana etc.”

⁵² See the beginning of Aristotle’s *Physics* I, 1, 184a25–b13.

object's essence. Moreover, the intellect is set up to achieve not merely a nominal definition but a real definition of a thing's essence. This is, ideally, the result of the second operation, the active, discursive function of the intellect: "However, in order to form in itself this essence of a thing, expressed by a definition, [1] our intellect is active by (discursively) examining, via the art of investigation, the essence, by way of negating and affirming of the genus one of the (specific) differences, until something convertible with what is defined is had, according to the rules of the art of definition treated in book II of [Aristotle's] *Posterior Analytics*. [2] When, however, after the aforementioned simple concept of the thing the intellect is engaged in its discursive (activity) just mentioned, its act is called 'thought' and it is a (mental) word, but it is still unformed, not yet formed, rather something formable. [3] When indeed, after the ultimate difference is added [to the genus] [the intellect] conceives a definitional account, which is the (mental) word of the thing in the intellect, now completed and formed through its second act, with respect to which the intellect is entirely active, and in which the intellect's discursive (activity) comes to rest [...]"⁵³

To express the essence of a cognitive object by way of a definition, [1] the human intellect engages in a discursive inquiry into the object's essential characteristics; it develops a definitional account or concept. That is, for a given object (in Henry's example *circulus*) the intellect attempts to find the appropriate highest genus (here: *figura*) and to further identify the thing's essential features—what it has in common with other members of a given kind—by subdividing, i.e. specifying the genus via specific differences (*plana*, i.e. two-dimensional, and so on). Intellect's discursive inquiry into a thing's essence comes to an end when the ultimate (specific) difference is incorporated into the definitional account, which is, Henry says, a mental word [3]. The mental word, then, is the result of this second, entirely active function of the intellect. Henry does not explicate here whether this conceived account does adequately,

⁵³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), pp. 14, 93–15, 4: "Ad formandum autem in se de re ipsum quod quid est, expressum per definitionem, [1] se habet intellectus noster active discurrendo via artis investigandi quod quid est, dividendo et componendo generi alterum dividendum, quousque habeatur convertibile cum definito, iuxta regulas artis definitivae traditae in [libro] II^o *Posteriorum*. [2] Cum autem post implicem notitiam rei iam dictam intellectus est in suo discursu iam dicto, actus eius dicitur cogitatio et est verbum, sed adhuc informe, non iam formatum, sed formabile quoddam. [3] Cum vero, ultima differentia adiuncta, concipit definitivam rationem, illa est verbum in intellectu de re iam perfectum et formatum per actum eius secundum, ad quem se habet pure active, et in eo quiescit discursus intellectus [...]"

i.e. completely, capture what a thing is. In Henry's example a definitional account of a circle whose content is 'plane figure' will not enable a cognizer to understand completely what a circle, or this circle in front of her, is, since such an account would not be specific enough; rather it would pick out all kinds of figures such as circles, squares, triangles etc.

A similar account of intellect's discursive inquiry into a thing's essence can be found in *Quodlibet XIV*, q. 6, where Henry links his own views to Augustine's, and he explicitly states that the resulting distinct, declarative conception is called "a word about the thing's essence. For this reason Augustine also called a thing's essence its 'word.'"⁵⁴ Yet there appears to be only one brief passage in *De trinitate* where Augustine speaks of *defining* in the context of the mental word: "For it pleases me that I [can] know and define what intemperance is, and this is its [mental] word. [...] And to define intemperance and to express its [mental] word, belongs to moral philosophy."⁵⁵ There is a further complication, since for Augustine intemperance and other vices or virtues do not appear to have images or representations in our fundamental cognitive capacity of *memoria*; rather, it seems that via our *memoria* we have cognitive access to these incorporeal, intelligible matters themselves. So it is difficult to see how there could be a definitional account generated from a prior conception. Nonetheless, in *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, Henry uses the core of Augustine's brief passage as his prime example for the mental word: "And [Augustine] says in book IX, chapter 10 [of *De trinitate*] about the word of the intellect: 'That I know and define what intemperance is, that is its word.' And this word is produced, or conceived from the concept that is latent in the *memoria* which is like its parent [...]"⁵⁶ Differentiating these two levels of conceptualization helps Henry to clarify and improve his initial account and to avoid theological difficulties: in the Trinity the personal generation of the Word by the Father must be distinguished from an essential understanding common to all three divine persons (which involves content but does not produce a word).

⁵⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. XIV*, q. 6, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. DLXVI^v: "... verbum de eo quod quid est. Propter quod Augustinus etiam quod quid est de re appellat verbum eius".

⁵⁵ Augustine, *De trinitate* 9.10.15, ed. W. Mountain (Turnhout, 1968), p. 306: "Nam placet mihi quod novi et definitio quid sit intemperantia, et hoc est verbum eius. [...] Et definire intemperantiam verbumque eius dicere pertinet ad artem morum [...]"

⁵⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 96^v: "Et libro IX^o capitulo 10^o [scil. *De trinitate*] dicit de verbo intellectus: 'Quod novi et definitio quod sit intemperantia, hoc est verbum eius.' Et nascitur verbum hoc, seu concipitur de notitia latente in memoria quae est sicut parens eius [...]"

V. *Thought and the Formation of a Mental Word*

In Henry's account of intellect's discursive inquiry—as outlined above—the beginning from an initial concept [1] and the endpoint, the formed mental word [3], mark intellect's twofold nature; it is a capacity that is both receptive and constructive. Henry is equally interested in the formation itself of the mental word [2], when the intellect is engaging in its inquiry and its act is called 'thought' and is a kind of word, although it is "unformed, not yet formed". This idea of an unformed mental word, a *verbum informe*, is much more prominent in Henry than in Augustine.⁵⁷ Henry calls this word in thought 'unformed' because he considers it to be in a state of conceptual flux. Intellect's active, constructive function means that, while a mental word is being formed, the intellect can and does activate, modify and combine cognitive contents available and accessible in intellectual memory: "And this concept which is a mental word is generated from the other, preceding concept, that is, from the intellect itself that has been informed with that concept, and it is formed from it like an offspring from a parent. And it is something that is formable, before it is actually formed through the operation of the intellect, as Augustine says in *De trinitate*, book XV, chapter 15 [...]"⁵⁸ Henry then quotes from the one chapter in Augustine that most clearly describes the 'wandering' character of human conscious thought (as we think now of this and now of that). Henry interprets this as the kind of conceptual flux and discursive inquiry that characterizes the unformed mental word.

However, contrary to Henry's presentation (or at least the manuscript source Henry is relying on), Augustine himself is very reluctant to call a 'word' what is unformed and still in the process of being formed in thought, as the original text of this passage about the Trinity shows. In fact, Henry's text from *Quodlibet VI*, q. 1 does not include the following italicized bits from Augustine's *De trinitate* 15.15.25: "And because of this, *even if* we [Henry: can] concede, *so that we shall not appear to*

⁵⁷ For a detailed and informative discussion see Matthias Laarmann, *Deus, primum cognitum* (Münster i. W., 1999), pp. 312–323.

⁵⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), p. 15, 9–13: "Et nascitur haec notitia quae verbum est, de alia notitia praecedente, hoc est de ipso intellectu illa notitia informato, et formatur de eo tamquam proles de parente. Et formabile est antequam opere intellectus actu formetur, dicente Augustino [libro] XV^o *De trinitate* capitulo 15^o [...]"

be troubled by a controversy over terms, that we ought to call a ‘word’ this thing of our mind that can be formed from our knowledge even before it is formed, since it is already, like I say, formable, *who cannot see how great the unlikeness here is with regard to God’s Word [...]*”⁵⁹ Augustine is reluctant to identify anything unformed as some kind of indeterminate word because in his view the comparison between some unformed mental word in human thought and the Divine Word is ill-suited, since the Word of God, Augustine continues, “is in God’s form in such a way that it was never formable before it was formed, nor can it at any time be without form.”⁶⁰ Augustine argues that in the case of the human intellect there is no one single mental word that could be always united to the understanding in actual thought, in the way the one all-encompassing Divine Word, the second person of the Trinity, is always pure form and always united to the Divine Mind, thus is a coeternal expression of its knowledge.

Since Henry’s version lacks the text in italics it offers a much more positive assessment of the unformed mental word, especially because Henry does not report how Augustine continues this thought. To be sure, Henry may have used a different version of the text, but one possible systematic reason for this creative re-interpretation is that Henry seeks to incorporate Aristotelian elements into his comprehensive conception of the mental word. Henry identifies the intellect’s thought, the higher-level conceptualization that is ongoing and in flux, with the unformed mental word. In this way Henry can better integrate the manner in which a definitional account is reached in terms of genus and specific differences.

We may ask what drives this entire thought-process, why it is the case that a cognizer continues to inquire into a thing’s nature. To answer this question Henry develops another Augustinian idea: according to Augustine the mental word is conceptual content or knowledge coupled with

⁵⁹ Augustine, *De trinitate* 15.15.25, ed. W. Mountain (Turnhout, 1968), pp. 499–500: “Ac per hoc *etiam si concedamus, ne de controversia vocabuli laborare videamur*, iam vocandum esse verbum quiddam illud mentis nostrae quod de nostra scientia formari potest, etiam priusquam formatum sit, quia iam, ut ita dicam, formabile est, *quis non videat quanta hic sit dissimilitudo ab illo Dei Verbo [...]*” (For Henry’s version, without the text in italics, see *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), p. 16, 20–22.)

⁶⁰ The text just quoted continues in Augustine (but not in Henry!), *De trinitate* 15.16.25, ed. W. Mountain (Turnhout, 1968), p. 500: “[...] quod in forma Dei sic est, ut non antea fuerit formabile priusquam formatum, nec aliquando esse possit informe, sed sit forma simplex et simpliciter aequalis ei de quo est, et cui mirabiliter coaeterna est.”

love (*notitia cum amore*).⁶¹ Henry identifies our will or rational desire as the driving force of inquiry that has to come to rest in a way similar to our intellect. He explicates this most clearly in his *Summa*, art. LVIII, q. 2. "For when the receptive intellect has been informed with a simple, confused concept of what a thing is, for instance of a man or horse, or white or black, the will that delights in the cognized thing (though incompletely since it has not been cognized completely) is excited to come to know through the intellect what is left [to be cognized], so that it might completely delight in something completely cognized, according to what Augustine says in *De trinitate*, Book X, chapter I: 'That something is known, but not fully known, is the reason the mind desires to know what is left [to be known about it].' For this reason the will through its command moves the intellect so that it may attend to what is already cognized in a confused manner and cognize it to a greater extent. The intellect that is moved by the command of the will and by its own active power, fixes its gaze on the thing that is cognized more strongly and sharply and strives to penetrate [to] the interior features of what is cognized in a confused way, so that it may cognize clearly what it is in the parts that make up its essence."⁶² While this conception illustrates the interaction between our cognitive and appetitive powers of the mind, Henry's description raises questions about the completeness or adequacy of our mental representations formed in this manner. How can the human mind assess whether there is anything left to be cognized or indeed known about a given object? How can we be sure that our mental word is not in some way deficient but rather comprises a complete definitional account? This

⁶¹ See Augustine, *De trinitate* 9.10.15, ed. W. Mountain (Turnhout, 1968), p. 307: "Verbum est igitur quod nunc discernere et insinuare volumus, cum amore notitia."—"The word which we now want to discern and study, is a concept [or: knowledge] with love." See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 96^{vi}: "verbum secundum Augustinum IX^o *De trinitate* est cum amore notitia".

⁶² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. LVIII, q. 2, ed. Badius (Paris 1520), II, fol. 130^{vi}: "Cum enim intellectus possibilis informatus fuerit simplici notitia confusa eius cuius est quod quid est, puta hominis aut equi, albi aut nigri, voluntas delectata in cognito sed imperfecte sicut imperfecte est cognitum flagrat per intellectum nosse quod restat, ut perfecte cognitum perfecte delectet, dicente Augustino [libro] X^o *De trinitate* capitulo 1^o: 'Quo aliquid notum est, sed non plene notum est, eo cupit animus de illo nosse quod reliquum est.' Propter quod suo imperio movet intellectum ut iam confuse cognito, ut ad amplius cognoscendum intendat. Intellectus autem motus imperio voluntatis et propria vi activa eius, aciem suam in rem cognitam fortius et acrius figit, et penetrare nititur interiora ipsius cogniti confuse, ut in partibus integrantibus eius essentiam ipsum limpide quid sit cognoscat." See Augustine, *De trinitate* 10.1.2, ed. W. Mountain (Turnhout, 1968), p. 312.

is an issue worth returning to; we have already seen Henry's qualifications regarding our natural cognitive abilities and his strengthening of the role of divine illumination (in Henry's revisions of the opening questions of the *Summa*).

VI. *The Mental Word and Theoretical Knowledge*

Henry seeks to integrate the conception of the mental word into a broader theory of how we acquire theoretical knowledge (*scientia*). To this end Henry identifies in *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, two relevant activities of our intellect—the first is by now familiar, the second a further elaboration:

- 1) Finding a thing's definition by discursively going through genera and species, on the model of the *arbor porphyriana* (for this 'method of division' Henry refers, very generally, to Book II of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*,⁶³ and to Boethius' *De divisione*).⁶⁴
- 2) Inferential, syllogistic reasoning which is the mark of demonstrative science (for this 'method of syllogistic reasoning' Henry simply refers to "the entire new logic," i.e. those logical writings by Aristotle that were not available in the Latin West before the twelfth century: the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations*).⁶⁵

Henry maintains that by means of these two activities it is possible to settle the four questions that Aristotle has identified, at the beginning of *Posterior Analytics* II, as specific to our scientific inquiry and the acquisition of theoretical knowledge: if something is, what it is, that it is, why it is.⁶⁶ The order in Henry is somewhat changed, to reflect his

⁶³ For the text and main ideas in Aristotle himself see Aristotle, *Prior and Posterior Analytics*, ed. William David Ross, revised text with introd. and comment. (Oxford, 1949), and Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, trans. with a comment. by Jonathan Barnes, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1993).

⁶⁴ See Boethius, *De divisione liber*, crit. ed., trans., proleg. and comment. by John Magee (Leiden, 1998).

⁶⁵ For a first overview see Bernard G. Dod, "Aristoteles latinus," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 45–79.

⁶⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris 1518), fol. 97^{vn}: "Ex quibus duabus operationibus intellectus terminantur quattuor quaestiones scientiales propositae a Philosopho in principio IIⁱ *Posteriorum*: 'Si est, quid est, quia est, propter quid est.'" — The order of these questions is changed in Henry as compared to the original order in

twofold distinction of first, a definitional activity that results in some conceptual content, and second, a syllogistic, argumentative activity that results in some propositional content, a judgment: “And first, by discursively going through and treating the most common universal [*scil.* the highest genus] in the manner of division, through specific differences until [it comes to] the species, it finds the concept of the essence of each thing, which it forms for itself in a [mental] word that it conceives through its intellectual operation and expresses through the intellect’s judgment that ‘This—for instance: a human being—is a rational animal.’”⁶⁷

In this example the inquiry results in a mental word that comprises a definitional account of a thing’s essence (e.g. *rational animal*). This definitional account can be used in a propositional context, namely in intellect’s judgment that this object under consideration (e.g. “this man”) does indeed have the stated essential characteristics (“... is a rational animal”).

But Henry is interested especially in the second activity of inferential reasoning: “Then, by discursively going through those things that it finds as middle terms between the predicate and the subject—when [for example] it conceives that the sun is eclipsed, it finds by way of the syllogistic method the middle term that is the cause of the predicate’s inhering in the subject—, it conceives the concept that is the cause, which it forms in a [mental] word that it conceives through an intellectual operation and expresses through the intellect’s judgment that ‘The sun is eclipsed because the moon is directly interposed between us [*scil.* the observers] and the sun.’”⁶⁸

Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* II, 1, 89 b24. For the reception of these questions and their interpretation in Henry see Pasquale Porro, *Enrico di Gand. La via delle proposizioni universali* (Bari, 1990).

⁶⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 97^{vN}: “Et primo discurrendo et pertractando universale communissimum via divisiva per differentias usque ad speciem, invenit notitiam eius quod quid est, de unoquoque, quam format sibi in verbo quod intellectuali operatione sua concipit, et dicit intellectui componente quoniam hoc, puta: homo, est animal rationale.”

⁶⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 97^{vN}: “Deinde discurrendo per ea quae media invenit inter praedicatum et subiectum, cum concipit quia sol eclipsatur via artis syllogisticae inveniendū medium quod est causa inhaerentiae praedicati ad subiectum, concipit notitiam quae est propter quid, quam format in verbo quod concipit intellectuali operatione et dicit intellectui componente quod sol eclipsatur, quia luna directe inter nos et ipsum interponitur.”

This example presents a syllogism rewritten in the form of an explanation. The conclusion of the syllogism is that “the sun is eclipsed”, that is, ‘the sun’ is the subject and ‘... is eclipsed’ is the predicate. Henry follows common Aristotelian usage: the ‘middle term’ is the desired definitional account that has explanatory force in a syllogistic argument (since it appears in both premisses) and that indicates the reason why some fact obtains.⁶⁹ The definitional account can enter the sort of judgment that Henry states as an example, i.e. “the sun is eclipsed because ... [*state the middle term, ‘the reason why’*]”. We can reconstruct the original syllogism, the basis of this judgment, roughly as follows:

- (P1) “The direct interposition of the moon between us [the perceiver] and the sun is the cause of a (solar) eclipse.”
- (P2) “The sun is such that the moon is directly interposed between us [the perceiver] and the sun.”
- (C) “The sun is eclipsed.”

We can see how forming (in a mental word) a definitional account of ‘eclipse’ as in (P1) will help us acquire a deeper theoretical understanding of a given phenomenon (the sun’s being eclipsed). While we can imagine a number of other attempts to explain why “the sun is eclipsed,” only a judgment that incorporates the correct definitional account (formed in a mental word) seems sufficiently explanatory in a fundamentally theoretical sense.

However, for Henry this is only the first step towards acquiring theoretical knowledge. True theoretical knowledge involves a habit, it is dispositional, with the result that the cognizer is in a position to reproduce its pieces without having to go again—as if for the first time—through the entire process of finding definitions and construing syllogisms: “before the first act of the intellect that cognizes what is scientifically true in the described manner, there is nothing at all in the intellect nor in the person’s *memoria* of some theoretical habit of knowledge nor, indeed, of any knowledge. But through this sort of first act it begins to bring about in the intellect a certain disposition towards a scientific habit which is strengthened, or increased, and confirmed *through frequent intellectual activity*. And through this, finally, a habit comes about.”⁷⁰

⁶⁹ See Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* II 12, 95 b12 et passim.

⁷⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 97^{vN}: “ante primum actum intellectus scientificum cognoscentis verum secundum iam dictum modum nihil est in intellectu omnino neque in eius memoria de habitu aliquo speculativo scientiali

For this reason Henry says in *Quodlibet V*, q. 25, that the perfect notion of the mental word implies that it is being brought forth from a theoretical, scientific habit: “when the intellect frequently conceives such a word in the act of its understanding, a scientific habit is produced in the intellect through which it is inclined, with the result that it may more easily and efficiently conceive a complex word that has already been expressed. This habit is in the intellect insofar as it is *memoria*. Thus, properly speaking intellectual memory is nothing but the receptive intellect, insofar as it contains a scientific habit, which is potentially everything knowable.”⁷¹ Henry here maps the Augustinian notion of *memoria* onto the Aristotelian notion of the receptive intellect.

VII. *Six Features of a Mental Word*

In *Summa*, article 40, questions 6 and 7, Henry presents a succinct account of the mental word, a summary of characteristics developed thus far. In question 7 Henry puts forth a list of six features of a mental word, more precisely: of a *complete* mental word, including findings from the *Quodlibeta*: “Thus, one should know that regarding the account and nature of a complete mental word, both in creatures and in the creator, six features are required. When these six features are combined and set in order, a mental word can be described in the following manner: A mental word is

- [1] the *terminus*
- [2] of an intellective activity,
- [3] emanating
- [4] from the one who is understanding in actuality,
- [5] remaining in the one who is understanding,
- [6] clarifying something else.”⁷²

neque ulla scientia omnino. Sed per huiusmodi actum primum incipit fieri in intellectu dispositio quaedam ad habitum scientialem quae *per frequentes actiones intellectuales* intenditur seu augmentatur et firmatur. Et per hoc demum fit habitus” (My emphasis)

⁷¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 25, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 204^v^k: “per hoc quod intellectus frequenter actu suo intelligendi concipit tale verbum, generatur in ipso habitus scientialis, per quem inclinatur ut de facili et expedite huiusmodi verbum complexum iam dictum concipiat. Qui [*scil.* habitus] quidem in intellectu consistit ut in memoria. Ita quod memoria intellectualis nihil aliud sit proprie dicta quam intellectus possibilis, ut est contentivus habitus scientialis, qui virtute est omnia scibilia.”

⁷² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XL, q. 7, ed. G. Wilson

These six items can serve as criteria for assessing whether any given *x* counts as a complete mental word or not. [1] states that the mental word constitutes the endpoint of an operation of the intellect, “in contrast to the intelligible object, which is the formal principle of every intellectual operation”.⁷³ For the first operation of the intellect is passive, or rather: receptive, and hence the intellect depends on its being acted upon by an intelligible object, presented initially via characteristics in the representational content (of phantasms) in the imaginative capacity. A mental word constitutes the endpoint of an activity of the intellect, as condition [2] specifies, since, Henry says, the endpoint of the will’s activity is the (coupling) love that proceeds from it. [3] means that the mental word needs to proceed, namely from the one who is understanding in actuality, as [4] determines. This is because, on Henry’s account, the intellect is only actualized as a result of its first operation, its receiving some simple understanding (*simplex intelligentia*) from a given cognitive object. The mental word is thus a result not of intellect’s receptive function, but rather of its active-constructive function. Moreover, characteristic of the mental word is that it remains in the thinker, as [5] states, “in contrast to the sounding word, which is emitted outward corporeally and is the sign of the word that remains inside.”⁷⁴ The final feature [6] suggests that if a mental word is complete it (fully) clarifies something else.

Henry puts most emphasis on the condition that the mental word be a clarification and manifestation of some (other) thing, so that via a definitional account the cognizer come to know a thing more perfectly. Henry is aware that a formed mental word may be complete or incomplete: “since the (mental) word that is a clarification of something else can comprehend the essence either completely comprehending with the genus all the (specific) differences up to and including the ultimate difference, or [incompletely,] omitting several among them, according to this *the word of a thing that is formed in the mind* can be either *complete*, as when of

(Leuven, 1994), p. 285, 79–83: “Est igitur sciendum quod ad rationem et naturam verbi mentalis perfecti, tam in creatura quam in Creatore, sex conditiones requiruntur, quibus coniunctis et ordinatis, potest verbum describi hoc modo. Verbum est [1] terminus [2] actionis intellectualis, [3] emanans [4] ab intelligente secundum actum, [5] manens in ipso intelligente, [6] alterius declarativum.”

⁷³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XL, q. 7, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1994), p. 285, 86–88: “ad differentiam obiecti intelligibilis, quod est formale principium omnis intellectualis operationis”.

⁷⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XL, q. 7, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1994), p. 285, 99–100: “ad differentiam verbi vocalis, quod corporaliter extra emittitur et est signum verbi manentis intra.”

a human being it is conceived that it is a substance, [namely a] corporeal, animated, sensible, rational [substance], or *incomplete*, as when it is conceived only that it is a substance, [namely an] animated, sensible [substance].”⁷⁵

Thus a complete mental word possesses all six features, including the last one, whereas an incomplete mental word is in a sense deficient. In contrast to the word-logos in the divine mind of the creator, the mental word in the created mind can clearly fall short. Although to some extent an incomplete mental word would still be a clarification of a given object (here: a human being), it would be so only imperfectly. Finally, since the mental word is a clarifying expression of something else which is itself the object of the intellect, it is that through which the object is understood (*in quo intelligitur*). This is the final actuality of understanding, after the word has been formed, based on a prior concept. This kind of understanding involves a reflection of one’s own cognitive acts.

VIII. *The Mental Word and Reflexivity*

Henry identifies a cognizer’s ability to reflect on her own cognitive acts and their contents in the trinitarian articles of his *Summa*. In article 54, question 9, Henry argues that a mental word brings the mind’s unstable, ongoing thought-process to a rest and provides for a final, stable cognition of a given object. The conception of a mental word now explicitly includes the idea that in a cognitive subject some reflection occurs, a turning towards the object, which is mediated by a reflection on the cognitive process itself, including its object: “[...] in all our intellectual cognition regarding a thing about which it is natural that a mental word be formed, there is first some simple knowledge or concept in the intellect that is created not by an activity of the intellect (because with respect to this sort of concept the created intellect is only passive), but from the intelligible thing, made an object by actualizing in the intellect its [*scil.* expressive] species, which is a concept of the thing that remains in

⁷⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XL, q. 7, ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, 1994), p. 288, 62–69, my emphasis: “[...] quia verbum declarativum alterius potest comprehendere id quod quid est, vel perfecte comprehendendo cum genere omnes differentias usque ad ultimam inclusive, vel ultimam, vel plures ex eis omittendo, secundum hoc verbum formatum in mente de re potest esse vel *perfectum*, ut si de homine concipiatur quia est substantia corporea animata sensibilis rationalis, vel *imperfectum*, ut si tantum concipiatur quia est substantia animata sensibilis.”

memory. And from the intellect (thus informed by that simple concept or knowledge that exists in memory), *which is reflecting on itself* insofar as it is an understanding *simpliciter*, and moving itself by having itself been informed in this way, as an intelligible object, there comes about a concept or knowledge in thought, which is a mental word in the understanding.”⁷⁶

When the actualized intellect has been informed with an initial concept (stored in and retrieved from intellectual memory), the intellect does not only reflect on this conceptual content. Rather, the intellect reflects on itself, on the entire act that has been informed with some content (*replicante se supra se*). The mental word thus involves a cognizer’s reflecting not only on the concept of some prior act, but on the entire current intellectual act with its content.

Given this self-reflexive capacity, the object *as we cognize it* is in part determined by the way we inquire into it, that is, by the way we reflect on our own intellectual acts. Henry seeks to explicate how we are aware of ourselves as *subjects* and cognitive *agents* in relation to an object via self-reflection that accompanies our intellectual acts and their representational content. A further passage from the same question may illustrate this expanded conception of the mental word: “For through the second concept which is in the mental word, [our intellect] does not only know and understand the thing, but it does know and understand it in such a way that it knows_R that it knows and understands the thing by virtue of intellect’s understanding in a second reflection over the first act of understanding or knowing.”⁷⁷

The index-R here in the phrase “knows_R” is meant to illustrate Henry’s development in his comprehensive conception of the mental word—the proper sense of expressing or saying (*dicere*) a mental word involves

⁷⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LIV, q. 9, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 104^vC, my emphasis: “[...] in omni nostra cognitione intellectuali circa rem de qua natum est formari verbum primo est aliqua simplex scientia sive notitia in intellectu creata non opere intellectus (quia respectu talis notitiae intellectus creatus solum passivus est), sed de re intelligibili obiecta agente in intellectum suam speciem quae est notitia quaedam de ipsa quae manet in memoria, et ab illa simplici notitia sive scientia existente in memoria intellectu sic informato *replicante se supra se* ut est intellectus simpliciter, et movente seipsum seipso sic informato ut quodam intelligibili obiecto, gignitur notitia sive scientia cogitativa, quae est verbum in intelligentia.”

⁷⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LIV, q. 9, ed. Badius (Paris 1520), II, fol. 104^vC: “Quia notitia secunda quae est in verbo, non solum scit et intelligit rem, sed sic scit et intelligit eam ut sciat se scire et intelligere eam intellectu intelligendi secundo reflexo super actum intelligendi sive sciendi primum.”

this kind of cognitive reflexivity. Henry recognizes the phenomenon that there is an awareness on the part of the cognitive subject that regards not only the cognitive object, but also itself, the active subject. Henry uses a similar phrase in *Summa*, article 58, question 1, where he argues—against Aquinas’s identification of any kind of conception in intellect with a word—that not everything understood in an intellect counts as a mental word;⁷⁸ rather we need to realize that “[...] from the intellect that is informed with a concept of a simple understanding through which it understands the thing understood [or: thought about], is generated in the intellect a clarifying concept through which it understands_R that it understands the thing understood [or: thought about].”⁷⁹

As the Latin expression ‘*intelligit se intelligere*’ suggests, the mental word is not merely some conceptual content but it includes an aspect of reflexive awareness, so that the intellect becomes aware of itself, or generally speaking a cognizer becomes aware of herself as the subject of her individual cognitive acts vis-à-vis a given object. Hence, this cognitive reflexivity enables us to assess not just some content but the progression and eventual completion of our intellectual inquiry, which requires that the cognitive subject consciously initiate the relevant mental acts. In the context of his trinitarian theology these insights allow Henry to avoid what he considers a fundamental mistake in Aquinas’s relevant exposition, namely “confusing God’s essential understanding of Himself with the Father’s production of a *verbum*,” as Giorgio Pini has helpfully put it, for “Henry can distinguish between the personal production of the Son and the essential understanding that the Son and the Spirit have of Themselves. Only the Father’s production of the Son is a true *dicere* and

⁷⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, 11, ed. Ceslaus Pera, Petrus Marc, Petrus Caramello (Turin 1961), n. 3469: “Intellectum autem in intelligente est intentio intellecta et verbum. Est igitur in Deo intelligente seipsum Verbum Dei quasi Deus intellectus sicut verbum lapidis in intellectu est lapis intellectus.” See the verbatim quotation in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LVIII, q. 1, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 142^{rH}, “quod addunt continue: ‘Intellectum autem in intelligente est intentio intellecta et verbum. Est igitur in Deo intelligente se ipsum Verbum Dei quasi Deus intellectus sicut verbum lapidis in intellectu est lapis intellectus,’ hoc non est sufficiens usquequaque.”— “[...] but what they add further, i.e. that ‘what is understood in the one understanding is a concept and a word. Thus there is in God when He understands Himself the Word of God, as it were, God understood, just as the word of a stone in the intellect is the stone understood,’ that is not sufficient at all.”

⁷⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LVIII, q. 1, ed. Badius (Paris 1520), II, fol. 124^{vL}: “[...] ab intellectu informato notitia simplicis intelligentiae qua intelligit rem intellectam, generatur in eodem notitia declarativa qua intelligit se intelligere rem intellectam.”

only the Son is a *verbum*, for the Son is the product of the Father's turning on Himself. By contrast, the understanding essential to the Trinity and common to all the persons of the Trinity is not a *verbum*," because it lacks these very features of self-awareness or -reflexivity.⁸⁰

Conclusion

Throughout his career Henry of Ghent seeks to develop a comprehensive account of the mental word. To this end Henry reinterprets Augustine's views on the mental word. Henry takes Augustine to imply that in forming a mental word we do not merely actualize cognitive content; rather, we progress towards a more complete, explanatory conception of a given object. Henry asks how we can acquire the sort of conceptual content that is deeply explanatory of the things that we cognize, and that can figure in our theoretical knowledge and understanding of reality. In Henry's view cognition begins with a receptive stage; thus a cognizer can only have representational content if some object initially acts on her (sensory) capacities. But Henry realizes that it is the agent's active, constructive abilities that allow for the formation of concepts that are more distinct and explanatory than initial concepts abstracted from representational content in phantasms. In developing his mature account of the mental word Henry stresses these abilities to explicate how a cognitive agent re-constructs an extramental object's essential structure: the agent engages in an intellectual, discursive inquiry into a thing's essence by working with genera, kinds, and specific differences. Henry considers this inquiry as the cognizer's approaching a full definitional account of some object. It is driven by a rational desire for complete understanding that comes to rest only in a perfect mental word that adequately matches and represents a thing's essential nature. Moreover, our ability to actualize mental acts of this kind requires not only an awareness of the acts or their conceptual content, or both, but also self-reflexivity that enables a cognizer to understand herself as the subject of her mental acts.

⁸⁰ Giorgio Pini, "Henry of Ghent's Doctrine of *Verbum* in its Theological Context," in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. Guy Guldentops—Carlos Steels, (Leuven, 2003), pp. 307–326, at 324.

C. MORAL PHILOSOPHY

MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN HENRY OF GHENT*

MARIALUCREZIA LEONE

Introduction

Unlike some of his colleagues, Henry of Ghent never wrote a work entirely dedicated to the moral philosophy.¹ Indeed, not much space seems to be devoted in his works to a systematic elaboration of an ethical theory. Henry's main work, the *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum* is mostly characterized by theological and speculative themes, perhaps because Henry only wrote the first part of the work, the part dedicated to God, and never completed the second part, concerning creatures.² To this we should add that in his *Quodlibeta*, the problem of the definition, classification, and connection of the virtues seems to be discussed in just a few questions (most of these discussions are concentrated in *Quodlibeta* IV, V, and VI), and only two virtues, *amicitia* and *prudencia*, are given a dedicated analysis. This also explains why the historical image of the *Doctor Sollemnis* over the centuries is more that of a speculative thinker and metaphysician than that of a moral philosopher.³

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¹ Many authors of the 13th century wrote on ethical problems. See, for example, the last three parts of Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, his exposition *In decem libros Aristotelis ad Nichomachum* and his *De malo* etc., Gerald Odonis' *Expositio in Aristotelis Ethicam*, Albertus Magnus's *Tractatus de natura boni, De bono, De homine*, or Boethius of Dacia's *De summo Bono*, etc.

² It seems most likely that Henry had decided to reserve his discussion of moral philosophy for precisely this part.

³ Henry's fortunes in the history of thought seem to be mostly connected to subjects concerning the theoretical sphere (i.e.gnoseological-theological issues), which have contributed, in some cases, to the formation and elaboration of later metaphysical systems. See e.g. Ada Lamacchia, “Notion et structure de l'être chez Tommaso Campanella”, *Journal Philosophique*, 9 (1986), pp. 244–267, esp. p. 254; Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les*

Given all of this, we will here try to determine whether there is in fact a moral philosophy in Henry of Ghent, that is to say, whether he provides a systematic elaboration of ethical theories, or whether, on the contrary, the Doctor from Ghent dealt with this sphere of inquiry only incidentally, perhaps merely to distance himself from and to attack some of the positions of his contemporaries and predecessors.⁴

In fact, several pieces of evidence speak for the existence of a systematic ethical philosophy in Henry of Ghent. First of all, a close reading of Henry's work surprisingly reveals that his treatment of the practical and moral issues is arguably more extensive than that of theoretical ones. A statistical analysis of Henry's texts shows that among the different questions present in his 15 *Quodlibeta*, most of them are devoted precisely to matters relating to human beings and their actions.⁵ The very open framework of the Quodlibetal disputations, in which any question could be asked by anyone, probably contributed to Henry dealing more extensively with moral and didactic-pastoral themes than with theoretical-speculative problems.⁶ Thus, apart from the texts that Henry specifically reserves for his moral theory in general (i.e., those concerning the virtues), we should recognize that, especially in the *Quodlibeta*, he is constantly asked to discuss concrete examples of human actions. In this way, he proceeds to sketch his own personal and systematic ethical theory. Also, we should remember that, as one of the most influential *magistri* of the University of Paris and the archdeacon of important cities like Bruges and Tournai, Henry would have been expected, perhaps more than his

tendances de sa métaphysique, Études de philosophie médiévale, 25, (Paris, 1938); Gordon A. Wilson, "Henry of Ghent and René Descartes on the Unity of Man", *Franziskanische Studien*, 64 (1982), pp. 97–110.

⁴ This is the purpose of Henry's interpretation of the virtues, according to Odon Lottin (*Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles.*, (Gembloux-Louvain, 1942–1960), esp. tome III/2 (Problèmes de Morale), pp. 487–491).

⁵ As P. Porro has showed, only 15.69 % of the contents of Henry's Quodlibetal questions concern God and problems relating to the divine, whereas 3.51 % treat angelic creatures. On the other hand, surprisingly, 54.33 % of them are based on themes relating to human beings. From this data, Porro concludes that Henry's *Quodlibeta* must primarily be considered a work of anthropology, and in particular of pragmatic anthropology, in the Kantian sense of the term. See Pasquale Porro, *Doing theology (and philosophy) in the first person: Henry of Ghent's Quodlibeta*, in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden/Boston, 2006), pp. 171–231.

⁶ The "free structure" that characterized this kind of disputation (namely, *de quolibet ad voluntatem cuiuslibet*), which was also open to normal citizens (in contrast to ordinary disputations), meant that many of the arguments under discussion dealt with questions concerning the lay world.

contemporaries, to wrestle with ethical and social problems of his time. All these elements lead us to argue for the presence of a moral philosophy in Henry of Ghent's major works.

This chapter aims not only to show that Henry created his own ethical theory, but also to demonstrate how Henry's moral doctrine is characterized by new and original traits in comparison to other thinkers of his day. As we will see, Henry appears in general to conform to the typical positions of the supporters of Christian moral orthodoxy. At the same time, however, he acknowledges a universal character to the moral rules of the active life, beyond any particular religious assumptions, through his defense of the role of the *recta ratio* and of natural law. In his texts, he seems to be aware of the fact that in the sphere of practical life it is necessary for there to be a moral framework (realized in "economic",⁷ political, juridical laws, etc. . . .) that is universally valid for all human beings. However, according to Henry, to achieve these conditions, the framework cannot be constituted only by "heteronymous" laws, i.e. laws that are valid for some but not for others, but rather by reason and natural law, common to all human beings and capable of guaranteeing a uniform model of an ethical active life. Approached in this way, we will arrive at a picture of Henry's ethical thought that shows it to be inclined, in accordance with his "voluntaristic" and "heteronymous" assumptions, to safeguarding human freedom and the action of divine grace, but also to be characterized by "autonomous" foundations that come even before Christian principles.⁸ From this, two other important conclusions will follow:

⁷ The word "economy" indicates the science of the wealth of nations only in the modern sense of the term. The Greek expression *oikonomia*, translated into Latin by *yconomica* (in the sense that medieval authors used it) instead indicates, in accordance with the etymology of the Greek word, the art of household administration. Furthermore, the three treatises known under the title of "Oeconomica", which arrived in the Latin West in the 13th century and were erroneously attributed to Aristotle, in general dealt with questions concerning the administration of the household and the family (the First and Third Treatises, respectively). These texts only briefly mention the techniques with which political men can obtain wealth (Second Treatise). In the present chapter, I will use "economy", "economic", etc., in their modern sense, because this can help us to understand Henry's doctrine better.

⁸ The expressions "heteronymous ethics" (*etica eteronoma*), according to which human beings can perform virtuous acts only through the will and through God's grace, and "autonomous ethics" (*etica autonoma*), according to which it is the human being alone who is the agent of virtuous acts through the exercise of reason, are used by Gianfranco Fioravanti in an article on Henry: Gianfranco Fioravanti, "Pro Patria Mori: un conflitto di modelli etici nel pensiero medievale", in *ENWSIS KAI FILIA. Unione e Amicizia: Omaggio a Francesco Romano*, ed. Maria Di Pasquale Barbanti/Giovanna R. Giardina/Paolo Mangano, CUECM (Catania, 2002), pp. 643–651.

- 1) That ethics and the sphere of *vita activa* seem to constitute for Henry a place of inquiry that is peculiar in its doctrinal implications. This sphere appears to be for him a field of mediation and reconciliation between ideas introduced through Aristotelian texts and through the Christian faith, the “thought of the philosophers” and the “thought of the theologians”.
- 2) Because, according to Henry, the validity of a moral norm depends on its conformity or non-conformity to the divine/natural law, prior to any positive law (civil or canonical), the legitimacy or illegitimacy of this norm is to be established by the theologian. The theologian (with whom Henry identifies himself) is one who, better than any other, knows this divine and natural law. From that, as a direct consequence, it will emerge that it is precisely the theologian who must establish what is right and wrong in the moral sphere.

In the following pages, the analysis of Henry’s ethical philosophy will be conducted first of all by studying the *Quodlibetal* questions in which Henry presents his theory of the virtues. Then, the inquiry will continue through the examination of some illustrative texts concerning specific cases of moral action in the political and “economic” sphere. This current study of Henry’s ethics will conclude with a discussion of the figure of the theologian, called upon by Henry to become the true arbitrator of ethics and its laws.

I. *Virtue and the vita activa*

Before beginning the current analysis of the virtues in Henry of Ghent, it is important that a foundational point is mentioned. What is rather peculiar about Henry’s doctrine of virtue is that, for him, virtue is closely connected to living the active life. That is to say, for Henry, in contrast to other thinkers of his time, the full actualization of virtue can only be attained in an active life (*vita activa*), rather than in a theoretical or contemplative one (*vita contemplativa*). A significant example of this view is to be found in *quaestio* 28 of *Quodlibet XII*, disputed at Christmas 1288.⁹ Here, Henry

⁹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 28, ed. Jos Decorte (Leuven, 1987): “Utrum opera vitae activae sint praeferenda operibus vitae contemplativae tamquam meliora”. For secondary literature on this *quaestio* see Alois M. Haas, “Die Beurteilung der *Vita contemplativa* und *activa* in der Dominikanermystik des 14. Jahrhunderts”, in *Arbeit Musse Meditation*, ed. Brian Vickers (Zürich, 1985), pp. 109–131; Ludwig Hödl, “Die

is called on to give a solution to the problem as to whether the deeds of the active life are to be preferred to the deeds of the contemplative life. In this text, unusually for Henry's days, the field of the active life is treated as the best chance that a human being has at his disposal for reaching the perfection of virtue in *this* life (and, consequently, in the afterlife). Henry begins by distinguishing between two types of contemplation (*contemplatio*). One is defined as authentic, i.e. as the true aim of every human being, but enjoyable only in the afterlife. The other is exclusive to this world. The latter form of contemplation is characteristic of *both* the human condition in the state of innocence after creation and of humanity after the Fall. Henry then goes on in the text to specify the different senses in which we should understand the action (*actio*). The first category indicates those kinds of acts, such as fasting or self-flagellation, that a human being chooses to practice in order to dominate his passions and to prepare his spirit for contemplation. The second category refers to those sorts of actions which are useful to someone for his own material subsistence in the secular world (for example, in commerce or agriculture). According to Henry, we should always privilege contemplation over these two types of *actio*. With regard to the first type of action, the aim or goal of the action (i.e. contemplation) is superior to the actions themselves (e.g. fasting and self-flagellation). With respect to the second type of action, the risk is that one may benefit only the body, and neglect the spirit. At this point, Henry also adds a third kind of action that is both predicated on the benefit it provides to other people *and* itself derives from contemplation.

After distinguishing these three kinds of action, Henry goes on in the *quaestio* to compare these types of action with the different types of speculation. However, just when he arrives at the comparison of the two

theologische Diskussion des Heinrich von Gent († 1293) über die thomastische Lehre von vollkommenen christlichen Leben (Quod. XII, 28–29)”, in *Thomas von Aquin. Interpretation und Rezeption*, ed. Willehad P. Eckert (Mainz, 1976), pp. 470–487; Matthew S. Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought*, (Oxford, 1999), esp. chs. 6–7, pp. 157–203; Raymond Macken, “The Superiority of Active Life to Contemplative Life in Henry of Ghent’s Theology”, *Medioevo*, 20 (1994), pp. 115–129; Steven P. Marrone, “Speculative Theology in the Late Thirteenth Century and the Way to Beatitude”, in *Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge*, ed. Bernardo C. Bazán/Eduardo Andújar/Léonard G. Sbrocchi (New York/Ottawa/Toronto, 1995), vol. II, pp. 1067–1080; Marialucezia Leone, “Zum Status der Theologie bei Heinrich von Gent—Ist sie eine praktische oder eine theoretische Wissenschaft?”, in *What is “Theology” in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th–15th Centuries), as reflected in their Self-Understanding* (Archa Verbi, Subsidia 1), ed. Mikolaj Olszewski (Münster, 2007), pp. 195–224.

spheres of existence, the active and the contemplative, he in fact takes into consideration only the contemplation of this life (*contemplatio vitae praesentis*) and the third category of action. The former is identifiable with the work of the religious, and the latter with the work of the prelates. In his comparison of these two conditions of existence, Henry explains that, with respect to the substance (*substantia*) of these lives, contemplation of this life is to be preferred over contemplative action. In regard to their use (*usus*), however, we should consider, firstly, the persons towards whom the action is directed and, secondly, the persons who perform the action. In the first case (i.e. concerning those who receive the actions), the active life is preferable to the contemplative life, because they receive more direct benefit from it. However, in the second case (i.e. concerning those who perform the action), there are (again) two alternatives. If these people lack a practical predisposition, then the contemplative way of life is for them undoubtedly more suitable. If, on the other hand, they are predisposed towards *praxis*, Henry thinks that it is better to exercise *praxis* than the *contemplatio*, but only when they are forced to do so (for instance, by the ecclesiastic authority or by their own conscience). Performing this type of action as a result of the pressure of these obligations is not only useful for those who receive the action, but it is also very helpful for the actors themselves. By acting out of obedience to an authority, there is no moral risk to the actor himself of acting erroneously.

Furthermore, because of the public utility gained from these kinds of actions, the actors themselves can also benefit. The more that works are useful to the human community, the greater the actors also benefit from them individually. As Henry explains at the end of the text, if the “*activa et contemplativa vitae praesentis non sunt nisi ad usum perveniendi ad vitam aeternam*”,¹⁰ and if the goods (*meriti*) attained in this life are more gained through acts of charity, then, according to Henry, the actions connected to the active life are to be preferred to the contemplative life. In other words, the works of practical life should take precedence, because “*quoad usum vitae praesentis simpliciter magis diligenda et eligenda est et melior talis vita activa quam contemplativa*”,¹¹ and because, consequently, the utility that derives from this *usus vitae praesentis* allows those who perform this kind of work to benefit in the future life. However,

¹⁰ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 28, ed. Decorte, p. 175, ll. 70–72.

¹¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 28, ed. Decorte, p. 175, ll. 74–76.

as Henry points out at the end of the text, it is the particular aptitude of one's soul, and the predisposition of one's character, which determines whether a human being should chose the one type of existence over the other.

It is noteworthy that, contrary to other authors of the period, Henry considers the active life to be essential to the full realization of moral virtue.¹² Practical works are first and foremost useful to others, and then, as a consequence, useful to the human being who executes them. This (paradoxically) makes these practical works superior to theoretical ones, even if only according to their use (*secundum usum*). In other words, if, over the course of his lifetime, a human being wants to achieve the most perfect form of virtue, he should above all engage in an active life:

Sic ergo dico quod pro toto tempore vitae praesentis melior est et perfectior virtutibus praeditis, quibus valeant prodesse, dum tamen sunt ad hoc coacti a Deo in conscientia vel exterius ab homine, actio quam contemplatio, et per hoc melior simpliciter ex parte agentis secundum dictum modum.¹³

Thus, the purpose of this paper will be to read Henry's ethical philosophy through the lens of this relative superiority of the active life over the contemplative one. In this way, when we deal with the doctrine of the virtues, we will keep in mind the fact that Henry fundamentally connects these virtues with the works of *praxis*.

¹² The tendency to conflate the earthly perfection of virtue with the acts of charity and with the good practiced towards one's neighbour, rather than with the accomplishment of theoretical activities, had already been emphasized by Henry in two previous *quaestiones*, i.e. in q. 14 of *Quodlibet II* ("Utrum religio viventium in vita solitaria sit perfectior religione viventium in societate magna") and in q. 28 of *Quodlibet VII* ("Utrum tantum habens necessaria vitae melius facit eadem dimittendi quam retinendo"). In both texts (from Christmas 1277 and 1282, respectively), perfection was divided into two states of existence: the *status perfectionis acquirendae* and the *status perfectionis exercendae*. The first state was defined as the inclination to achieve the *habitus* of perfection through works of virtue. The second was interpreted as the actualization of the works of perfection, starting from the *habitus perfectionis acquisitus*, granted to the human being during the course of his earthly life. Apart from the fact that both the questions deal with religious topics, they emphasized the greater value that characterized the *perfectio exercenda* relative to the *perfectio acquirenda*. Thus, the *utilitas ad alios* seems, ultimately, to be the criterion that Henry uses in his texts, but always in reference to a pure, earthly horizon (that however does refer to the future life), in order to establish the merits of one action over another.

¹³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 28, ed. Decorte, p. 187, ll. 48–52.

II. *The Theory of the Virtue*

Henry of Ghent discusses the virtues in nine questions of his *Quodlibeta*.¹⁴ In particular, Henry's interpretation of the general foundations of the virtues is concentrated in *Quodlibeta* IV-V-VI, disputed at Christmas in 1280, 1281 and 1282 (respectively), as well as in *Quodlibet* XII of 1288. These texts take up three of the most common issues in the debates over moral philosophy of the 13th century, after the arrival of the ethical and political works of Aristotle to the Latin West.¹⁵ These issues are as follows: 1) whether the virtues should be located in the will or in intellect (q. 22 of *Quodlibet* IV); 2) what kind of difference exists between the natural virtues and the infused virtues (q. 23 of *Quodlibet* IV, qq. 16, 18, 19 of *Quodlibet* V, and q. 12 of *Quodlibet* VI); 3), and whether or not the virtues are connected, and, if they are, whether or not we should consider prudence to be their unifying cognitive principle (q. 17 of *Quodlibet* V, and q. 14 of *Quodlibet* XII).

1) Among the numerous ethical doctrines discussed in the second half of the 13th century, concern over the location of the moral virtues is most characteristic of the debate between "voluntarists" and "intellectualists".¹⁶

¹⁴ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 22: "Utrum omnes morales virtutes sint in voluntate ut in subiecto"; q. 23: "Utrum virtutes, dona, beatitudines et fructus sint habitus specie differentes"; Id., *Quodlibet* V, q. 16: "Utrum quolibet actu primo habitus acquisitus generetur et deinde augmentetur"; q. 17: "Utrum virtutes acquisitae morales sint connexae"; q. 18: "Utrum habitus generatus possit corrumpi"; q. 19: "Utrum habitus infusus possit augeri"; Id., *Quodlibet* VI, q. 12: "Utrum cum virtutibus acquisitis necesse sit ponere alias infusas eis respondententes"; Id., *Quodlibet* X, q. 12: "Utrum amicitia sit virtus"; Id., *Quodlibet* XII, q. 14: "Utrum prudentia possit generari sine virtute morali".

¹⁵ The definitive translation of Aristotle's *Politics* was made by William of Moerbeke around 1260. The first complete translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* was completed by Grosseteste in 1246–1247 from a collection of Byzantine *scholia*, and was probably checked afterwards by Moerbeke; it became part of the university *curriculum studiorum* already by the end of the first half of the 14th century.

¹⁶ The debate between the "voluntarists" and "intellectualists" arose after the arrival of the Aristotelian ethical and politics works in the Latin west in the second half of the 13th century. The discussion of free will and human action in the doctrinal world of that time was focused around the debate about the role of the two faculties of the practical sphere: the will and the intellect. The assertion or denial of the texts by the greatest philosophical authorities (such as Aristotle) generated a great controversy about the relative primacy of these two faculties, both simultaneously recognized as the agents of moral action. This led to a dispute between those masters who, following the Aristotelian position, mostly tried to defend the superiority of the intellect, upon which they made the will dependent, and of the masters who, on the other hand, accused the rationalists of claiming that reason was

These two doctrinal positions are based on divergent readings of Aristotle's writings on virtue. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle locates the virtues in the soul, which (in Book I of the text) is divided into two parts:¹⁷ the rational and the irrational. The irrational is, in turn, divided into two more parts: the vegetative and the appetitive, the latter of which, Aristotle specifies, *participates in reason*. The intellectual virtues (or dianoetic virtues) belong to the rational part of the soul, while the moral virtues (or ethical virtues) belong to the appetitive part. However, the moral virtues are also characterized by rationality, insofar as they are based on the intellectual virtue of *phronesis*, i.e. prudence or practical reason.

In the academic world of that time, the reading of Aristotle's newly arrived texts generated several controversies about how his words should be interpreted. The first major problem concerned the fact that Aristotle placed the higher and supreme virtues (the intellectual ones) in the rational sphere, creating what Gauthier defines as an "*eudemonisme intellectuel*".¹⁸ The second discussion concerned the way in which one ought to comprehend the appetitive part of the soul, in which Aristotle locates the moral virtues. This part is understood by the authors of the time sometimes as sensible appetite, and sometimes, more specifically, as will.

a) As soon it arrived in the doctrinal world of the Latin West in 13th century, the Aristotelian doctrine of the virtues risked appearing "autonomously" feasible in its aims and means, self contained for the human being during his mortal life alone. In Aristotle, this doctrine is totally independent of God, who, in the Aristotelian system is completely indifferent to human destinies, since it thinks immutably only of itself. It is

self-sufficient, reducing the will to a completely passive role, and consequently rejecting free will and the value of grace. This is usually interpreted in the history of philosophy as a debate between "intellectualism" and "voluntarism", within the larger dispute between "radical or heterodox Aristotelianism", or "Latin-Averroism" and "Neo-augustinianism". In fact, the disputes over these faculties cannot be reduced to these superficial formulas, because, like all of the 'ism' in the history of thought, these sorts of interpretations suffer from excessive schematization, and are unable to deal adequately with the nuances of individual authors. Also in the case of the controversy on the relative supremacy of the will or the intellect, the thinkers belonging to the "two groups" often do not have a monolithic perspective with regard to the issue, but are instead characterized by a variety of approaches. See Roland Teske's article in this volume.

¹⁷ See Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, 13, 1102a–1103a.

¹⁸ See René A. Gauthier, "Trois commentaires 'averroïstes' sur l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 16 (1947–1948), pp. 187–336.

structurally connected to the exercise of thought (both practical and theoretical), and for this reason, it is attainable only by a few people, through research and study, that is to say, with instruments completely within the possession of human beings themselves.¹⁹ In this exercise or non-exercise of the *nous*, Aristotle's ethical theory finds, respectively, its own reward (achievement of full *edoné*) and its own punishment (if the life of the wise is the most pleasant and the most fulfilled, not being wise means not being happy). From this, it follows that through the exercise of knowledge alone beatitude is possible already in this life. In this way, Aristotle sketches an anthropological vision that considers the human being able, on his own, without divine aid or grace, to exercise *ratio* and achieve happiness. This ethical doctrine finds its law wholly within the human being and his intellectual faculties. Aristotle's ethical theory collides with Christian ethics that, in contrast, defends the idea of man as a subject capable of choice, with the help of the will, even when this choice is contrary to the dictates of reason. This kind of ethics is governed by purposes and aims which are beyond the human sphere, and yet at the same time are within everyone's reach.²⁰ According to this latter type of ethics, the ultimate activity of man (that is, the union with God) cannot be achieved without the action of grace, the gift of God. In fact, it finds its full realization only in the afterlife.²¹

The first official attack made on behalf of Christian orthodoxy against Aristotelian and Averroist moral "mistakes"²² is the Condemnation of 1277, promulgated by the bishop of Paris, Stephan Tempier. As we know

¹⁹ See Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, 9, 1099b17–20.

²⁰ The discussion concerning an ethics based on reason versus an ethics based on the will was in any case already known, if not in the same terms, to the thinkers of the 13th century. They were aware of similar controversies through Augustine's polemics, in particular in Books IX and XIV of *De civitate Dei*, against the Stoic doctrine of passions, especially against the ones of Zeno and Chrysippus. In attacking the Stoics' ethical theory (according to which the foundation of the moral act was constituted by nature, which coincided with reason [*logos*]), Augustine asserted the role of the will and of grace in moral life. Virtue and vice, according to Augustinian thought, did not correspond to positive and negative uses of the rational faculty, as the Stoics thought, but also had to depend on man's will, and on the divine gifts gratuitously infused in the human soul.

²¹ See Anthony J. Celano, "Act of the Intellect or Act of the Will: the Critical Reception of Aristotle's Ideal of Human Perfection in the 13th and early 14th Centuries," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 57 (1990), pp. 93–119, esp. p. 95.

²² An initial awareness of the "intellectualistic danger" of the Aristotelian/Averroistic theory of the virtues is traceable to some of Bonaventure's works (among which we should especially mention the *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum* of 1250–1252 and the *Collationes in Hexaemeron* of 1273) as well as to the first three *Quaestiones disputatae* of Walter of Bruges, composed between 1270 and 1276. These texts are very important

according to Henry's own statements, he participated in compiling the list of condemned articles.²³ Among the propositions relevant to morality condemned there, a few concerned the correct interpretation of some Christian virtues (e.g. continence, humbleness and poverty). Other propositions addressed the question of whether or not happiness is attainable in this world through human capacities alone.²⁴ All of these propositions

because they represent the first explicit accusation of incompatibility between Aristotelian/Averroistic positions (according to which the human being is the agent of virtuous acts, through the exercise of his own reason) and Christian doctrine (according to which a person can perform virtuous acts only by means of the will and God's gifts). For example, for Bonaventure, the *Nicomachean Ethics* appears to be a book which is dangerous to Christian orthodoxy, and the Aristotelian theory of virtue in particular (to which he dedicates three of his *collationes*), one of its most erroneous doctrines. In his *Commentary on the II Sentences*, the Franciscan master, after he had located virtue in the sphere of the will, claimed the title of "true virtue" only for the theological virtues, i.e. those virtuous habits infused by God into the soul, and not obtainable by human intellectual action alone. These works by Bonaventure are relevant not only because they are among the first to openly criticize all of the differences between the Aristotelian theory of virtue and the Christian one, but also for their contents and for the way they formulate their attacks on certain problems, which ultimately appear to be anticipations of those articles of the Condemnation of 1277 dedicated to morality in general and to the ethical virtues in particular.

²³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. Robert Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 67, ll. 21–23: "In hoc enim concordabant omnes magistri theologiae congregati super hoc, quorum ego eram unus . . ."; see also the references in the articles by Wilson (above, p. 11, n. 44) and by Wielockx (above, p. 25, n. 1).

²⁴ Art. 170 (Hissette): "Quod omne bonum, quod homini possibile est, consistit in virtutibus intellectualibus"; art. 171: "Quod homo ordinatus quantum ad intellectum et affectum, sicut potest sufficienter esse per virtutes intellectuales et alias morales, de quibus loquitur Philosophus in *Ethicis*, est sufficienter dispositus ad felicitatem aeternam"; art. 172: "Quod felicitas habetur in ista vita et non in alia"; art. 173: "Quod felicitas non potest a Deo immitti immediate"; art. 200: "Quod non sunt possibles aliae virtutes nisi acquisitae vel innatae"; art. 211: "Quod humilitas, prout quis non ostendit ea quae habet, sed vilipendit et humiliat se, non est virtus. Error, si intelligatur: nec virtus, nec actus virtuosus"; art. 212: "Quod pauper bonis fortunae non potest bene agere in moralibus". Most probably, the object of the polemic of these propositions could be found in some texts of that time (primarily of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia) which explicitly defend the Aristotelian theory of virtue. In the Condemnation of 1277, other propositions instead deal with themes concerning sexuality: art. 205: "Quod simplex fornicatio, utpote soluti cum soluta, non est peccatum"; art. 206: "Quod peccatum contra naturam, utpote abusus in coitu, licet sit contra naturam speciei, non tamen est contra naturam individui"; art. 207: "Quod delectatio in actibus venereis non impedit actum seu usum intellectus"; art. 208: "Quod continentia non est essentialiter virtus"; art. 209: "Quod castitas non est maius bonum quam perfecta abstinencia"; art. 210: "Quod perfecta abstinencia ab actu carnis corrumpit virtutem et speciem". These latter articles have as a target the doctrinal conflicts present in some works of courtly literature of the time, or present in the teachings of some religious movements. For a discussion regarding the ethical conflicts in the Parisian condemnation of 1277, see esp. Saturnino Alvarez Turienzo, "Incidencia en la ética de la condena parisiense de 1277", *Cuadernos Salamantinos de*

are meant to condemn any attitude of total faith in human capacities, considered as self-sufficient and adequate in “and” of themselves, for the full realization of a happy life.

b) Aristotle had located the dianoetic virtues in the rational part of the soul, and placed the moral virtues in the appetitive part. Concerning this last point, some masters of the time, especially those belonging to the Franciscan order, interpreted this appetitive part as ‘will’. From this interpretation, they deduced the idea that virtue, as well as vice, resides solely within the sphere of the will. According to this point of view, the will can set itself apart from the intellect, and judge independently for itself whether an act is good or bad. Among the supporters of this position, the most prominent was perhaps Bonaventure. In Book III of his *Sentences Commentary*, he explicitly maintains that the cardinal virtues exist only insofar as they are related to the free will.²⁵ At the same time, he rejects the “theses of the philosophers”, which places prudence and justice in the rational part of the soul and temperance and courage in the appetitive part. However, according to other masters, the appetitive part of the soul (in which Aristotle located the moral virtues) contains not only the will, but also the sense appetite. Reasoning along these lines, Thomas Aquinas, for example, located justice in the will,²⁶ whereas he placed other virtues, like temperance and courage, in the sense appetite.²⁷

In q. 22 of his *Quodlibet* IV of Christmas 1279 (“Utrum morales virtutes sint in voluntate”), Henry addresses both of these issues.

Filosofia, 4 (1977), pp. 55–98; Luca Bianchi, *Il vescovo e i filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277 e l'evoluzione dell'aristotelismo scolastico*, (“Quodlibet”, 6), (Bergamo, 1990), esp. ch. IV, pp. 149–195; Alain de Libera, *Penser au Moyen Âge*, (Paris, 1991), pp. 193–245; R.A. Gauthier, “Trois commentaires ‘averroistes’ sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque”, esp. pp. 329–333; Roland Hissette, “Étienne Tempier et les menaces contre l’éthique chrétienne”, *Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale édité par la SIEPM*, 21 (1979), pp. 68–72; Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will. The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century*, (Washington, 1995), esp. pp. 71–76; David Piché, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Nouvelle édition du texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire*, (Paris, 1999), pp. 227–283; Georg Wieland, *Ethica. Scientia practica: Die Anfänge der philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, Neue Folge, 21, (Münster, 1981), pp. 197–220.

²⁵ See Bonaventura de Balneoregio, *In III Libri Sententiarum*, in S. Bonaventurae *Opera Omnia*, Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, (Quaracchi, 1883–1889), tome III, pp. 716–717.

²⁶ See Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, II-II, q. 58, art. 4.

²⁷ See Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, II-II, qq. 123; 141.

Henry's discussion seems to criticize those who locate the moral virtues in the appetitive part of the soul. At the beginning of the *quaestio*, in the arguments against the thesis that the moral virtues reside in the will, Henry gives an account of the position of those who maintain that the virtues are found in the sense appetite. According to this position, if it is true that virtue moderates the passions, and that the passions are not in the will, but in the irascible part of the soul, it follows, consequently, that the virtues are also found in this irascible part, because it is precisely there that those passions are located which the virtues are said to govern.²⁸ At the beginning of the *solutio* of the question, Henry returns to this theory:

In quaestione ista, est opinio aliquorum quod morales virtutes de quibus specialiter erat proposita quaestio non sunt in voluntate sed in parte sensitiva, irascibili et concupiscibili.²⁹

It is difficult to identify with certainty who exactly these *aliqui* are to whom Henry refers. Among the supporters of the determinism of the passions, we should certainly keep in mind some contemporary masters that, like Thomas Aquinas, had located some of the moral virtues in the appetitive part of the soul. As Aquinas explains in q. 56, art. 4 of the I-IIae of the *Summa theologiae*, the irascible part of the soul can be considered in two ways: "secundum se" (as part of the appetitive soul) and "in quantum participans rationem".³⁰ In the first case, this part of the soul cannot be subject to virtue, but in the second case, it can be. Aquinas does not posit that all moral virtues reside in the sense appetite. The sense appetite contains only those virtues that moderate the passions. Hence, he locates temperance and courage in the sense appetite because

²⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, in *Quodlibeta*, Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo, Doctoris Solennis Socii Sorbonici et Archidiaconi Tornacensis, cum duplici tabella. Vaenumdantur ab Iodoco Badio Ascensio, Parisiis 1518 [reprint.: Bibliothèque S. J., Louvain 1961, 2 vol.] (hereafter: ed. Badius), fol. 138^{rp}: "Circa primum arguitur quod non, quia [virtutes] moderant passionem. Ergo debent esse in potentia illa in qua sunt passionem. Passiones autem sunt non in voluntate, sed in irascibili parte et concupiscibili ...".

²⁹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, ed. Badius, fol. 138^{rp}.

³⁰ See Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 56, art. 4, ed. Marietti, (Torino, 1952), p. 245: "Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo secundum se, in quantum sunt partes appetitus sensitivi. Et hoc modo, non competit eis quod sint subiectum virtutis.—Alio modo possunt considerari in quantum participant rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi oboedire. Et sic irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis humanae: sic enim est principium humani actus, in quantum participat rationem. Et in his potentiis necesse est ponere virtutes".

they are sufficient (without additional virtue of the will) to produce an internal order. However, he posits justice in the will (*Summa theologiae*, II-II, q. 58, art. 4), because it moderates actions.

Responding to his opponents, Henry explains that will and reason are *naturaliter* determined, namely by the first good (*primum bonum*) and the first truth (*primum verum*) respectively. Outside the first good will (as well reason) can make mistakes. Therefore they need the virtuous habit of love that contains all the moral virtues to choose the good—because reason inclines them to the good. On the contrary, the passions do not follow reason and do not permit it to condition them. This can also be explained by the fact that, like every inferior potency, the passions are more distant from reason. This is not the case in the will, which works very closely with and according to reason, and in this way constitutes the virtues. This is why, Henry concludes, we should locate all of the virtues in the will. Thus, Henry goes on explicitly to declare, following the Franciscans thinkers, that *all* of the moral habits (among which he includes the virtues) are in the will, and concern the good of the will toward both the absolute good and the apparent good:

... quod omnes morales habitus sunt in voluntate, et pertinent ad voluntatis amorem circa bonum simpliciter, vel apparens, ita quod virtus moralis nihil aliud sit quam habitus inclinans voluntatem ad amorem boni simpliciter. Vitium autem est habitus contrarius inclinans ad amorem boni apparentis.³¹

Furthermore, responding to the objections from the *quaestio* (i.e. to the doctrine according to which the virtues are not in the will, but in the concupiscible part of the human being, because they moderate the passions), Henry refers to the Aristotelian principle according to which the moral virtues must be characterized *per essentiam* of what is rational *per essentiam*, but *per participationem* of what is rational *per participationem*. Thus, because the concupiscible part of the soul is rational only by participation, it follows that the moral virtues that are in the will would also not exist in the passions if not for participation.³² In other words, the virtues,

³¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, ed. Badius, fol. 138^{vQ}.

³² See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, ed. Badius, fol. 141^{vB}: "... quod virtutes morales per essentiam sunt in voluntate, sicut in eo quod est rationale per essentiam, quoquo modo, in irascibili et concupiscibili per quandam participationem, secundum modum quo sunt participantes ratione, ut dictum est. Quod si virtus debeat dici et habitus in irascibili et concupiscibili est omnino aliud genus virtutis quam est in voluntate.

as well as the passions, are in the former *per essentiam*, in the latter *per accidens*. In this sense, the passions can be considered "*impressiones*" of the virtues.³³

In this way, Henry follows the Aristotelian interpretation of the location of the virtues and the relationship between virtue and reason. In particular, he conforms to Aristotle's view in placing the virtues in a part of the soul in which reason also operates. However, this part is located in the will, and not also in the passions (as, for example, Thomas Aquinas has maintained), because the latter are not considered essentially connected to rationality. In other words, what is important to emphasize here is that Henry, although he located the moral virtues in the will, is careful to connect these virtues with the exercise of the reason. In contrast to the arguments against the thesis of the *quaestio*, Henry was very careful to claim the importance of the role of the intellect in the moral sphere: the moral virtues seem not to be possible without the contribution of reason. In irrational beings, as well as in brutes, there is no moral virtue.³⁴ Following the view of Augustine, Henry affirms that the will without reason is blind, and would not be moved by love to an object if it had not been known before.³⁵ (In this sense, the will is essentially rational.) The role of reason here is emphasized several times throughout the *quaestio*, shown in how the will is moved and advised by right reason (*ratio recta*). In this

Per correspondentiam tamen se habens ad illud. Quemadmodum aliud genus virtutis est virtus quae est in servo ab illa quae est in domino, secundum quod determinat Philosophus in primo *Politicae*, et multo magis quam servus, in quantum, sicut dicit, homo est communicans ratione scilicet per essentiam, quod non facit irascibile vel concupiscibile".

³³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, ed. Badius, fol. 140^{rx}: "Quia ergo voluntas, ut dictum est, licet sit quodammodo participans ratione: simpliciter tamen est rationalis per essentiam; appetitus autem sensibilis est rationalis per participationem tantum, idcirco dico quod virtus moralis simpliciter et essentialiter est in voluntate et essentia habituum eius, per participationem autem et impressionem quandam in appetitu sensibili".

³⁴ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, ed. Badius, fol. 138^{ro}: "Contra: virtutes non sunt nisi rationalis, quoniam in omnino irrationali ut in bruto non habent esse, quod autem est in aliquo, non inest ei nisi secundum id eius in quo est".

³⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, ed. Badius, fol. 139^{vv}: "Non quod propter hoc voluntas ad diiudicatum determinetur, ut oporteat ipsam eligere et prosequi quod diiudicatum est: quasi in hoc solo consistat libertas arbitrii, quod ratio hoc modo vel illo potest diiudicare: hoc enim modo solum determinatur per nudam visionem primi veri et ultimi boni. Sed quod voluntas ex se caeca est, nec potest circa quidquam moveri amore nisi fuerit prius cognitum, ut dictum est supra secundum Augustinum. Et quo ad hoc quod voluntas est rationalis per essentiam".

sense, following Aristotle, Henry can maintain that “*Moralis virtus non est nisi in quodammodo rationem habenti*”.³⁶ Thus, the virtues are located in the will, but *only* because this is advised by reason.

Although he defends the role of rationality in the moral sphere, Henry is always careful to describe (as he already had in *Quodlibet I*) the will as a faculty also free to oppose the dictates of reason. In particular, Henry distinguishes between a “*voluntas ut natura*”, a “*voluntas ut deliberativa*” and a “*voluntas ut arbitrio libera*”. In the first case, the will is inclined “passively” to pursue the natural good, because, as Augustine maintains, “*Naturale est nobis velle vivere bene*”. In the second case (as Henry recalls, quoting Cicero’s words “*virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus*”), the will follows the judgment of right reason. In the third case, the will appears to be a faculty also free to oppose what is proposed to it both from nature and by right reason. With this threefold distinction, Henry begins to outline a fundamental doctrine that he will return to and examine in *Quodlibet IX*: that is, the application of the intentional distinction to the will.³⁷ This is the case because this faculty appears, at the same time, as both mover and moved. Insofar as nature is determined by the good in general, and because it is “advised” by reason, the will is as a result “moved” (*voluntas ut natura*) or “inclined” (*voluntas ut deliberativa*). Insofar as the will moves freely towards a determinate good, it moves (*voluntas ut arbitrio libera*).³⁸ In the act of willing, the mover and the moved are not distinct as different faculties, but as different possibilities of the same faculty. In other words, the will, because of its nature and because of how reason guides it, is determined in the first case, and inclined in the second, to pursue the good proposed by reason. However, it also remains free relative to the supreme good. This application of the intentional distinction leads Henry to elaborate a theory of the self-movement of the will (addressed in depth in *Quodlibet IX*), according to which the will is a faculty superior to reason, not only because it drives all of the faculties of the soul (including

³⁶ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, ed. Badius, fol. 140^{rx}.

³⁷ It is in fact a special distinction, that is neither real, in the sense present in corporeal motion, nor rational, but only present in God. On this topic see Raymond Macken, “Les diverses applications de la distinction intentionnelle chez Henri de Gand”, in AA.VV., *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13 (Berlin, 1981), II, pp. 769–776.

³⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 9.

the intellect), but also because it moves itself.³⁹ As Henry concludes in the *quaestio*, the acts of virtues belong, in a strict sense, to the will and to its freedom. This faculty, although it is lead by nature toward the good and although it is “inclined” to follow that which is presented as the good by reason, remains free. While it is moved *ut natura* and *ut deliberatio rationis*, it is also the mover of itself, and it is precisely its self-movement which constitutes its freedom (*ut arbitrio libera*). Because of this freedom it needs to acquire the habit of the virtue to be able to act.

From this first statement on virtue, in *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, we can deduce that Henry is very close to the “voluntary interpretation” of morality: virtue, considered as a *habitus*, is located in the will and concerns the exercise of charity (or better yet, the love of the good *simpliciter*). Although the moral virtues are constituted by reason, they are not determined by reason. Thanks to its threefold distinction, the will is always free to go against the choice of reason. Nevertheless, at this moment a) it is clear that Henry is speaking only about acquired virtues, that is to say, about those Aristotelian moral virtues attainable by human effort, through the exercise of rationality. There is, however, not yet any indication of the infused virtues, which are given by God and not obtainable by any human potency, which were unknown to Aristotle. b) Henry at this point had not yet demonstrated, specifically, the way in which reason works toward the formation of the moral virtues.

2) In the academic world of the 13th century, strongly related to the problem of the location of the virtues, the other principal debate concerning the virtuous dispositions revolved around the nature of the virtues. Against Aristotle’s intellectualistic doctrine of the virtues, Christian teachings consider virtues to be essentially those dispositions that presuppose a voluntaristic initiation on the part of a human being and, especially, those gifts given by God to a person.⁴⁰ For example, these gifts

³⁹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 22, ed. Badius, fol. 140^{va}: “Sed tale operans movens non motum ex se indeterminatum ad actum, semetipsum determinans est voluntas: quia est instrumentum seipsum movens, ut dicit Augustinus *De Libero Arbitrio*, et ut dicit ibidem, voluntas movet se et alia”.

⁴⁰ For a complete discussion of the role of the virtues in Christian doctrine, as well as the conflict with the Aristotelian conception of virtue see esp. L. Bianchi, *Il vescovo e i filosofi. La condanna*, esp. ch. IV, pp. 149–195; Roberto Lambertini, “Felicità, virtù e ‘ragion pratica’: aspetti della discussione sull’etica”, in *La filosofia nelle Università*, ed. Luca Bianchi (Firenze, 1997), pp. 305–343; O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. III; B. Kent, *Virtues of the will*, esp. ch. V, pp. 199–245. Many Franciscan authors follow this line of reasoning. In his second *Comment to the Sentences*, Bonaventure, after having located virtue

include those infused by God in the soul at the moment of baptism, like the theological virtues of faith (*fides*), hope (*spes*) and charity (*caritas*).⁴¹ Those natural and innate faculties inclined to ethically good behavior thus are not considered properly virtues. Particular natural virtues are also considered those habitual acts that arise from the will due to the repetition of positive actions. These include the cardinal virtues of prudence (*prudentia*), justice (*iustitia*), fortitude (*fortitudo*), and temperance (*temperantia*).⁴² Concerning the cardinal and the infused virtues, another controversy arises. In general, for the Christian tradition (in particular, for the *auctoritates christianae*, such as Augustine and Peter Lombard),⁴³ only the infused virtues can be considered true and authentic virtues: for instance faith, hope, and charity, because they are those gifts infused by God, should be considered “more virtuous” than those natural dispo-

in the sphere of the will, specifies the title of “true virtue” only for the theological virtues, that is to say, for those virtuous acts infused by God in the soul, and not those achievable by human effort alone: “... dicendum, quod hic non definitur virtus, prout distinguitur contra dona et alios habitus gratuitos, sed prout nomine virtutis clauditur omnis qualitas animae gratuita.—Posset tamen dici, quod per appropriationem recte vivere est virtutum, expedite donorum, sed perfecte beatitudinum, sicut alibi manifestabitur”. See Bonaventura de Balneoregio, *In II Sententiarum*, ed. Quaracchi, tome II, p. 672.

⁴¹ The theological virtues are the virtues listed by St. Paul in the first *Letter to the Corinthians*. According to the Christian tradition, they were considered to be directly and conjointly infused in the human being at the moment of baptism. See O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. III.

⁴² It seems that the first thinker to employ the expression “cardinal virtues” was Ambrose, using the term in the *De paradiso*, *De Sacramentis*, *De excessu* and in the *Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam*. Ambrose deduces the word “cardo” from the translation of the Greek word *kentron* of Apuleius, the list of the four virtues. Besides finding it in the *Libro della Sapienza* (VIII, 7), it is also found in the texts of Macrobius, Cicero and in Plato’s *Republica*. See esp. Rollen E. Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues. Aquinas, Albert, and Philip the Chancellor*, (Toronto, 2004); Id., “The Cardinal Virtues: Aquinas and the Fathers,” in *Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge*, ed. B.C. Bazán/E. Andújar/L.G. Sbocchi, vol. II, pp. 699–708; O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. III.

⁴³ See Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, IV, 3: “Absit ut sit in aliquo vera virtus nisi fuerit iustus. Absit autem ut sit iustus vere nisi vivat ex fide: iustus enim ex fide vivit”; Petrus Lombardus, *Libri IV Sententiarum*, II, d. XXVII, c. 5, ed. Quaracchi (Roma, 1981), pp. 483–484: “Si enim fides, ipsa virtus praeveniens, diceretur esse mentis actus qui est meritum, iam ipsa ex libero arbitrio originem haberet; quod quia non est, sic dicitur esse meritum quia actus eius est meritum: si tamen adsit caritas, sine qua nec credere nec sperare meritum est vitae. Unde apparet vere quia caritas est Spiritus Sanctus; quae animae qualitates informat et sanctificat, ut eis anima informeretur et sanctificetur; sine qua animae qualitas non dicitur virtus, quia non valet sanare animam”. For the critical studies on the problem of the authenticity of the theological and cardinal virtues in the 12th century, see esp. O. Lottin, “Les Vertus morales acquises sont-elles de vraies vertus? La Réponse des théologiens de Pierre Abélard à St. Thomas d’Aquin”, *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale*, 20 (1953), pp. 13–39.

sitions such as *prudentia*, *iustitia*, *fortitudo*, and *temperantia*, which are instead improved by an human effort. Another reason suggested for not giving to the cardinal virtues the title of “virtue” in the strict sense of the term is the fact that they were already theorized in pagan times, e.g. by Plato.

In q. 23 of his *Quodlibet IV* (debated Christmas 1279), Henry makes a distinction between virtues (*virtutes*), gifts (*dona*), beatitudes (*beatitudines*), and fruits of the Spirit (*fructus*). Gifts work *modo superhumano*, but concern the human being, whereas the beatitudes work *modo inhumano* but are oriented toward the sphere of the divine.⁴⁴ On the other hand, the fruits of the Spirit are *delectationes* that come through the repetition of the actions of the virtues, gifts, and beatitudes. In particular, there are twelve fruits of the Holy Spirit: *caritas* (love), *gaudium* (joy), *pax* (peace), *patientia* (patience), *longanimitas* (forbearance), *bonitas* (goodness), *benignitas* (benevolence), *mansuetudo* (meekness), *fides* (faith), *modestia* (modesty), *continentia* (continence), and chastity (*castitas*).⁴⁵ The case of the virtues that depend on their end (*finis*) is different insofar as they are distinguished between those that are called “human” by the philosophers, and those that Christians define as “gratuitous”. The former, also said to be acquired (i.e., the moral and rational virtues), have a natural end in the cognition of the good and the true, whereas the gratuitous virtues have a supernatural end, which they share with gifts and beatitudes. In particular, the infused virtues (among which should only be counted the theological virtues) exist through charity. But for Christians, Henry specifies in the text, true happiness must not be connected with the exercise of the acquired virtues, as the philosophers assert, but rather with the practice of the infused virtues. The natural ends of the acquired virtues bring only a certain type of “*humana felicitas*”, defined as speculative in Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Christians must, on the contrary, direct the end of the virtues toward the good that is beyond any other good and toward the truth that is beyond every truth. Only in this way can one really be blessed (*beatus*).⁴⁶ Also, in this *quaestio*, as in

⁴⁴ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 23, ed. Badius, fol. 142^{rG}: “... dicitur vero esse opus doni, ut donum est, cum illud agit ut homo, sed modo superhumano. Opus vero beatitudinis tunc dicit ut beatitudo est, cum illud agit non ut homo, sed ut iam deus quidam factus est et ideo modo inhumano”.

⁴⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 23, ed. Badius, fol. 142^{vH}.

⁴⁶ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 23, ed. Badius, fol. 142^{vH}: “Ad hoc ergo nos vocat deus ne simus homines: sed tunc in melius non erimus homines, si prius nos esse homines cognoverimus, ut ad illam celsitudinem ab humilitate surgamus, hoc est ut a

the previous one, Henry seems to give a “voluntaristic interpretation” of morality: the Christian virtues, as opposed to the virtues of the philosophers, have a supernatural aim and exist through charity. Only through the exercise of these virtues can a human being achieve authentic happiness.

Two years later, Henry returned to the differences among the various types of virtues in q. 12 of *Quodlibet VI*, held at Christmas 1281. As he explains, according to some people, every virtue requires two elements: the goal toward which it is directed, and the acts through which it achieves this goal. This leads to the conclusion that every virtue has a twofold form: one that concerns its own object (or goal), and another that instead regards the way the act arrives at the goal. Keeping in mind this distinction, this comes down to the difference between moral theological virtues and moral acquired virtues: the former pursue an ultimate goal, while the latter pursue a human one. In terms of the second of these forms (which concerns the acts’ arrival at this goal), it entails the distinction between the acquired virtues and the infused virtues. If the acquired virtues concern the way one achieves a natural goal, the infused virtues refer to the means of achieving a supernatural one.⁴⁷ However, a human being should direct all of his acts toward a supernatural goal. Because of this, it would be necessary to posit, for every moral acquired virtue, the existence of an infused moral virtue.

Following Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Henry *denies* this distinction. He points out that while the moral virtue determines the goal of the action, there is only one way that shows the means to achieve that goal, which is *prudentia*.⁴⁸ Although he refers to Aristotle, this prudence does not seem to be fully identifiable with Aristotelian *phronesis*.

virtutibus humanis inquantum humanae sunt inchoantes perfectionem virtutum, inquantum humanae sunt, primo requiramus quae secundum Philosophum est humana felicitas et operatio quaedam secundum virtutem perfectam. Et hoc in virtutibus moralibus secundum virtutem prudentia. [...] Sed hic non debet esse status Christiano, ponendo scilicet finem virtutum in boni operatione quo ad regimen vitae, et in veri speculatione circa creaturas ex creaturis accepta. Sed finem earum debet ponere in boni illius quod est summa omnis boni, dilectione, et in veri illius quod est summa omnis veri, cognitione. Non quantum scilicet naturaliter ex puris naturalibus diligi habet et cognosci, sed quantum per fidem et adiutorio gratiae. Et tunc virtutes quae humanae dicuntur a philosophis, a Christianis dicuntur gratuita⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 12, ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Leuven, 1987), p. 140.

⁴⁸ From this came the doctrinal impasse in the Aristotelian doctrine between the moral virtues’ need for prudence to acquire the means to achieve their aim, and prudence’s need of the moral virtues to guarantee the correctness of those aims.

Henry's concept of prudence is both human and superhuman. As *prudentia humana*, it points to the proper goal of an action. As the prudence which is the gift of God's grace, it is commanded by charity, and indicates the ultimate goal.⁴⁹ There are not different ways to achieve the goal, and there are not different goals appropriate for every virtue. There is only one unique goal: charity (*forma una virtutum*). However, on this point, Henry—paradoxically—employs Aristotelian theory in order to avoid any sort of intellectualism in the ethical act. The doctor from Ghent explains that, if we follow the doctrine of the Philosopher literally, and we acknowledge with him that we have the distinction of the moral virtues not in reference to the goal *ex se* (i.e. the aim according to which the virtues are properly distinguished), but through the goal *ex alio*, it follows that the distinction of the moral virtues can occur only through charity (which indeed constitutes the aim *ex alio* of every moral virtue). As Lottin maintains,⁵⁰ this reasoning leads, in Henry's thought, to the annulment of every distinction between acquired virtues and infused virtues: the action of *caritas* transforms every virtue into a supernatural virtue. This is the reason why, for Henry, there is no need to postulate in the human being, alongside every acquired moral virtue, an accompanying infused one.

Here, Henry's position again seems to move back towards a "voluntaristic interpretation" of morality. All virtues, including acquired ones, have an aim *ex alio* through charity, which represents the supreme infused virtue. Although the action of prudence appears in the formation of virtue, this prudence, in addition to being characteristic of humans, also acts through charity, becoming a *gratuitous* prudence.

3) Henry deals for the first time with the concept of "*prudentia*" in q. 17 of his *Quodlibet V* of Christmas 1280, where he responds to the question "*Utrum virtutes acquisitae morales sint connexae*." As Lottin mentions, in the Middle Ages, the theme of the connection of the virtues (to which this *quaestio* evidently belongs) actually predates the arrival of the Aristotelian texts. However, Aristotle's ethical texts undoubtedly

⁴⁹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 12, ed. Wilson, pp. 141–142, ll. 70–75: "Et est una prudentia, quae regulam imprimit actionibus et dat eis rationem medii, ut ordinantur in fines proprios ei in finem ultimum: ut ordinantur in fines proprios, ex se ut est prudentia humana, in finem vero ultimum, ut ipsa est imperata a voluntate caritate informata et per hoc facta est gratuita, sicut patet in exemplo iam proposito de sobrietate".

⁵⁰ See O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, esp. tome III (2).

inform this discussion.⁵¹ Furthermore, the problem is an important one, when we consider that everyday experience teaches us that a human being can possess one virtue, but not others.

Furthermore, with their assimilation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the masters of the 13th century were faced with a new unifying principle of moral life: *prudentia*, understood not only as one of the four traditional cardinal virtues, but, there are also places where it translates the Greek word *phronesis*, and can be understood as an intellectual virtue. As we have seen, the Aristotelian text, with its link between prudence and the moral virtues, leads to the admission of a rational principle into the foundations of the formation and actualization of virtue, and thus to the expression of a cognitive conception of ethics. For Aristotle, all of the moral virtues were connected through prudence. In other words, through the exercise of the completely human virtue of *phronesis*, a human being could simultaneously possess all of the moral virtues.

Confronting this problem in q. 17 of *Quodlibet V*, Henry's first suggestion is to postulate more connections among the acquired virtues. In accordance with the Franciscan tradition, he maintains that strength, justice, temperance, and prudence are closely related to one another. Every cardinal virtue requires the others in order to exist in the first place. It is also evident that every particular virtue is so named precisely because it possesses all four of the cardinal dispositions at the same time.⁵² However, the three cardinal virtues of justice, fortitude and temperance need the contribution of prudence (in fact, a particular sort of prudence) also

⁵¹ See O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale ...*, esp. tome III (1), pp. 197 ss. According to the Christian tradition, only the theological virtues can be considered connected, but not other types of virtue. That is to say, only the possession of one of the three virtues of faith, hope and charity automatically implies the possession of the other two. In support of the thesis that the only connected virtues are the theological ones, there is the fact that only these latter ones are given simultaneously by God to the soul. On the other hand, since the acquired virtues come into being through the repetition of good acts, a person may exercise, over the course of his life, one virtue more than another.

⁵² See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 17, ed. Badius, fol. 189^{rX-Y}: "Unde quia quaelibet quatuor virtutum cardinalium sic assistendo alteri proprium opus et finem illius intendit cui assistit et est quasi ministerialis ei: ideo id quod sibi proprium est, est quasi alterius conditio seu circumstantia ut quatuor generales conditiones quatuor virtutum principalium simul cum qualibet virtute concurrant una tamquam sibi propria: aliae tres tamquam ab aliis sibi subministratae. Quae sunt: modus scilicet quo ad temperantiam, firmitas quo ad fortitudinem, rectitudo quo ad iustitiam, discretio quo ad prudentiam: ut non sit vera virtus nisi habeat moderamen, firmitatem, rectitudinem et discretionem. Et ex hoc contingit quod quidam advertentes praedictam connexionem non in radice et in causa, sed in signo et in effectu, dicunt connexionem virtutum esse penes earum generales conditiones".

to acquire the means to achieve their aims.⁵³ In addition to these two relations, Henry offers a third: the connection of the three virtues of justice, fortitude, and temperance with prudence, understood not simply as the common means to the other virtues, but as their common end. In the text, Henry is careful to explain that, in addition to the “particular prudence” that fixes the concrete means to realize their ends, there is also a “general prudence” that fixes these ends in the first place. Returning to the already quoted axiom of Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle says that there is no moral virtue without prudence and no prudence without moral virtue, Henry maintains that this general prudence (the habit of the practical intellect) dictates to the virtues the moral ends which they are to follow. These particular virtues, however, although they recognize their aim as dictated by universal prudence, are not able to realize it on their own. As we have seen, they are located in the will (*domina operationum quod sunt secundum virtutes*). However, the will in turn can make mistakes *per accidens* if it has another object contrary to the end that it pursues.⁵⁴ With this, it is important to acknowledge at the foundation of these virtues some concrete means that helps the will to pursue the moral good, i.e. particular prudence.⁵⁵

⁵³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 17, ed. Badius, fol. 188^vQ: “Virtutes autem morales, et earum fines, quia sunt tanquam ea quae sunt ad finem, ut ad prudentiam et ad eius finem, ideo connexio omnium inquantum quaelibet requiritur ad existentiam cuiuslibet virtutum moralium, est connexio sicut in fine eorum quae sunt ad finem inter se. Connexio vero virtutum moralium cum prudentia inquantum requiruntur ad eam, est connexio sicut eorum quae sunt ad finem. Unde prudentia inquantum connectitur virtutibus moralibus et requiritur ad earum existentiam ordinat ad seipsam ut in finem: inquantum ipsa regulat morales in seipsa, et per hoc morales connectunt in ipsam et ad esse requaruntur ipsius”.

⁵⁴ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 14.

⁵⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 17, ed. Badius, fol. 189^rR: “Quia tamen voluntas quae est domina operationum quae sunt secundum virtutes, ut dicit Philosophus II *Ethicorum*, bono unius virtutis non est alligata: neque bono virtutis acquisitae omnino: sed liberam habet electionem talis boni simpliciter, et ut nunc sive sit finis, sive ad finem: cum hoc igitur quod delectabiliter operatur quae sibi sunt propria, quibus in fine suo stat vel adipiscitur ipsam: ut ad ipsam perfecte perveniat et persistat requirit alia adiutoria. Licet enim quaelibet virtus voluntatem sic afficit, et ad finem suum inclinat, ut per se delectet in eis quae congruunt suo fini: et per se abhorreat contraria: per accidens tamen praefendo aliud bonum ut nunc fini suo, non directe contrarium sed disparatum ab eo, a quo non per se retrahit virtus illa, sed alia cuius fini directe opponitur ne appetendo illud agat actionem contrariam suo fini: et impediatur ne ipsam attingat, vel deiiciatur ab eo, necessario eget se iuvare et fulciri per illam virtutem quae voluntatem ipsam sic per se afficiat, et in finem suum inclinet, ut in opibus fini suo congruentibus delectet et omne contrarium ei abhorret et contrariam actionem: et per hoc firmiter voluntas, ne per illud bonum ut nunc ipsum appetendo impediatur illa alia virtus a fine suo, vel cadat ab

In the text, alongside the doctrine of the double connection of the virtues with prudence, the other important conceptual element that Henry stresses is that of “natural prudence” (*prudentia naturalis*). He adds that, underlying particular and general prudence (and thus, underlying moral virtue), there is a practical natural reason, the Aristotelian concept of “cleverness” (*deinotes*) or “natural prudence”. This prudence consists in the reciprocal action of the will and reason in the instinctive pursuit and realization of the first principles of natural law.⁵⁶ This means that, prior to the action of either particular or general prudence, and thus prior to the moral virtues, there exists, in Henry’s doctrine, a rational, natural element, common to all human beings and capable of guaranteeing ethical moorings valid for all the men.⁵⁷ As we will see, when called on to address particular moral problems in the political sphere, as well as in the “economic” one, Henry will frequently mention the action of this natural reason, in the process of postulating universal moral precepts.

Coming back to the inquiry of the *quaestio* (i.e. whether or not there exists a connection among the cardinal virtues), Henry answers in the affirmative: the virtues are connected through general prudence, which directs them toward their proper ends, and through particular prudence, which indicates the means to achieve these ends. However, the virtues are

ipso. Et quia bonum contrarium fini cuiusque virtutis si fuerit sola posset dicto modo per accidens retrahere voluntatem a fine cuiusque virtutis: ne finem suum prosequatur: aut ut cadat ab ipso, idcirco dico quod quodlibet virtus ut tuta sit et secura ne impediatur a finis prosecutione, vel ne deiiciatur a fine adepto, debet habere quamlibet virtutem aliam sibi annexam”.

⁵⁶ See Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI, 12, 1144a22–1144b10.

⁵⁷ See O. Lottin, “La connexion des vertus morales acquises au dernier quart du XIII^e siècle”, *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 15 (1948), pp. 107–151, esp. p. 133; Id., *Psychologie et morale*, esp. tomes III, IV (2), p. 571. Keeping in mind the three types of prudence that Henry considers, Lottin explains the process of Henry’s doctrine concerning the constitution of the moral virtues in this way: “Ainsi donc, à la source de la prudence et des vertus morales, il faut placer une raison naturelle pratique qui, avant l’acquisition de tout habitus, conçoit les premiers principes de l’ordre naturel qui sont l’ébauche de l’habitus prudentiel; et une volonté naturelle se portant d’instinct vers les fins morales qui sont l’ébauche des vertus morales; Or, sous l’action de ces moteurs naturels, la raison est incitée à déterminer pour la volonté les objets particuliers, objets de la prudence particulière; et celle-ci, à son tour, par l’expérience des cas particuliers, contribue à enrichir l’habitus de la prudence générale. Et de même, en réalisant ces cas concrets, la volonté affirme l’habitus des vertus morales, lesquelles, à leur tour, augmentent l’habitus de la prudence universelle qui, lui-même, incite à la détermination des cas particuliers. Et c’est par cet échange continu d’influences que se crée dans l’âme la cohésion mutuelle des vertus morales et de la prudence générale”.

not characterized by this double connection all at once. In fact, the union of virtue consists of four stages: inchoateness (*inchoatio*), progression (*profectus*), perfection (*perfectio*) and excession (*excessus*). In the first two stages, the virtues are not connected, because at this point, it's possible that a human being *naturaliter* or *occasione* could be disposed to exercise one virtue but not another. At the third stage (*perfectio*), there is also no connection. The connection among the virtues only fully comes into being at the stage of *excessus* (that is, when particular and general prudence work together). In the text, there is also a reference to charity when Henry cites Augustine in order to defend the connection of the virtues, but at same time affirms that the virtues cannot be completely connected in this world.⁵⁸ Thus, following Aristotle, Henry defends the idea that the moral virtues are connected to each other through particular and general prudence. However, this connection is not perfect. Perfection is only attainable in the afterlife and through the intervention of grace. Although in this question Henry seems to insist on the important role the action of prudence (even postulating two 'prudences') plays in the formation of the moral virtues, he is nevertheless careful to emphasize that the true connection of virtue happens only through charity, which is ultimately only possible in the afterlife.

Prudence is discussed for the last time by Henry in *quaestio* 14 of *Quodlibet XII*, in which he deals with the problem as to whether or not prudence⁵⁹ can exist independently of the moral virtues. If prudence, as a habit of the practical intellect, takes its place in the rational sphere, and the moral virtues are located in the sphere of the will (and this latter sphere is autonomous and free relative to the first), then it would seem that prudence could come about without the generation of the moral virtues. But if this were the case, it would violate the Aristotelian principle according to which the moral virtues are connected to prudence. In order to address this problem, Henry re-proposes the subdivision of prudence, this time however only into "natural prudence" and "acquired prudence".⁶⁰ The first type of prudence is naturally innate in the human

⁵⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 17, ed. Badius, fol. 192^v.

⁵⁹ As Lottin explains, it is the acquired prudence; see O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, esp. tome IV, p. 573, n. 1.

⁶⁰ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 14, ed. Decorte, pp. 80; 81, ll. 20–22; 45–51: "Dico quod duplex est prudentia in hominis intellectu practico: una naturalis, quae est origo alterius et principium acquirendi illam, alia vero acquisita. [...] Dicta autem prudentia naturali intellectus practicus ab initio primitivo operis determinat ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut voluntas dictis principiis seminalibus virtutum moralium determinat

being; through it, all of the virtues are connected. This natural prudence (which Henry had already spoken about in q. 17 of *Quodlibet V*) determines the work of the practical intellect that, in turn, determines the means to arrive at the end, established by the will. In this way, the moral virtues begin to be generated in the will. The practical intellect, proceeding from the action of the will, in turn becomes acquainted with the things it is to work with, directing them toward their aim. In this way, prudence (in the “acquired” sense) is generated in the intellect. Unlike q. 17 of *Quodlibet V* (where the determination of the means and the aim of the moral action were the work of particular prudence and general prudence, respectively), here we instead find at work the practical intellect and the will (which were not compared in the previous treatment). Evidently, Henry wanted to return to an insistence on the important role of the will in the moral sphere, which was contested by the person who proposed the question.

Despite the renewed focus on the role of the will here, the conclusions concerning prudence at which Henry arrives in q. 14 of *Quodlibet XII* and q. 17 of *Quodlibet V* are both the same: the Aristotelian position that the moral virtues and prudence are connected are in both cases taken to be the correct one. Most importantly, Henry again points to a rational natural element at the foundation of the formation of morality. In the text, alongside the acquired virtue of prudence (which comes into being at the same moment as the other moral virtues), Henry also acknowledges the existence of a natural prudence, which demonstrates the good of the intellect, and that the will is inclined to follow. For a human being, to follow this particular virtue of reason means to choose the good:

... Ad rationem in contrarium quod qua ratione semel recta ratione iudicante aliquid agendum, voluntas potest illud non eligere eadem ratione et pluries, dico quod falsum est, quia, cum primo eligit contra rectam rationem, inficitur vitio, a qua infectione voluntatis statim incipit obscurari ratio et obliquari a sua rectitudine, et sic incipit deficere a rectitudine iudicii gradatim et interscalatim, quousque voluntate in vitio obstinata ratio sit excaecata.⁶¹

et praestituit ipsum finem. Cumque autem voluntas ab initio praestituerit finem et intellectus practicus id quod est ad finem, et hoc ante operis inchoationem, tunc voluntas incipiendo operari incipit velle id quod est finem, et operando illud tendere in finem”.

⁶¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 14, ed. Decorte, p. 82, ll. 70–76.

Therefore, at the foundation of moral action, Henry again locates natural reason, which is common to all human beings.

Here, at the end of this section, which analyzed the theory of the virtues in Henry of Ghent, we can now draw some conclusions. Henry undoubtedly advocates a “voluntaristic interpretation” of morality. He locates every virtue, defined as *habitus*, in the will. Although the will requires the contribution of reason in order to constitute the virtues, it remains free due to its threefold division. Reason, in the form of prudence, works together with the will first and foremost in the formation of the moral virtues, through the action of particular prudence (which reveals to the virtues the means to achieve their aim) and of general prudence (which indicates to the virtues their proper end). The contribution reason makes to morality is also expressed in connection to virtue. However, this connection is fully possible only through charity and only in the afterlife. Thus charity remains, in Henry’s thought, the supreme virtue,⁶² which guides all other virtues (including the acquired virtues), toward their ultimate, supernatural end. In other words, Henry identifies in an infused virtue—charity—the supreme form of virtue as such, and he expects the fulfillment of happiness to be achieved only in the afterlife, when all of the moral virtues will be connected and we will enjoy the knowledge of the absolute good and truth.

Another noteworthy fact that emerges from the analysis of Henry’s texts is that both the will and the reciprocal action of particular prudence and general prudence are made dependent, by Henry, on a natural prudence (the Aristotelian “cleverness” [*deinotes*]). This natural prudence leads both particular and general prudence to conform to the primary natural laws, common and universal to all human beings. Thus, for Henry, a re-evaluation emerges of the moral virtues common to all human beings. Only at a subsequent stage do these natural predispositions become supernatural virtues, through the action of *caritas*, a divine gift.

⁶² A focus on the role of *caritas* in the constitution of virtue returns in q. 12 of *Quodlibet* X, dedicated by Henry to the virtue of friendship. In this text, *amicitia* is defined as “*moralium virtutum corona*”, because, among all of the moral virtues, it is the one chiefly conforming to charity. Thus charity, as the infused virtue *par excellence*, becomes the criterion for establishing the importance or non-importance of a virtue.

III. *Examples of the Moral Act in the Political and in the "Economic" Spheres*

Concrete examples of Henry's ethical philosophy, until now sketched at a theoretical level, can be found in the numerous questions Henry dedicated to the political sphere and to those dealing with what we would call, in modern terms, "economics". As mentioned at the beginning of this contribution, for Henry, the fulfillment of the most perfect virtues on this earth is possible through an active life, rather than through a contemplative one. Hence, the questions dedicated to the problems of the practical sphere not only represent for Henry that field in which the moral laws are usually realized, but they are also the best opportunity that a human being has at his disposal to achieve virtue in the fullest possible sense. These texts primarily concern three arguments: 1) the problems regarding the *res publica*; 2) some "economic" practices, such as the practice of usury; 3) the defense of the human person.

These discussions are very important in the history of thought because, with them, Henry delineates two important sets of concepts. a) Firstly, Henry postulates moral rules based on natural law and on right reason (*recta ratio*). Although a *magister* of theology and an ecclesiastical authority, the *Doctor Sollemnis*, in accordance with the ethical positions he outlined at the theoretical level, elaborates universal laws that precede and anticipate the religious laws which apply to the sphere of the active life. b) Secondly, Henry elaborates doctrinal positions that will actively contribute to the ultimate genesis of social and human rights, as the valuable studies of B. Tierney and V. Mäkinen have shown.⁶³

1) In *quaestio* 13 of *Quodlibet XII*, Henry responds to the question as to whether or not an atheist (who has no hope for a future life), must, in conformity to right reason, sacrifice himself for his country.⁶⁴ The

⁶³ See Virpi Mäkinen, *Property Rights in the Late Medieval Discussion on Franciscan Poverty*, (Leuven, 2001), pp. 120–123; Brian Tierney, "Natural Rights in the Thirteenth Century. A *Quaestio* of Henry of Ghent", *Speculum*, 67 (1992), pp. 58–68; Id., *The Idea of Natural Rights. Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150–1625*, (Atlanta, 1997), esp. pp. 78–89; Id., "Tuck on Rights: Some Medieval Problems", *History of Political Thought*, 4 (1983), pp. 429–441.

⁶⁴ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13: "Utrum non sperans vitam futuram debeat secundum rectam rationem eligere mori pro patria". On this *quaestio* see in particular Georges de Lagarde, *La naissance de l'esprit laïque au déclin du Moyen Age*, II, (Louvain-Paris, 1960); G. Fioravanti, "Pro Patria Mori: un conflitto di modelli etici";

question is interesting because here Henry considers the case of whether a person, irrespective at any *felicitas post mortem* (i.e. totally outside of a religious context), should (or should not) risk his own life in order to conform to what is established by right reason (*recta ratio*). Henry's answer is surprisingly in the affirmative:⁶⁵ one must be willing to sacrifice one's life for one's country, neither for the sake of a glory beyond this world, nor out of fear of eventual punishment (either in this life or the next), but because it is established by right reason. As Henry maintains in q. 14 of the same *Quodlibet XII*, reason is the faculty that chooses in favor of the virtues, as opposed to the vices. In this sense, by relying on the judgment of the intellect, a human being can always be sure to act in favor of the good and to avoid error:

Secundum autem rectam rationem semper opera virtutum eligenda sunt, et opera vitiorum sunt fugienda, etiam si non speraretur vita alia. [...] ... quia virtutes sunt secundum rectam rationem, secundum quam homo secundum quod homo vivere debet. Hoc enim est ei secundum naturam suam vivere. Vitia vero sunt contra rectam rationem. Sic ergo dico quod secundum rectam rationem etiam non sperans aliam vitam debet eligere mori pro re publica.⁶⁶

In Henry's text, the other relevant element to consider is that right reason is not only the true arbiter of the moral sphere, capable of distinguishing between virtue and vice, but is also a principle that is valid for everyone (*apud omnes*), valid for philosophers and Catholics, for believers and non-believers, for those who trust in the existence of an afterlife and those who do not:

M.S. Kempshall, *The Common Good*, esp. pp. 171–178; Raymond Macken, "The Moral Duty of a Man who does not hope for a Future Life, to offer in a Case of Necessity his Life for his Country, according to the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent", in *Essays on Henry of Ghent*, ed. Raymond Macken, (Leuven, 1994), pp. 85–100.

⁶⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, pp. 68–69, ll. 45–54; 65–66: "Nunc autem ita est quod secundum rectam rationem sperans vitam aliam iudicare debet secundum rectam rationem quod praeeligendum est mori pro salute rei publicae, non tam quia sperat poenam mortis sibi restitui et recompensari in praemio vitae futurae, quam quia non eligens hoc, peccaret et Deum offenderet quicumque pro re publica vitam suam temporalem non exponeret. Quare et idem debet iudicare non sperans vitam futuram, quod scilicet secundum rectam rationem pro re publica eligendum est mori, et hoc quia non eligens hoc, peccaret, etsi Dei offensam non timeret propter poenam futuram, quia illam non crederet. [...] Sic ergo dico quod secundum rectam rationem etiam non sperans aliam vitam debet eligere mori pro re publica".

⁶⁶ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, p. 69, ll. 55–56; 65–66.

Dico quod id quod secundum rectam rationem debet fieri, apud omnes aequaliter debet fieri, et ab omnibus rectam rationem habentibus aequaliter debet iudicari debere fieri, nec in hoc diversificari debent iudicia philosophorum et catholicorum, nec aliter debet iudicare sperans aliam vitam quam non sperans, nec e converso. Sicut enim quod verum est apud quosdam, verum est apud omnes, nec est aliquid verum secundum philosophiam veram quod non sit verum secundum theologiam, nec e converso, sicut et de eo quod rectum est aut faciendum secundum rectam rationem, et sic in ista quaestione non debet aliter sentire bonus theologus quam sentiret verus philosophus, nec e converso; et consimiliter de eo quod falsum est, et contra rectam rationem.⁶⁷

As Henry explains in the text, the truth (*verum*) dictated by right reason is univocal and certain in both philosophy and theology, in a way that, as Kempshall maintains, “There can be no ‘double truth.’”⁶⁸ Hence, in Henry’s thought, right reason is of fundamental importance to the ethical sphere, because it results in the only universally valid motivation that can determine a moral action. In the following lines of the *quaestio* under examination, Henry compares this “right reason” to charity: one who does not believe in an afterlife should sacrifice himself for the sake of his country *secundum rectam rationem*. In the same way, one who believes in eternal life will sacrifice himself *ex caritate*.⁶⁹ Right reason thus constitutes, for the non-believer, the motive through which the believer acts, i.e. charity. Somewhat paradoxically, right reason even seems to constitute a better motivation than charity. While charity is valid only for the believer, right reason has the advantage of being valid for both believer and non-believer alike. What is noteworthy here is that Henry, although he is a theologian and an ecclesiastical authority, maintains that the foundation of the ethical act of dying for the sake of one’s country, which is applicable to all human beings (i.e. right reason) is prior to the religious and supernatural principle (i.e. charity).

Alongside the right reason, Henry lists other motivations for why we should “eligere mori pro re publica”. First of all, because it means choosing a superior good: since it is an act done for the good of the community, then, according to Aristotelian doctrine, it will also be good for the

⁶⁷ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, p. 68, ll. 35–45.

⁶⁸ See M.S. Kempshall, *The Common Good*, p. 171.

⁶⁹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, p. 74, ll. 60–62: “Et sic secundum rectam rationem debet non sperans aliam vitam eligere mori pro re publica, sicut et sperans illam ex caritate”.

individual.⁷⁰ Henry explains that if this is considered the primary motivation, especially for the man devoted to political happiness (*felix politicus*), then, on the contrary, the motive of a man more properly dedicated to the contemplative life (*felix speculativus*) to sacrifice his life for the sake of the state is something else entirely. If a contemplative man willing to die for his country will not in fact achieve any good, he will at the very least avoid doing evil.⁷¹ To this, we should add that the motivation to die for one's country which comes from the *felix politicus* and the *felix speculativus* in fact constitutes a good in itself (*bonum simpliciter*).⁷² At the end of the solution to the *quaestio*, Henry adds another important reason why both the political man and the contemplative man should sacrifice their own lives for their country: both should "eligere mori pro re publica" because "teneatur de iure naturae".⁷³ With this appeal to natural right, Henry thus adopts, in addition to right reason, another motivation which is a foundational principle universally valid for every human being.

In this way, in Henry's thought, both reason and natural law are able to give to morality (which, if connected via heteronymous prescriptions, would run the risk of being authoritative only for some men and not

⁷⁰ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, p. 71, ll. 9–11: "Propter hoc igitur mori pro re publica non solum est simpliciter melius quia pluribus, sed etiam melius est sibi, secundum quod dicit in IX^o Ethicorum". Henry underlines in the text that the public good is better only if it includes also the good of the single. See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, pp. 75–76, ll. 98–2: "... verum est quod bonum publicum praeferendum est privato, dum tamen bonum privatum includatur in publico, aliter non, licet simpliciter sit praeferendum quantum est ex parte sui, non tamen quantum est ex parte illius cuius bonum privatum non includitur in bono publico".

⁷¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, p. 73, ll. 39–44: "Credo Philosophum non recte sensisse de felice speculativo, aut sensit quod secundum rectam rationem speculativus deberet illud eligere, quia illud est melius simpliciter et etiam sibi; quia etsi non sibi melius est quoad boni alicuius acquisitionem nec omnino nec pro illa hora, est tamen melius sibi quoad evasionem mali culpa". As Kempshall explains (*The Common Good*, p. 173): "The contemplative ought to sacrifice himself, therefore, not because he acquires good (in this respect he suffers loss), but because he avoids evil. Self-sacrifice is thus good for the contemplative, not in a positive, but in a negative sense".

⁷² See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, p. 73, ll. 44–46: "Secundum quem modum et politicus, etiam si nullo modo esset melius sibi quoad boni acquisitionem, deberet tamen illud eligere quod est melius simpliciter et etiam melius illi quoad evasionem mali culpa".

⁷³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, p. 73, ll. 47–49: "Dico ergo quod ad hoc uterque eorum, scilicet tam felix politicus quam speculativus, tenetur de iure naturae, et quod peccaret, si illud non eligeret, et quod turpiter viveret. Melius est autem mori quam turpiter vivere".

for others) a uniform character, valid for all human beings, irrespective of their being philosophers or theologians, men devoted to politics or speculation.⁷⁴

2) Henry appeals once again to natural law in order to universalize moral norms in q. 26⁷⁵ of *Quodlibet IX* of Easter 1286. This question, together with q. 25,⁷⁶ to which it is strongly connected, is one of the writings most often discussed by scholars dealing with Henry's ethical thought. The two texts are of great value: with them, Henry arrives at what are revolutionary positions for his time. In q. 25 Henry denounces the practice of torture in juridical inquiry which was at the time permitted by law. Furthermore, in q. 26 he refers to the right of self-preservation (of one's own life), and, in the process, elaborates the idea of an inviolable sphere of personal natural rights (and duties), one of the first in the history of thought to do so.⁷⁷

Among these texts, q. 26 appears more significant because Henry establishes there a relation between the inviolability of human life and natural law. More specifically, Henry holds the position that a judge, on the basis of positive law, has the power to capture and to take the life of the body of a man condemned to death. However, this condemned person,

⁷⁴ The *quaestio* is also even positive regarding intellectual happiness: continuing to follow Aristotle, Henry emphasizes that according to the Philosopher, because dying for one's country is a good for the political happiness (that is a good for everyone), it cannot also not be a good for speculative happiness (intended here as the most supreme): see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 13, ed. Decorte, pp. 72–73, ll. 23–26; 30–33; 42–49: “Si enim sentit de ipso felici speculativo quod secundum rectam rationem debet eligere mori pro re publica, quaero an hoc sensit quia est sibi ipsi bonum, aut quia simpliciter bonum, licet non sibi ipsi. [...] quia nequaquam contingit in aliqua operatione secundum virtutem politicam tantum delectari, quantumcunque sit magna, quantum secundum virtutem speculativam, quia illa habet mirabiles delectationes, ut dicit in libro X^o [...]; quia, etsi non sibi melius est quoad boni alicuius acquisitionem nec omnino nec pro illa hora, est tamen melius sibi quoad evasionem mali culpa. Dico ergo quod ad hoc uterque eorum, scilicet tam felix politicus quam speculativus, tenetur de iure naturae, et quod peccaret, si illud non eligeret, et quod turpiter viveret. Melius est autem mori quam turpiter viveret”.

⁷⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 26: “Utrum condemnatus morti possit abire licite si tempus habeat et locum”.

⁷⁶ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 25: “Utrum iudex saecularis possit aliquem cogere ad confitendum aliquid ad quod sequitur mors alterius”.

⁷⁷ See esp. Raymond Macken, “Henry of Ghent as defender of the Personal Rights of Man”, *Franziskanische Studien*, 73 (1991), pp. 170–181; V. Mäkinen, *Property Rights in the Late Medieval Discussion on Franciscan Poverty*, pp. 120–123; B. Tierney, “Natural Rights in the Thirteenth Century. A *Quaestio* of Henry”; Id., *The Idea of Natural Rights*; Id., “Tuck on Rights: Some Medieval Problems”.

in cases of extreme necessity, also has the power (*potestas*) and the right, according to natural right (*ius naturale*), to use his own body to preserve his own existence, but only without harming others (*sine iniuria alterius*):

Dico ergo ad propositum quod super corpus damnati ad mortem potestatem habet iudex saecularis capiendi, detinendi et occidendi. Habet autem et ipsemet damnatus quoad animam potestatem super idem corpus utendi eo ad vitae suae in corpore custodiam, in qua consistit eius perfectio sine iniuria alterius. Et hoc non solum aequitate naturae quae fas est circa rem alienam, sed quae licitum est. Et non solum licitum tamquam a lege naturae indultum in aliquale alterius praeiudicium, sed quae ius est secundum legem naturae. Et non solum ius, sed in casu necessitas exsequendi ius suum.⁷⁸

According to this argument, in instances of extreme need, as in the case, for example, the risk of starvation, a person condemned to death is even allowed to steal, with the purpose of preserving his own life:

Ut si oporteret captivum talem mori fame nisi acciperet clam contra voluntatem custodis sui panem eius, in hoc habet potestatem et ius atque necessitatem utendi corpore ad panem capiendum et vescendum. Et fit hoc sine laesione alterius, quia necessitas facit commune quod erat proprium, ut iuste occupanti concedatur [...] Si enim, ut dictum est, existens in vinculis necesse haberet mori fame nisi subtraheret ei panem, hoc liceret ei, quia hoc nullo modo vergit in praeiudicium iuris quod habet in detinendo vel occidendo. Quare cum subtractio corporis necessaria sit animae suae ad vitae eius custodiam, quam facit absque omni praeiudicio potestatis quam habet iudex super corpus eius, quando sentit quod corpus non est in vinculis et quod ostiis apertis nullum restat obstaculum, ideo in tali casu licet corpus suum subtrahere utendo iure suo, sicut in alio casu liceret subtrahere panem iudicis.⁷⁹

Thus, contrary to human law,⁸⁰ which prohibits escape and practices the death penalty, Henry reaffirms the rule that, according to the *natural right*, the life of a person (even a person condemned to death) must always be safeguarded. In the *quaestio*, there does not appear any reference to charity, which Henry refers to elsewhere in order to defend the right

⁷⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 26, ed. Raymond Macken, (Leuven, 1983), p. 308, ll. 38–46.

⁷⁹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 26, ed. Macken, pp. 308; 309, ll. 46–50; 68–76.

⁸⁰ Henry in his texts repeatedly emphasizes that human law permits many evils due to custom: see for instance Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 32, ed. Badius, fol. 210^r: “Hic attendendum est: quod in tali quaestione et in consimilibus in quibus aliqua statuunt iura humana de permittendo aliqua fieri vel non fieri simpliciter, aut aliquibus permittunt, aliquibus prohibent aut in quibus aliquid detinetur ex consuetudine”.

of (and duty to) self-preservation.⁸¹ Here, surprisingly, Henry appeals instead to a principle common to all human beings (even non-believers): natural law (*lex naturalis*).⁸²

3) The universalization of the moral principles is again put forth by Henry in his treatment of natural law in two questions: q. 39 of *Quodlibet I* (1276) and q. 15 of *Quodlibet II* (1277), dedicated to the problem of the *emptio-venditio redditum*.⁸³ This is an “economic” practice, developed in the 13th century, consisting of a seller (or debtor) granting to a buyer (or creditor) some type of property (*census*), for life (*ad vitam*) or in perpetuity (*perpetue*) (that is, a grant extended for the life of the creditor’s heirs), in exchange for a fixed income in material goods or in money.

⁸¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 19 (“Utrum bonum proprium magis sit procurandum quam commune”). On this occasion, Henry defends the theory that the *bonum proprium* should be preferred over the *bonum commune*, by appealing to the *ordo caritatis* of Augustine, according to which we should privilege the good towards ourselves over that of the good towards others.

⁸² At the basis of this defence of the individual there is 1) the previously cited Henry doctrine of the superiority of the individual good over the common good and 2) the defence of the role of the *civitas* relative to the figure of the *princeps*, which Henry goes on to discuss in more detail in *Quodlibet VIII*. Concerning the first point, see especially *quaestio* 19 of *Quodlibet IX*, where Henry criticizes Aristotle (i.e. who says that the *bonum commune* is always the most divine): the common good appears primarily divine only if it also realizes and includes within itself the individual good. On this point, see M.S. Kempshall, *The Common Good*, esp. 155–203; Marialucezia Leone, “Bene comune, bene individuale e naturalità dei rapporti economici in Enrico di Gand”, in *Atti del Convegno SIEPM “I beni di questo mondo. Teorie etico-economiche nel laboratorio dell’Europa medievale”* [forthcoming]. Concerning the second point see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VIII*, q. 22: “Utrum res praescripta in bona fide cum notum fuerit de mala fide statim tenens eam teneatur restituere ei ad quam de iure debet pertinere”; q. 26: “Utrum pro delicto principis possint subditi iuste puniri occisione, captione et huiusmodi”. From these questions, there is no longer any trace of the importance previously assigned by Henry (for instance, in *Summa*, art. XXV, q. 2; art. XXIX, q. 6, and *Quodlibet VI*, q. 23), to the absolute authority of the *princeps*. For instance, the monarchical authority over the temporal good, which in *Quodlibet VI* was rooted in God, now comes from the will of the citizens.

⁸³ Henry’s other treatments of the *emptio redditum* are q. 24 of *Quodlibet VIII*: “Utrum liceat emere redditus perpetuos” and q. 21 of *Quodlibet XII*: “Utrum licet alicui dare ecclesiae cuiquam certam summam pecuniae ad emendum terras ad opus illius ecclesiae, ut detur ei certa summa pecuniae ad vita suam”. On this “economic practice” in Henry, see esp. Marialucezia Leone, “The Theologian and the Contracts: Henry of Ghent and the *emptio-venditio redditum*”, *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 75/1 (2008), pp. 137–160; Fabiano Veraja, *L’origine della controversia teologica sul contratto di censo nel XIII secolo*, “Storia e economia”, 7, (Roma, 1960).

Called in q. 39 of *Quodlibet I* and in q. 15 of *Quodlibet II* (respectively) to decide whether it is permissible to buy and sell *redditus ad vitam*, Henry criticizes this sort of contract as a form of usury. In order to do this, in both the texts, he adopts as his starting point the Aristotelian economic model, based on the arithmetical equality of exchange (*iuxta aequitatem proportionis arithmeticae*). This model interprets money as the intermediate (and not the final) term between the different parts of the equation, serving as an instrument for comparing and exchanging different values.⁸⁴ The *emptio-venditio reddituum* is a form of usury because, first of all, it is opposed to this natural equity and thus opposes the *ius naturae*.⁸⁵ Secondly, he criticizes this practice as a form of usury by quoting Luke 19:21 and John Chrysostomus' *Commentary on Matthew* 21:12. In other words, Henry begins his condemnation of this "economic" practice (in a manner very advanced for his time), first of all by pointing out the proportional and egalitarian equilibrium proper to economic and natural exchange;⁸⁶ that is to say, by referring to a moral norm common to all human beings. Only subsequently, following this natural and universal

⁸⁴ For a very good survey of Henry of Ghent's concept of money, see Odd Langholm, *Economics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition 1200–1350*, (Leiden/New York/Köln, 1992), esp. pp. 254–275.

⁸⁵ Certainly, we should keep in mind that some *Summa* authors and Decretalists of the first half of the 13th century had already considered such a rent contract to be usurious (Henry himself mentions, for instance, Geoffrey of Trani and John of Fribourg). Nevertheless, these authors did not condemn rent contracts because they were *contra naturam*, but because of the possibility that, in this practice (1) the seller of the rent might wish for the death of the buyer (or vice versa), and (2) the purchaser might hope to live for a long time, so as to receive a usufruct of the good greater than the price paid. In other words, it seems that, in these texts of Henry's, the rent contract is for the first time in its history identified as a form of usury, specifically because *ex forma sua* it is against nature. See F. Veraja, *L'origine della controversia teologica sul contratto di censo*, p. 163.

⁸⁶ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 15, ed. Wielockx, pp. 99–100, ll. 92–96: "Si autem praeter aequitatem iuris naturalis, quae stat in medio indivisibili secundum naturam inter emptum et venditum, sicut lingula librae stat perpendiculariter inter brachia librae aequaliter ponderantia (licet ex parte nostra medium illud est divisibile, quia nescimus singula ad unguem aestimare, et ideo relinquitur conscientiae ementium et vendentium, ne quis plus vendat quod suum est, quam bona fide credat pro tempore et loco debere valere, neque similiter minus emat), si, inquam, praeter talem aequitatem ius humanum positivum aliquid statuerit per illos qui omnes res humanae possessionis habent in sua potestate, ut videlicet liceat vendentes et ementes, inter quos solent fieri contractus, citra medietatem iusti pretii se decipere, et ius positivum sic poterit usque ad talem gradum determinare medium naturae, vel aliqua alia huiusmodi statuerit, et quomodo ex virtute iuris positivi talia liceant, non me intromitto. Omnino tamen statuta iuris positivi scio a primis regulis naturae derivari et ad ipsas reduci et cum eis concordare".

command, does Henry also add religious criteria, which are valid only for believers. From this, as we will see in the follow paragraph, Henry surprisingly derives a doctrinal premise that he will advance several times over the following years: since the problems regarding the *quaestiones ad mercatores*, i.e. “economic” questions, also concern divine and natural law, this problem should be resolved by those persons who, in fact, know best and act most according to divine and natural law, namely theologians.

IV. *The Theologian as the True Guarantor of Henry's Moral Philosophy*

These last two questions, dedicated to the “economic” practice of *emptio-venditio reddituum*, are especially important since they are the first texts in which Henry claims that the theologian has the greatest capacity to resolve ethical questions concerning the active life; that is to say, those questions regarding the sphere of existence in which human beings can achieve perfect virtue. In particular, after he claims that the validity of an “economic” norm depends on whether or not it conforms to natural or divine law (which are common to all human beings), rather than to positive law (i.e. civil or canon law), Henry argues that the legitimacy of this norm must be established by the theologian, and not by the jurist.⁸⁷ The theologian (by which he means primarily the secular master) is the one who can best make decisions about ethics in general, and “economic” matters in particular, because he knows better than anyone else the dictates of natural law:

Ad intellectum ergo eius quod dicendum est in hac quaestione, reducenda sunt ad memoriam quaedam tacta in quadam alia quaestione, anni praecedentis, videlicet “an liceat emere vilius, ut in continenti vendatur carius”, de qua determinatur fuit quod non. Contra quam determinationem similiter, ut intellexi, multum fuit murmuratum. Et tamen, ut credo, non continet nisi naturalis iuris aequitatem, secundum quam pertinet ad theologos huiusmodi quaestiones determinare: si enim secundum aequitatem iuris civilis aut canonici possunt determinari, hoc non est nisi in quantum ortum habent ex regulis naturalis iuris et divini.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 39, ed. Raymond Macken, (Leuven, 1987), p. 217, ll. 75–79: “Nec solum dico quod est contractus illicitus, sed quod est expresse ex forma sua contractus usurarius, ut patet ex natura contractus usurarii. Nec debet forma huius contractus, in genere cuius contractus iniqui sit, peti a iuristis, sed magis a theologis et philosophis, cum sit iniquitas contra legem iuris divini et naturae, ut dictum est”.

⁸⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 15, ed. Wielockx, p. 97, ll. 41–49.

As Henry will emphasize in other parts of his work, divine and natural law can never be wrong; this is not the case in positive law. Positive law, because it pursues “the peace of the conscience” (*pax conscientiae*) among weak human beings, leaves many evils unpunished, especially hidden evils.⁸⁹ Consequently, a) moral rules should conform to what is established by divine and natural law, rather than to positive law. b) The theologian is the only person who personifies the real ruler, since he knows, better than anyone else, divine and natural law (which coincides with the divine order of the world). In other words, it is the theologian who is the real guarantor of this natural law. From this, it follows, as a direct consequence, that it is precisely the theologian (who we can easily recognize as Henry himself) who becomes the only one who can also establish what is right and wrong in positive law; not only because he is the proper interpreter of Biblical messages and of the divine decree, but above all because he follows the natural law, common to all human beings.

The idea that the theologian is the person who should deal with the problems of the active life, because he is best able to know (and thus to put in practice) divine and natural laws, comes up again, for example, in q. 32 of *Quodlibet V* (“Quod non liceat pugnare in duello: quia in hoc tentatur Deus”):

Hic attendendum est: quod in tali quaestione et in consimilibus in quibus aliqua statuunt iura humana de permittendo aliqua fieri vel non fieri simpliciter, aut aliquibus permittunt, aliquibus prohibet aut in quibus aliquid detinetur ex consuetudine: theologi est iudicare quid iuxta statuta divinae legis et naturalis et quid non liceat. Quidquid enim invenit legi divinae et naturali repugnans et contrarium, quacumque lege humana statutum fuerit, sive ut praeceptum, sive ut permissum, debet illud damnare tamquam illicitum, et similiter legem sive statuentem, sive permittentem, et etiam contrariam consuetudinem.⁹⁰

In the text, Henry argues that, in the ethical sphere, we should follow divine and natural law instead of human law, which, sometimes due to certain established customs, does not prohibit certain negative practices, e.g. duelling. Thus, we should rely on the judgment of theologians because “theologi est iudicare quid iuxta statuta divinae legis et naturalis et quid non liceat”.

⁸⁹ See in particular Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 16: “Utrum princeps licite possit tenere bona alicuius sibi per publicam iustitiam adiudicata propter culpam illi impositam, quem in rei veritate scit esse innocentem”.

⁹⁰ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 32, ed. Badius, fol. 210^rl.

The portrait of the theologian that comes from these passages is once again that of a person who, due to his knowledge of divine and natural law, is called upon more than any other,⁹¹ to make decisions within the ethical sphere. In this way, the theologian plays a decisive role, not only in the Church (as Henry's contemporaries also maintain), but also in the civil society in which the theologian lives.

The privilege granted by Henry to the master of theology is not just limited to the arbitration of questions regarding the active life. The theologian, in Henry's view, also enjoys another advantage, denied to most human beings: he is able, on this earth, to know God and the separate substances, and to enjoy, in this way, a kind of earthly beatitude. Especially in article XIII of the *Summa* and in some *Quodlibeta* (for instance, XII), Henry attributes to the theologian what his successors will call the *lumen medium*.⁹² In addition to the light of glory (which is only attainable in the afterlife) and to the light of faith, (which is infused in the soul of every man at the moment of baptism and common to every believer), the theologian also possesses a supplementary *clarius lumen*.⁹³ Because of this *lumen*, the doctor of theology is able to understand the truths of theology, achieving the status of a scientist. In this way, he achieves certain knowledge (*certa ratio*) of the truths of faith during

⁹¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 36, ed. Badius, fol. 212^{va}: "... etiam ut ecclesia contra instituta Apostolorum et concilia generalia in eis quae non statuerunt secundum praecepta evangelica vel scripta, vel secundum quod ea a Christo audierunt observata, possit dispensare et addere vel subtrahere et immutare, nihil tamen horum potest contra instituta legis naturae et divinae". Regarding this, see G. de Lagarde, *La naissance de l'esprit laïque au déclin du Moyen Age*, p. 187.

⁹² See Paul De Vooght, "La méthode théologique d'après Henri de Gand et Gérard de Bologne", *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 23 (1956), pp. 61–87; P. Porro, *Filosofia e scienza teologica in Enrico di Gand in Verum et certum. Studi di storiografia filosofica in onore di Ada Lamacchia*, ed. C. Esposito/P. Ponzio/P. Porro/V. Castellano, (Bari, 1998), pp. 415–442, esp. p. 441, n. 46; Reijo Työriñoja, "Auriol's Critique of Henry of Ghent's 'lumen medium'", in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? ...*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen/Andreas Speer (Berlin/New York, 1998), pp. 622–628; id., "Lumen medium. Henry of Ghent on the Accessibility of Theological Truths", in *Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times*, ed. Ghita Holmström-Hintikka (Dordrecht/Boston (Mass.)/London, 2000) (Synthese library, 288. Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science), pp. 161–182.

⁹³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 2, ed. Decorte, pp. 14–15, ll. 20–23: "Dico, secundum quod determinavi in Quaestionibus ordinariis, quod quid est Deus, et quod sit trinus, et cetera credibilia de illo, clarius possunt cognosci quam per fidem, et hoc in clariori lumine quam sit lumen fidei"; id., *Summa*, art. XIII, q. 2, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 77^{rh}: "Tale autem est lumen fidei in cognoscendo ea quae sunt fidei, et si aliquid sit superius cognoscibile ad quod lumen fidei non sufficit ad veritatem illius perspicendam, adhuc secundum quod infra videbitur, illustratio aliqua clarior et superior requiritur".

this life and thus, in a sense, achieves the *beatitudo* that the *Syllabus* of 1277 condemns.⁹⁴ This special condition that belongs to theologians in particular consequently elevates the master of theology above every other master, and above every other human being. In this way, the theologian comes to represent in himself an aristocratic and elitist ideal, already embodied by the “philosopher” of Aristotle and of the masters of the Faculty of Arts. Thus, Henry’s “voluntaristic ethics” is not only mitigated by the call to right reason and natural law (which Henry addresses in the questions concerning the active life), but also by the possibility that only the theologian is able to realize in this life, albeit through the supernatural instrument of the *lumen medium*, that *eudamonisme intellectuelle* of which Gauthier was speaking.

Conclusions

This current analysis of passages in the works of Henry of Ghent has demonstrated that one can undoubtedly speak of an ethical philosophy in his major writings. Henry participates in the ethical discussions of his time and deals with several problems related to the virtues, especially those problems which arose after the arrival in the Latin West of Aristotle’s ethical and political works: the issue of the location of the virtues, the problem concerning the nature of the virtues (i.e. acquired and infused virtues), the question of the relationship among the virtues, and the nature of their unification through prudence. As we have seen, Henry not only participates in the moral debates of his time, but also arrives at original solutions, relative to those of his contemporaries.

The first point to emphasize is that Henry outlines an ethics that is intended, according to “voluntaristic” and “heteronomous” principles, to safeguard human freedom and the action of divine grace. All of the moral virtues, considered in terms of “habit”, are located in the will. Charity, as an infused virtue, is virtue *par excellence*. The true *beatitudo* is achieved not through contemplation in this life (as Aristotle claims), but is possible only in the afterlife, where it will also become possible to connect perfectly all of the virtues together.

⁹⁴ On this point, see Marialucezia Leone, “Metaphysics, Theology and Natural Desire to know Separate Substances in Henry of Ghent”, *Quaestio. Annuario di Storia della Metafisica*, 5 (2006), pp. 111–124.

However, as we have seen, Henry also seems to follow Aristotelian doctrine, especially concerning the contribution of reason to the formation of moral virtues. Because the will can make mistakes and allow the passions to carry it away, the contribution of reason is necessary. (In irrational beings, as well as in brutes, there is no moral virtue). In particular, following Book VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, according to which there are no moral virtues without prudence and *vice versa*, reason primarily contributes to the sphere of morality through *prudentia*. Prudence operates both as an intellectual virtue (when understood as the Latin translation of the Greek word *phronesis*), and as a superhuman virtue, the fruit of charity and divine grace. At the basis of the contributions of prudence and the will, Henry posits a natural prudence, common to all human beings. Thus, as we have seen, in addition to formulating a moral philosophy containing heteronymous principles, Henry also formulates an ethics with “autonomous” foundations, that is to say, one based on right reason and natural law. Only at a later, secondary moment, does Henry add to this ethics, which is valid for all human beings guided by right reason, an ethics characterized by the action of grace. It is grace, through the infused virtues, that is in the end the only thing capable of guaranteeing authentic holiness.

Through the contribution of reason, morality can achieve a universal validity for all human beings, irrespective of whether they are philosophers or theologians, persons devoted to the practice of politics or to the exercise of speculation.

Over the course of this study, the other element to emerge through the analysis of Henry’s ethical philosophy is that he assigns the discussion and resolution of this kind of problem primarily to the judgment of the theologian. In addition to his expertise on the *vita contemplativa*, the theologian is the only one, in Henry’s view, who can have the last word on the problems of the *vita activa*, because his work is first and foremost conforms to natural law, prior to religious and positive law. Thus, the theologian is, according to Henry, the only person able to define the boundaries between what is ethically permissible and not permissible, and thus the only one who can propose laical moral rules (anterior to those connected to faith), valid always and for everyone.

HENRY OF GHENT ON FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN WILL

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During his long teaching career Henry of Ghent returned to the topic of freedom of the will again and again, often defending the freedom of the will against some of his contemporaries who, as Henry saw it, undermined the will's freedom by some form of determinism.¹ Although Henry has been accused of holding a radical voluntarism, Raymond Macken has argued that he is closer to the center of the spectrum, having given the primacy of place to the will without depreciating the human intellect.² One of the most striking features of his defense of freedom of the will is his claim that the will moves itself by itself to the act of willing, and the concomitant claim that the Aristotelian principle that whatever is moved is moved by something else does not apply to the will.³ For Henry held

¹ "Ce sont près de vingt-cinq questions quodlibétales qu'Henri de Gand consacre au problème de la liberté et de la volonté, sur une période s'étendant sur presque quinze années" (François-Xavier Putallaz, *Insolente liberté: Controverses et condamnations au XIII^e siècle* [Fribourg, 1995], p. 177).

² See Raymond Macken, "L'interpénétration de l'intelligence et de la volonté dans la philosophie d'Henri de Gand," in *L'homme et son univers au moyen âge. Actes du Septième Congrès Internationale de Philosophie Médiévale*, ed. Christian Wenin (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1986), pp. 808–814, here 808. For further study of the will and its freedom in Henry, one could hardly do better than to consult the series of articles by R. Macken, which include the following: "La volonté humaine, faculté plus élevée que l'intelligence selon Henri de Gand," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 42 (1975), 5–51; "La doctrine de S. Thomas concernant la volonté et les critiques d'Henri de Gand," in *Tommaso d'Aquino nella storia del pensiero. Atti del Congresso Internazionale Roma-Napoli, 1974* (Naples, 1976), pp. 84–91; "La liberté humaine dans la philosophie d'Henri de Gand," in *Regnum Hominis et Regnum Dei. Acta Quarti Congressus Scotistici Internationalis*, in *Studia Scholastico-Scotista*, 6 (1978), 1, pp. 577–584; "Der geschaffene Wille als selbstbewegendes geistiges Vermögen in der Philosophie des Heinrich von Gent," in *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zum 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam, 1991), pp. 561–572; "Heinrich von Gent im Gespräch mit seinen Zeitgenossen über die menschliche Freiheit," *Franziskanische Studien* 59 (1977), 125–182.

³ On this point, see my "Henry of Ghent's Rejection of the Principle: 'Omne Quod Movetur Ab Alio Movetur,'" in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death*, ed. Willy Vanhamel (Leuven, 1996), pp. 281–308.

that, if anything moves the will, it introduces necessity into the will and its act.⁴ The claim that the will moves itself to its act of willing marks, according to Johann Auer, “der tiefgreifende Unterschied zwischen der aristotelisch-thomistischen und der scotistisch-franziskanischen Auffassung von Willen und Freiheit ...”⁵

The development of Henry’s position on freedom of the will, which he defended, explained, and qualified over and over again during his many years of teaching at Paris, can best be seen in his *Quodlibetal Questions*, which represent the disputations held at Christmas and/or Easter from 1276 to 1292.⁶ His *Summa*, on the other hand, has the advantage of presenting his teaching in a more irenic and systematic fashion. The present study of freedom in Henry sketches his teaching on freedom of the will, mainly as it is found in his *Summa*, which contains his ordinary lectures to students at the University of Paris, lectures that were hardly ordinary in the ordinary sense of the word. Although the *Summa* remains incomplete, without ever getting beyond the articles on God to the intended articles on creatures, Henry’s article 45, “On the Will of God,” which dates from 1280–1281, presents his view of the will and its freedom, both in God and in creatures, in a series of four questions. After an examination of these questions, this study will turn briefly to some other features in Henry’s teaching on the freedom of the will drawn from his *Quodlibeta*, especially his rejection of the Aristotelian principle that whatever is moved is moved by something else and the claims that the human will is a higher power than the intellect and that the human will is a power that virtually contains its act.

I. Whether There is Will in God

The modern concern with freedom of the will is usually—and not unreasonably—focused upon the freedom of the human will. Henry, however, takes a larger view of things and locates the human will within a hierarchy

⁴ On this claim see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 2, ed. Ludwig Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 104. For the Latin see below note 13.

⁵ Johann Auer, *Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik* (Freiburg, 1951), p. 145.

⁶ For an English translation of select quodlibetal questions on freedom of the will, see Roland J. Teske, *Henry of Ghent: Quodlibetal Questions on Free Will*. Translated from the Latin with Introduction and Notes. *Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation* 32 (Milwaukee, 1993). For the dating of Henry’s fifteen *Quodlibeta* and their relation to the

of appetitive beings that extends upward from natural beings that have no knowledge to the highest being, namely, God. In speaking of the various levels of appetite, Henry says that appetite without knowledge is purely natural, but that appetite with sentient knowledge is animal appetite, and appetite with intellectual knowledge is will. Hence, "because God's nature is intellectual, one has to admit that there is will in God ..."⁷ Thus, "appetite" is like a genus, and "will" is like a species of that genus, while "natural," "animal," and "rational" are like differences of the genus "appetite."

An obvious objection to the presence of will in God is that the presence of will in a being is a mark of its being ordered to an end, which cannot be the case with God, because "he does not have an end, but is the end of all things."⁸ In replying to that objection, Henry distinguishes between created beings "which have perfection in their nature and being, only because they are a likeness and participation of that which is perfect through its essence and in its being" and "that being which has perfection without qualification in its nature and being ..."⁹ The former, namely, all created beings, desire their end "as tending toward it through appetite, as toward the end and the good without qualification, from which they have it that they are good by participation."¹⁰ The latter is, of course, God who desires the end and perfect good "as being perfectly at rest in his good, and in this way appetition belongs only to God."¹¹ Thus in Henry's universe of teleologically ordered beings, appetition belongs to every level of being, but in God appetition is not a tending toward or seeking a good to be possessed, but a repose in the good already possessed, the

seventy-five articles of the *Summa*, see José Gómez Caffarena, "Cronologia de la 'Suma' de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus 'Quodlibetos,'" *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), 116–133.

⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 1, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 103,79–80: "Cum ergo Deus est intellectualis naturae, in Deo ponendum est esse voluntatem"

⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 1, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 100,12–13: "quia non est ipsi finis, sed ipse est omnium finis."

⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 1, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), pp. 102,64–103,73: "quae non habet perfectionem in natura sua et esse, nisi quia sunt similitudo et participatio eius quod est perfectum per essentiam et in suo esse Illud ... ens quod habet perfectionem simpliciter in natura sua, et esse"

¹⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 1, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 103,68–70: "ut in ipsum per appetitum tendentia sicut in finem et bonum simpliciter, a quo habent quod sunt bona per participationem."

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 1, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 103,75–76: "ut perfecte in suo bono quietatum, et hoc modo soli Deo convenit appetere."

perfect good, which is God himself, from whom all other beings have their goodness and being by participation and toward whom they tend according to their nature.

II. *Whether the Will in God Is an Active or a Passive Power*

In replying to this question, Henry once again does not limit his response to the will of God, but argues that, whether in God or in creatures, will is an active power. His argument, "To the Contrary," makes it clear in a few words why Henry holds that the will in God or in a creature is not acted upon by something else that moves it to its act. He says "every passive power has necessity in its act from something else that moves it. But if it moves it, it is necessary that it be moved by it in its act."¹² Accordingly, Henry says that "in God and in other beings, will has to be said to be an active power without qualification and not a passive one, but it is just the opposite with the intellect which ... has to be said to be a passive power without qualification and not an active one."¹³ His argument behind that answer rests upon a comparison between intellect and will in human beings since our knowledge of God in this life has to begin from created beings and on this question from created beings with intellect and will.

Henry explains that the intellect is a passive power without qualification because it does not act unless it has been previously acted upon, but it is an active power in a certain respect, because, once an intelligible object has come to be in the intellect, the intellect becomes active and produces a concept or mental word, as the articles by Marrone and Goehring in this volume indicate. Hence, the intellect is active in the sense that it brings forth an act of understanding, but only after it has been acted upon by the object known. The will, on the other hand, "by

¹² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 2, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 104,12–14: "In contrarium est, quoniam omnis vis passiva in suo actu necessitatem habet ab alio movente ipsum. Quod si movet illud, necesse est ipsam in suo actu moveri ab illo."

¹³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 2, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 107,82–84: "in Deo et in aliis simpliciter debet dici virtus activa et non passiva, e contrario intellectus qui ... debet dici simpliciter virtus passiva et non activa." Intellect in God, however, is not a passive power in the sense that God is moved or changed by things that he knows other than himself.

itself elicits the act of willing from itself by which it in some way makes itself into the object willed and unites itself to the object willed.”¹⁴ The puzzling expression “makes itself into the object willed”—or perhaps better “becomes the object willed”—may reflect Augustine’s claim that one becomes what one loves.¹⁵ Although an act of willing presupposes an act of understanding, “a known good does not produce any impression on or motion in the will, but the will by itself moves itself to the object shown it . . .”¹⁶ Or, as Henry says at other times, the object known moves the will only metaphorically,¹⁷ that is, in the way the beloved draws the lover to itself.¹⁸ Henry illustrates his account of willing as active by comparison with what seeing would be like if seeing were active rather than passively receptive. He asks us to suppose that our seeing were achieved not by a reception, but by an emission to the visible object. “For then the power of sight would by itself move itself to see the object without being first moved by it.”¹⁹ Although the will is an active power without qualification, there is a passive consequence to the act of willing. Henry explains that, once the will unites itself to the object, “it immediately conceives in itself from the object willed an impression of delight or of some other affection (*passionis*), and in this respect alone it is passive . . .”²⁰ Hence, just as the intellect can actively proceed to knowing once it has been passively informed by an object, the will passively receives from an object willed a feeling of delight or of some other affection once it has actively united itself to the object.

¹⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 2, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 108,5–6: “ipsa voluntas ex se ipsa elicit actum volendi, quo se quomodo facit in volitum et unit se volito.”

¹⁵ See, for example, Augustine, *In epistolam Ioannis ad Parthos* 2.14, PL 35:1997.

¹⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 109,9–10: “bonum tamen cognitum nullam impressionem aut motum facit in voluntatem, sed voluntas in obiectum ostensum se ipsam movet se ipsa . . .”

¹⁷ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 108.

¹⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 123.

¹⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 2, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 109,12–13: “tunc enim vis visiva se ipsam se ipsa moveret in obiectum videndum, abque eo quod prius esset mota ab ipso.”

²⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 2, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 109,17–19: “statim impressionem delectationis aut alicuius passionis concipit in se a volito, et in hoc solum passivus est . . .”

III. *Whether the Will of God Is Free*

In order to answer the third question, one has to know what it means for a will to be free. Henry first explains that all creatures have determinate degrees of perfection in their nature and essence and have operations proper to them, "by which they are ordered to their due and proper ends and through their proper ends to the common end of them all."²¹ Thus Henry situates the whole discussion of freedom within a world of beings ordered to ends proper to their natures under God, who is the ultimate end of all. If it were not for such a teleological order in the world, Henry says that "everything would happen by chance or from necessity as a result of the connection of preceding causes."²² That is, everything that happens would either be pure chance, that is, an uncaused event, or would be the result of a prior efficient or moving cause, which would render the effect necessary.

Under the one common mover of all, who moves things to their proper ends and through them to their one common end, various things move in different ways. That is, there is a hierarchy of created beings and their motions, which Henry approaches from the lowest level or degree.

First of all, things moved violently, such as something heavy moved upward, are impelled by one who directs them without their receiving from their mover a natural form by which they are moved and inclined toward that end.²³ Things moved violently have a finality imposed upon them only by an external agent, as an arrow is directed toward a target.

Secondly, some things receive a natural form by which they are moved to their proper ends, and these things are not said to be moved violently, but naturally. Of these natural things, some that are in a lower degree of perfection and more distant from the first mover lack any knowledge. "Although there is a principle in them inclining them to their motion and directing them to their proper end, it is still not a mover

²¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), pp. 110,21–111,22: "... per quas in fines sibi debitos et proprios ordinantur, et per proprios fines ad finem communem omnium."

²² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 111,22–24: "Aliter enim omnia contingerent casu, vel de necessitate ex connexione causarum praecedentium"

²³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998).

in the proper sense.”²⁴ For example, according to Aristotle, heavy and light things are moved of themselves (*ex se*) only accidentally, when they are outside their proper place in which they are naturally at rest. “Their principle of motion moves purely naturally and is called a purely natural appetite.”²⁵ Such things are moved “accidentally” because the cause of their upward or downward motion is merely the removal of something preventing that motion.²⁶ Thus someone who brings down a roof by removing its supporting column is only an accidental cause of the roof’s collapse, while the essential cause of the roof’s collapse is its heaviness.²⁷

Things that have some sort of knowledge are moved by themselves (*per se*) of themselves (*ex se*), and such things necessarily have at least two parts, one that moves by itself and another that is moved by itself.²⁸ Among such beings with knowledge, the motion of some of them is determined by a desirable object that is apprehended. “And in that way brute animals are moved in pursuing a source of pleasure and in fleeing a source of pain.”²⁹ Their moving principle is not determined to move or not to move, and in this respect it differs from the moving principle in non-sentient beings, “but after it has been determined by an object, it is not in its power not to move and not to pursue a source of pleasure or to flee a source of pain, insofar as it can.”³⁰ A principle of this sort “does

²⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 112,56–57: “etsi in eis sit principium inclinans illa in suum motum et dirigens in proprium finem, non est tamen proprie movens.”

²⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 112,60–61: “Principium motus eorum pure naturaliter movet, et vocatur appetitus pure naturalis.”

²⁶ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. I, q. 4, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 97,143–98,146: “ponit omne agens inferius et exterius ad esse istarum formarum esse agens solummodo per accidens ut removens prohibens, quod secundum Philosophum octavo *Physicorum* non est nisi agens per accidens.”

²⁷ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1983), pp. 116–117.

²⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, where Henry discusses at great length Aristotle’s account of animal motion based on his *De motu animalium* and *De animalium incessu*.

²⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 112,68–69: “Et sic moventur bruta animalia in prosequendo delectabile et fugiendo triste.”

³⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 112,71–73: “postquam tamen fuerit determinatum ab obiecto, non est in potestate eius ut non moveatur et sequatur delectabile, aut ut non fugiat, quantum est in se tristabile.”

not move purely naturally, yet it moves purely servilely, and it is called an animal or sensitive appetite.”³¹

Beings with such an animal or sensitive appetite cannot determine the end and motion for themselves because, in order to do so, a being has to know “the end and its circumstances and likewise those things that are means to the end and their relation to the end.”³² Only beings with a rational and intellectual nature can do so. “For this reason,” Henry says, “only such beings have a free ordering to their motions and ends ...”³³

In animals both the cognitive and the appetitive powers are determined in their act in accord with the apprehended sensible particular, and “appetite in brute animals necessarily has to follow cognition.”³⁴ Hence, all beings of the same species have the same sort of knowledge and act in the same way.³⁵ Thus, every swallow knows how to build a nest in the same way, and sheep all flee from wolves, and all wolves pursue sheep.³⁶

But rational and intellectual cognitive beings “receive forms completely abstracted from matter and the conditions of matter and thus purely under the character of a universal. For this reason neither the cognitive nor the appetitive power in them is determined in what it does to the character of some particular.”³⁷ Thus the concept of house in the human mind “is ... universal and abstracted from matter and all particular conditions ...”³⁸ Of itself such a concept of house has no ten-

³¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 112,74–75: “non pure naturaliter movet, movet tamen pure serviliter, et appellatur appetitus animalis seu sensitivus ...”

³² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 113,79–80: “finem et circumstantias eius, et similiter eorum quae sunt ad finem et habitudinem eorum ad finem.”

³³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 113,81–82: “Et propter hoc solum talia liberam habent ordinationem in motus et in fines ...”

³⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 114,66–67: “appetitus in brutis necesse habet sequi cognitionem.”

³⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 114.

³⁶ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998).

³⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 114,18–21: “recipiunt formas omnino abstractas a materia et conditionibus materiae, et sic pure sub ratione universalis. Propter quod nec cognitiva nec appetitiva in ipsis determinatur in suo opere ad rationem alicuius particularis.”

³⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl

dency to exist or not to exist or to be of a particular shape or design. "Rather a builder has the judgment of reason about making or not making it and about making it in this way or in another and similarly has the freedom of appetite about choosing to make or not to make it or to make it in this way or in another."³⁹ Thus human beings can not only make the same thing in different ways, but can also judge whether to make or not to make a house and freely choose to make a house or not to make a house.

Henry says: "In this respect the rational appetite always follows the apprehension of reason, and the freedom of the appetite depends on the manner of cognition, and the appetite follows cognition absolutely."⁴⁰ He, however, immediately points out that this is true of the indeterminate appetite for the good without qualification and of indeterminate cognition of the good in the universal. Some unnamed contemporaries, however, say that appetite "follows the judgment of reason so that, when they are concerning the same thing or about the same thing, the judgment of reason and the appetite can never be opposed, neither in the universal nor in the particular. Thus the judgment about the universal can never be opposed to the appetite about the universal nor the judgment about this particular to the appetite about the same."⁴¹ Hence, in this view, the judgment of reason and the rational appetite could be opposed only when one is about the universal and the other about the particular. Thus the judgment of reason might be, for example, in the universal that innocent human life should not be taken, but in particular the rational appetite might choose to take the life of this particular man. But if the judgment of reason were that this particular human life should be taken, the rational appetite would necessarily follow it.

(Leuven, 1998), p. 119,21–22: "est ... universalis, et abstracta a materia et omnibus conditionibus particularibus ..."

³⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 114,24–27: "Remanet artificii iudicium rationis de faciendo vel non faciendo, et de sic vel aliter faciendo, et similiter libertas appetitus de eligendo facere vel non facere, vel sic facere vel alio modo."

⁴⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 114,27–29: "Et quoad hoc appetitus rationalis semper sequitur apprehensionem rationis, et dependet libertas appetitus ex modo cognitionis, et appetitus sequitur omnino cognitionem."

⁴¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 115,33–37: "sequitur determinationem rationis ita, quod quando sunt circa idem sive de eodem iudicium rationis et appetitus, numquam possunt contrariari, neque in universali neque in particulari, ut iudicium de universali numquam potest contrariari appetitui de universali, neque iudicium de hoc particulari, appetitui de eodem."

Against such a view Henry holds that “the freedom of determining the appetite to this or that particular in no way comes from the side of reason because [the appetite] has a free judgment so that it is not necessary that the appetite follow the particular reason. Rather, the immaterial and abstract appetite is able by itself to determine itself by its choice (*electione*) and can do so more freely than reason can determine itself by its judgment.”⁴² Thus nothing violently impels the will from the outside, as when someone throws a stone upwards, nor does something naturally incline it from within, as the weight of a stone naturally inclines it to move downwards, nor does any known good lead it servilely, as the sight or smell of meat servilely leads a dog. Rather, the will “freely and by choice or as if by choice and as master of its action wills this of itself.”⁴³ Hence, Henry says that will is defined as a free appetite where “appetite” is like a genus and “free” like a species.

Will, however, is found not only in human beings, but also in angels and in God, and Henry distinguishes the ways in which will is present in them in terms of greater or lesser variability. Human beings have the lowest level of freedom such that, “as soon as a human being attains the use of free choice, he can by his first act incline to a motion directed to the ultimate end or to a motion turning away from it so that he freely and by choice inclines to one or the other.”⁴⁴ But afterwards a human being can, if one considers only his nature—for other factors such as grace and bad habits may enter the picture—“vary the motion until the point at which he has been confirmed in good or evil.”⁴⁵ That

⁴² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 115,43–47: “libertas determinandi appetitum ad hoc particulare vel illud nullo modo est ex parte rationis quia habet iudicium liberum, ut necesse non sit appetitum sequi rationem particularem. Immo ipse appetitus immaterialis et abstractus se ipso habet se determinare sua electione, et hoc liberior quam ratio se habeat determinare suo iudicio.”

⁴³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 115,53–54: “libere et eligibiliter aut quasi eligibiliter, et tamquam dominus suae actionis ex se ipso hoc velit.” The expression “quasi eligibiliter” perhaps refers to a situation where the will does not choose between two means, but simply chooses to act or not to act.

⁴⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 116,79–82: “homo statim cum devenerit ad usum liberi arbitrii, suo primo actu potest inclinare in motum directum in finem ultimum vel in motum deviantem ab eo, ut libere et eligibiliter inclinet in unum vel in alterum.”

⁴⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 116,84: “potest variare motum, quousque fuerit confirmatus in bono vel in malo.”

is, a human being can repent of his wrongdoing or turn away from God up to the end.

Angels have a higher level of freedom, and freedom and choice in angels is less variable than in human beings. Like human beings, angels can by the first act of will incline to a motion directed to the ultimate end or to a motion turning away from it, but afterwards—again if one considers only the angelic nature—an angel cannot vary its motion but “is firmly fixed in evil, if it turns away from the ultimate end, or is confirmed through grace for the good if, having been helped by grace, it inclines its motion toward the ultimate end.”⁴⁶ Because of the greater strength and firmness of freedom and choice in an angel, the will clings more strongly to what it chooses first and cannot afterwards vary its choice.

Finally, God has the highest level of freedom of appetite and of will so that “the freedom of will in God is infinitely stronger and firmer in God than in the angels and is for this reason utterly invariable so that it can in no way incline toward a motion other than one directed toward himself insofar as he is the ultimate end of all things.”⁴⁷ The claim that greater freedom in the angels and in God entails less variability may seem initially counterintuitive. But God cannot cease to will and to love himself, and our human variability with regard to the ultimate good is surely less perfect than an angel’s invariable love for God or rejection of him.

Hence, Henry answers the principal question by saying that “the divine will is unqualifiedly and absolutely free in its act of willing . . .”⁴⁸ On the other hand, if one distinguishes between the divine will’s willing itself and the divine will’s willing things other than itself, Henry says that God’s will “has freedom in willing things other than itself because he wills none of them by any necessity,” but his will does not have freedom in willing himself “because it has necessity in willing itself.”⁴⁹ However, just as God’s

⁴⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 117,8–10: “obstinetur in malo, si inclinet motum a fine ultimo, vel per gratiam confirmetur in bonum, si adiutus gratia inclinet motum in finem ultimum.”

⁴⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 118,29–31: “in infinitum fortior et firmior sit libertas voluntatis in Deo quam in angelis, et ideo omnino invariabilis, ut nullo modo potest inclinare in motum alium quam directum in se ipsum, ut est omnium finis ultimus.”

⁴⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 118,39–40: “divina voluntas libera est simpliciter et absolute in actu suo volendi . . .”

⁴⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 119,41–42: “libertatem habet in volendo alia a se, quia nulla necessitate vult aliquod illorum . . . habet necessitatem in volendo se ipsum . . .”

act of knowing himself and other things are not two acts of knowing, so his act of willing himself and other things are not two acts of willing, but one and the same act. Henry, therefore, concludes that God “does not will himself and other things in different ways, but equally freely, because he does so through a delight (*complacentia*) of the will, not through an impulse of nature nor through some determination of an object ...”⁵⁰ That is, just as God wills himself as resting in the good that he is, so he freely wills himself with the delight of a lover in possession of the beloved. He wills himself, nonetheless, both necessarily and freely—not, however, with a necessity stemming from an impulse of nature or from a determination by an object, but, as Henry explains in the following question, with a necessity that accompanies his immutability.

IV. *Whether There Is Freedom of Choice in God*

In question four Henry asks whether there is in God freedom of choice (*libertas arbitrii*), as we have seen that there is freedom (*libertas*) in him.⁵¹ In his answer Henry first explains how choice (*arbitrium*) is related to freedom. He says that

to choose (*arbitrari*) is to prefer one thing to another when two or more have been proposed as indifferent means to something, as, for example, if two people are arguing with each other over the possession of something, a judge (*arbiter*) is picked to whom both parties entrust the settling and determination of what each of them ought to have of that thing ... And the power entrusted to him of deciding in that way is called choice (*arbitrium*).⁵²

⁵⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 3, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 119,45–47: “non aliter vult se et alia, sed aequè libere, quia per voluntatis complacentiam, non per naturae impetum, nec per obiecti aliquam determinationem”

⁵¹ The Latin term “*arbitrium*” poses a problem since Henry explicitly links the meaning of the term to a judge or arbiter and to judging or deciding. “*Arbitrium*” is also in one sense a power of the intellect or reason and in another sense a power of the will. Moreover, Henry also uses “*electio*” and “*eligere*” for “choice” and “choosing.” I have, nonetheless, translated “*arbitrium*” as “choice,” which is not entirely satisfactory.

⁵² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 122,25–31: “arbitrari est, duobus vel pluribus propositis, per indifferentiam respectu alicuius alterum alteri preferre respectu illius, ut puta, si duo litigent inter se super re aliqua habenda, sumitur arbiter, cui committitur a partibus quod definiat et determinet quid quisque illorum debeat habere in re illa Et potestas ei sic definiendi commissa vocatur arbitrium.”

Such choice can be carried out in two mutually independent ways. The first consists in judging what each of the parties ought to have in accord with justice. The second consists simply in choosing beforehand what one wills to give to the one party and what to the other. That is, the first manner of choosing determines what decision is just, while the second simply follows what one wills to do, whether it is just or not. In the first way of deciding "reason is the judge," and the decision "is brought to completion by the work of reason when . . . it determines through counsel by right reason in a practical conclusion what each of the parties ought to have in the matter in dispute in accord with a rule of justice."⁵³ But once reason has come to its choice, it still remains "in the choice of its will what it wills to assign to the one and what to the other, because . . . it is not bound in its choice to follow the choice of reason. In fact one can decide in the opposite way if one is unjust."⁵⁴ The choice of the will need not follow the choice of reason, and if in fact the choice of the will could not fail to follow the choice of reason, one could never act in a morally evil way or sin, although one could be mistaken. Nor could one act in a morally good way either, since the act would not be free.

Choice, then, taken without qualification, belongs in common to reason and to will. The choice of these powers differs, however, insofar as the choice of the will

is entirely free, because it is not determined to one thing by some principle of natural inclination, as heavy things are determined for descent, nor by reason of an object, as the appetite of brute animals is determined, and also not by the judgment of reason. For the will in its action depends in no way upon reason, except that it proposes an object to it, without its being acted upon in any way by the object or altered in itself . . .⁵⁵

⁵³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 122,37–41: "et est ratio arbitrer . . . per opus rationis terminatur quando investigatione et discursu facto, per consilium recto iudicio sententiat conclusione practica, quid secundum regulam iustitiae quisque illorum debeat in re dicta habere."

⁵⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XLV, q. 4 ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 122,41–45: "adhuc in arbitrio voluntatis suae est, quid uni et quid alteri assignare velit, quia . . . non astringitur in suo arbitrio sequi arbitrium rationis, immo potest contrario modo arbitrari, si sit iniustus."

⁵⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 123,55–61: "omnino liberum est, quia nec est determinatum ad unum per aliquod principium naturalis inclinationis, quemadmodum gravia determinata sunt ad descensum, neque per rationem obiecti, quemadmodum determinatur appetitus brutorum, neque etiam per iudicium rationis, quemadmodum voluntas in sua actione in nullo dependet a ratione, nisi quod ei praeponat obiectum, absque hoc quod quidquam patiat ab obiecto aut alteretur in se ipso . . ."

Whereas, the appetite of brute animals is moved by the apprehended object and receives an impression from it and is in that way determined by the object of desire, the object proposed to the will by the intellect moves the will only metaphorically, as the beloved moves a lover. The choice that pertains to reason, on the other hand, "is servile and in no way free,"⁵⁶ neither in the act of simple intelligence nor in the act of judging. For in the act of simple intelligence reason "is entirely passive and is determined by the species of the intelligible object so that, when it is present in it in act, it cannot not understand through it, just as, when a visible object is present in the light directly opposite and unimpeded, the eye cannot not see it."⁵⁷ And in terms of the act of judging about what is apprehended in simple intelligence, it is servile in two ways. It is servile in one way because reason judges only "at the command of the will, which can compel it to inquire and pull it back from inquiring, as it wills ..."⁵⁸ It is servile in a second way because, when the right means has been found, "reason cannot not assent or not dissent because it has to judge and decide and choose in accord with the demands of the means."⁵⁹ Thus Henry concludes that free choice is nothing but "the free power of the will to choose, that is, to prefer one thing to another"⁶⁰ Hence, just as "will" includes in what it signifies appetite and freedom, so free choice includes appetite, freedom, and an order to the act of choosing. Hence, following Aristotle, Henry says, "To choose ... is an action of the will about those things that are ordered to an end, and will is indifferently about an end and about those things that are ordered to an end."⁶¹

⁵⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 124,70: "servile est et nullo modo liberum ..."

⁵⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 124,71–74: "omnino est passiva et determinatur per speciem intelligibilis, ut, ipsa praesente in ipsa secundum actum, non potest per ipsam non intelligere, quemadmodum oculus, praesente visibili in luce et recta oppositione, non impedita, non potest non videre."

⁵⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 124,76–77: "hoc non facit nisi ad imperium voluntatis, quae potest ipsam ad inquirendum compellere et ab inquirendo, prout vult, retrahere ..."

⁵⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 124,78–80: "non potest ratio non assentire, vel non dissentire, quin oporteat eam iudicare et sentire vel arbitrari secundum exigentiam medii."

⁶⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 124,82–83: "nihil aliud est quam libera potestas voluntatis ad eligendum, hoc est ad aliquid alteri praeferendum ..."

⁶¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 125,00–2: "eligere ... sit actio voluntatis circa ea quae sunt ad finem,

Hence, not merely the human will, but also the will of God has free choice, although the will of God has free choice only about things other than himself, not with regard to himself. Henry states, "God freely and willingly wills himself, not necessarily with a necessity that is as it were preventive, with neither his nature nor with intellect determining it, but only with the necessity of immutability accompanying it."⁶² God, on the other hand, has free choice in willing things other than himself. Free choice in God is, however, different from free choice in us in two respects. First, "choice in God is without any discourse of preceding counsel . . ."⁶³ Secondly, "in God's choice there is diversity or variability only on the side of those things at which the act of choosing terminates . . . not on the side of the act itself because it is the divine essence itself."⁶⁴ Hence, God has free choice only with respect to things other than himself, although his act of choosing them is necessary, but only with a necessity of concomitant immutability, since his act of choosing is identical with his immutable essence.

V. The Supremacy of Will

Finally, I want to emphasize three of the most characteristic features of Henry's philosophy of freedom, which are corollaries of what we have seen from the *Summa*, namely, that the will is a higher power than the intellect, that the will is moved to its act by nothing else, and that the will is a power that virtually contains its act.

In *Quodlibet I*, q. 14, Henry argues that the will is a higher power than the intellect, an issue on which he disagreed with Thomas Aquinas

et voluntas indifferenter est circa finem et circa ea quae sunt ad finem . . ." See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.4.1111b20–26.

⁶² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 126,32–34: "libere et sponte velit se ipsum Deus, non necessario necessitate quasi praeviente, neque natura sua determinante, neque etiam intellectu determinante, sed sola necessitate immutabilitatis concomitante . . ." For further explanation Henry refers to the preceding question and to Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae*, art. XLVII, q. 5, ed. Badius, (Paris, 1520), II, fol. 27.

⁶³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 126,52–53: "electio in Deo est absque omni discursu consilii praecedentis . . ."

⁶⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl (Leuven, 1998), p. 127,57–60: "in electione Dei per liberum arbitrium tantummodo est diversitas et variabilitas ex parte ipsorum in quae terminatur actus eligendi . . . non ex parte ipsius actus quia est ipsa divina essentia."

and others in the Aristotelian tradition.⁶⁵ Henry claims that the will is a higher power than the intellect because “the habit, act, and object of the will are utterly superior to the act, habit, and object of the intellect.”⁶⁶ The characteristic habit of the will, namely, love, is superior to any habit of wisdom and knowledge, as Augustine and Paul testify.⁶⁷ Henry has two arguments for the superiority of the act of the will over the act of the intellect. The act of the will is superior, first of all, because “the will commands reason to consider, reason, and deliberate when it wills and about what it wills, and it likewise commands it to stop. The intellect does not command or move the will in any such way ...”⁶⁸ The act of the will is, secondly, “much more perfect and higher than that of the intellect to the extent that love and longing for God is better than knowledge of God.”⁶⁹ The object of the will is superior to the object of the intellect “because the object of the will, which is the good without qualification, has the character of an end without qualification and of the ultimate end. The object of the intellect, however, which is the true, has the character of the good of something, for example of the intellect.”⁷⁰ In his conclusion, Henry invokes the metaphor of the will as king over the other powers of the soul and concludes that “the will is the higher power in the whole kingdom of the soul and thus higher than the intellect.”⁷¹ Although Henry concedes that the intellect directs the will, he holds that it directs the will, not as a person with authority does, but “by way of service, as a servant directs a master in carrying a light before him at

⁶⁵ See St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.82.3, where Aquinas argues that the intellect is a higher power than the will.

⁶⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 14, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), p. 84,27–28: “omnino habitus, actus et obiectum voluntatis praeminet actui, habitui et obiecto intellectus ...”

⁶⁷ Henry appeals to I Cor. 13 and Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.1.3.

⁶⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 14, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), p. 86,54–56: “voluntas rationi imperat ut consideret, ratiocinetur, et consiliatur quando vult et de quibus, et similiter facit ut desistat. Non sic ullo modo imperat aut movet intellectus voluntatem ...”

⁶⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 14, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), p. 87,72–74: “multo perfectior ... et altior est operatio voluntatis quam intellectus, quanto melior est amor et dilectio Dei quam cognitio eius.”

⁷⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 14, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), p. 88,1–3: “quia obiectum voluntatis quod est bonum simpliciter, habet rationem finis simpliciter et ultimi finis, obiectum autem intellectus quod est verum, habet rationem boni alicuius ut intellectus.”

⁷¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 14, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), p. 89,16–17: “voluntas superior vis est in toto regno animae, et ita ipso intellectu.”

night so that the master does not stumble.”⁷² But the will can remove the intellect from its role of director as a master can dismiss a servant. Thus, unlike Aquinas who argued for the superiority of the intellect over the will, Henry argues for the superiority of the will, to which he grants the power of command (*imperium*) over all the other powers of the soul.⁷³

In *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, Henry argues that the will moves itself to the act of willing. The first objection states the standard Aristotelian position that the will cannot move itself since, in order to do so, the will would have to be in act and in potency at the same time with respect to moving. In his response to the question Henry lists six levels of self-movers in which there is a greater difference between the mover and the moved as one moves down the list of movers from the divine will, to the created will, the created intellect, heavy and light things, an animal, and an external cause. At the level of the created will, Henry first deals with several views opposed to his own. Anselm and Aristotle, he reports, claim that “the first motion of the will cannot be from itself, but must be from God.”⁷⁴ Henry grants that God moves all things as their universal cause, but insists that the motions of particular things and their effects should not on such grounds be attributed to him. Rather, as Augustine said, God governs things while allowing them to produce their own motions.⁷⁵

Other unnamed opponents say that “the will is moved by the known good as a passive power by its proper object, just as the intellect is moved by the knowable truth, naturally, but not violently.”⁷⁶ Against this view Henry argues that this cannot be so. For, if it were,

then, just as the intellect cannot, when the intelligible is present, fail to be moved by it to the act of knowing, so the will could not, when the known good is present, fail to be moved to the act of willing. Thus free choice would perish, and as a result all meaning for meriting well or ill, for persuasion, deliberation, counsel, and the other things requisite for the virtues.⁷⁷

⁷² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 14, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), p. 90,46–47: “ministrat, sicut servus dominum, praeferendo lucernam de nocte ne dominus offendat.”

⁷³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 6, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), pp. 139–149.

⁷⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 120,15–16: “primus motus voluntatis non potest esse a se ipsa, sed a Deo.”

⁷⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 121,25–26, where he alludes to Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 7.30.

⁷⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5 ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 121,27–29: “voluntas movetur a bono cognito sicut a suo proprio obiecto proprium passibile, quemadmodum a vero cognoscibili movetur intellectus, sed naturaliter, non violenter.”

⁷⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 121,30–35:

Still others distinguish between the determination of the act of willing and its exercise and claim that the specification of the act is determined by the intellect, but that the exercise of the act still remains in the power of the will. Here too, Henry argues that one cannot claim that the intellect moves the will in its specification, but not in the exercise of its act. Rather, if the will is necessitated in its specification, it is also necessitated in its exercise.⁷⁸ If the will were naturally moved by anything else, "it would be determined to its act without any freedom, and it could not pull back from it. Thus it would not 'be master of its own acts,' nor would 'the appetite' which is the will 'have the power to restrain the appetite' in these matters which fall short of the vision of the last end . . ."⁷⁹ Henry insists that one must say without qualification "that the will is moved to its act of willing by nothing else, but is moved by itself alone."⁸⁰

In order to maintain that the will is free and master of its actions, one cannot, Henry claims, hold that the will "proceeds from potency to act by something other than itself. For this is . . . utterly incompatible with freedom . . . and the appetite of the will would be acted upon no less than the sensible appetite."⁸¹ In order, then, to avoid a determination of the will that would preclude freedom, Henry held that the will moves itself by itself. And yet, such a claim seems to be directly contrary to the Aristotelian position that nothing can move itself from potency to act.

Henry's account of the will's moving itself in *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5 was attacked repeatedly, which forced him to return to the topic in *Quodlibet X*, q. 9 and in *Quodlibet XI*, q. 6. In one approach to the problem of the will's self-motion, Henry argues that, "whenever the philosophers

"tunc, sicut intellectus praesente intelligibili non potest non moveri ab ipso ad actum intelligendi, sic volutas praesente bono cognito volibili non potest non moveri ad actum volendi. Et sic periret liberum arbitrium, et per consequens omnis ratio meriti et demeriti et suasionis ac deliberationis et consiliationis et ceterorum huiusmodi, quae necessaria sunt ad virtutes."

⁷⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 123,94–95.

⁷⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), pp. 130,3–131,7: "determinaretur ad actum absque omni libertate, nec posset resilire ab ipso, et ita non 'esset domina suorum actuum,' nec 'appetitus' qui est voluntas, 'haberetur potestatem refrenare appetitum' in eis quae sunt citra visionem ultimi finis . . ." Henry quotes phrases from John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 41, ed. Eligeus Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1995), p. 153.

⁸⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 131,8–9: "voluntas in actum volendi a nullo alio, sed a se ipsa sola moveretur."

⁸¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 132,37–39: "alio a se procedat de potentia in actum: hoc enim omnino repugnat libertati . . . et non minus agetur appetitus voluntatis, quam ille qui est sensibilis."

prove that nothing moves itself by itself, they are speaking of motion in the proper sense in bodily things,” and “for this reason their statements about them do not hold for the present case about the will ...”⁸² But the Aristotelian principle that nothing can move itself from potency to act is a metaphysical principle that applies to being as being. Hence, in my opinion this answer will not work.

In *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, Henry returns to the problem and asks whether a subject can be the cause of its own accidents. Henry notes that the question specifically applies to the will and asks how the act of willing can be effectively caused by its subject, namely, the will.⁸³ The principal objection that Henry faced was “that what is in potency in relation to something, by the very fact that it is non-being in that respect, cannot be the cause of that thing’s existing in act.”⁸⁴ He grants that a thing cannot be the cause of its own accident “if it in no way receives from another the power (*virtutem*) for this, before it does it.”⁸⁵ But he appeals to an analogy with heavy things, which receive from the creator the form by which they have the power to move downward, unless they are impeded. Similarly, Henry claims “that by the form of its freedom, which is a certain power (*vis*) in it ... from him who causes the free will in the soul and impresses upon it for this his power for causing its proper operations ... the will can move and educe itself from the potency of willing to the act of willing.”⁸⁶ Hence, with its God-given power, the will can move itself from potentially willing to actually willing, just as by its heaviness a stone can move itself from potentially descending to actually descending without any external mover—provided that it is not impeded.

In replying to another objection that something that causes something else to be in act from being in potency must first be in act in that respect,

⁸² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), p. 234,70–73: “quandocumque philosophi probant quod nihil se ipsum per se ipsum movet, loquuntur de motu in corporalibus proprio dicto ... propter quod dicta ipsorum circa illa non valent ad propositum circa voluntatem ...”

⁸³ See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 221.

⁸⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 220,5–7: “Quod est in potentia ad aliquid, eo quod in quantum huiusmodi est non ens, illud non potest esse causa ut secundum actum sit illud.”

⁸⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 230,59: “nullo modo recipiendo ad hoc virtutem ab alio priusquam illud facit.”

⁸⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 225,26–30: “quod voluntas forma libertatis suae, quae est vis quaedam in ipsa ... a causante voluntatem liberam in anima et imprimente ei in hoc virtutem suam ad causandum suas proprias operationes ... potest movere se ipsam et educere de potentia volendi ad actum volendi.”

Henry appeals to another distinction, that is, between being formally in act and being virtually in act. He grants that the objection is true that such a cause must be in act "either formally, as something hot is first hot in act when it makes something hot from cold ... or virtually, as the sun is first hot when by its ray it makes something potentially hot actually hot."⁸⁷ That is, in terms of medieval physics the sun was not actually hot, but had the power to make other things actually hot. Here something that is virtually Φ is not itself formally or actually Φ , but has the power to cause other things to become Φ . In that sense God possesses all the perfections of creatures virtually, but not formally.⁸⁸

Henry returns to the will as virtually containing its act in *Quodlibet XI*, q. 6 and in *Quodlibet XIV*, q. 2, each time explaining and defending the will as a potency that contains its acts virtually. Obviously he was never totally successful in convincing his opponents that the will could by itself move itself from potency to act, although his followers in the Franciscan school, such as Duns Scotus, found Henry's position on the will and its freedom less problematic and more to their liking. Henry himself was from early on convinced that, if anything other than the will moved the will, it imposed necessity upon the will and in that way destroyed freedom, choice, and moral responsibility.

VI. Concluding Reflections

This article has examined Henry's account of freedom principally as found in his *Summa*. Henry discusses the will and its freedom in the context of the divine will. While arguing that there is will in God, he situates the question within a universe of appetitive beings ordered to their proper ends and through them to the ultimate end, God. All rational and intellectual beings have will, although the divine will does not move toward an end, but rather reposes in the supreme good, which is God himself. Will is an active power, although in creatures will is passive in a certain respect insofar as a created will experiences a delight in the object

⁸⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, q. 9, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1981), p. 230,80–83: "vel formaliter, sicut calidum est in actu prius calidum quando de potentia calido, ut de frigido, facit calidum ... vel virtualiter, quemadmodum sol est prius calidus quando suo radio de potentia calido facit actu calidum."

⁸⁸ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.4.2, where, in speaking of how all the perfections of creatures are found in God, he says, "Manifestum est enim quod effectus praeexistit virtute in causa agente"

willed. Will is a free appetite, and as a free power will cannot be moved by anything else. In order to defend the freedom of the created will, Henry argues that the will as a potency virtually contains its act so that it can move itself by itself from potency to act. Finally, free choice is a species of will, and free choice belongs both to created wills and to the divine will, although God has no choice about willing himself, but only about willing things other than himself.

HENRY OF GHENT'S INFLUENCE

HENRY OF GHENT'S INFLUENCE ON JOHN DUNS SCOTUS'S METAPHYSICS

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There is hardly a philosophical or theological topic that Henry of Ghent does not approach with great sophistication and originality. Even where he sees himself as a defender of traditional views, his solutions are highly innovative. It is not surprising, then, that Henry's thought left a significant impression on his contemporaries and on the generations of theologians succeeding him, provoking both dissent and admiration. During his lifetime and in the first decades after his death, his impact was felt no less than that of Thomas Aquinas. For the Franciscans, he became a privileged point of reference. The relation between Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent is particularly noteworthy. Scotus uses Henry's positions systematically as the starting point on almost any issue, especially in the theological works.¹ He may well have read Henry's two principal works, the *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*) and the *Quodlibets*, from cover to cover, for he refers to them on almost every issue. In any event, his relatively detailed accounts of Henry's positions indicate that Henry's writings are on his desk as he writes.

It is rather rare for Scotus to follow Henry unqualifiedly, but even where he criticizes Henry's position most severely, the Solemn Doctor's views usually leave significant traces in Scotus's own solutions. Moreover, Scotus often adopts the setting of the question as well as some technical vocabulary from Henry. Yet he tends to mention Henry explicitly only

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For a concise summary of the impact of Henry of Ghent on his contemporaries and on 14th century theologians, see Matthias Laarmann, *Deus primum cognitum: Die Lehre von Gott als Ersterkanntem des menschlichen Intellekts bei Heinrich von Gent* (Münster, 1999), pp. 338–360. In most of his writings, Scotus begins the examination of the problem under discussion with an exposé of Henry's views, sometimes accompanied by one or more alternative views. The only detailed study of Scotus's use of Henry in a particular work is by Gordon A. Wilson, "The Presence of Henry of Ghent in Scotus's *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*", in *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics*, ed. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, and Mechthild Dreyer (Leiden, 1996), pp. 107–124.

when disagreeing with him, which is why secondary literature on Duns Scotus tends to stress his discontinuity with Henry of Ghent. When reading Henry of Ghent for his own sake, however, one discovers a remarkable inner logic and nuance that often gets lost in Scotus's incomplete and somewhat tendentious summaries of Henry's teachings.

When studying doctrinal influences, one cannot always single out one determinate source of inspiration. At times, Scotus merely learns through Henry views commonly held by many contemporaries. But often, Henry's position is itself a departure from the common view or a considerable refinement thereof. In what follows, I will focus on some central points of metaphysics in which Henry's doctrine manifests considerable originality while noticeably influencing Scotus, either by preparing Scotus's position or by impelling him to find a ground-breaking solution.² The first section examines how God can be known by means of notions that are common to God and creatures analogically (Henry) or univocally (Scotus). The second section concerns a closely related issue, namely the notion of being qua being as the subject of metaphysics. Both Henry and Scotus include God within this subject. Two short final sections offer further clarifications and round out the picture of Henry's and Scotus's metaphysics. As a corollary to their conception of metaphysics, their new approach to the argument for God's existence will be briefly presented in the third section. The fourth section explains what Henry and Scotus mean by the notion of being (*ens*) as the subject of metaphysics. For them, the term "being" does not indicate the actual existence of a thing, but is rather said of something insofar as it has an intelligible and consistent nature. In other words, they take "being" to signify what they call a *quidditas* ("quiddity" or "whatness"), that is, a nature or an essence.

What I hope to show in what follows is that the originality of Duns Scotus's metaphysics unfolds within the context of Henry of Ghent's innovative approach to classical metaphysical themes. In order to bring out their novelty, I will present the approaches of Henry and Scotus against their historical background, with particular emphasis on Thomas Aquinas, who was an important point of reference especially for Henry of Ghent, prompting his admiration and critique.

² Stephen Dumont concisely summarizes Henry's privileged role in Scotus's overall method and with regard to numerous topics; see "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus", in *Routledge History of Philosophy Volume III: Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon (London, 1998), pp. 291–328, at pp. 296–297.

I. *Analogy vs. Univocity of Being and the Knowability of God*

A central concern of metaphysics is the knowledge of God. Yet only creatures, not God, are directly knowable to us. The problem is not only to investigate God's existence (knowledge of "whether he is"). Rather, even when God's existence is acknowledged on rational grounds, the question is whether we can know anything about his nature (knowledge of "what he is"). Is it possible to transfer to God certain notions that apply to a creature? Thirteenth-century theologians, including Henry of Ghent, commonly held that the names by which we speak of God (saying that he *is*, that he is good and wise, etc.) are said of him analogously. Duns Scotus famously attacks Henry's account, arguing that only univocal notions can convey any knowledge of God's nature.³

I.1. *Aristotle and Aquinas on Analogy*

The remote origin of the debate is Aristotle's view that "being" has more than one meaning. It is not predicated of substance and accidents univocally, that is, according to a single distinct meaning (*Physics* I, 3). Nor is it predicated completely equivocally, in the way that in English the word "date" has several unrelated meanings, such as a particular day of the year, or the fruit of the date palm tree. Rather, "being" is said of accidents or even of privations and negations with reference to one primary instance, which is substance, just as "healthy" is primarily said of an animal, but derivatively also of medicine because it preserves health, and of urine because it indicates health (*Metaphysics* IV, 2 and VII, 1).

³ For Henry on analogy, see Jos Decorte, "Henry of Ghent on Analogy: Critical Reflections on Jean Paulus' Interpretation", in *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, ed. Willy Vanhamel (Leuven, 1996), pp. 71–105; Martin Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft: Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Leiden, 2007), pp. 158–167; see also Pickavé's chapter "Henry of Ghent on Metaphysics", in this volume. The relation between Scotus and Henry on analogy is studied in detail by Dumont, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus", pp. 297–322. For Scotus on univocity of being, see also idem, "Scotus's Doctrine of Univocity and the Medieval Tradition of Metaphysics", in *What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin, 1998), pp. 193–212; Ludger Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens: Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, 2nd ed. (Münster, 1989), pp. 268–395; Giorgio Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*: The Solution to a Riddle", *Medioevo* 30 (2005), pp. 69–110.

For the scholastics who appropriated Aristotle's teaching it was thus a commonplace that "being" is neither predicated univocally, nor equivocally, but analogically. Going beyond Aristotle, they applied the analogy of being not merely to the relation between substance and accidents, but also to the relation between God and creatures. They argued that "being" is not predicated equivocally of God and creatures, as though the word "being" were used only incidentally in both instances. Rather, because the being of creatures stands in a relation of dependence to the being of God, there results some resemblance, however remote, between the effects and the cause. For this reason, "being" is predicated analogically. In similar fashion, other perfections, such as goodness or wisdom, can be said analogically of God and creatures, because they eminently preexist in God, who is the cause of the perfections found among creatures. This account of analogy, which is articulated by Thomas Aquinas for instance, was the common view when Henry wrote on the subject.⁴

It is important to highlight two aspects of Aquinas's view of the knowability of God by analogical predication. First, it is implicit in his account that a name that is predicated by analogy of God and creatures does not constitute a third notion resulting from abstraction and in some way common to God and creatures. Rather, for Aquinas, analogy is based on the recognition that the intelligible contents of the terms predicated of God and creatures are realized in God primarily and in creatures secondarily. In other words, analogy concerns only two terms, namely, a perfection in a creature and a perfection in God; it does not involve three terms, namely a creaturely perfection, the corresponding perfection in God, and an analogously common notion signifying this perfection.⁵

Second, for Aquinas, "what God is" cannot be known in this life; rather, it can only be known when God is seen face to face. Our only way of knowing God's nature is by knowing what God is not. Yet he acknowledges that negative knowledge presupposes some positive knowledge on account of which a certain characteristic is denied of God. For example, saying that God is simple because he is not composed presupposes the recognition that God is pure act, lacking all potentiality. Such knowledge

⁴ For Aquinas's account of the knowability of God's nature by analogical predication, see John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, 2000), pp. 501–575.

⁵ On this point, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 571–572.

is obtained through the proofs of God's existence, whereby one understands God as the first being and consequently as pure act and as the very subsistence of being. In his later writings, Aquinas softens his earlier insistence on negative knowledge of God somewhat, in response to the negative theology of Moses Maimonides. For Maimonides, the names said of God express nothing pertaining to God, but only either God's way of operating with regard to the creatures, or a pure negation. Thus for Maimonides, one cannot say that God is wise, but only that he acts wisely; one cannot say that God is alive in any other sense than as a denial of the mode of existence proper to inanimate things. Against this view, Aquinas argues that names of pure perfections can be predicated of God essentially, indicating something really present in God, although they signify God's essence imperfectly.⁶

1.2. Henry of Ghent's Analogously Common Notions as Seen by Scotus

To a large extent, Henry of Ghent's account of analogy follows in the footsteps of Aquinas. Yet Henry's treatment of analogy is more elaborate than Aquinas's. His explanation of analogy will provoke Scotus's critique and indirectly inspire Scotus's own account of the knowability of God by means of univocal concepts.

In Aquinas, the acknowledgment that certain perfections can be predicated of God essentially appears to be a concession he made later in his career in order to avoid the consequences of a radically negative theology. Henry, in contrast, makes this issue the starting point for his discussion of the knowability of God. He not only insists on the inability of negative knowledge to convey any knowledge whatsoever of God, but also on the importance of a certain knowledge of God's nature so as to be able to love him.⁷ He writes on this topic in the very same year of the

⁶ *De potentia*, q. 7 a. 5, ed. P.M. Pession, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Quaestiones disputatae* vol. 2, 9th ed. (Rome and Turin, 1953), p. 198a–199a. For the progression of Aquinas's account of the knowability of God, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 502–542. For the relationship between Aquinas and Maimonides, see Mercedes Rubio, *Aquinas and Maimonides on the Possibility of the Knowledge of God: An Examination of the Quaestio de attributis* (Dordrecht, 2006).

⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 1, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), I, fol. 137^rc. Articles 21–24 of Henry's *Summa* are available in a bilingual edition; see Henry of Ghent's *Summa: the Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21–24)*, trans. Jos Decorte and Roland J. Teske (Leuven, 2005).

condemnation of the statement according to which “one cannot know anything of God except that he is.”⁸

For Henry, knowledge of God’s nature “is achieved by the way of eminence through abstraction from creatures of intentions that belong to the creator and to creatures in common by analogy.”⁹ The interpretation of Henry’s account of how this works in detail is controversial to the present day. What is important for our present purpose is how Scotus understood Henry on this point. Scotus summarizes his explanation as follows:

They say that God is known by us in a common notion, for instance in the notion of good and true, but not in a concept that is univocally common to God and to the creature, but only analogically common. For God’s nature is of itself singular, having no concept that is common to his nature and to us, but only an analogical common concept. And such a concept, which is one only by the unity of analogy, consists of two concepts. Yet the concept is quasi-one, because the two concepts are close to each other by attribution, and thus they are conceived as quasi-one concept.¹⁰

Henry would hardly have considered this an accurate summary of his thought, particularly the claim that he considers a perfection said of God, such as goodness, as a “quasi-one concept” that consists of two concepts. Yet his explanation of the knowability of God’s nature by means of intentions analogically common to God and creatures is not expressed with enough clarity to protect it from an interpretation like Scotus’s.

Henry repeatedly speaks of the transcendental notions of being, one, true, beautiful and the like as “*commune analogum*”, that is, something analogous which is common to God and creatures.¹¹ Yet he makes it clear that, although such transcendental notions are in a sense common to

⁸ Jan A. Aertsen, “‘Von Gott kann man nichts erkennen, außer daß er ist’ (Satz 215 der Pariser Verurteilung): Die Debatte über die (Un-)möglichkeit einer Gotteserkenntnis *quid est*”, in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery Jr., and Andreas Speer (Berlin and New York, 2001), pp. 22–37.

⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 6, ed. Badius, I, fol. 141^{vN}, trans. Decorte and Teske, p. 223: “Et hoc [scil. cognitio de Deo quid sit] fit via eminentiae per abstractionem a creaturis intentionum quae secundum analogiam communiter conveniunt creatori et creaturis.”

¹⁰ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1–2 n. 11, Editio Vaticana XVI, ed. Charles Balić et al. (Rome, 1960), p. 226; see also *Ordinatio I*, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1–2 n. 20, Editio Vaticana III, ed. C. Balić et al. (Rome, 1954), p. 12.

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 3, ed. Badius, I, fol. 126rD; art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius, I, fol. 128^{vZ}; art. XXIV, q. 6, ed. Bad., I, fol. 141^{vM}; *ibid.*, fol. 142^{rQ}; *ibid.*, fol. 142^{vV}.

both God and creatures, they do not relate to the concept of God and to the concept of a creature like a third concept that would apply to both. In Aquinas's account of analogy, this point is only implicit. Henry, conversely, discusses it at length in article 21, question 2 of the *Summa*, in refutation of an objection stemming from Avicenna's axiom that "being" is the first known notion, an axiom to which Henry wholeheartedly subscribes. According to the objector, as the first known, the concept of being is prior to the concepts of divine being and creaturely being, and it is common to both.¹² Henry begins his reply as follows:

To the third argument, that being simply [*ens simpliciter*] is conceived before the concept of the being that is God or a creature, it must be said that this is not true. For a concept of being simply [*entis simpliciter*] can only be conceived by conceiving some concept of God or of a creature. But it can never be conceived by conceiving a single concept common to God and to a creature, and distinct from the concepts of God and of the creature. For there can be no such concept. But if one conceives something, it is either what pertains to the being of God alone or what pertains to the being of a creature alone . . . Every real concept, therefore, by which something real is conceived when one conceives being simply [*esse simpliciter*], is either a concept of the thing that is God or a concept of a thing that is a creature, not the concept of something common to both.¹³

To group the concepts of the good of God and of the good of a creature under a single more general concept of goodness, because in our way of conceiving them there is a certain proximity between these concepts, would result in an erroneous general concept of goodness.¹⁴ On the premise that every real concept has something real as a foundation, a single univocal concept could only be ascribed to both God and creatures if they shared in a single reality. But that some reality be common to God and creatures is impossible, given divine simplicity and divine transcendence, for then God would be composed of something he shares with creatures and something proper to him.¹⁵ These considerations seem to be the source of Scotus's claim that for Henry a concept that is said of God, such as goodness, consists of two distinct concepts, one applying

¹² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2 arg. 3, ed. Badius, I, fol. 124^{rE}.

¹³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2, ed. Badius, I, fol. 125^{rO}, trans. Decorte and Teske, pp. 55–57. Emended translation.

¹⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2 ad 3, ed. Badius, I, fols. 124^{rO}–125^{rS}.

¹⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2 arg. 1 in opp., ed. Badius, I, fol. 124^{rE}.

properly to goodness as found in a creature, the other applying properly to goodness as found in God.

Scotus's supposition that for Henry such notions are nevertheless quasi-one because of some proximity between the two distinct concepts of goodness seems to be inspired by article 24 question 6 of the *Summa*. There, considering whether God's nature can be known from creatures, Henry explains the function of transcendental notions (being, the good, the true, etc.) for knowing God's nature. The Solemn Doctor distinguishes five stages in the knowledge of God which differ according to their degree of generality. It will suffice to consider the first two, which are the basis for the subsequent ones. Both stages are based upon different ways of conceiving notions that express a perfection in a creature, such as goodness (or being, beauty, etc.). Henry argues that these conceptions of goodness grant us an extremely general understanding of God's nature in his attributes:

... one way by understanding this particular good, and this most indistinctly from a creature. For, when I say "this good", I say two things, both that it is good and that it is this. That it is said to be "this" belongs to the creature; that it is said to be "good" is common to the creator and to the creature. If you subtract from it "this" and "that", this is the second way of understanding the good, that is, as less limited to the creature than before. And this is the analogous good common to God and a creature, and it is among the first intentions that the intellect conceives about things in itself and first, such as one and being. And although the good of the creator and the good of the creature in themselves produce different and distinct concepts—as "being" also does concerning God and a creature—our intellect, nonetheless, conceives the two of them in a confused way as one, because they are very close to each other.¹⁶

Again, Henry says that the good of God and the good of the creature are distinct concepts. And once more, he remarks that our intellect conceives the two in a confused way as one on account of their proximity. Yet Scotus apparently understood Henry's point here not as a warning, but as the tool which is supposed to explain how to bridge the epistemological gap between concepts that are proper to a creature and concepts that are proper to God. Thus Scotus takes Henry to say that the transcendental notions that are common to God and to creatures by analogy are both two and one: two distinct proper concepts sharing nothing in common are conceived in a confused way as one.

¹⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 6, ed. Badius, I, fol. 142^{vT-V}, trans. Decorte and Teske, pp. 233–235. Emended translation.

I.3. *Duns Scotus on Univocal Concepts*

Scotus might not have seen any urgency in developing a theory of univocal concepts that are common to God and creatures if he had not been confronted with Henry's solution. He shares Henry's point of departure for discussing the knowability of God. Following the Solemn Doctor, Scotus argues that knowledge of God by negation alone is not possible, and even if it were, this would not provide an adequate foundation for loving God.¹⁷ Thus Scotus joins Henry in the search for a positive foundation for our knowledge of God. Like Henry, he sees this foundation in notions that can be predicated of God and creatures. But can one really know anything about God if the concepts employed to speak of God share nothing in common with the concepts we form by knowing a creature? Scotus considered Henry's account to be a failure and replaced Henry's analogy with univocity. For him, the epistemological advantages of a univocal concept of being far outweigh the difficulties that such a novel theory posits for a traditional conception of metaphysics. In fact, in his commentaries to the *Sentences*, and even earlier in his *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima*, he reverses his earlier denial of the univocity of being and develops tools to address the difficulties that a univocal concept of being poses.¹⁸

In order to examine Scotus's relation to Henry, it will suffice to outline two features of his account of univocity: first, his arguments in favor of univocal concepts and specifically his insistence that they alone can adequately address Henry's own concerns; second, his solution of the very difficulties that Henry saw in positing univocally common notions. The difficulties Henry raised pertain to univocal concepts that are common

¹⁷ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1–2 n. 10, Editio Vaticana III, pp. 4–5; *Reportatio* I A, d. 3 q. 1 nn. 6–10, vol. 1, ed. Allen B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 2004), p. 188.

¹⁸ In his early works, Scotus considered being as equivocal or analogical, depending on the perspective taken, but he explicitly and repeatedly denied that being is univocal. The epistemological advantages of a univocal concept of being are brought out for the first time in his commentary on the *De anima*. Although in this work he is not directly in dialogue with Henry of Ghent, it can be reasonably assumed that he had already Henry's position in the back of his mind. *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima* 21, Opera Philosophica V, ed. Timothy Noone et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. and Washington, D.C., 2006), pp. 207–225. See Tobias Hoffmann, "The *Quaestiones De anima* and the Genesis of Duns Scotus's Doctrine of Univocity of Being," in *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. Jean-Michel Counet and Russell L. Friedman (Leuven, forthcoming).

to God and creatures, that is, univocity on the transcendental level. (Univocity on the categorical level, that is, with regard to substance and accidents, implies further problems, for which Scotus found ingenious solutions as well. But on these issues, he is not specifically in dialogue with Henry of Ghent.)¹⁹

Scotus gives numerous arguments for the univocity of the concept of being. In an annotation to his *Ordinatio*, he enumerates ten arguments and tells us that he considers the first and the fourth particularly important.²⁰ In addition to these two, I will summarize his second argument, because together with the fourth argument it constitutes the most direct response to the major difficulty Scotus saw in Henry's account.

In his first argument, Scotus argues precisely in favor of a hypothesis that Henry rejected, namely that when "being" is predicated of God and creatures, the concept of being is a third concept that is distinct from the concept applying to God and the concept applying to a creature. The argument begins with the observation that we cannot be both certain and uncertain about one and the same concept. Now we can be certain that God is a being and uncertain whether this being is finite or infinite, created or uncreated. This indicates three things: first, that the concept of being (which is certain to us) is distinct from the concepts of finite being and of infinite being (about both of which we are uncertain); second, that it is contained in both; third and most importantly, that it is applied to both according to a single meaning—in other words, that it is univocal. In confirmation of this claim, Scotus points to the history of philosophy, in which some thinkers have in fact been certain about God and uncertain whether he was a first principle or not, or whether he was created or uncreated, etc.²¹

The second and the fourth argument start from the hypothesis that knowledge of God's nature is possible and argue that only univocal concepts can account for this possibility. Thus they are more specifically targeted at Henry's concern for the knowability of God. In his second argument, Scotus argues that our natural capacity for knowledge cannot provide us with any concept that is proper to God, as Henry would

¹⁹ See *Lectura* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1–2 nn. 105–123, Editio Vaticana XVI, pp. 264–273; *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1–2 nn. 152–166, Editio Vaticana III, pp. 94–103. For a discussion of these issues, see Hoffmann, "The *Quaestiones de anima* and the Genesis of Duns Scotus's Doctrine of Univocity of Being."

²⁰ *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1–2 n. 44, adnotatio, Editio Vaticana III, p. 31.

²¹ *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1–2 nn. 27–29, Editio Vaticana III, pp. 18–19.

have it, because all our concepts are obtained by abstraction from the sense data acquired from creatures. Concepts attained in this way do not include a proper concept of God any more than a concept proper to Socrates would include a concept proper to Plato. Henry had assumed that the proper concepts of God and of a creature are related because the creature's causal dependence on God entails that the creatures imitate divine perfections.²² But for Scotus, in order to know the relation between any two concepts, they must first be known individually. Thus positing a relation of analogy between God and creatures, and even ascribing causality to God, presupposes, rather than provides, some knowledge of God's nature. If Henry wants to uphold the possibility of our knowledge of God, he must admit that the epistemological gap between creatures and God is bridged by univocal concepts that are common to God and creatures.²³

In the fourth argument, Scotus likewise shows that without univocally common notions, we cannot know anything specific about God. As was generally agreed, even if one grants that the creatures imitate perfections found in God on account of their dependence on him, this is not a sufficient criterion for ascribing to God certain attributes (such as wisdom) while denying others (such as stoneness). A further criterion was needed for meaningful language about God, and it was Anselm of Canterbury who provided this criterion. According to Anselm, attributes other than relative attributes (like "supreme" being) apply to God if it is better to possess that attribute rather than to lack it, provided the quality is compatible with the subject. Such attributes are called "pure perfections" (*Monologion*, chapter 15). The candidates for pure perfections are taken from perfections found in creatures. For Scotus, unless the pure perfections (such as intellect, will, or wisdom) signify something that applies univocally to God and creatures, they would split into two absolutely distinct concepts when applied to God and when applied to a creature. But then created realities would provide no basis for the knowledge of a pure perfection that is said of God. Thus it would not be any more reasonable to say of God that he is wise than that he is a stone, after all.²⁴

²² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXI, q. 2, ed. Badius, I, fol. 124^{rG-I}.

²³ *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1-2 n. 35, Editio Vaticana III, pp. 21-24; *Reportatio* I A, d. 3 q. 1 nn. 29-31 and n. 49, vol. 1, pp. 193-194 and p. 198.

²⁴ *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1-2 nn. 38-40, Editio Vaticana III, pp. 25-27. For Henry's discussion of Anselm's pure perfections, see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXXII, q. 2, ed. Raymond Macken, (Leuven, 1991), pp. 46-50.

From the epistemological point of view, then, univocally common concepts are preferable to analogously common concepts. But with every new solution, new problems arise. Scotus clearly formulates the principal difficulty implied by his novel theory:

But there is a problem: How can a concept common to God and to a creature be a real concept unless it is based upon the reality of a single genus? But then this reality would be potential to the reality which is the basis for the distinguishing concept ... and if there is in the thing one reality that is distinguishing, and another that is distinguished, then the thing seems to be composed, for it would have something in which it conforms and something by which it differs.²⁵

This was precisely Henry's worry: since a concept univocal to God and creatures presupposes a reality that is common to God and creatures, God would be composed of something he shares with creatures and of something that distinguishes him from creatures.²⁶ Being would be differentiated into created and uncreated being, and wisdom would be differentiated into created and uncreated wisdom, as a genus is differentiated into its species.

Scotus wants to maintain that the univocal concepts by which we name God are real concepts, directly referring to reality, rather than second order concepts which would merely refer to other concepts. And yet he claims that while God and creatures share in univocal concepts, they differ completely in reality.²⁷ He denies in fact that the concept of being or of any pure perfection is a genus, that is, a concept that refers to a common reality; as a matter of fact, nothing predicated of God is a genus. How can these affirmations be reconciled?

Scotus distinguishes between perfect and imperfect concepts of God or creatures. Perfect concepts conceive God as "being in the mode of infinity" and creatures as "being in the mode of finitude"; imperfect concepts conceive God and creatures as "being" apart from the modes of infinity and finitude. When "being" is perfectly conceived, there are two proper concepts, one applying exclusively to God, the other to creatures; when "being" is imperfectly conceived, it is a single concept that is common to God and creatures. Infinity and finitude are not like specific differences that specify a genus, but they are rather merely intrinsic modes

²⁵ *Ordinatio* I, d. 8 pars 1 q. 3 n. 137, Editio Vaticana IV, ed. C. Balić et al. (Rome, 1956), pp. 221–222.

²⁶ See above, note 15.

²⁷ *Ordinatio* I, d. 8 pars 1 q. 3 n. 82, Editio Vaticana IV, p. 190.

of a thing. When a genus is differentiated into various species, there is one reality common to all species, such as "animality", and another, added reality that is unique to a single species, such as "reason." The concept of being, in contrast, is not differentiated by an added reality, but it is merely found in different degrees. Scotus gives the example of whiteness: the degree of whiteness characterizes whiteness without adding anything to whiteness, that is, without differentiating it into species. Like a generic concept, "being" is indifferent with regard to several instantiations; unlike a generic concept, "being" is not in potency to determining realities. Being-common-to-God-and-creatures, being-proper-to-this-creature, and being-proper-to-God are not three disparate concepts; rather, they differ only in that the first is an imperfect concept, whereas the second and third are perfect concepts. In this life, the concept proper to God cannot be had at all; rather, it is only had when God is seen face to face.²⁸

In sum, Henry and Scotus agree that knowledge of God's nature requires a cognitive bridge by means of concepts that we abstract from creatures and that disclose something essential to God. Yet whereas Scotus takes Henry to hold that notions said of God and creatures consist of two perfect and absolutely distinct concepts of God and creatures that are approximated in the analogously common notions, Scotus himself argues that we have distinct knowledge of a single imperfect univocal concept applying to both God and creatures. In Scotus's eyes, ultimately, either analogy breaks down into two equivocal concepts without any cognitive link, or it is undergirded by a univocal concept that makes it possible to proceed from one to the other.

II. *The Subject of Metaphysics*

Henry's account of analogy is not only instrumental to his explanation of the knowability of God. It also underlies his account of the subject of metaphysics and thereby affects his overall understanding of the nature and task of metaphysics as a universal science of being. Scotus's view regarding the subject of metaphysics is notably influenced by Henry's position, but thanks to his theory of the univocity of being, Scotus also

²⁸ *Ordinatio* I, d. 8 pars 1 q. 3 nn. 138–141, Editio Vaticana IV, pp. 222–224; *Lectura* I, d. 8 pars 1 q. 3 nn. 123–125; n. 129, Editio Vaticana I, ed. C. Balić et al. (Rome, 1966), pp. 43–45; p. 47.

moves significantly beyond Henry. In order to understand Henry's and Scotus's contributions to this topic, we have to return to Aristotle, who originated metaphysics or "first philosophy" as a universal science, and to Avicenna and Averroes, whose readings of Aristotle formulated the problem that the scholastic authors inherited.²⁹

II.1. Aristotle on First Philosophy

Medieval thinkers writing in Arabic and Latin were confronted with a major difficulty in their attempt to clarify the unity and scope of the science of metaphysics. According to the Aristotelian theory of "science", that is, of demonstrative and systematic knowledge, the domain of each science is defined by its subject. For example, the subject of arithmetic is number. The subject has to be confined to a single genus so as to secure the unity of the science. The subject of a science is—analogously to the subject of a proposition—that about which assertions are made by way of demonstration (*Posterior Analytics* I, 7; I, 10; I, 28).

Later, in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle does not say explicitly how first philosophy fits his theory of science of the *Posterior Analytics*. But once his followers do attempt to square his account of first philosophy with his theory of science in the *Posterior Analytics*, they are confronted with two difficulties. The first is that Aristotle does not tell us what he considers to be the subject of first philosophy. Although he tells us which topics fall under the study of first philosophy, he does not say how these various topics, rather than occupying different sciences, constitute a single domain of inquiry that unfolds from the consideration of a single subject. The topics of first philosophy are these: the first principles or highest causes (*Metaphysics* IV, 1), being qua being (*Metaphysics* IV, 1–2), and separate substances (that is, God and pure intelligences) (*Metaphysics* VI, 1). Which of these is supposed to be the subject that unifies their consideration into a single account? This puzzle gave rise to controversy. Since the separate substances can easily be identified with the first principles and

²⁹ For an excellent summary of this problem from Aristotle to Scotus, see Stephen Dumont, "Scotus's Doctrine of Univocity and the Medieval Tradition of Metaphysics", in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin, 1998), p. 193–212. For a broader study of late medieval attempts to identify the subject of metaphysics, see Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, Texte und Untersuchungen*, 2nd ed. (Leuven, 1998). Ludger Honnefelder emphasizes more than these scholars the novelty of Scotus's account of metaphysics, see *Woher kommen wir? Ursprünge der Moderne im Denken des Mittelalters* (Berlin, 2008), pp. 85–132.

highest causes (God as final cause and thus as first mover of the universe; the intelligences as the movers of the orbits), the alternative candidates for the subject of first philosophy were being qua being and separate substances. A second difficulty follows from the requirement of the *Posterior Analytics* that the subject of a science have generic unity. Yet being is not a genus; rather, it is said in many ways.

The problems with positing being, a non-generic notion, as the subject of first philosophy can be overcome by the analogical predication of being. For Aristotle, as was seen above, the unity of "being" is safeguarded by the fact that being is predicated of all things with reference to a primary instance, namely substance. Thus he seems to consider the unity of first philosophy's subject to be guaranteed by a less than generic unity. Some of his ancient and medieval commentators employed analogical predication also to address the first difficulty, namely, the tension between two principal candidates for the subject of first philosophy, being qua being and separate substances. Thus separate substances, above all God, would be the primary instances of being to which all other beings are referred.³⁰

II.2. Aristotle's Medieval Interpreters and the Alternative between Being qua Being and God

Avicenna sees a significant problem in positing God as the subject of first philosophy. According to *Posterior Analytics* I, 10, the reality of the subject of a science cannot be demonstrated by that science itself, but has to be presupposed, either because it is self-evident or because it is demonstrated by a different science. In first philosophy, Avicenna argues, God's existence is not presupposed, but it is precisely the task of first philosophy to demonstrate it. God's existence cannot be presupposed, because it is neither self-evident nor demonstrated by the other, lower sciences (ethics, politics, natural philosophy, mathematics, and logic). Instead, Avicenna posits as the subject of first philosophy being qua being (*ens, inquantum est ens*), which Avicenna takes as a notion common to all things. This subject requires no previous inquiry, because it is manifest to all.³¹

³⁰ Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought*, 3rd ed. (Toronto, 1978), pp. 9–15.

³¹ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* I, cap. 1, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven and Paris, 1977), pp. 4–5; I, cap. 2, pp. 12–13.

Like Avicenna, Averroes appropriates the doctrine of the *Posterior Analytics* that a science does not demonstrate its own subject. Yet his view seems to be—at least to his medieval readers—that the separate substances are the subject of first philosophy. Averroes repeatedly criticized Avicenna's denial that natural philosophy can demonstrate God's existence. According to Averroes, natural philosophy demonstrates his existence by reasoning from effect to cause.³²

Most medieval theologians of the Latin West fully accepted neither Avicenna's nor Averroes's views, as they understood them. Avicenna's outright rejection of a demonstration of God within natural philosophy stands against Aristotle's own demonstration of God in the *Physics*. Furthermore, both of their accounts of the subject of metaphysics are problematic, for opposite reasons. By positing being qua being as the subject of first philosophy, one safeguards the universal character of this science at the cost of subordinating God and creatures to the general notion of being, thus treating being as a generic notion. By positing separate substances or God as its subject, one avoids treating being as a generic notion, but then it is not clear how metaphysics can be a universal science. Positing God as the subject of first philosophy has another undesirable implication: first philosophy, the most common science, would be subordinated to natural philosophy, for it would then be the task of natural philosophy, a particular science, to demonstrate the existence of the subject of first philosophy, the universal science.

Aquinas's way out of the dilemma was to understand Aristotle's "being qua being" as created being (*ens commune*) and to consider God the cause of all created being; thus in his view, first philosophy has created being as its subject, but extends also to God as the cause of its subject. This solution is warranted by Aristotle's claim that we must grasp the causes of being qua being (*Metaphysics* IV, 1).³³ Yet with Aquinas's conception of the subject of first philosophy, a new problem arises that both Avicenna's

³² Averroes, *In Physicorum* I, com. 83, ed. Iuntina (Venice, 1562), IV, fol. 47^{F-K}; *In Physicorum* II, com. 22, IV, fols. 56^M–57^C. For an argumentation in favor of the received interpretation that Averroes considers God and the pure intelligences the subject of metaphysics, see Timothy Noone, "Albert the Great on the Subject of Metaphysics and Demonstrating the Existence of God", *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 2 (1992), pp. 31–52, at 35–37. For a challenge to this interpretation, see Martin Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft*, pp. 94–99.

³³ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boethium de trinitate* q. 5 a. 4, Editio Leonina L, ed. Pierre-Marie J. Gils (Rome and Paris, 1992), p. 154a–b; *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, proemium, ed. M.-R. Cathala and Raymond M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1950), pp. 1a–2b. See Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 14–22.

and Averroes's received solutions had avoided. While in both accounts, God was included in the subject of first philosophy—either as one of the beings it studies (Avicenna), or as the subject itself (the received account of Averroes)—for Aquinas, God, the most noble of all beings, falls outside of the subject of metaphysics. Thus his theory seems to jeopardize the unity and nobility of first philosophy.

II.3. *Henry of Ghent on the Subject of Metaphysics and the First Known Object of the Intellect*

Without making an explicit reference to Aquinas, Henry of Ghent rejects his solution to the problem of the subject of metaphysics. Henry contends that only the particular sciences, but not the universal sciences such as first philosophy and theology, study the principles of their subject. He argues in fact that a science considers the principles of its subject only when its subject is itself composed. Thus natural philosophy studies its principles, for the subject of natural philosophy, “moveable body”, is composed of matter and form. But according to Henry, the subject of first philosophy is “being simply [*ens simpliciter*], which contains under it all being, whether it be a principle or something caused by a principle”, and this subject has no principles.³⁴ (Notice that Henry uses the expressions “being simply” and “being qua being” interchangeably.) To confirm this point, Henry refers to two pertinent considerations from Avicenna. First, Avicenna argues that the notion of principle accrues to (*accidit*) the notion of being, that is, “being” neither includes nor excludes the notion of principle. Second, not all being has a principle (in other words, “being caused” is not a property of being), for otherwise, being would have to be the cause of itself.³⁵

It is out of epistemological considerations that Henry posits being simply (*ens simpliciter*) as the subject of metaphysics and that he includes God within the scope of its subject. For Henry, the subject of metaphysics, the most general of all sciences, coincides with what is the absolutely first notion known by the intellect. What is first known distinctly by the human intellect is the notion of being, as it is not yet determined to any

³⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XIX, q. 1, ad 4, ed. Badius, I, fol. 115^{vl}. For Henry of Ghent on the subject of metaphysics, see Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft*, pp. 102–125, and his “Henry of Ghent on Metaphysics” in this volume.

³⁵ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* I, cap. 2, ed. S. Van Riet, pp. 13–14.

particular domain, that is, God or creatures, substance or accidents.³⁶ Henry explicitly links “being simply”, as the subject of metaphysics, with analogy:

... being simply, as common to being in act and to being in potency, is being that is taken in the broadest sense, which according to Avicenna is the subject of metaphysics. And it is analogous and common to the creator and a creature, containing under itself the being that is the principle and the being that is derived from the principle, because, according to Avicenna, not every being is a principle, nor is there a principle of any being whatsoever.³⁷

Henry’s conception of being as an analogously common intention that applies to God and creatures allows Henry to conceive of metaphysics as a universal science of being that encompasses God and creatures.³⁸ In Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy of being, there are no notions that encompass God and creatures. Thus Aquinas cannot include God within the subject of metaphysics.³⁹ In contrast, Henry’s notion of being is so general that it applies indifferently to God and creatures.⁴⁰ This is why he can say elsewhere that God is part of the subject of metaphysics, as if he were saying that God is part of being qua being.⁴¹

³⁶ For the parallelism between what is first known and the subject of a science, see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XIX, q. 1, ed. Badius, I, fol. 115^{rC}; art. XIX, q. 1 ad 3, ed. Badius, I, fol. 115^{vK}. The connection between being qua being as the first known of the intellect and as the subject of metaphysics is made in Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 3, ed. Badius, I, fol. 138^{vP}. Henry’s claim that being is the first known does not contradict his celebrated doctrine that God is the first known of the human intellect, for being is the first notion that is distinctly known, whereas God is first-known only by indistinct and non-reflective knowledge, see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VII, q. 6 ad 2, ed. Badius, I, fol. 56^{rR} and Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft*, pp. 129–181.

³⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 3, ed. Badius, I, fol. 126rD, trans. Decorte and Teske, p. 67. See also Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VII, 3 ad 4, ed. Badius, I, fol. 51^{rL}: “... commune est ens, quod est subiectum metaphysicae, et ad Deum et ad creaturam ...” Emended translation.

³⁸ Notice that including God under the subject of metaphysics is not a unique position at Henry of Ghent’s time. See Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, pp. 223–339.

³⁹ On the relation between Aquinas’s account of the knowability of God and his solution to the problem of the subject of metaphysics, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 122–123 and p. 593.

⁴⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 7 ad 1 and ad 2, ed. Badius, I, fol. 144^{vI} and fol. 144^{vK}.

⁴¹ See Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VII, q. 6 ad 2 and ad 3, ed. Badius, I, fols. 56^{rS} and 56^{vT}.

II.4. *Univocity of Being and the Subject of Metaphysics in Duns Scotus*

Duns Scotus repeatedly situated his own position between the received accounts of Avicenna and Averroes on the subject of metaphysics. Whether being qua being qualifies as the subject of metaphysics hinges on whether “being” is univocal or not. This seems to be Scotus’s position at least in his first ex professo discussion of the issue, in book 1 question 1 of *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*. In this early treatment of the problem, Scotus is still denying the univocity of being, which seems to be a major reason why he is at that time more sympathetic to a revised account of Averroes’s solution than to Avicenna’s account.⁴² Against Avicenna, Scotus argues that “being”, as it is divided into the ten categories that share nothing univocally in common, is not a unitary notion and therefore cannot be the subject of metaphysics.⁴³

In his mature writings, when Scotus defends univocity of being, he embraces straightforwardly the Avicennian position that the subject of metaphysics is being qua being. Against the Averroistic hypothesis of God as the subject of metaphysics, Scotus argues that the special sciences presuppose a universal science that provides the knowledge of what is common to these sciences and of what they presuppose. This is the science of being qua being. God is not the subject of metaphysics, but he falls under its scope as that which is considered therein in the most noble way.⁴⁴ Scotus also implicitly rejects Aquinas’s solution of God as the cause of being qua being, following almost verbatim, yet without

⁴² For Scotus, the subject of metaphysics cannot be separate substances in the plural, that is, God and angels, for—he thought then—there cannot be anything univocal common to them, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* I, q. 1 nn. 125–129, Opera Philosophica III, ed. Girard Etzkorn et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1997), pp. 58–59. But Scotus advances some arguments in support of God as the subject of metaphysics, nn. 130–136, Opera Philosophica III, pp. 59–63.

⁴³ *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* I, q. 1 nn. 85–87, Opera Philosophica III, pp. 44–45.

⁴⁴ *Ordinatio* prol. pars 3 q. 1–3 nn. 193–194, Editio Vaticana I, ed. C. Balić et al. (Rome, 1950), pp. 129–131; *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* VI, 4 nn. 10–11, Opera Philosophica III, pp. 87–88. This extremely succinct question must have been written later than the beginning question of the *Metaphysics* commentary, because here he not only reverses his position regarding the subject of metaphysics, but also admits univocity and refers to his treatment of it elsewhere, possibly to the *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima* or to one of his *Sentences* Commentaries. It is generally acknowledged that in their written form, the *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* stem from different stages of Scotus’s career.

acknowledgement, Henry's argumentation against the hypothesis that being qua being has principles.⁴⁵

In the writings in which Scotus follows the Avicennian view on the subject of metaphysics, he takes the same epistemological approach to metaphysics as did Henry of Ghent. "Prima scientia est scibilis primi": the subject of metaphysics coincides with the first object of the intellect. In other words, the scope of metaphysics and the scope of human knowledge are the same.⁴⁶ Accordingly, if the first object of the intellect were limited to material substances rather than to being qua being (a position that Scotus attributes to Aquinas), then likewise "metaphysics would not be a more transcendental science than natural philosophy."⁴⁷ For Scotus, it is on account of its univocal character that the concept of being qualifies as the first object of the intellect, for precisely as a univocal concept, it applies to all beings, God and creatures.⁴⁸ Thus according to Scotus, being qua being is the object of the intellect and the subject of metaphysics. Just as God falls under the object of the intellect (although under the conditions of the present life the possibility of knowing God is limited), so God also falls under the subject of metaphysics. Scotus even claims that without univocity of being, metaphysics would not be possible, for the univocal concept of being bridges not only the cognitive gap between creatures and God, but also between the accidents (which are knowable to us directly) and the substance (which according to Scotus is knowable only by means of the accidents).⁴⁹

Historically speaking, what does Scotus contribute to the thorny question of the subject of metaphysics, and to what extent is his solution indebted to Henry of Ghent? Scotus's solution is congruent with Henry's and likely depends on it in at least three ways. First, Scotus followed Henry in appropriating Avicenna's position on being qua being as the subject of metaphysics. Contrary to Aquinas, Henry and Scotus included God within being qua being, rather than restricting being qua being to finite being. Second, like the Solemn Doctor, Scotus posits a strict parallelism between the first object of the intellect and the subject of metaphysics. Third, Henry's account of analogously common intentions pressured Scotus to develop his theory of the univocity of being, and

⁴⁵ *Ordinatio* prol. pars 3 q. 1–3 n. 191, Editio Vaticana I, p. 128. See note 34.

⁴⁶ *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* VI, q. 4 n. 12, Opera Philosophica IV, p. 88.

⁴⁷ *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 3 nn. 117–118, Editio Vaticana III, pp. 72–73.

⁴⁸ *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 3 n. 129, Editio Vaticana III, pp. 80–81.

⁴⁹ *Lectura* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1–2 nn. 110–112, Editio Vaticana XVI, pp. 265–266; *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 3 nn. 139–140, Editio Vaticana III, pp. 87–88.

it was this theory of the univocity of being that allowed Scotus to follow Henry in upholding an Avicennian account of the subject of metaphysics.

The novelty in Scotus's solution is that by construing being as a univocal notion, he can assimilate metaphysics to Aristotle's definition of a science in the *Posterior Analytics*. As Stephen Dumont puts it, although Scotus denies that being is a genus, he endows his univocal concept of being with as many features of a genus as will allow it to satisfy Aristotle's requirements for the unity of a science.⁵⁰ Scotus's concept of being unifies the science of metaphysics because it extends to all the things that are studied therein according to a single intelligible content. Neither Aquinas, who considered God to fall outside of the subject of metaphysics, nor Henry, for whom "being" signifies either God or creatures, but not something they share in common, were able to ground metaphysics on a conceptual unity. Thus the scope of metaphysics is defined independently from the relations of dependence between creatures and God or between accidents and substance, which the metaphysician scrutinizes rather than presupposes.

III. *The Metaphysical Proof of God's Existence*

Henry not only follows Avicenna in positing being qua being as the subject of metaphysics. He also took up the Avicennian idea of a "metaphysical demonstration" of God. For Henry, such a demonstration does not proceed from the effects to the cause, but from God's nature or essence to his existence. Yet it is distinct from the "ontological argument" of Anselm of Canterbury, who argues from the mere concept of God as "that greater than which nothing can be thought" to God's existence. Henry's metaphysical argument is noteworthy for several reasons: it sheds further light on Henry's keen interest in the knowability of God's nature and on the general emphasis on essences in Henry's metaphysics. Moreover, it is an additional important instance where Scotus follows in Henry's footsteps.

Henry summarizes numerous arguments for God's existence by thinkers such as Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and others. He identifies these arguments as "*a posteriori*" (proceeding inductively, from the

⁵⁰ Dumont, "Scotus's Doctrine of Univocity and the Medieval Tradition of Metaphysics", pp. 209–211.

effects to the cause). He considers these proofs conclusive, but inferior to a “metaphysical proof” of God’s existence which proceeds *a priori* (deductively, from the cause to the effect), rather than *a posteriori*.⁵¹ Yet neither Avicenna nor Henry of Ghent, it seems, actually work out a full-blown *a priori* demonstration of God’s existence.⁵² But Henry at least tells us—although in a rather sketchy way—how such a metaphysical proof of God would have to proceed. In such an effort to demonstrate God metaphysically, one aims to know God’s essence, and since in God essence and existence coincide, by knowing God’s essence, one would know that God necessarily exists. The knowledge of God’s essence is to be obtained by means of the primary notions of the intellect. In fact, as Augustine teaches, the notions of being, one, good, true, etc., conceived in abstraction of their particular instantiations among creatures, enable us to understand God, who is being, good, truth without qualification.⁵³ As the reference to Augustine shows, for Henry the metaphysical proof of God is not *a priori* in the sense that it requires no prior knowledge of creatures. Henry agrees in fact that all human knowledge starts from the senses.

Although Henry does not provide a complete metaphysical proof of God’s existence, he offers us important considerations about the limitations of an exclusively physical approach to the knowledge of God’s existence. Even if one has demonstrated a first mover, a first efficient cause, and a first final cause, one has not yet shown that they are all identical. In other words, one has not yet excluded that there are several gods, one for each order of causality. Thus one must demonstrate that God is only one in nature.⁵⁴ Furthermore, God’s unicity must be established, that is, it must be shown that this nature can only be instantiated by a single being. In order to demonstrate the unicity of God, Henry uses the Avicennian

⁵¹ For the *a posteriori* proofs, see Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXII, q. 4; for the *a priori* proof, see art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius, I, fol. 134^{vB}; see also Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* I, cap. 3, ed. S. Van Riet, pp. 23–24. For Henry’s metaphysical proof of God, see Pickavé, “Henry of Ghent on Metaphysics”, in this volume, as well as his *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft*, pp. 323–347; Anton C. Pegis, “Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent”, *Mediaeval Studies* 30 (1968), pp. 226–246; 31 (1969), pp. 93–116; 33 (1971), pp. 158–179.

⁵² See Pickavé’s considerations on this point in his publications cited in the previous reference.

⁵³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXII, q. 5, ed. Badius, I, fol. 134^{vC-D}; Augustine, *De trinitate* 8.3.4, CCL 50, p. 272.

⁵⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*), art. XXV, q. 2, ed. Badius, I, fol. 149^{vO-P}.

argumentation that God is necessary being and that necessary being is incommunicable to more than one supposite.⁵⁵

From the beginning of Scotus's career, his views on demonstrating the existence of God were influenced by Henry's idea of a metaphysical proof and by his approach to the unicity of God. When Duns Scotus is adjudicating the dispute between Avicenna and Averroes on the subject of metaphysics and the demonstration of God's existence, he concludes in favor of Avicenna's idea of a metaphysical proof. While the approach to God by natural philosophy is based upon the properties of material things, the metaphysical approach is based upon the properties of being, and hence it is a more perfect demonstration of the First Cause. Moreover, while natural philosophy can only demonstrate that there is a first mover, metaphysics alone can show that there is a being that is first and necessary, both of which are more essential characteristics of God than that he is a first mover.⁵⁶ Scotus's proof of God's existence and unicity proceeds in three major steps that clearly show Henry's influence: first, he demonstrates a primacy in the order of efficiency, final causality, and eminence; second, he shows that the primacy in these three orders coincide, in other words, that God is one in nature; last, he demonstrates God's unicity by means of God's infinity and necessity.⁵⁷

Scotus's approach to God's existence is metaphysical in that it is not based upon the evidence of what is actually existent, for actual existence is merely a contingent fact. Rather, he argues entirely on the level of what he calls the essential order. Instead of arguing that an actually existing effect

⁵⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXV, q. 3, ed. Badius, I, fols. 154^{vl}–156^{rs}. Henry makes ample use of Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* I, cap. 6–7, ed. Van Riet, pp. 46–54; VIII, cap. 5, ed. Van Riet, 404–411.

⁵⁶ *Ordinatio* prol. pars 3 q. 1–3 n. 194, Editio Vaticana I, pp. 130–131. Even in his early treatment of *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* I, q. 1, where he still rejects Avicenna's position on the subject of the metaphysics, Scotus agrees with Avicenna's idea of a metaphysical proof, see n. 113, *Opera Philosophica* III, pp. 54–55. See also *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* VI, q. 4 nn. 4–5, *Opera Philosophica* IV, ed. G. Etzkorn et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1998), pp. 85–86; *Lectura* I d. 2 pars 1 q. 1–2 n. 40, Editio Vaticana XVI, pp. 125–126.

⁵⁷ Scotus's proofs for God's existence are found in *Lectura* I, d. 2 pars 1, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2 pars 1, *Reportatio* I A distinction 2, part 1–2, and *De primo principio*. On the structural similarities between Scotus's and Henry's proofs, see Stephen D. Dumont, "The *quaestio* 'si est' and the Metaphysical Proof for the Existence of God according to Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus," *Franziskanische Studien* 66 (1984), pp. 335–367; Olivier Boulnois, *Être et représentation: Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (XIII^e–XIV^e siècle)* (Paris, 1999), pp. 356–367. For Scotus's proof in particular, see Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (Aldershot, 2005), chapter 2.

indicates the existence of an efficient cause, Scotus argues that something that can be caused (*effectibilis*) implies something that is able to cause (*effectivum*). In fact, whether there actually is something caused out there is a matter of contingent fact. Yet a statement about something that *can* be caused is necessarily true. The crucial step of his argument consists in showing that the “first in the order of what is able to cause” is such that it is able not to depend on anything else, but is able to exist of itself. And “*to be able to be of itself*” can only be the characteristic of “what *is of itself*”. In short, Scotus argues for God’s existence from his possible existence, that is, from his essence.⁵⁸ Thus Scotus accomplishes the task that Henry proposed, namely that of proving God’s existence from the characteristics of his essence, specifically, from the possibility of his existence. Yet this is not an *a priori* proof, for we can conclude to the possibility of God only *a posteriori* by acknowledging the laws of causality that we discover in created reality.

IV. *Being as a Quidditative Notion*

In order to assess what is unique about Henry of Ghent’s and Duns Scotus’s approach to metaphysics, we have to address briefly one last question: What does it mean for them to posit being qua being as the subject of metaphysics? What is the scope of “being”, in their accounts? As was seen earlier, they both understand “being” as in a sense common to God and creatures, disagreeing only upon whether being is common in an analogous or in a univocal sense. Do they likewise extend being qua being to both essence and existence, or only to one or the other? In other words, is the subject of metaphysics being as actually existing, so that being qua being includes individual things in their concrete existence, such as you and I and Nelson, George Washington’s horse during the Revolutionary War? Or does it only include quidditative being, such as “humanity” and “horseness”, but not particular living human beings, and not Nelson qua actually alive?

For Aquinas, being qua being as the subject of metaphysics was limited to created being, but extended to being both in the sense of essence and of actual existence. In his account, our notion of being is not the fruit of conceptual analysis or of abstraction. If the notion of being were

⁵⁸ *Ordinatio* I, d. 2 pars 1 q. 1–2 nn. 56–58, Editio Vaticana II, ed. C. Balić et al. (Rome, 1950), pp. 161–163.

obtained through abstraction, it would relate to that from which it is abstracted as the universal to the particular. Thus abstracting from any individuating or specifying differences—and from existence—the notion of being would be the most general notion contained in all more specific notions (animal, horse, Nelson) precisely inasmuch as it prescind from what is specific, individual, and existing here and now. Moreover, it would be a purely quidditative notion, only answering the question of what something is, not whether it exists. Instead, for Aquinas the notion of being is obtained by separation. Although it is a general notion, it is not general in the sense of being a universal over particulars, but rather in the following sense: the general notion of being is that by which one acknowledges that a particular instantiation of being (such as material being or quantified being) is not the only possible instantiation. The recognition that being is not known by abstraction but by a judgment of separation allows Aquinas to include existence in being qua being, the subject of metaphysics. This is congruent with his general approach to being; Aquinas accords to existence ontological priority over essence, for being (*esse*), in the sense of actual existence, is the act of a thing.⁵⁹ In fact, for Thomas, being (*esse*) is the “perfection of all perfections”.⁶⁰

Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus take a different approach. According to Henry, “being simply (*ens simpliciter*), as common to being in act and to being in potency, is being that is taken in the broadest sense, and this ... is the subject of metaphysics.”⁶¹ By this, Henry does not intend to say that the subject of metaphysics comprises both essence and existence. Rather, “being in the broadest sense” abstracts from existence. Being qua being as the subject of metaphysics and as the first concept impressed in the soul is what Henry calls the “non-complex notion of being”.⁶² This means that it is the fruit of simple apprehension rather than of judgment, and this is for Henry precisely a quidditative notion

⁵⁹ For being qua being as subject of metaphysics extending to essence and existence, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, p. 61 and p. 123. For the discovery of the notion of being through separation rather than abstraction, see pp. 44–49 and idem, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp. 78–82. For the priority of *esse* over existence according to Aquinas, see Étienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), chapters 5 and 6.

⁶⁰ *De potentia*, q. 7 a. 2 ad 9, ed. P.M. Pession, p. 192b; see also *Summa theologiae*, I q. 4 a. 1 ad 3, Editio Leonina IV, p. 50b.

⁶¹ See above, note 37.

⁶² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXIV, q. 3, ed. Badius, I, fol. 138^vp.

of being, indicating a thing's essence, but prescinding from its existence. In other words, it simply expresses the consistence and possible existence, not the actual existence of a thing. In contrast, a "complex notion" is propositional knowledge, by which one judges whether the essence at hand has actual existence. Accordingly, for Henry, "the principal concern of metaphysics is to consider the essences (*quidditates*) of being qua being".⁶³ Something is a being (*ens*) by virtue of having an essence. In other words, by predicating the concept of being of something, one acknowledges the thing's reality as an essence while abstracting from actual existence.⁶⁴

Because of their central role in his conception of metaphysics, Henry repeatedly discusses essences, to which he famously ascribes a "being of essence" (*esse essentiae*) independently of whether they have actual existence. As Henry frequently explains, a thing that has being of essence ("*res a ratitudine*") is midway between a thing of which one can form whatever notion one pleases ("*res a reor, reris dicta*") and a thing that has real existence (*esse existentiae*). Not all things of which one can form a notion (*res a reor, reris*) are such that they are consistent, that is, intrinsically possible, but only those that have an idea in God's mind and that thereby have a being of essence. A goat-stag (*hircocervus*), an animal that is half goat, half stag, can be imagined and thus is a *res a reor, reris*, but it is something inconsistent and thus lacks a being of essence—it is a pure nothing.⁶⁵ While a thing is an essence on account of God's exemplar causality, it exists on account of God's efficient causality.⁶⁶

Duns Scotus expands on Henry's view of being as possible being. Although he accuses Henry of attributing eternal reality to the creature's

⁶³ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XIX, q. 1, ed. Badius, I, fol. 115^{rB}.

⁶⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 2, ed. Badius, I, fol. 124^{rK}: "... attribuitur ei esse essentiae, a quo res ipsa concepta dicitur esse ens aut essentia aliqua" and art. XXXIV, q. 2, ed. R. Macken, (Leuven, 1991), p. 174, 43–45: "... ratio entis sive esse quidditativi, quae convenit ei ex respectu ad formam divini exemplaris, a quo accipitur ratio rei dictae a ratitudine, quae eadem est cum ratione entis quiddiativi."

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VII*, q. 1–2 ad 2, ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Leuven, 1991), pp. 27, 71–28, 78; Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius, I, fol. 127^{rP–vP}; id., *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXVIII, q. 4, ed. Badius, I, fol. 168^{rV–vV}. See also Martin Pickavé, "Henry of Ghent on Being, Essence, and Individuation", in this volume.

⁶⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XXI, q. 4, ed. Badius, I, fol. 127^{vQ}; id., *Quodlibet IX*, q. 2, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 31, 34–52.

being of essence, which is contrary to the Christian doctrine that God creates out of nothing,⁶⁷ Scotus appropriates Henry's understanding of being (*ens*) as quidditative, that is, conceivable reality. As early as in his commentary on Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*, Duns Scotus interprets the subject of metaphysics as quidditative being: "... first philosophy considers being qua being, hence it considers being according to its quiddity [i.e., whatness]."⁶⁸

Scotus's conception of being as a quidditative notion is implied in his account of the univocity of being. As Scotus puts it, "being" is predicated "in quid" of uncreated being and of the genera, species, and individuals of finite being.⁶⁹ In other words, when one asks what uncreated being is, or what the genus of material substance is, and so forth, the answer, for Scotus, is always "it is a being". Obviously, since Scotus's notion of being is so general, it is also extremely abstract. While Aquinas holds that being (*esse*) is the "perfection of all perfections", Scotus's concept of being (*ens*) is the most imperfect of all concepts. In order to extend as a univocal notion to all beings, its intelligible content can only be minimal. Scotus himself admits that what is signified by his univocal concept of being is less perfect than what is signified by the word "white". Yet he argues that the very strength of this concept is the fact that the univocal concept of being is not limited to anything specific. For only for this reason is "being" conceivable as "infinite being". This is the proper concept of God, which is more perfect than any other concept.⁷⁰

Scotus is very clear, however, that predicating being of something does not imply anything about its actual existence. It only means that existence is compatible with that thing: the intelligible content of being (*ens*) is that "to which actual existence is not repugnant."⁷¹ "Being" in the most general sense can be said of all that is non-contradictory, even if it is only mental being; "real being" is what is either possible or actual outside of the mind.⁷² Actual existence is nowhere included in the conceptual analysis

⁶⁷ *Ordinatio* I, d. 36 q. un. nn. 13–18, Editio Vaticana VI, ed. C. Balić et al. (Rome, 1963), pp. 276–278.

⁶⁸ *Quaestiones Super Librum Elenchorum* I q. 1, Opera Philosophica II, ed. T. Noone et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. and Washington, D.C., 2004), p. 271.

⁶⁹ *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 3 n. 137, Editio Vaticana III, p. 85.

⁷⁰ *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 pars 1 q. 1–2 n. 51, Editio Vaticana III, p. 34.

⁷¹ *Ordinatio* IV, d. 1 pars 2 q. 1 n. 205, Editio Vaticana XI, ed. Barnabas Hechich et al. (Rome, 2008), p. 72.

⁷² *Quodlibet*, q. 3 nn. 2–3, *Opera omnia* XII, ed. Luke Wadding (Lyon, 1639; reprint: Hildesheim, 1968), pp. 67–68.

of a particular being; rather, it accrues to the thing that is completely determined at the quidditative level to the point of individuality.⁷³

For both Henry and Scotus, then, metaphysics, the study of being qua being, concerns primarily the structures of possible things, and—apart from the case of God—only secondarily the question of their actual existence. Thus the question of the ontological status of the possibles and the question of their relation to God's knowledge and power plays a key role in Henry's and above all in Scotus's metaphysics. It gains even greater interest among Scotus's students and among the later Scotists, to the point of becoming one of the central issues of Scotism.⁷⁴

V. Conclusion

Quite fittingly, the approach to first philosophy by Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus has been called "a new way to metaphysics".⁷⁵ What does this novelty consist in? Their treatment of the four topics discussed in this essay—the knowability of God's nature, the subject of metaphysics, the metaphysical proof of God's existence, and the understanding of being qua being in terms of possible essences—reveal a common denominator: Henry and Scotus do not develop a metaphysics of participation. Rather, they approach metaphysics with a keen epistemological concern.⁷⁶ This is what ties all four topics together according to a rigorous internal logic. The subject of metaphysics must be equal in extension to the first object of the intellect; in other words, metaphysics concerns the notion that is contained in everything knowable by the human intellect. The very notion of "being" expresses cognizability rather than real existence.

⁷³ *Ordinatio* II, d. 3 pars 1 q. 3 n. 63, Editio Vaticana VII, ed. C. Balić et al. (Rome, 1973), pp. 419–420.

⁷⁴ Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (Hamburg, 1990); Tobias Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta: Die Ideen und Possibilia bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius* (Münster, 2002); idem, "Duns Scotus on the Origin of the Possibles in the Divine Intellect", in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch (Leiden, 2009), pp. 359–379.

⁷⁵ Theo Kobusch, "Der neue Weg der Metaphysik: Heinrich von Gent, Meister Eckhart, Duns Scotus", in *Johannes Duns Scotus 1308–2008: Die philosophischen Perspektiven seines Werkes—Investigations into his Philosophy*, ed. Ludger Honnefelder et al. (Münster, forthcoming).

⁷⁶ This is the main thesis of Boulnois, *Être et représentation*, see especially p. 10 and pp. 505–515.

The notion of “being” and other transcendental notions must allow for some knowledge of God’s nature, for otherwise, the most noble object of metaphysics would remain inaccessible to us. Because the knowledge of “what God is” is accessible to us, God must fall within the subject of metaphysics. Knowing “what God is” furthermore allows us to prove God’s existence metaphysically, arguing from the characteristics of being to the nature of the first being, and thence to the existence of the first being.

HENRY OF GHENT AND
GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA:
A CHAPTER ON THE RECEPTION AND INFLUENCE
OF SCHOLASTICISM IN THE RENAISSANCE*

AMOS EDELHEIT

The need for detailed studies of the doctrinal relationships between scholastic and humanist thinkers had long been indicated, but even today the number of such studies is far from satisfactory.¹ It will not be enough to focus only on the influence of some canonical figures in medieval philosophy such as Thomas Aquinas or John Duns Scotus, but rather, the dynamic nature, development, and changes in the scholastic schools between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries must be reflected in such a history of the reception of scholasticism in Renaissance and Early Modern philosophies.²

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¹ See the remarks of Paul Oskar Kristeller regarding Ficino and scholastic philosophy, in his "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino," *Traditio* II (1944), pp. 257–318, especially on pp. 273–274: "This scholastic element is Aristotelian rather than Platonic in character, and it is obviously due to Ficino's early training at the University of Florence. The specific sources of this element are difficult to verify as long as the philosophical and theological environment of fifteenth-century Italy is not more thoroughly investigated. For it is among the Italian scholastics of the fourteenth and the early fifteenth century that we have to look for Ficino's teachers, not among the philosophers connected with the French schools of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, who have so far attracted most of the interest of competent medievalists." These remarks are most relevant also in the case of Pico, whose formation and basic training in scholastic philosophy at the Universities of Ferrara, Padova, and Paris between 1479 and 1486, as well as the many explicit references to scholastic thinkers in his writings, are established facts (on this see n. 3). On late scholastic schools in Italy see Cesare Vasoli, "Le doctrine teologiche e i primi inizi della crisi religiosa," in *Le filosofie del Rinascimento*, ed. Paolo Costantino Pissavino (Milan, 2002), pp. 154–174 and Luca Bianchi, "Le scienze nel Quattrocento. La continuità della scienza scholastica, gli apporti della filologia, i nuovi ideali di sapere," *ibid.*, pp. 93–132.

² A good starting point for this issue, with further references, is provided in Martin W.F. Stone, "Scholastic Schools and Early Modern Philosophy," in *The Cambridge*

In the present study I wish to discuss the relationship and possible influence of the thirteenth-century master Henry of Ghent (c. 1217–1293) on the fifteenth-century thinker Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494).³ More specifically, I would like to deal with questions such as which texts of Henry were read and used by Pico and how did Pico use Henry's authority in the different contexts of his writings. Focusing on the thirteen theses dedicated to Henry among Pico's *900 Theses* (1486), and on some of the references to Henry in his *Apology* (1487), I shall try to trace these theses and references back to Henry's *oeuvre*, in order to compare Henry's original intention with the way Pico has used his opinions. The aim of such a comparison is to determine whether we can identify a specific influence of the medieval philosopher on the young and ambitious Renaissance philosopher.

Pico's admiration towards scholastic philosophy is evident in his writings. In his 1485 famous letter to his humanist friend Ermolao Barbaro, which contains Pico's dramatic apology for the scholastic philosopher and his attack on the humanist rhetorician, we find, just before the fictitious speech by the scholastic, what seems like Pico's confession:

I have experienced this matter, both often on other occasions and in that most recent letter you wrote me, in which, while attacking those barbarian philosophers who, as you say, are regarded everywhere as sordid, crude, uncultivated, who [even] while being alive were not alive, they are much less alive [now] when they are dead; and if they were now alive they

Companion to Early Modern Philosophy ed. Donald Rutherford, (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 299–327. For the late medieval tradition see, e.g., Christopher Schabel [ed.], *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century* (Leiden, 2007). For the case of Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus see Charles B. Schmitt, "Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Gianfrancesco Pico on Illumination," *Mediaeval Studies* XXV (1963), pp. 231–258. For Henry in the 'second scholasticism' see Jacob Schmutz, "Les paradoxes metaphysiques d'Henri de Gand durant la seconde scolastique," *Medioevo* XXIV (1998), pp. 89–149. On the schools of Oxford and Paris in the Italian Renaissance see the case-study presented in Stefano Caroti, "Pomponazzi e la *reactio*. Note sulla fortuna del pensiero oxoniense e parigino nella filosofia italiana del Rinascimento," in *Filosofia e scienza classica, arabo-latina medievale, e l'età moderna* ed. Graziella Federici Vescovini, (Louvain–La-Neuve, 1999), pp. 255–288.

³ On Pico and his training in scholastic philosophy see Eugenio Garin, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: vita e dottrina* (Florence, 1937), pp. 10–14; Paul Kristeller, *Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance* (Stanford, 1964), p. 56, and his "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and His Sources," in *L'Opera e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia dell'umanesimo, convegno internazionale (Mirandola: 15–18 Settembre 1963)*, 2 vols. (Florence, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 35–133, see pp. 57–64. For the Padovan context see Bruno Nardi, *Saggi sull'Aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI* (Florence, 1958), esp. pp. 127–146.

would have been living under punishment and insult, so, by Hercules, I am moved so much [by these words of yours], and I feel so much shame and reluctance at my own studies (because it has been already six years that I have been studying these philosophers), since there is nothing I would like to have done less than to strive so zealously for useless matter. I would have wasted, I admit, my best years, studying Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Albert the Great, and Averroes, so many nightly vigils, in which I could, perhaps, improve my knowledge of classical literature!⁴

There is no reason to doubt Pico's sincerity here, despite the clear ironic tone. He certainly does not think that he wasted his efforts on a useless matter, and he reflects, while mentioning the torments and insults which those medieval philosophers would have to suffer if they were alive, the tensions between humanists and scholastics in his own time.⁵ But Pico is not taking part in those torments and insults against scholastic philosophy, although he is a distinguished member in the humanist milieu. In his best known text, which is regarded as one of the most representative documents of the Renaissance spirit, the opening speech for the public debate (which never took place) on his 900 theses, later entitled *De hominis dignitate*, we find a longer list of medieval philosophers which includes Henry:

⁴ See the critical edition of this letter, with Italian translation and notes, in Francesco Bausi [ed.], *Ermolao Barbaro, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Filosofia o eloquenza?* (Naples, 1998), pp. 36–64; the citation is from p. 38: “Expertus sum ego, cum semper alias, tum hac proxima tua ad me epistola, in qua, dum barbaros hos philosophos insectaris, quos dicis haberi vulgo sordidos, rudes, incultos, quos nec vixisse viventes, nedum extincti vivant, et si nunc vivant vivere in poenam et contumeliam, ita, Hercules, sum commotus, ita me puduit piguitque studiorum meorum (iam enim sexennium apud illos versor) ut nihil minus me fecisse velim, quam in tam nihili facienda re tam laboriose contendisse. Perdiderim ego, inquam, apud Thomam, Ioannem Scotum, apud Alberum, apud Averroem meliores annos, tantas vigilias, quibus potuerim in bonis litteris fortasse nonnihil esse!” A discussion of the historical background, Latin style, and the philosophical contents of the correspondence between Pico and Barbaro, together with a full English translation, can be found in Quirinus Breen, “Document. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* XIII (1952), pp. 384–412. A more recent study of Pico's letter can be found, e.g., in Francesco Bausi, *Nec rhetor neque philosophus. Fonti, lingua e stile nelle prime opere latine di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1484–1487)* (Città di Castello, 1996), chapter one. See also the cautious philosophical and historical analysis of this letter, with further references, in Jill Kraye, “Pico on the Relationship of Rhetoric and Philosophy,” in *Pico della Mirandola. New Essays* ed. M.V. Dougherty, (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 13–36.

⁵ On this see e.g., Erika Rummel, *The Humanist-Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance and Reformation* (Harvard, 1995); Ann Moss, *Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn* (Oxford, 2003).

And one cannot correctly choose from all [philosophical schools] the right one for himself, without first intimately knowing all of them. Add [to this point] that in every [philosophical] 'family' there is something important, which is not common to it with the rest. And, to begin my discussion of our [Christian philosophers], to whom philosophy has recently migrated, there is in John Duns Scotus something vigorous and agitating; in Thomas Aquinas something solid and consistent; in Giles of Rome something terse and accurate; in Francis of Mayrone something sharp and acute; in Albert the Great something ancient, great, and lofty; in Henry of Ghent, so it seems to me, [there is] always something sublime and venerable.⁶

Again, beyond the strong rhetorical gesture, as expected in such speeches, there is here also a honest admiration and a true effort to distinguish each of these six philosophers. This list of scholastic philosophers precedes, contrary to the chronological sequence, and as a way of rhetorical emphasis, lists of other philosophical 'families': the Arabs and the Greeks.⁷ It is important to see that for Pico scholastic philosophy represents a stage in the development of philosophical tradition, starting from the barbarians, moving to the Greeks, and then, via the Arabs reaching the scholastics. This should be regarded as part of Pico's positive attitude towards scholasticism. If we compare this list to the one we have in Pico's 1485 letter, we notice that beyond the fact that Pico added here three more names (Giles of Rome, Francis of Mayrone, and Henry of Ghent), he also changed the order: now Scotus is first and Thomas is second. But more importantly, we notice that once again Pico completely disregards the chronological sequence, beginning with Scotus (c. 1266–1308) and Thomas (c. 1225–1274), moving to Giles of Rome (c. 1243–1316), Francis of Mayrone (c. 1280–1327), and only then to Albert the Great

⁶ Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *De hominis dignitate, heptaplus, de ente et uno, e scritti vari*, ed. Eugenio Garin (Florence, 1942), p. 140: "Nec potest ex omnibus sibi recte propriam selegisse, qui omnes prius familiariter non agnoverit. Adde quod in unaquaque familia est aliquid insigne, quod non sit ei commune cum ceteris. Atque ut a nostris, ad quos postremo philosophia pervenit, nunc exordiar, est in Joanne Scoto vegetum quiddam atque discussum, in Thoma solidum et aequabile, in Aegidio tersum et exactum, in Francisco acre et acutum, in Alberto priscum, amplum et grande, in Henrico, ut mihi visum est, semper sublime et venerandum." This citation appears also in the *Apology*; see Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Apologia*, in *Opera omnia* (Basel, 1557; repr. Hildesheim, 2005), pp. 114–240; see p. 118.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 140–142. And see the connection between barbarian, Greek, and Christian philosophers on p. 142: "Quid erat, si Latinorum tantum, Alberti scilicet, Thomae, Scoti, Aegidii, Francisci, Henricique philosophia, obmissis Graecorum Arabumque philosophis, tractabatur? Quando omnis sapientia a Barbaris ad Graecos, a Graecis ad nos manavit." And again, see the same citation in the *Apologia*, p. 119.

(c. 1193/1206–1280), and ending with Henry of Ghent (c. 1217–1293). Pico must have been aware of the fact that Scotus criticized Thomas, Giles was a disciple of Thomas, Francis studied with Scotus, and Albert, who is mentioned after them, was Thomas' teacher. Opening with Scotus, and certainly ending with Henry, is another rhetorical emphasis which may reflect Pico's preferences in regard to scholastic philosophy.⁸

The obvious starting point for discovering which texts of Henry were available to Pico is Pearl Kibre's book on Pico's library. According to Kibre, Pico had in his library Henry's *Summa theologica*, his *Quodlibeta*, and another unknown work which was ascribed to Henry, *Improbatio quorundam actorum*.⁹ Stefano Caroti's recent studies of Pico's scholastic sources present a general picture with some detailed examples of this complicated issue.¹⁰

The *900 Theses* and the *Apology* are, on the one hand, the *loci classici* for a discussion of the relation between Pico and scholastic philosophy, since they contain plenty of references to scholastic authorities. But on the other hand, these texts, which belong to Pico's Roman period, contain some essential methodological difficulties for modern scholars: with regard to the *Theses*, we simply do not have any explicit evidence (beyond the notion of *concordia*, a certain harmony between all philosophical schools) concerning Pico's general aim in collecting and presenting these theses. Elsewhere I claimed that while the *Theses* should be regarded as musical notes without any performance instructions, the *Apology*

⁸ These six philosophers who represent, according to Pico, the doctrines of the Latin philosophers and theologians, appear in his *900 Theses* in this order: Albert (16 theses), Thomas (45 theses), Francis (8 theses), Scotus (22 theses), Henry (13 theses), and Giles (11 theses); see Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Conclusiones sive theses DCCCC, Romae anno 1486 publice disputandae, sed non admissae*, ed. Bohdan Kieszkowski (Geneva, 1973), pp. 27–33. But references to scholastic thinkers and themes can of course be found also in many other theses; see, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 53–67. And see Stefano Caroti, "Note sulle fonti medievali di Pico della Mirandola," in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 84 (2005), pp. 60–92; especially on the *Theses* see pp. 62–72; and his "Le fonti medievali delle *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem*," in *Nello specchio del cielo. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e le Disputationes contro l'astrologia divinatoria. Atti del convegno di studi, Mirandola, 16 aprile 2004, Ferrara, 17 aprile 2004* ed. Marco Bertozzi, (Città di Castello, 2008), pp. 67–93.

⁹ Pearl Kibre, *The Library of Pico della Mirandola* (New-York, 1936), pp. 70–71, 154, 201, 247.

¹⁰ See Caroti, "Note sulle fonti medievali"; especially relevant for the present discussion are his notes on Pico's *Apology* on pp. 72–85. But see also the notes on the medieval philosophy section in Pico's library (containing both printed works and manuscripts) on pp. 86–91.

contains the instructions, at least with regard to some of the theses.¹¹ This means that we are left only with a long list of undeveloped theses or conclusions, from which it is not easy, on the one hand, to determine a specific 'influence'; but on the other, identifying Pico's sources and the way he used them (citing or paraphrasing his sources, his accuracy in working with his sources, etc.) can give us some important details regarding the 'reception' of scholastic philosophers, and in our case, of Henry of Ghent, in the Renaissance. It is not impossible that in some of these details we shall find out some indications of a specific influence. Thus the first part of this study will be focused on the thirteen theses Pico dedicated to Henry.¹² The second part will be focused on some of the references to Henry in the *Apology*. The difficulty in this text lies in the fact that it is a polemic discussion, aimed against the condemnation of thirteen theses by the papal commission; Pico is not simply presenting his own views here, while using patristic and scholastic authorities, but rather argues against the accusations of his critics, defending the probability and possibility of his condemned theses by using the Fathers and Doctors of the Church.¹³ But since we have here a discussion, and not only theses, it might include more evidence as to an 'influence', beside a 'reception'.

Let us start then with the theses dedicated to Henry:

1. There is a light which is superior to the light of faith, by which the theologians see the truth of theological science.
2. Paternity is the principle of producing in the father.
3. Processions are divided in divine matters between the intellect and the will.

¹¹ Amos Edelheit, "The 'Scholastic' Theology of Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola: Between Biblical Faith and Academic Skepticism," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* LXXIV/2 (2007), pp. 523–570; see p. 536. And see Pico's remark against his critics on the papal commission regarding a certain *concatenatio* (connection or a common uniting principle) running all through his theses, in his *Apologia*, p. 235: "Et sic in omnibus meis conclusionibus, semper occulta quaedam est concatenatio, quam forte ipsi [magistri] non advertunt . . ." See also Caroti's notes on this point in his "Note sulle fonti medievali," p. 63, and the citation from the *Apology* in n. 10.

¹² An example for a detailed study of a section of the theses, the Kabbalistic theses, in which a comparison with the sources revealed some surprisingly important conclusions regarding a certain influence, can be found in Chaim Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism* (Cambridge, 1989).

¹³ The polemic nature of Pico's *Apology* is also reflected in the medieval sources he used, usually polemic discussions; this important observation can be found in Caroti, "Note sulle fonti medievali," p. 83.

4. This proposition should not be confirmed: 'The father is the essence of the son'.
5. Demons and sinful souls suffer from fire, in as much as it is hot, [that is] by a suffering of the same kind as that which bodies suffer.
6. Operations of angels are measured by determined time.
7. Angels understand through a scientific habit which is natural to them.
8. Irascible and concupiscent [powers] are divided in the same way in both the superior and the inferior appetite.
9. Having some specific and definable reality is common to both fictions and non-fictions.
10. Friendship is a virtue.
11. Formally, the approval of some creature is respect.
12. With respect to this, it is necessary for a mutuality of a real relation that a foundation would be set with regard to another [foundation] out of its own nature, just as with regard to its own perfection.
13. Relation is not really distinguishable from a foundation.¹⁴

It is clear that this list of theses is not obvious or self-explanatory and demands some clarifications regarding the philosophical issues it contains. I shall provide these clarifications while tracing the theses back to Henry's texts; then, after dealing with the problem of the sources, we shall be able to deal with the question of influence.

Thesis 1 is basically present in Henry's *Summa*, art. VI, q. 1, where the medieval master claims that in theology there are matters held by belief through faith, but the divine light helps the faith.¹⁵ In the comparison

¹⁴ Pico, *Conclusiones*, pp. 32–33: "1. Datur lumen superius lumine fidei, in quo Theologi vident veritatem theologice sciencie; 2. Paternitas est principium generandi in patre; 3. Processiones distinguuntur in divinis penes intellectum et voluntatem; 4. Ista propositio non est concedenda, essencia est pater filii; 5. Demones et anime peccatrices paciuntur ab igne, in quantum calidus est, afflictione eiusdem rationis cum ea, qua affliguntur corpora; 6. Operationes angelorum mensurantur tempore discreto; 7. Angeli intelligunt per habitum scienciam sibi connaturalem; 8. Irrascibilis et concupiscibilis ita distinguuntur in appetitu superiori, sicut in inferiori; 9. Habere aliquidativam et deffinibilem realitatem, commune est figmentis et non figmentis; 10. Amicitia est virtus; 11. Ratitudo formaliter cuiuslibet creati est respectus; 12. Ad hoc, ut sit mutuitas realis relacionis, requiritur, quod fundamentum ex sua natura ordinetur ad aliud tanquam ad suam perfectionem; 13. Relacio non distinguitur a fundamento realiter."

¹⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. VI, q. 1, ed. Badius (Paris, 1520), fol. 42^{vb}: "Ad quaestionem istam intelligendam quod Theologia sit credibilium, et nullorum aliorum, nisi ut accipiuntur ab initio, ut per fidem credita. Nunc autem

between the philosopher and the theologian in art. VII, q. 1, the theologian is described as someone who considers first singular matters which were held by belief through the light of faith, and then intelligible matters through the light which is beyond and above the infused light of natural reason.¹⁶ The spiritual man mentioned in art. VII, q. 13, whose intellect is enlightened by superior light, is also close to Pico's theologians.¹⁷ The more general epistemological problem is dealt by Henry in art. I, q. 2, which is focused on the problem whether man can know anything without divine illumination. Neglecting the possibility of knowing pure natural matters naturally, i.e. only through created intellectual faculties, Henry contends that every act of knowing involves the influence of the first intelligent entity who is the first agent in any intellectual and cognitive act, just like the presence of the first mover in any movement. This divine influence assists man in every act of understanding.¹⁸ This view is more radical than Pico's thesis (which reflects a more traditional and accepted view regarding theology) and includes every science, not only theology, and thus, for instance, makes it impossible to distinguish between theology and philosophy.¹⁹ On the other hand, Pico's thesis is

ita est quod credibilia primo per fidem nata sunt fieri scita per intelligentiam, ut quae proponuntur homini primo credenda per fidem, postmodum divino lumine adiutus ...” In general, articles 6–8 are focused on different aspects of theology as a science.

¹⁶ Ibid., art. VII, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 48^{ve}: “Theologus vero considerat singula, ut primo credita lumine fidei, et secundo intellecta lumine ulteriori super lumen naturalis rationis infusum, ut infra patebit.”

¹⁷ Ibid., art. VII, q. 13, ed. Badius, fol. 62^{vr}: “... et iudicit homo spiritualis per lumen fidei, et intellectus, lumine superiori illustratus ...”

¹⁸ Ibid., art. I, q. 2, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 29–69; see p. 35, 121–130: “Dico autem ‘ex puris naturalibus’ non excludendo generalem influentiam primi intelligentis, quod est primum agens in omni actione intellectuali et cognitiva, sicut primum movens movet in omni motu cuiuslibet rei naturalis. Nec impedit illa influentia generalis adiuvans ad cognoscendum quin cognitio illa dicatur fieri ex puris naturalibus. Quia enim homo in cognoscendo quaecumque cognoscit naturaliter habet sibi assistentem illam influentiam, idcirco dicendum est quod ad cognoscendum omnia alia posteriora, ad quae per illam attingit, ex puris naturalibus attingit.” And see also *ibid.*, art. V, q. 3, p. 334, 155–160: “Sicut ergo ratio naturalis adiutorio luminis naturalis, quasi fodiendo sub signis et intentionibus sensibilibus quae patent, potest [homo] in cognitionem venire eorum quae sub ipsis latent propter naturalem colligantiam eorum ad signa quae patent, sic ratio naturalis adiutorio luminis fidei, quasi fodiendo sub credibilibus, potest venire in cognitionem veritatis eorum.”

¹⁹ Later on in the same art. I, q. 2, we have, on p. 46, an important account of the ancient academic skeptic school derived from Augustine's *Contra Academicos*, used by Henry to show that knowledge through sense perception or the intellect only, without the divine exemplar, should not be regarded as real knowledge. These arguments,

focused on a specific distinction between a superior divine light and a 'common' light of faith. This distinction can be found in art. XI, q. 1, where Henry argues that only God should be regarded as doctor of theology and teach the science based on Scripture to a human mind impressed by the light of faith.²⁰

Thesis 2 comes from Henry's *Quodlibet III*, q. 3, where Henry argues that the Father's own characteristic feature, paternity, is the reason of production and not the divine essence, although one can say that the essence is included in the characteristic feature.²¹ Henry's discussion is obviously more nuanced and developed than Pico's fragmentary thesis, but beyond changing *ratio generandi* with *principium generandi*, Pico's thesis is in accordance with Henry's opinion.

and the terms *probabile* and *verisimile*, will be very important for Pico in his *Apology*, while refuting the necessary validity of theological opinions. On this issue see my article cited in n. 11.

²⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. XI, q. 1, ed. Badius, (Paris, 1520), fol. 77^{rG-H}: "Immo cum his requiritur lumen superius infusum amplius illustrans, ut sub illo verum supernaturale discere possit, quod nequaquam discere posset sub solo lumine naturali intellectus, et communi praesidentia primae veritatis. Tale autem est lumen fidei in cognoscendo ea quae sunt fidei, et si aliquid sit superius cognoscibile ad quod lumen fidei non sufficit ad veritatem illius perspicendam, adhuc secundum quod infra videbitur, illustratio aliqua clarior et superior requiritur. Et tunc dicendum ad quaestionem: cum sacrae scripturae veritas excedit notitiam naturalis rationis, quia est de eis quae sunt fidei, ut dictum est supra, et etiam dicitur infra ad quorum notitiam Deus lumen fidei supernaturale infundit menti humane, sub quo naturale iudicarium illustratur in tantum ut sufficiat in illis veritatem perspicere; sicut ergo in scientiis naturalibus dicitur solus Deus docere maxime praesidendo menti, ut dictum est supra; similiter dicitur solus Deus docere hanc scientiam menti imprimendo lumen fidei, vel aliquam aliam illustrationem in ea faciendo, quae ut infra dicitur sufficiat ad veritates credibilium menti humanae manifestandas."

²¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 3, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518; repr. Louvain 1961), fol. 40^r: "... utrum ratio generandi in patre sit divina essentia, vel proprietas eius ut paternitas, vel utrumque ... Circa primum arguitur quod ratio generandi in patre esset paternitas, quam unumquodque agit actionem sibi debitam eo quo est id quod est; ut ignis forma quod est ignis; et calidum forma qua habet esse calidum. Pater id quo est pater est paternitas, et propria actio sibi debita eo quod est pater, est generare filium, ergo etc"; fol. 40^v: "... idcirco absolute dicendum quod ratio generandi in patre potius est proprietas quam essentia, licet sit utrumque quam proprietas essentiam includit, et est ipsa essentia." Compare with Henry's *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LVIII (entitled *De proprietate patris*) where we find, in the sixth conclusion of the first question (ed. Badius, fol. 125^{r1}), that "Absolute dicendum, quod generare est proprietas patris." For the philosophical and theological importance of this point see Jos Decorte, "Relatio as *Modus Essendi*: The Origins of Henry of Ghent's Definition of Relation," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10/3 (August, 2002), pp. 309–336; see p. 317.

We have traces of thesis 3 in art. LIV, qq. 9 and 10 of Henry's *Summa* for instance, where God's operations are explained by means of using the concepts of intellect and will. Thus, God's operations, from the point of view of the intellect, include, on the one hand, understanding based on speculation, in which the intellect is passively perfected as if it were informed by a notion coming from an intelligible object. On the other hand, the operations of God's intellect consist of actively producing and acting. From the point of view of the will, it is self-moving through the act of willing towards an object. Moving on to discuss the matter by using trinitarian terms, Henry contends that the Father exists by His own power and does not need anything else for His existence. He also holds in Himself all the essential things, and for this reason what really exists according to essential acts of understanding and willing is in a perfect fertility with regard to the first productive acts of someone, to whom the characterizing productive acts of the persons within the divine essence belong.²² The closest formulation to Pico's thesis I could find is in art. XLVIII, q. 1, where Henry claims that the only potencies in

²² Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa)*, art. LIV, q. 9, ed. Badius, fols. 104^{vE}–105^{rF}: "Dicendum quod intellectus in Deo dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo, ut est intellectus sub ratione intellectus; alio modo ut est natura, et sub ratione memoriae, secundum iam dictum modum. Primo modo eius operatio non est nisi intelligere, et consistit in speculatione, atque perficitur modo passionis; qua scilicet ab obiecto intelligibili quasi informatur notitia illius. Secundo autem modo eius operatio consistit in productione. Intellectus enim existens in actu intelligendi simplicis notitiae, iam perfectus et foecundus est ad producendum verbum, non ut intellectus est, et in patiando, sed ut natura producens, et in agendo. Et similiter est de voluntate, et eius duplici actu, praeter hoc quod voluntas in actu simplici volendi activa est, movendo se actu volendi in obiectum; cum tamen intellectus pure passivus sit in actione intelligendi simplici recipiendo motum ab obiecto, ut dictum est"; q. 10, fol. 105^{rH}: "Dicendum quod persona patris ex se non ab alio sicut nec habet esse ab alio, in se habet omnia essentialia . . . Per hoc autem quod existit in actu secundum actus essentialia intelligendi et volendi, est in perfecta foecunditate ad primos actus alicuius productivos, cuiusmodi sunt actus notionales productivi personarum intra divinam essentiam." And see also *ibid.*, art. XLV, q. 2, ed. Ludwig Hödl (Leuven, 1998), pp. 106,56–107,69: "Cum ergo voluntas et intellectus, et universaliter actus eorum qui sunt velle et intelligere, determinantur et distinguuntur secundum formam et speciem, licet secundum rationem solum in Deo, et habent obiecta formalia bonum et verum, actus ergo illi qui sunt velle et intelligere, in suo esse et perfecto et formali habent terminari ad illa, secundum quod habent esse perfectum simpliciter in suo esse formali. Quare, cum, ut declaratum est, verum habet suum esse perfectum formale in cogitatione, non in ipsa re ut est extra cogitationem, bonum vero e contra habet suum esse perfectum formale in re, et non in ipsa voluntate, sicut ergo actus intelligendi terminatur ad verum, ut habet esse in ipsa cogitatione sive in intellectu, sic actus volendi terminatur ad bonum ut habet esse in ipsa re volita, ut intelligere sit actus intellectus ex habitudine quam habet ad rem, secundum quod ipsa res est in se existens."

God are the will and the intellect.²³ Thus, we can determine that Pico's thesis does show an understanding of Henry's view on this issue, and includes an interesting term, *processiones*, which I could not locate in Henry's discussion of this point. Henry mentions potencies and actions or operations in God, not processions in divine matters. This term might reflect another discussion of Henry or an intermediate source used by Pico, or even Pico's own interpretation and understanding of Henry's opinion.

With regard to thesis 4 we should perhaps consider first the nature of the relations among the persons in the trinity. Henry determines in art. LI, q. 1, that absolutely there are no differences between the persons, only differences with regard to relation and comparison, and that there is no plurality of attributes in God.²⁴ In the same way God cannot be regarded as better understanding with regard to the intellect than with regard to the will, nor can the Son be regarded as being born from the Father more by way of intellectual operation than by voluntary operation.²⁵ Neglecting the possibility of any diversity or difference in God, such that even the name 'diversity' cannot exist in Him, one can discuss only relatively (*relative*), as contrasted to absolutely or essentially, a difference in God.²⁶ This means that the argument 'The Father is the

²³ Ibid., art. XLVIII, q. 1, ed. M. Führer (Leuven, 2007), p. 40, 109–114 et p. 41, 127–131: "Et ita oportet ponere quod in Deo different ut diversae potentiae, voluntas et intellectus, et quod non sit in ipso potentia tertia, quae nec sit ratio sive intellectus aut voluntas. Et similiter oportet sentire de actibus eorum, qui sunt velle et intelligere, quod inter se different, et quod non sit ponere aliquem alium actum in Deo differentem ab istis"; "Nunc autem, ut dictum est, non quaelibet diversitas rationum est secundum quam sumitur diversitas actuum aut potentiarum, sed illa quae est per se obiectum secundum quod est obiecti, et illae non sunt nisi duae, scilicet veri et boni, ut dictum est, penes quas distinguuntur intelligere et velle." The preposition *penes* which we have in Pico's thesis is not used much by Henry, but in this question he used it 13 times. This might be another indication that this question was indeed Pico's source.

²⁴ Ibid., art. LI, q. 1, ed. Badius, (Paris, 1520), fol. 52^{va}: "Similiter quod non differant [personae] absolute, sed solum ex respectu et comparatione, arguitur sic, quoniam illa absoluta aut different in alio positive aut negative. Non positive, quia plura absoluta ponibilia non sunt in eodem nisi per aliquam compositionem, qualis non est in Deo propter pluralitatem attributorum, ut in sequenti quaestione patebit. Nec negative, quia negatio nihil dignitatis ponit, quod necessario ponunt attributa in Deo, quia melius est Deo esse ipsa quam non ipsa, secundum regulam Anselmi, ergo etc."

²⁵ Ibid.: "Aliter enim Deus non verius diceretur esse intelligens secundum intellectum quam secundum voluntatem, nec potius diceretur filius procedere a patre modo intellectualis operationis quam voluntariae, quod falsum est, ut infra patebit."

²⁶ Ibid., ed. Badius, fol. 53^{vm}: "... quia diversum dicitur res absolute, quia in se continet diversa re, sive sint materia et forma, sive partes quantitativae vel quaecumque alia. Quae quia in Deo esse non possunt, ideo in ipso non recipitur nomen hoc quod est diversum

essence of the Son' assumes an essential difference and a real diversity among two persons in the trinity, which is impossible according to Henry. I could not find Pico's exact formulation in Henry, and it seems that this thesis of Pico reflects his own elaborated synthesis, rather than a direct fragmentary citation; it shows a good understanding of some of the more technical, abstract, and complicated issues dealt by the Parisian master.

Thesis 5 is discussed by Henry in *Quodlibet VIII*, q. 34. The medieval master presents here the question whether corporeal fire can cause real suffering to a spiritual entity. In discussing different ways of this possibility we find, in the sixth way, more or less the same formulation we have in Pico's thesis, together with a philosophical analysis which is of course missing from Pico's thesis. Henry points out that we need some explanation for the fact that a spiritual entity can suffer from corporeal fire, since it does not have a physical sense; such an explanation should focus on the ability of a spiritual entity to receive pain and to suffer.²⁷ The only possible solution, contends Henry, is that God supernaturally imprinted a common faculty in the nature of angelic and human spirits, through which they can suffer from corporeal fire.²⁸ While Henry mentions here only the Devil as a concrete example of a spiritual entity, Pico mentions demons and sinful souls; but beyond this difference, Pico's thesis accurately reflects Henry's opinion.

vel diversitas. Differens autem non dicitur nisi relative, sicut et conveniens, quia non est differens nisi ab aliquo differens, sicut non est conveniens nisi alicui conveniens. Et illa quae inter se differunt, quo ad illa quibus differunt oportet re absoluta esse ab invicem divisa, ut sunt diversa genera, vel diversae species, vel diversa individua sub eadem specie. Et quia sic plura adhuc non convenit ponere in Deo, ideo neque nomen quod est differens, proprie recipi debet in Deo, secundum quod procedit ratio ista."

²⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VIII*, q. 34, ed. Badius, (Paris, 1518), fol. 339^r: "Ideo oportet dicere sexto modo quod ignis affligit spiritum inquantum calidus; et eodem genere afflictionis quo affligeret sensum corporis. Sed cum non est activum sine passivo sibi correspondent, non potest ignis agere sua naturali actione in spiritum ipsum affligendo, nisi spiritus possit pati ab ipso passionem veram qualem sensus reciperet ab igne; potentia autem propria in recipiendo huiusmodi passionem non est nisi sensus; et actus activorum non sunt nisi in patiente et disposito, diabolus autem vim sensitivam non habet; restat ergo difficultas ex parte spiritus quomodo passionem ab igne corporali in se possit recipere."

²⁸ Ibid.: "Restat igitur ut videtur quod deus naturae spiritus angelici et humani communem vim qua pati possit ab igne corporali, imprimit supernaturaliter." Compare with the opposite view presented in *Quodlibet XII*, q. 9, ed. Jos Decorte (Leuven, 1987), pp. 47–50.

The angels are at the centre of the next two theses, 6 and 7. With regard to thesis 6, we can find traces in *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, which, as we shall see in the discussion of Pico's *Apologia*, the Renaissance philosopher knew well. Henry is presenting here his account of the question whether an angel can, according to his substance and without operation, be attached to a physical place. Time is only mentioned in a citation of Damascius, in which it is argued that while only God is not limited (*incircumscribibile*) by anything, the angel is limited by time, place, and comprehension.²⁹ This means by implication that also the operations of an angel are limited and can only last a determined quantity of time. If angels are regarded as the spirits of the world which move the celestial bodies and serve God out of free choice, Henry contends in *Quodlibet IV*, q. 17, then it is possible for an angel to be locally moved by renewing his operations and influences upon places and bodies. While describing the way in which such an angelic influence can take place, either continuously (*continue*) or by alternating influences (*alternando influentias*), time is mentioned: in the first case, an object under angelic influence is moved from one end to another end through a medium and through incontinuous time; in the second case, the angel is effecting one end at a time, and the object is moved from end to end without a medium, either by continuing in one end or another, or by transferring from sign to sign (or from point to point) through moments of times.³⁰ Henry emphasizes that this accidental movement just described belongs to the object under angelic operation, not to the angel, since from the point of view of the angel his

²⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. Robert Wielockx (Leuven, 1983), p. 69, 73–78: “Adhuc idem quod primum videtur posse haberi ex verbis Damascius libro 1, cap. 16, ubi dicit: “*Circumscribibile quidem est, quod loco vel tempore vel comprehensione comprehenditur, incircumscribibile vero, quod nullo horum continetur. Incircumscribibile quidem igitur solus Deus. Angelus autem et tempore circumscribitur (incipit enim esse) et loco (etsi intelligibiliter, ut praediximus) et comprehensione ...*” The exact reference to Damascius is provided in the *apparatus fontium: De fide orth.*, c. 13 (I, c. 13), n. 6 (ed. Eligeus M. Buytaert, pp. 59, 48–58; PG 94, 854B). Compare with the contrasted references to Damascene and Pseudo-Dionysius regarding the materiality of angels in *Quodlibet IV*, q. 16, ed. Badius, (Paris, 1518), fol. 131^v.

³⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 17, ed. Badius, fol. 132^r: “Cogitantur angeli mundi spiritus caelestia corpora inspirantes, atque ad arbitrium quo serviunt deo mutantes atque versantes voluntarie. Ergo angelus potest dici moveri localiter innovando operationes suas et influentias circa loca et corpora. Et hoc vel continue influendo ab extremo in extremum per totum medium; et sic movebitur ab extremo in extremum per medium incontinuo et tempore; vel alternando influentias modo in uno extremo, modo in altero et non in medio; et tunc movebitur ab extremo in extremum sine medio. Et hoc vel continuando in utroque vel altero extremorum opus, vel transferendo opus a signo in signum per atoma temporum.”

movement represents perfect activity, while an object suffers or receives this activity passively, which is an imperfect activity.³¹ One notices that also from the point of view of the objects under angelic influence, beyond the consideration of the angelic nature itself which, as we have seen, is regarded as limited in time, these angelic operations must be determined in time, since their objects are determined. But the fact that angelic operations are measured by determined time is not emphasized in Henry's discussions mentioned above, it is only implied. We are getting closer to Pico's source in *Quodlibet XII*, q. 8, where Henry discusses whether the thoughts of incorporeal and separated substance are measured by a measure which is composed of indivisibles (*Utrum cogitationes substantiae incorporalis separatae mensurentur mensura composita ex indivisibilibus*). Henry, following Augustine and Aristotle, points out that there should be a correlation between separated individual measures or quantities of thoughts and a separated quantity of time, given the fact that they transgress in the same way and without any connection between them. This implies that there is some kind of inner structure between them, one measure out of which they are constituted as separated, and this is a separated quantity of time.³² What we do not have here is the operations we find in Pico's thesis. And so, we still need a more precise reference to Henry, since Pico's thesis seems to reflect in this case his careful reading and interpretation of the Parisian master, in which his discussion of the angelic nature and operations (without emphasizing the aspect of time) and the discussion of angelic thoughts, their measures, and

³¹ Ibid.: "Sed hoc est improprie moveri et per accidens; et est proprie istud moveri eius circa quod operatur angelus, non angeli. Quia huiusmodi mortus inquantum respicit angelum actio est, et actus perfecti secundum quod perfectum est. Inquantum vero respicit id circa quod operatur, passio est, et actus imperfecti secundum quod imperfectum est."

³² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XII*, q. 8, ed. Jos Decorte (Leuven, 1987), pp. 40–46; see p. 42, 38–45: "Propter quod oportet quod mensurae illarum cogitationum sint singulae indivisibiles et totae simul, sed transeuntes consimili modo et absque omni connexione illarum inter se. Quia tamen ordinem quemdam inter se habent, una quaedam mensura ex illis constituitur ut ex discretis, quam Augustinus appellat tempus quando dicit XII super Genesim quod *Deus movet spiritualem creaturam per tempus*, licet non per locum. Et est tempus discretum et ex discretis, habens potius rationem numeri quam temporis; de quo loquitur Aristoteles." And see also *ibid.*, p. 46, 25–32: "Propter quod ibi inter duo indivisibilia oportet ponere continuum ad indivisibilia terminatum: mensura enim proportionatur mensurato. Mensuratum autem hic ab indivisibili potest esse manens in se; etiam si fluat desinendo esse, non tamen fluit in aliud cuius est terminus, licet aliud similiter fluat post ipsum, ut una cogitatio angeli post aliam. Sed nulla fluit in aliam vel terminat fluxum illius. Propter quod nullum continuans omnino cadit inter illa, sed manent omnino discreta, et constituunt tempus discretum ex indivisibilibus."

separated quantity of time (without mentioning angelic operations) are joined together. This can be found in *Quodlibet XIII*, q. 7.³³

With regard to thesis 7, it can be found in *Quodlibet V*, q. 14, where Henry claims that separated intellect as an intellect does not have its own proper natural operation except naturally understanding singular intelligibles.³⁴ Some lines later in the same question Henry says that an angel or a separated intellect understands through his own natural cognition, through which he understands things in their proper nature, not as a word or a concept, and in this way an angel was born for understanding.³⁵ In fact, it is impossible for the angelic intellect, being informed by intelligible species, not to understand.³⁶ Further on in the question we have more or less the same formulation that we find in Pico's thesis.³⁷

Thesis 8 is discussed by Henry in *Quodlibet VIII*, q. 15, where Henry deals with the question whether in the rational appetite there is a distinction between irascible and concupiscent powers, and compares it with the sensible appetite. Basically, according to Henry, there is a clear similarity between the way in which rational and sensible appetites function. The essential difference is that while the rational appetite is focused on the good as such (*bonum simpliciter*), the sensible appetite is focused on temporary good (*bonum ut nunc*). But since the object of the sensible appetite, i.e. temporary good, can be divided into pleasurable and painstaking good, so is the good as such, the object of the rational appetite. And for this reason, if the sensible appetite is divided into irascible and concupiscent powers, so is the rational appetite.³⁸ One notices

³³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XIII*, q. 7, ed. J. Decorte (Leuven, 1985), p. 43, 16–18: “Quae alias declaravimus, quod videlicet tempus angeli discretum est, sicut et suae actiones sive motiones quarum est mensura, discretae sunt sibi succedentes absque medio continuante.”

³⁴ Ibid., V, q. 14, ed. Badius, (Paris, 1518), fol. 174^r: “... intellectus autem separatus ut intellectus est non habet operationem sibi propriam naturalem nisi intelligere singula naturaliter intelligibilia ...”

³⁵ Ibid.: “... quilibet angelus sive intellectus separatus naturali cognitione sua quae cognoscit res in propria natura, non in verbo, natus intelligere ...”

³⁶ Ibid., ed. Badius, fol. 175^r: “... sic intellectus angelicus informans specie intelligibilis non potest non intelligere ...”

³⁷ Ibid., ed. Badius, fol. 175^v: “... planum est igitur quod necesse habemus ponere quod illud sit habitus scientialis intellectui angelico naturaliter impressus tanquam illud quod sibi connaturale est ad explendam operationem naturalem in quantum est unum intellectuale, quae operatio est ipsum intelligere.”

³⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VIII*, q. 15, ed. Badius, (Paris, 1518), fols. 326^r–326^v: “Et sequitur has potentias [concupiscibilitas et irascibilitas] habet antequam corpori miscetur; naturales siquidem sunt ei. Sed non separatur nisi secundum quod est rationalis; ergo et cum secundo sic appetitus rationalis est circa bonum simpliciter; sicut appetitus

that what Henry calls rational and sensible appetites, Pico calls superior and inferior appetites. Beyond this difference, Pico's thesis reflects Henry's opinion.

Thesis 9 is connected to Henry's discussion of relation, so we shall deal with it shortly below, while discussing thesis 11.

Thesis 10 is dealt by Henry in *Quodlibet X*, q. 12. Henry provides here a philosophical account of the notion of friendship, using mainly the authorities of Aristotle and Cicero, and maintaining that friendship is indeed a virtue. Thus, according to Henry, the act of love or friendship includes three members: benevolence, beneficence, and confidence. Habits are descended from using these three members in the act of love and they unite lovers as much as possible; because of this friendship directs the operations of all virtues towards a common exercise through which the operation of the other virtues is perfected. The fact that the operations of friendship are taking place for the sake of common utility makes them the reason without which no act of virtue can be perfected. This is why friendship should be regarded as a general virtue and as a principal part of general justice, since it gives each one what he deserves, and thus it fulfils that rule of nature: do not do to someone else what you would not like that person to do to you.³⁹ Once again we find that Pico's thesis is in accordance with Henry's opinion, but being only a thesis, we do not have here Henry's nuanced analysis.

sensibilis est circa bonum ut nunc quod quidem appetitus sensibilis dividitur in concupiscibile propter bonum ut nunc; secundum quod potest habere rationem delectabilis et ardui, sicut autem bonum ut nunc potest dividi in bonum delectabile et arduum; sic et bonum simpliciter, quare si propter illud appetitus sensibilis dividitur in concupiscibilem et irascibilem; similiter et appetitus rationalis."

³⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet X*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), q. 12, pp. 278, 6–279, 10: "Amplius autem actio amoris in unoquoque dictorum graduum debet habere tres comites qui necessario amorem sequuntur, qui sunt benevolentia, beneficentia et confidentia: benevolentia quoad initium generationis amicitiae, beneficentia quoad eius progressum, confidentia quoad eius consummationem"; p. 281, 68–70: "Ex exercitio igitur horum trium, benevolentiae, beneficentiae et confidentiae in actione amandi generantur habitus quidam connectentes inter se amantes et ad unitatem, quantum possibile est, redigentes"; p. 282, 78–92: "Propter quod amicitia omnium virtutum opera in commune exercitium deducit. Dicente enim Tullio, '*Amicitia nihil aliud quam omnium divinarum rerum humanarumque summa cum benevolentia et caritate consensio*', in quo perficitur aliarum virtutum operatio. Quae aliarum virtutum opera sunt ut simpliciter fiunt, amicitiae autem opera sunt ut in communem utilitatem sese interamantium producuntur, ut idcirco nullus sine amicitia actus virtutis possit esse perfectus ... Propter quod quantum ad exercitium operis respectu aliarum virtutum est virtus quaedam generalis et pars principalis iustitiae generalis, reddens unicuique quod suum est et implens illud naturae praeceptum: 'Quod tibi vis fieri, hoc feceris alii; quod tibi non vis fieri, ne feceris alii.'"

Theses 11, 12 and 13 deal with Henry's notion of relation, a crucial point in Henry's thought which can be found in many different parts of his works. Thus, for instance, Henry discusses in detail the question whether a relation in divine matters remains a relation in *Quodlibet III*, q. 4, where we can find some expressions which are close to theses 11 and 13, according to which, every relation according to existence in created beings is founded or based on (*fundatur*) some accident; since, on the one hand, a thing has its absolute existence in the subject because of one category. But on the other hand, a thing has its relative existence with regard to another thing, thanks to the category 'relation.' Because of this every relation as such is accidental.⁴⁰ Thesis 11 can be found in *Quodlibet V*, q. 2, where Henry is discussing the double respect of relation as one of the accidental categories transferred from a created being towards God: with regard to its own foundation and with regard to its opposite. The medieval master distinguishes here an empty concept (*conceptus vanus*) which has no correspondence in reality, from a true concept (*conceptus verus*) which is founded upon an existing reality. Any thing, either existing or not, if it exists in God, so that God is its exemplar, includes not only an imaginary thing (*res a reor reris*) which exists only inside the intellect, but also a real existing thing (*res a ratitudine*) which contains nature and essence.⁴¹ In the last note we also have a remark on

⁴⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 4, ed. Badius, (Paris, 1518), fol. 41^v: "... aperte patet ex iam declaratis quod omnis relatio secundum esse in creaturis fundatur super aliquod accidens: quod unum esse habet absolutum in subiecto per rationem unius praedicamenti; aliud vero esse respectivum ad aliud secundum rationem praedicamenti relationis. Propter quod etiam omnis relatio, ut relatio, accidentalis est, secundum quod dicit Avicenna cap. XLII." On this complicated issue see the general observations and further references in Jos Decorte, "Studies on Henry of Ghent. The Relevance of Henry's Concept of Relation," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* LXIV/1 (1997), pp. 230–238; his "Heinrich von Gent. Von einer Ontologie der Relation zur Relationsontologie," in *Philosophen Des Mittelalters* ed. Theo Kobusch (Frankfurt, 2000), pp. 152–166; and his "Relatio as Modus Essendi". The idea behind thesis 13 is discussed in Decorte, "Relatio as Modus Essendi" pp. 318–319. It can be clearly found in William of Ockham's *Expositio in libros physicorum Aristotelis III*, 2 (*Opera philosophica* vol. 4, p. 418): "Nec Philosophus et Commentator utuntur tali modo loquendi, quia relatio non est aliqua res distincta ab illo quod vocant moderni fundamentum, fundata in illo sicut in re distincta, sicut moderni aliqui imaginantur."

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, V, q. 2, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 154^r: "Quoniam relatio quae est unum praedicamentum accidentis, et transfertur a creatura in deum, duplicem habet respectum et ad suum fundamentum et ad suum oppositum"; "... sciendum quod primus conceptus communissimus et communis ad conceptum vanum quo concipitur saltem modo privatorio id cui nihil natum est respondere in re, ut est conceptus fictitius chimere vel hircocervi; et ad conceptum verum quo concipitur modo positivo id quod est aliquod per essentiam, et natum existere extra intellectum in rerum existentia, ut est conceptus

a fictitious concept (*conceptus fictitius*) which obviously has a definable reality, just like the fictions (*figmenta*) mentioned in thesis 9.

Close to thesis 13 are some expressions mentioned in *Quodlibet IX*, q. 1, where we find that a real relation is founded or based upon a thing.⁴² A foundation is mentioned in *Quodlibet IX*, q. 3, which is entitled: *Utrum, circumscripta re sui fundamenti, relatio possit signari per nomen primae impositionis* (whether while being enclosed by a thing of its own foundation a relation can be recognized through a name of first application or signification).⁴³ It is important for Henry to determine that a relation or a habit exists in a thing in addition to its own foundation, and thus, it is something which exists in reality and outside the soul; it is not merely a name or a mental concept.⁴⁴ This means that the exact nature of both a relation and its foundation should be clearly specified. Apparently there are two ways in which a relation should be considered: either as something in the middle or an interval between its own habit and other habits, or as something which is founded upon these habits and which is not separated from them.⁴⁵ A habit, taken in itself, entails a

divinae essentiae et creaturae. Primus inquam conceptus communissimus et communis ad illum conceptum, et ad istum, est conceptus quo concipitur res a reor reris dicta, quae continet sub se rem imaginariam quae est purum non ens; quia neque ens per essentiam neque natum esse per existentiam. De quo dicit Philosophus: quod non est non contingit scire. Et continet sub se rem veram quae est natura et essentia alicuius vel rei increate vel create habentis ideam in mente divina et natae existere extra; in qua non consideratur ratio eius quod est esse aliquod per essentiam nisi ex respectu quodam ad rationem exemplaris in deo. Res enim quaecumque sive existens sive non existens, si habet esse in deo secundum exemplaris rationem, non solum dicitur quod est res dicta a reor reris, sed etiam quod sit natura et essentia aliqua. Et ideo dicitur res a ratitudine. Et haec res est super quam fundatur prima ratio praedicamenti." For a more detailed explanation and conceptual analysis with further references to Henry's works on this issue see Decorte, "*Relatio as Modus Essendi*" pp. 325–326.

⁴² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 1, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 14, 70–73: "Relatio vero secundum rem sive realis est, secundum quod alibi exposuimus, quae in re fundata est, et hoc praecise ex necessitate naturae ipsius super quam fundatur, absque omni consideratione aut opere intellectus vel voluntate circa ipsam ut iam praeexistentem."

⁴³ Ibid., q. 3, pp. 46–88.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 50, 94–96: "Simpliciter ergo concedendum est quod relatio sive habitudo praeter suum fundamentum sit aliquid in rebus extra animam, et non solum nomen aut conceptus mentis secundum iam dictum modum."

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 52, 62–70: "Ad percipiendum autem differentiam inter relationem huiusmodi et suum fundamentum, et quomodo est aliquid unum et simplex extra animam praeter suum fundamentum, et quomodo non, et quomodo modus et quomodo res, et quod horum vel quid horum verius, sciendum est quod, cum secundum Simplicium ex sola habitudine ad alterum oriatur, immo relatio est ipsa habitudo qua unum eorum mutuo est ad alterum et quasi medium inter ipsa, dupliciter habet considerari ipsa rela-

foundation because it is founded upon one. Its pure mode of existence is *ad aliud* and there is no difference between a habit and its foundation.⁴⁶ In this bare or naked habit (*nuda habitudo*) all the modes of relations are assembled.⁴⁷

Let us have a closer look at another expression in the same *Quaestio*:

And it should be argued that according to Simplicius, on the one hand, there is the genus of changing, through which a respect or a relation, just like a habit, is changed in the subject, or, to speak more correctly, a foundation or the subject as such according to relation; and on the other hand there is the genus of transmutation, through which any absolute thing, such as a thing of a foundation, is transformed in the subject or a subject as such ...⁴⁸

We have here, in the description of the genus of changing, almost the same idea that we have in thesis 13. It is difficult to determine whether Pico was fully aware of all the philosophical complexities involved here, but the thesis shows at least some familiarity with these issues.

Traces of thesis 12 can be found in *Quodlibet* XIV, q. 2, where Henry claims that real relations require real diversity of foundations, so that different real relations will not be similar according to a measure and

tio: uno modo ut est quasi medium et intervallum habentium inter se habitudinem; alio modo ut est fundata in ipsis, non separata ab eisdem."

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 55, 52–62: "Sed illud sic debemus intelligere quod habitudinem, quae nuda est secundum se et non nisi modus quidam, ipsum fundamentum, in quantum fundatur in ipso, caracterizat, communicans ei per hoc quodam modo realitatem suam, in eo videlicet quod habitudinem, quae circumscripta realitate fundamenti ut in se et per se consideratur, purus modus essendi ad aliud est, in quo nulla cadit distinctio aut differentia aut determinatio, sive in divina fundatur essentia, sive in creata, sive ex natura rei sive ex opere intellectus, ipsum fundamentum, in quantum super ipsum fundatur, secundum conditione suae realitatis determinat, ut alia et alia sit habitudo secundum rem, secundum quod aliud et aliud est suum per se fundamentum."

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 56, 93: "In qua quidem habitudine nuda conveniunt omnes modi relationum ..."

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 66, 44–48: "Et est dicendum quod secundum Simplicium aliud est genus mutationis quo respectus sive relatio, ut habitudo, mutatur in subiecto, vel ut verius loquar, fundamentum aut ipsum subiectum secundum relationem, et aliud est genus transmutationis quo res aliqua absoluta, ut res fundamenti, transmutatur in subiecto aut subiectum secundum ipsum ...". Compare with Henry's statement that in God substance and relation cannot be distinguished, in *Quodlibet* III, q. 4, ed. Badius, (Paris, 1518), fol. 52r: "Ex quo patet plane responsio ad quaestionem, dicendo scilicet quod relatio in deo et secundum rem, et secundum rationem sui generis cadit in substantiam comparata absolute ad ipsam substantiam; comparata vero ad substantiam in respectu ad suum terminum, et oppositum respectu substantiae, sic manet secundum rationem sui generis; aliter enim adinvicem non distinguerentur substantia et relatio in deo, sicut duo genera duos modos praedicandi diversos habentia."

the thing measured. The existence of different relations requires different things measured. And it is necessary that they should be different because of different reality (*res diversa*) according to different real perfections.⁴⁹ But the power of relation to found or constitute order mentioned in thesis 12 is discussed by Henry in *Quodlibet III*, q. 4, where *relatio per se* and according to existence is in fact identified with order.⁵⁰

Pico's theses ascribed to Henry contain some of the most central philosophical themes found in the writings of the medieval master. Despite their fragmentary character, and given the complexity of some of the philosophical and theological issues presented, these theses show a good understanding of the philosophical background and concepts, and thus, they reflect a reception of Henry's thought in late fifteenth-century Italy by the Renaissance philosopher. Sometimes Pico follows closely Henry's discussion, but on other occasions he seems to introduce his own understanding of Henry. Let us move on now and discuss some of the references to Henry in Pico's *Apology*.

The first discussion in the *Apology* is focused on the question regarding Christ's descent into hell. Now Pico's own opinion is that only Christ's soul descended there; this immediately brings us to a discussion of the status of separated souls (or else immaterial substances or angels) and their connection to a physical or material place. This connection is explained by means of identifying 'presence' with 'operation'. And so, the reason given for the presence of such separated souls in a place is their operation in that place.⁵¹ In his more detailed explanation, Pico

⁴⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XIV*, q. 2, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 559^r: "Et est dicendum quod super idem sic diversum secundum rationem talem non possunt fundari relationes reales convenientes in nomine, cuiusmodi sunt aequale et simile et eorum contraria; qua ut dictum est istae relationes cum sint reales requirunt realem diversitatem fundamentorum; neque similiter diversae relationes reales secundum mensuram et mensuratum; qua altera istarum secundum rationem est, secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae, ut ista quae est in mensura. Si ergo essent diversae relationes, oporteret quod essent diversa mensurata; quae necessario sunt re diversa secundum diversas perfectiones reales."

⁵⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet III*, q. 4, ed. Badius (Paris, 1518), fol. 52^v-53^r: "Et sic relatio per se et secundum esse nihil aliud est quam quidam ordo essentialis unius ad alterum, fundatus in natura et essentia eorum quae ex hoc habet quod sit res et realis relatio; qua scilicet in aliqua reali natura et essentia fundatur. Et similiter ipse ordo ab eodem habet quod sit res et ordo realis; quia idem sunt ordo et relatio." On this see Decorte, "*Relatio as Modus Essendi*," p. 324.

⁵¹ Pico, *Apologia*, pp. 126-127: "Summarius sensus conclusionis meae est iste. Quia Christus secundum animam tantum descendit inferos, et animae sicut cuicumque substantiae separatae, videtur non competere locari, vel moveri localiter, nisi ratione operationis. Ideo dico, quod descendisse ad infernum, vel fuisse in inferno localiter, videtur

rejects what he regards as the explanation of Scotus and the Scotists,⁵² finally presenting the explanation he follows, according to which, just as a corporeal substance is present in a place because of its quantity (which is external with regard to its essence) and not because of its substantiality, an incorporeal substance is present in a place not because of its substance, but rather because of its operation or effect.⁵³

Pico presents an impressive list of authorities to support his own view, including Henry.⁵⁴ But Henry is relevant only to the first part of Pico's view: that separated souls or angels are not related to a place via their incorporeal substance.⁵⁵ Henry's authority is most important for Pico,

non competisse Christo, nisi ratione operationis: ita, quod licet vere praesentialiter fuerit anima Christi in inferno, substantia tamen sua, non fuit ei ratio praesentialitatis, sed solum sua operatio . . ."

⁵² Ibid., pp. 127–128: "Sed in hoc discrepant [via Scoti et omnium Scotistarum], quod Scotistae dicunt quod finitio et limitatio essentiae, et finaliter intrinseca determinatio suae substantiae, est ratio substantiae separatae essendi in loco."

⁵³ Ibid., p. 128: "Ista autem opinio, quam ego sum secutus, in conclusione dicit: quod sicut licet substantia corporera sit commensurative, in loco tamen ratio ei essendi taliter in loco, non est sua substantialitas, sed quantitas quae est extrinseca et extranea a ratione suae substantiae; ita etiam, licet substantia incorporea vere sit definitiva in loco et praesens localiter, tamen ratio ei essendi in loco, non est sua substantia, sed operatio eius, ab ea transiens ad extra." The expressions *effectus vel operatio* or *per effectum et operationem* immediately follow this explanation on p. 128.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 128–129: "Hanc enim opinionem quam ego sequor, licet assertive tenet, non solum Durandus, sed et Bernardus de Gannaco in impugnationibus, Henrici quodlibeto secundo, tenet Thomas Anglicus in quolibetis suis, tenet Hervaeus Britonis in suo secundo sententiarum, tenuit et beatus Thomas in primo sententiarum, licet alibi deinde videri potest sequi aliam opinionem. Tenet Archiepiscopus Malpithensis in suo secundo, tenet Ioannes Parisiensis in correctorio corruptorii, et quid plures enumero? Tenuerunt credo istam opinionem plusquam centum doctores catholici et probatissimi, quorum libri non solum non reprobat ab Ecclesia, sed celebres in omnibus Christianorum gymnasiis publice leguntur." This passage is also cited by Caroti, "Note sulle fonti medievali," p. 74, and the medieval sources are discussed in n. 54 there.

⁵⁵ In Pico's *Apologia*, p. 130 we have a quotation from Henry: "Et testatur Henricus quolibeto secundo, q. 9, quod omnes magistri theologiae congregati, in hoc unanimiter convenerunt: quod substantia angeli non est ratio angelum esse in loco; et dicit se fuisse inter illos magistros qui hoc determinarunt. Et subdit ipse Henricus ibidem, quod consimili ratione verum est indubitanter, quod si angelus per potentiam suam, scilicet per intellectum et voluntatem virtutem suam non applicat locum, operando circa ipsum, quod simpliciter potentia eius intellectus, scilicet et voluntas non est ratio essendi ipsum in loco, quia potentia eius non est minoris abstractionis, quam sit eius substantia . . ." See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 67, 21–28: "In hoc enim concordabant omnes magistri theologiae congregati super hoc, quorum ego eram unus, unanimiter concedentes quod substantia angeli non est ratio angelum esse in loco secundum substantiam. Et consimili ratione verum est indubitanter quod, si angelus per potentiam suam, intellectum scilicet vel voluntatem, virtutem suam non applicat ad locum operando circa ipsum, quod similiter potentia eius, intellectus scilicet vel voluntas,

since, as Henry himself mentions in the passage quoted in the last note, he was among the theologians who advised Stephan Tempier in 1277 regarding the 219 condemned propositions, and so he is indeed 'the authority' for clarifying proposition 204 (and in fact the context of this quotation is clarifying this proposition).⁵⁶ With regard to the question how, then, angels are related to a place, Henry honestly admits that he does not know, and that he prefers to hear others on this issue.⁵⁷ Pico follows Henry quite accurately up to this point, but here he seems to push Henry a bit towards his own position, while Henry is still very cautious and uncommitted as to determining the right explanation.⁵⁸ One notices that Pico is also repeating the basic idea in one of Henry's examples,⁵⁹ and as we shall shortly see, he also relates this question to

non est ratio essendi ipsum in loco, ut dictum est"; p. 66, 2–6: "Secundo autem modo non est videre quomodo magis determinatur substantia angeli situi ratione potentiae alicuius quam ratione substantiae; quia non est minoris abstractionis a quantitate situati potentia animae quam substantia, ut videtur sequentibus iudicium naturalis rationis, quae forte in hoc deficere potest."

⁵⁶ Proposition 204 is the subtext of both Henry's and Pico's discussion; see David Piché and Claude Lafleur [eds.], *La condamnation parisienne de 1277* (Paris, 1999), p. 141: "204 (55). Quod substantie separate sunt alicubi per operationem; et quod non possunt moveri ab extremo in extremum, nec in medium, nisi quia possunt velle operari aut in medio, aut in extremis.—Error, si intelligatur sine operatione substantiam non esse in loco, nec transire de loco ad locum." And see Edward P. Mahoney, "Reverberations of the Condemnation of 1277 in Later Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy," in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr. and Andreas Speer, (Berlin, 2001), pp. 902–930; on Henry see pp. 911–912, and on Pico see pp. 925–927.

⁵⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 67, 31–35: "Igitur, si forte potentia angeli non sit ratio ipsum essendi in loco, quod ad praesens nec determino nec sustineo nec defendo, oportet quaerere aliquid aliud, quod est ratio essendi ipsum in loco. In quo mallet alios audire quam aliquid dicere. Et est mihi tutius profiteri in proposito quia ignorem quid dicam, quam quod aliquid de meo indiscrete ingeram."

⁵⁸ Pico, *Apologia*, p. 130: "Unde et Henricus in eodem loco fatetur, se non posse intelligere quomodo substantia separata sit in loco, nisi agat aliquid aut patiat in loco, vel a re existente in loco"; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, pp. 67, 36–68, 39: "Quid enim sit illud, nescio, nisi forte dicamus substantiam angeli sine operatione esse in loco, sed per passionem quam in se recipiunt a rebus corporalibus quae sunt in loco, ut daemones ab igne infernali propter quod in inferno sunt, ubi ille ignis est."

⁵⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 66, 99–1: "Et tamen, in quantum motor, dicitur esse in tota sphaera mota et maxime in convexitate, quia ibi suam operationem maxime ostendit, quia pars illa citius movetur. Propter quod etiam pars illa dicitur esse motori propinquior, ut dictum est"; Pico, *Apologia*, p. 127: "Dicent ergo sic opinantes, quod anima Christi separata a corpore, secundum suam substantiam, nec fuit in inferno nec extra infernum, sed vere nullibi fuit. Dicitur autem fuisse in inferno quia operata est in inferno, et in illa parte inferni principaliter dicitur fuisse, ubi principaliter est operata ..."

physics and mathematics, again following Henry and his account of *situs naturalis* and *situs mathematicus*.⁶⁰ Henry's repeated statements that he is not determining which explanation regarding the way angels are related to a place is the right one,⁶¹ is exactly what Pico needed in order to refute the accusations against his own condemned thesis by the papal commission: this is a matter of theological speculation only, not of the necessary truth of faith.⁶²

Citing once more Henry's *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, on the double limitation of every created being in comparison with God, one according to its nature and essence, the other according to its place, Henry admits that he simply does not know how to explain the difference and distance between created beings and God according to their relation to a place, given the fact that only God is said to be present everywhere (*ubique*), that means also somewhere, while created beings are always somewhere. The problem is how can the presence or activity of an angel in a place be distinguished from God's presence and activity.⁶³

⁶⁰ Ibid., ed. R. Wielockx, pp. 60–66.

⁶¹ Ibid., ed. R. Wielockx, p. 70, 82–89: "Substantia ergo angeli, etsi non operetur, necessario est circumscripta loco, etsi intelligibiliter, non corporaliter, ut dictum est. Quin ita sit nec determino, nec sustineo, nec defendo. Sed quid sit illud, per quod angelus ita sit in loco, et quid sit in eo, ratione cuius ita sit in loco, sive ipsa naturae limitatio, sive aliquid aliud, re vera nescio. Quod tamen sit ipsa naturae suae limitatio, credere bene possum, licet non intelligam, ut credendo intelligere valeam. Hoc enim forte ex illis est, de quibus dicit propheta: 'Nisi credideris, non intelligetis'"; pp. 71, 18–72, 27: "Quomodo vero necesse est omnem creaturam differe et distare ab eo per secundam limitationem quia ipse est ubique, omnis autem creatura necessario alicubi, sed non ubique, et an prima limitatio, in natura scilicet et essentia, sit causa et ratio istius secundae limitationis, vel quodcumque aliud illud sit, dico quod penitus ignoro. Quin tamen angelus secundum substantiam sine operatione sit in loco, et quin ipsa limitatio naturae eius vel aliquid huiusmodi sit illius ratio, nullatenus dogmatizo, sustineo seu defendo quoque modo. Et, quod amplius est, nec mihi nec cuiquam ut contrarium teneat, suadere intendo ex praemissis."

⁶² Pico, *Apologia*, p. 128: "Ultra autem opinio sit verior, de modo essendo in loco substantiarum separatarum, Scotistarum scilicet, an eorum quos sum sequutus, ego non determino, hoc tantum dico, a tot tantisque magistris doctoribusque catholicis, et doctrina et sanctitate celebratissimis creditam esse opinionem meam, et habitam pro verissima: ut longe magis temerarii iudicandi sint, si qui sunt, qui opinionum doctorum tam probatorum, pro haeretica aut haeresim sapiente audent iudicare, quam ego, qui auctoritatem veterum illorum theologorum iuniorum determinationibus anteponam."

⁶³ Ibid., p. 131: "Primum est, quod cum sit pars universi inconveniens, est quod non sit in universo; ad quod illi dicerent, quod arguens aequivocat se parte. Si enim per partem universi intelligit id, quod habet situm determinatum in universo, sic dicent: quod angelus nec cum operatur, nec cum non operatur, potest dici esse pars universi. Si autem intelligit esse partem entium, id est unum ex entibus et naturis universi, sic concedent, quod tunc est una pars universi, imo una ex nobilioribus; sed ex hoc non

Another related problem dealt by Pico through the authority of Henry is the problem of abstraction. This issue is again related to the complicated connection between an incorporeal substance and a physical place, and is explained via the concepts of unity (*unitas*) and point (*punctus*).

videtur concludi, quod habeat situm vel definitionem ad locum. Secundum inconveniens est quod non potest dici quod sit ubique, quia hoc est, proprium Dei; ad hoc dicitur quod esse ubique eo modo quo Deus dicitur a theologis esse ubique per essentiam, scilicet per potentiam et presentiam Dei proprium est, et nulli naturae creatae potest competere. Esse autem ubique, id est hic vel ibi per indifferentiam, aut ubique per indifferentiam, id est vere esse secundum substantiam indistantem a quocumque loco utrum repugnet creaturae, audiat Henricum quolibeto 2, q. 9, sic dicentem. In creatura potest intelligi duplex limitatio: una in natura et essentia, quae finita est et caeteris terminis contenta, et sic solus Deus illuminatus et infinitus in natura. Alia potest intelligi limitatio naturae, quae est limitatio ad situm, qua ita finita est et certis limitibus contenta, ut necesse sit eam esse alicubi, nonnusquam nec ubique, sed ita hic, quod non ibi, vel quod etiam si non determinate hic vel ibi, tamen sub determinatione vel hic vel ibi vel alicubi, et pertinet ista limitatio ad praedicamentum ubi, quod omnis creatura differat a Deo per primam limitationem suam clare video. Quomodo autem necesse sit omnem creaturam differre et distare ab eo, per secundam limitationem, quia scilicet ipse est ubique, omnis autem creatura necessario est alicubi, sed non ubique, dico quod penitus ignoro. Haec Henricus ad litteram, ex quibus verbis satis clare habemus, non posse intelligere Henricum quomodo illud sit inconveniens, quod illi adducunt pro inconvenienti.” The first point in this quotation, concerning the angel being part of the whole, also contains traces of Henry’s discussion in *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 68, 44–55, where he explains Tempier’s intention in condemning proposition 204: “Aequalis enim error iudicabitur forte substantiam non esse in loco sine passione sicut sine operatione. Ita quod intentio episcopi sit substantiam esse in loco, etsi nihil operetur circa corpus existens in loco aut patiatur ab ipso. (Si tamen hoc sit possibile, scilicet quod nihil operetur. Aliquis enim forte diceret quod natura angeli, in quantum est pars universi, aliquid necessario operetur in eo circa aliquam partem universi cuius ipse etiam est pars. De quo nihil ad praesens, nec ad quaestionem, quia, etsi forte non posset esse quin angelus circa substantiam corpoream aliquid operetur, et per hoc est in loco, si tamen per impossibile ponatur quod non operetur aliquid circa corpus existens in loco, dicit articulus quod ‘error est dicere substantiam angeli non esse in loco’).” The second point, concerning the limitations of created beings like angels, refers to *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, pp. 68, 56–69, 60: “Non restat ergo nisi limitatio naturae angelicae, vel forte aliquid aliud, sed maxime ipsa limitatio, ut ex hoc quod limitata est natura angeli, oporteat quod ipse sit alicubi in universo corporali: non nusquam, nec ubique (sicut ubique est Deus propter suam illimitationem), sed alicubi, etsi non determinate hic solum vel ibi solum”; p. 70, 89–92: “Sed ex parte limitationis creaturae unum scio, videlicet quod in ea potest intelligi duplex limitatio. Una in natura sua et essentia, qua finita est et certis terminis contenta. Et sic solus Deus illimitatus est et infinitus in natura et essentia”; p. 71, 10–22: “Alia vero est limitatio creaturae, quae dicitur limitatio ad situm, qua ita finita est et certis limitibus contenta, ut necesse est eam esse alicubi, non nusquam nec ubique, sed ita hic, quod non ibi, ita quod, etsi non determinate hic vel ibi, tamen sub indeterminatione, ut hic vel ibi vel alibi, ut dictum est supra de situ puncti. Et pertinet ista limitatio ad praedicamentum ‘ubi’, et certum est eam esse per substantiam in qualibet creatura sub quantitate extensa vel sub ratione puncti intellecta. Quod omnis creatura distat et differt a Deo per primam limitationem suam, clare video. Quomodo vero necesse est omnem creaturam differe

While a point is something which belongs to quantity, and it has a physical place by its own nature, an incorporeal thing is completely abstracted from a physical place, and so, Pico contends, it is grave ignorance shown by the critic of his thesis to imagine that the indivisibility of an incorporeal and a corporeal thing is the same; thus, the young philosopher demands an explanation to the problem: assuming that there is a separated unity, does it have a determined place?⁶⁴ Once again we can compare Pico's discussion with the more nuanced discussion of Henry, who (following closely Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Posterior Analytics*) relates 'simplicity' to 'unity' and contrasts them to 'point', while emphasizing the fact that a point is related to a place not thorough its corporeal magnitude, but rather through its composition, which extends beyond the simplicity of unity.⁶⁵ Coming back to Pico's question, the Renaissance philosopher gives a negative answer: while a point is something having a position, a unity is not. Following Henry's path, with some differences, Pico immediately moves on to discuss angels and abstraction, and also the disciplines based on abstraction like metaphysics. A specific reference to Henry is given only after another mention of Pico's critic, who is described as someone who cannot imagine the abstraction of an angel, so at least, Pico says, let him hear Henry's discussion of the abstraction of unity.⁶⁶ It is important to notice that the sequence of Pico's argument

et distare ab eo per secundam limitationem quia ipse est ubique, omnis autem creatura necessario alicubi, sed non ubique, et an prima limitatio, in natura scilicet et essentia, sit causa et ratio istius secundae limitationis, vel quodcumque aliud illud sit, dico quod penitus ignoro."

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 132: "Punctus enim est res de genere quantitatis, habens situm de sua natura; res autem incorporea omnino abstrahit a situ et profecto magna est ruditas imaginari, similiter esse de indivisibilitate rei incorporeae, et de indivisibilitate puncti, quod ut etiam fiat clarius isti Magistro, dicat mihi ipse quaeso, si esset unitas separata, utrum haberet determinatum situm."

⁶⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 62, 9–16: "Unitas ergo in quantum unitas, ex ratione simplicitatis suae qua excedit punctum, si ipsa in aliquo est separata a ratione puncti, cum punctus non determinat sibi situm in corporali magnitudine nisi ratione suae compositionis, qua exceditur ab unitatis simplicitate, illud in quo ratio unitatis est separata a ratione puncti omnino, propter conditionem suae simplicitatis nullo modo sibi determinabit rationem situs, non solum huius vel illius, sed nullius omnino."

⁶⁶ Pico, *Apologia*, pp. 132–133: "Certe patet quod non, quando quidem per hoc distinguitur unitas a puncto, quod punctus est positionem habens, unitas autem non; sed manifestum est quod angelus et quaelibet substantia incorporea, adhuc est abstractior quam sit quaecunque quantitas sive continua sive discreta. Metaphysica enim, ut patet secundum omnes, est de abstractioribus quam sit arithmetica, quae est una ex mathematicis,

before the explicit reference is similar to Henry's, and that we also find an angel in Henry's discussion; on the other hand, the concept of simplicity which is again emphasized by Henry is missing from Pico's discussion.⁶⁷ On this point we can say that Henry seems more Platonic than Pico, who usually is associated with his friend, the great Neoplatonic contemporary thinker Marsilio Ficino.⁶⁸

Pico is citing a shortened version of Henry's argument,⁶⁹ from which he concludes that

It follows from these [citations] that according to Henry this magister is hardly suited towards the study of natural philosophy, even less towards the study of metaphysics, and worst towards the study of theology, which indeed involves abstractions. He is thus left with only an inclination towards mathematics, in which, although he has not engaged himself [in these mathematical disciplines], this is what he should do, he should have restricted himself so that he would pass judgment [only in these mathematical disciplines].⁷⁰

ergo multo minus poterit dici de angelo quod habeat situm, quod si iste Magister non potest imaginari abstractionem angeli, saltem qualis est abstractio unitatis, audiat quid de ipso sit dicendum secundum Henricum."

⁶⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, pp. 62, 17–63, 25: "Nunc autem sic est quod angelus in sua substantia et essentia simplicitatem habet, non ad modum puncti, sed potius ad modum unitatis, quia natura sua omnino abstracta est a natura magnitudinis, ita quod in sua natura nec est magnitudo, nec principium alicuius magnitudinis natus est esse. Quod ergo angelus secundum substantiam suam sit in situ vel in loco, ut ipsa substantia angeli sit ratio ipsum essendi in situ aut loco hoc vel illo determinate, vel etiam sive in hoc sive in illo indeterminate, ut tamen necesse sit ipsum ad modum puncti esse in aliquo, omnino adhuc est impossibile, ut dicit praedictus articulus."

⁶⁸ For the relations between Henry of Ghent and Platonism see Carlos Steel, "Henricus Gandavensis Platonicus," in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought. Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte*, ed. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel, (Leuven, 2003), pp. 15–39.

⁶⁹ Pico, *Apologia*, p. 133: "Qui ergo non possunt angelum intelligere secundum rationem substantiae suae, ut unitatem absque ratione puncti, sunt illi de quibus dicit Commentator super secundo Metaphysice, in quibus virtus imaginativa dominatur super virtutem cogitativam. Et ideo ut dicit, videmus istos non credere demonstrationibus, nisi imaginatio eos comitetur; et quicquid cogitant, quantum est aut situm habens, in quanto ut punctus, unde tales melancholici sunt, et optimi fiunt mathematici, sed sunt naturales inepti. Haec Henricus ad verbum." For the first half of this citation (until *comitetur*) see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet II*, q. 9, ed. R. Wielockx, p. 63, 37–39; for the second half see p. 64, 56–61. After *mathematici* we have in Henry: "sed pessimi metaphysici, quia non possunt intelligentiam suam extendere ultra situm et magnitudinem, in quibus fundantur mathematicalia, et metaphysicalia per se abstracta sunt secundum rem a situ et magnitudine, quia metaphysica abstractio excedit mathematicam. Et fiunt naturales inepti ..."

⁷⁰ Ibid.: "Ex quibus sequitur quod secundum Henricum iste Magister sit male dispositus ad studium philosophiae naturalis, peius ad studium metaphysicae, pessime ad

This is of course not exactly what we have in Henry's text. Henry does not mention theology at all in this context; but mentioning theology is most relevant to Pico's self-defense against the accusations of heresy and condemnation of 13 of his theses by a papal commission.

The next mention of Henry can be found at the beginning of the discussion concerning the adoration of the cross. Pico's condemned thesis, according to which neither Christ's cross nor any image should be worshipped with the adoration due to God, although it stands against Thomas' view, is supported by many authorities, including Henry.⁷¹ Henry discusses this matter in *Quodlibet* X, q. 6.⁷² What we have in this case is a good example of the rich scholastic tradition of which Thomas Aquinas is only one among many, whose opinions are often criticized by other thinkers.

Pico extensively cites and refers to Henry's *Quodlibet* XIII, q. 5 (entitled: *Utrum verbum Dei potuit assumere substantiam non intellectualem in unitate personae*) in his discussion concerning the question whether a non-rational nature can be assumed by God. Preferring a rational nature, Pico has been accused by the papal commission of injuring God's omnipotence.⁷³ Henry is the first authority mentioned and cited by Pico

studium theologiae, quae etiam est de abstractionibus; relinquitur ergo ei solum aptitudo ad mathematica, in quibus cum se non exercuerit, quod iudicium de eo faciendum sit, relinquatur ipsimet ut iudicet."

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 155: "Nec crux Christi, nec ulla imago adoranda est adoratione latrariae, etiam eo modo, quo non solum credo esse catholicam, sed etiam veriore sua opposita, quae est haec: crux Christi et imagines sunt adorandae, latraria, eo modo quo ponit Thomas; minus enim mihi videtur rationabilis in hoc opinio Thome quam sit opinio Durandi et Henrici de Gandavo, Ioannis de Guarra, Roberti Olchot, Petri Aquila et aliorum complurium quos ego sequor in conclusione." Henry is also mentioned further on in the same discussion on pp. 156–159. For some of the medieval sources in this discussion see Caroti, "Note sulle fonti medievali," pp. 81–83.

⁷² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* X, q. 6, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), pp. 132–145; see, e.g., p. 136, 23–27: "Unde si corpus sancti alicuius ad separationem animae maneret secundum formam corporalem idem in mortuo quod fuit in vivo per miraculum, sicut mansit in Christo, vel per naturam in omnibus hominibus secundum aliquos, non esset adorandum nisi ex habilitatione et ordine quem habet ad suam animam"; p. 138, 67–70: "Quia vero Deus secundum veritatem factus est homo, scripta ad memoriam et nostram doctrinam adoramus, non materiam, sed imaginatum, quemadmodum neque evangelii vel crucis materiam adoramus, sed figuratum."

⁷³ Pico, *Apologia*, p. 159: "Quarta conclusio damnata per istos est haec. Non assentior communi sententiae theologorum dicentium, posse Deum quamlibet naturam suppositare, sed de rationabili tantum hoc concedo. Per hanc conclusionem ego non intendo negare Deum posse quamlibet naturam suppositare; sed solum intendo negare assensum particularem, et explicitum huius assertionis. Deus potest quamlibet naturam suppositare, et inter has duas intentiones magna est differentia: quia etiam si hoc esset de

in support of his own thesis and for a very good reason: Henry holds here a more radical and extreme position than Pico, in denying the possibility of God to assume any kind of nature, including a non-rational one, and in insisting on obtaining a rational nature only. Pico, on the other hand, only rejects a particular and explicit assent of this statement, that God can assume any kind of nature.⁷⁴ By accusing him of heresy, Pico concludes, these members of the papal commission are turning Henry himself into a heretic, since, as shown through some long cited passages, in an older age Henry tended to accept the view that not just any nature is assumed by God.⁷⁵ One notices that Pico here is referring to a development in Henry's thought, and does not use him simply as an authority.

There is no doubt that Henry's cautious discussions of many difficult philosophical and theological issues, in many cases without determining a necessary true position,⁷⁶ was crucial for Pico's response to the accusations against him by a papal commission. In this respect, beyond Pico's *Apology*, art. I, q. 2 of Henry's *Summa* for instance, must be considered as an important source for late medieval, Renaissance, and Early Modern skepticism, where the two main ancient sources for the academic skepticism, Cicero's *Academica* and Augustine's *Contra Academicos* are widely cited and referred to.

possibilibus secundum potentiam absolutam Dei, propositio tamen de virtute sermonis solum negans assensum positivum, explicitum in particulari illius dicti, non derogat omnipotentiae Dei de virtute sermonis, nec de virtute sermonis haeresim aliquam sapit."

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 160: "... nego igitur assensum particularem et explicitum huius assertionis in me. Deus potest quamlibet naturam suppositare. Et negare possum rationabiliter, tum quia oppositum etiam si sit verum, quia tamen nobis ignotum esse potest in particulari, et explicite videtur quod non obligor explicite credere; tum maxime, quia non est facile falsificare aut convincere assertionem illam. Deus non potest etc. omnipotentiae Dei derogantem, quod maxime confirmatur autoritate solennis doctoris Henrici de Gandavo, qui postquam oppositae fuit opinionis, quod scilicet quaelibet natura possit assumi ad istam deinde declinavit, quod solum rationabilis potest assumi; sic enim scribit Henricus ..." At this point we have a very long citation of Henry, on pp. 160–163, taken from *Quodlibet XIII*, q. 5, ed. J. Decorte, pp. 27–34. Pico does not cite the whole of Henry's discussion but rather chooses the relevant passages for his argument.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 166: "... debent meminisse quod ex eorum dictis sequitur quod Henricus ille, qui per excellentiam doctrinae solennis doctor vocatur, mortuus sit haereticus, qui ut supra visum est, in senectute sua ad istam opinionem declinavit, et in ipsa permansit, quod non quaelibet natura a Deo sit suppositabilis."

⁷⁶ Here are Henry's last remarks of the solution to the same *Quodlibet XIII*, q. 5, ed. J. Decorte, p. 34, 98–2: "Propterea haec alia positio a praedicta, licet minus sollemnis, quae, cum magis applicabilis est animo, licet non videatur ita vera propter consuetudinem, tamen forte verior est, quod scilicet nulla natura susceptibilis est a Deo dicto modo per circumincessionem nisi natura intellectualis, magis mihi placet."

Pico's theses dedicated to Henry and his references to, and citations from, Henry in his *Apology* can give us a glimpse of what might have been regarded as central, important, and unique in Henry's thought in the late fifteenth century, although Pico is by no means a typical representative of either the scholastic (though he did studied in Padua and Paris) or the humanist discourses.

With regard to some guiding principle or connection (*concatenatio*) between these theses, it is simply impossible to identify any such principle.

What might be a further conclusion of this study? We can only say that many more detailed discussions of the reception and influence of Henry in the Renaissance are required. To give only one example, we can mention the sixteenth-century Augustinian Hermit Ambrogio Flandini and his *Commentarium in Parmenidem* (Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana, Riccardianus 133), where one can find many important references to Henry's works.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ I would like to thank Prof. Carlos Steel for introducing me to Flandini and his important commentary.

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